1. This appeal is directed against the judgment and order dated 28.2.2011 passed by the learned Addl. District & Sessions Judge, Aizawl in Arbitration Case No. 2 of 2007 as well as the Arbitral Award dated 24.11.2006 passed by the sole arbitrator in Arbitration Dispute Pertaining to CA No. CE(P) Psk-33 of 1993-94. 2. Heard Mr. Vanlalnghaka, learned CGC appearing for the appellant as well as Mr. M. Zothankhuma, learned senior counsel assisted by Mr. Lalfakawma, learned counsel appearing for the respondent. 3. Mr. Vanlalnghaka, learned CGC submits that the Arbitration Case No. 2 of 2007 was dismissed on the ground that the application was devoid of any merit under section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 and failure to deposit 75% of the award as required under the Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises Development Act, 2006. He submits that the arbitration award was beyond the scope of the letter of reference dated 29.6.2004 as t lie sole arbitrator has considered the matter involving other claims as can be detected from the arbitral award dated 24.11.2006. The said award is not based on any available evidence. He also submits that the learned Addl. District & Sessions Judge, Aizawl had dismissed the application of the appellant without going into details of the case. The learned court had misread the provisions of law and facts. It is the submission of the learned CGC that the learned arbitrator framed as many as 14 issues for determination and had come to the conclusion without giving any reasons and had proceeded to hear the claims. This would indicate that the learned sole arbitrator had passed the impugned award on the basis of pre-determined conclusions and had, therefore, acted in a very bias manner. The learned Addl. District judge had also failed to appreciate this fact and had seriously erred in law and, therefore, the arbitral award dated 24.11.2006 as well as the judgment and order dated 28.2.2011 is liable to set aside and quashed. The learned Addl. District judge had also failed to appreciate this fact and had seriously erred in law and, therefore, the arbitral award dated 24.11.2006 as well as the judgment and order dated 28.2.2011 is liable to set aside and quashed. The learned court while passing the judgment and order dated 28.2.2011 has taken a one sided and bias view of the matter and has not taken into consideration that the reasons for delayed completion of abutment was exclusively attributable to the respondent inasmuch as the respondent has submitted faulty designs and drawings which had led the appellant to request the respondent for rectification and during which process considerable length of time was consumed. The abutments were to be completed with the bearings which was supposed to be supplied by the respondent. The bearings could not be supplied by the respondent on time and this had lead to delay in completion of the abutments and, therefore, the appellant cannot be faulted for the same. Further, as per the respondent’s time and progress chart, the work was to be completed on 24.4.1995. The flood came only on 17.5.1995. This would show that had the respondent provided the necessary requirements on time, the work would have been completed much before the flood had come, i.e., 17.5.1995. Therefore, the whole responsibility of not completing the work fails squarely due to the inefficiency and callousness on the part of the respondent and, therefore, it was not correct to hold that time is of no more essence of the contract and the appellant was held to be the defaulter. He also submits that the learned Addl. District Judge had discussed the issue as to whether the damaged should fall under the accepted risk but had failed to come to a decision on the same. While admitting that the incomplete bridge (73.12% completed) was washed away by the flood, however, such an event could have been avoided if the bridge was standing on its own legs after being completed on time. While the bridge was washed away there was only erection of super structure and deck casting was still to be commenced. Under the circumstances, the bridge was easily washed away by the flood. The incompletion of the work beyond the scheduled time was due to the fault of the respondent and, therefore, the same does not fall under the purview of accepted risk. 4. Under the circumstances, the bridge was easily washed away by the flood. The incompletion of the work beyond the scheduled time was due to the fault of the respondent and, therefore, the same does not fall under the purview of accepted risk. 4. Learned CGC also submits that the learned arbitrator had passed the award in gross violation and in excess of the terms of the contract agreement and also beyond the terms of reference which was beyond its jurisdiction. The learned arbitrator had accepted almost each and every contention of the respondent without any cogent reasons for accepting such claims whereas the claims of the applicant were rejected. While considering the application, the learned District Judge had also failed to consider the gross irregularity committed by the sole arbitrator. He further submits that the learned arbitrator has erred by awarding Rs. 1 lakh under the head of claim for unwarranted/in fructuous expenditure whereas no such terms existed in the contract as well as in the reference. The same was a complete deviation from the jurisdiction of the learned arbitrator. The learned arbitrator has also failed to apply the substantial law of contract and other relevant laws in force in the country as well as the special laws applicable in Mizoram. The award was made in a very haphazard and illegal manner without proper discussion of the facts of the case and proper application of the principles of law. The learned arbitrator had unduly favoured the respondents by making the award by blindly accepting the claims of the respondents under different heads and nomenclatures without verifying such claims. There was wrong application on the principles of Interest Delayed Payment inasmuch as the said Act was not in existence at the time of passing the impugned order and the learned Addl. District Judge had also erred by wrongly interpreting the provisions of Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises Development Act, 2006. Under the said facts and circumstances, he submits that the arbitral award dated 24.11.2006 as well as the judgment and order dated 28.2.2011 be set aside and quashed. District Judge had also erred by wrongly interpreting the provisions of Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises Development Act, 2006. Under the said facts and circumstances, he submits that the arbitral award dated 24.11.2006 as well as the judgment and order dated 28.2.2011 be set aside and quashed. In support of his contentions, the learned CGC has relied on the following authorities: (a) State of Jammu and Kashmir v. Dev Dutt Pandit, (1999) 7 SCC 339 ; (b) Dandasi Sahu v. State of Orissa, (1990) 1 SCC 214 ; (c) V.G. George v. Indian rare Earths Ltd., (1999) 3 SCC 762 ; (d) Associated Engineering Company v. Government of A.P., (1991) 4 SCC 93 and (e) State of U.P. v. Combined Chemicals Co. (P.) Ltd., (2011) 2 SCC 151 . 5. Mr. M. Zothankhuma, the learned senior counsel appearing for the respondent, countering the allegations made by the appellant, submits that the respondent, i.e., M/s. Hindustan Metal Refining Works (P.) Ltd. is a small scale industry. The respondents were the petitioners before the arbitrator who had raised the dispute between the appellants and the respondents in respect of payment of the money due and payable in respect of the contract agreement CA 33 entered between the appellant and the respondent for construction of a 68 Mtr Span Bridge. After hearing the parties the award dated 24.11.2006 was passed. However, there were some arithmetical mistake and, therefore, on request of the respondent, the said mistake was corrected and the arbitrator held that the sum of Rs. 10089262.00 as on 25.11.2006 was payable to the petitioners/respondents herein with interest as prescribed in the Interest on Delayed Payments to Small Scale And Ancillary Industrial Undertaking Act, 1993. Being aggrieved by the award as well as the findings and conclusions therein, the appellants had preferred Arbitration Case No. 2 of 2007 before the court of learned Addl. District & Sessions Judge, Aizawl challenging the award dated 24.11.2006. The Addl. District Judge, after hearing the parties on merit, had dismissed the application by judgment and order dated 28.2.2011 as well as due to the fact that the appellants had not deposited 75% of the decreed amount as was mandatory under section 19 of the Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises Act, 2006. The Addl. District Judge, after hearing the parties on merit, had dismissed the application by judgment and order dated 28.2.2011 as well as due to the fact that the appellants had not deposited 75% of the decreed amount as was mandatory under section 19 of the Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises Act, 2006. He also submits that the present appeal was admitted on 30.9.2011 with the condition to deposit 75% of the decreetal amount within a period of two months. He submits that the respondent is a small scale industry and, therefore, the interest on delayed payments to Small Scale and Ancillary Industrial Undertakings Act, 1993 (32 of 1993) is applicable to the respondent. The said Act was repealed and replaced by MSED Act. The said Acts are for protection of suppliers whether they are small scale industries or the ancillary suppliers to the manufactures and, therefore, stringent provisions have been incorporated but the appellant has still not paid the amount payable to the respondent due to which fact the respondents were paying compounded interests on loans taken by it from the Central Bank of India @ 19.5%. 6. Learned senior counsel appearing for the respondent submits that clause 8 of the NIT states that the tenderers were requested to furnish four copies of drawings and detailed specifications of the proposed structure. The respondent had six months to complete the entire work as per Schedule ‘A’ of the NIT and nine months as per clause 4 of the NIT. The work order was issued for the contract on 12.5.1994 and, therefore, as per clause 5 and Schedule ‘A’ of the NIT the contract was to be completed by 11.11.1994. However, the abutments upon which the 60.69 meters span Steel Structure was to be rested above was completed by the appellant only on 28.2.1995 and, therefore, there was no question of completing the contract by 11.11.1994. The respondents had also written a letter dated 24.11.1994 to the appellant along with four sets of GA drawings and four sets of designed calculation sheets for approval. By another letter dated 9.6.1994, the respondent had written to the appellant for submitting six copies of the work order No. 1 dated 12.5.1994 being duly accepted and signed and as desired by the appellant. By another letter dated 9.6.1994, the respondent had written to the appellant for submitting six copies of the work order No. 1 dated 12.5.1994 being duly accepted and signed and as desired by the appellant. By the said letter, it was communicated that deputing their accredited representative along with power of attorney to finalize time and progress chart in terms of the CA would be arranged on receipt of the approved design drawings from the appellant and also further requested for expediting the approved design drawing at an early date. By a letter dated 15.7.1994, the appellant had written to the respondent seeking clarification on the drawings and, therefore, by another letter dated 28.8.1994, the respondents had written to the appellant enclosing four sets of GA drawings and four sets of design calculation sheets after revision and thereafter, the appellant had requested the respondent to send their design engineer for design clarification by teletext dated 1.10.1994. By a letter dated 7.10.1994, the appellant had written to the respondents approving the drawing by incorporation the changes. Accordingly, the respondents requested for extension of time till 30.4.1995 by a letter dated 22.11.1994 but no reply was received from the appellant giving them extension of time. The appellant by a letter dated 16.11.1994 had also approved the bridge bearing drawings. Thereafter, the respondents had submitted their first RAR Bill amounting to Rs. 30.42 lakhs. However, the appellant had paid only Rs. 22 lakhs against the said RAR Bill of Rs. 30.42 lakhs. As the site was handed over to the respondents on 22.8.1995, the respondents could start placing the bridge super structure upon the abutments only from March 1995. He also submits that though the respondents had submitted their time and progress chart on 22.11.1994, the same had no relevancy inasmuch as the same could not be applied till the site was handed over to the respondents and which was done only on 28.2.1995, i.e., after the abutments had been made by the appellant. The respondents had started their works in March 1995 and had completed about 73.12% of the entire contract work but due to the unprecedented flood which occurred on 17.5.1995 the partially erected bridge between the two abutments was washed away as the floating logs and flood water hit against the partially erected bridge. Out of the 32 bays, 2 derricks and 23 bays were washed away. Out of the 32 bays, 2 derricks and 23 bays were washed away. After the bridge was washed away, the respondents were again directed by the appellant to retrieve the washed away bridge parts. Under such direction, the respondent retrieved whatever bridge parts were retrievable and thereafter submitted a second RAR Bill amounting to Rs. 7,94,920. The respondents made a bill for retrieval works of Rs. 40,85,250 thereby taking the total amount to Rs. 48,80,170. 7. The learned senior counsel for the respondent further submits that the appellant had repeatedly assured the respondents that they would be compensated as per the accepted risk clause as the damage to the bridge was due to unprecedented flood. However, the respondents were later told by the appellants that the damage to the bridge coming under the accepted risk clause would depend upon the decision made by the higher authorities. He also submits that under the General Conditions of Contract, under accepted risk and clause 48 of the General Conditions of Contract it is clear that when orders for retrieval of damaged bridge are made by the Engineer-in-charge, the contract comes under the accepted risk definition. In the present case, the bridge was destroyed by unprecedented floods and that orders were issued by the appellant to the respondent to retrieve the bridge parts which is not in dispute. The respondents had repeatedly requested the appellants for release of the second RAR Bill, cost of retrieval works under the accepted risk clause and for release of the security deposit to Rs. 76,100 and the reserved amount of Rs. 3,04,200 which was illegally deducted from the 1st RAR Bill, Further submission is made by the learned senior counsel that the appellant had entertained the second RAR Bill of the respondents for only Rs. 910 and the respondents were assured by the appellant to release the security deposit and the reserved amount if bank guarantee were submitted for the said two amounts. The respondents, therefore, made two bank guarantees which were submitted to the appellant with the understanding that the security deposit and the reserved amount would be released to him. However, the same was not done by the appellants and the respondents were further informed by the appellant that the washing away of the bridge was not accepted under the accepted risk clause by a letter dated 5.11.1998. However, the same was not done by the appellants and the respondents were further informed by the appellant that the washing away of the bridge was not accepted under the accepted risk clause by a letter dated 5.11.1998. The said two bank guarantees were also engaged in cash by the appellant without returning the security deposit and the reserved amount to the respondents even though the arbitral award states that the amount was to be returned. As the letter dated 5.11.1998 written by the appellants had informed the respondents that all claims under the accepted risk clause was rejected, therefore, the respondents having no other option, had to stop work. The appellant a thereafter, issued a show-cause notice dated 16.4.2003 to the respondent to show-cause as to why the contract should not be cancelled and clause 54 of the Conditions of Contract should not be invoked. The respondents replied to the show-cause notice by letter dated 10.7.2003. Thereafter, the contract was cancelled by letter dated 5.11.2004. Consequently, on the request of the respondents, an arbitrator was appointed by the appellant and the arbitration proceeded. By the said arbitral award dated 24.11.2006, the arbitrator held that the respondent is a unit under the Small Scale Industries and that the department could complete the abutments by 28.2.1995 upon which the Bridge Super Structure was to be made by the contractor. The arbitrator also concluded that the collapse of the partially-held-bridge on 17.5.1995 was primarily due to flood and that granting no extension beyond 11.11.1994 was an incorrect decision as the abutments upon which the bridge super structure was to be made was completed and handed over to the respondents only on 28.2.1995. Therefore, the arbitrator awarded payments to be made in favour of the respondents along with interest as per the provisions of the interest of delayed payments to Small Scale and Ancillary Industrial Undertaking Act, 1993. He, therefore, submits that there was not fault on the part of the respondents as the Super Structure could be built by him only from March, 1995 and the damage to the bridge and the retrieval of the bridge parts came under the clause of accepted risk. Finally, the learned senior counsel submits that the grounds taken by the appellant in the present appeal does not come within the grounds for setting aside the arbitral award. Finally, the learned senior counsel submits that the grounds taken by the appellant in the present appeal does not come within the grounds for setting aside the arbitral award. The appellant has failed to prove that section 34 of the Arbitration Act, 1996 has been violated by the arbitrator and more importantly, the appellant has also not deposited 75% of the arbitral amount awarded along with interest and the present case being squarely covered within the clause of accepted risk, the present appeal should be dismissed and the arbitral award be upheld. The learned senior counsel also places his reliance in the cases of: (a) Snehadeep Structures (P.) Ltd. v. Maharashtra Small-Scale Industries Development Corporation Ltd., (2010) 3 SCC 34 ; (b) Judgment of the Division Bench of the Madras High Court passed in Goodyear India Ltd. v. Norton Intech Rubbers (P.) Ltd.; (c) Judgment of the Division Bench of this court passed in RFA No. 15 of 2011 in the case of Union of India r/b the C.E., Project Pushpak v. M/s. Hindustan Metal Refining Works (P.) Ltd.; (d) G. Ramachandra Reddy and Company v. Union of India and Another, (2009) 6 SCC 414 ; (e) Satna Stone and Lime Company Limited, Madhya Pradesh and Others v. Union of India and Another, (2008) 14 SCC 785 ; (f) Bijendra Nath Srivastava (Dead) Through LRS. v. Mayank Srivastava and Others, (1994) 6 SCC 117 and (g) Union of India v. B.K. Construction (M/s.), 2003 (3) GIT 712. 8. I have heard the submissions made by the learned counsel appearing for the rival parties. 9. Section 7 of the Interest of Delayed Payments to Small Scale and Ancillary Industrial Undertakings Act, 1993 (‘the Interest Act of 1993’) reads as under: “7. Appeal - No appeal against any decree, award or other order shall be entertained by any court or other authority unless the appellant (not being a supplier) has deposited with it seventy - five per cent of the amount in terms of the decree, award or, as the case may be, other order in the manner directed by such court or, as the case may be, such authority.” 10. Section 19 of the Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises Development Act, 2006 reads as under: “19. Section 19 of the Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises Development Act, 2006 reads as under: “19. Application for setting aside decree, award or order.- No application for setting aside any decree, award or other order made either by the Council itself or by any institution or centre providing alternate dispute resolution services to which a reference is made by the Council, shall be entertained by any court unless the appellant (not being a supplier) has deposited with it seventy-five per cent. Of the amount in terms of the decree, award or, as the case may be, the other order in the manner directed by such court: Provided that pending disposal of the application to set aside the decree, award or order, the court shall order that such percentage of the amount deposited shall be paid to the supplier, as it considers reasonable under the circumstances of the case, subject to such conditions as it deems necessary to impose.” 11. Clause 8 of the NIT reads as under: “8. You are requested to furnish four copies of such drawings and detailed specifications as would give a clear idea of the structure proposed by you along with your tender. Please also refer to Sri Page No. 111 and 113 para 5.8 regarding approval finalisation of design and working drawings, after acceptance of tender.” 12. Clause 5 of the Schedule ‘A’ of the NIT also reads as under: “5. The period of completion stipulated in column 7 of schedule “A” shall be reckoned from the date of handing over site of the bridge as indicated in the work order.” 13. Relevant portion of the minutes of the meeting held at HQ.CE(P) a Pushpak on 4.11.1996 at 2(iv) is also reproduced herein below :- “2(iv) DESIGN AND CONSTRUCTION OF BUG BRIDGE OF 60.96 MTR SPAN AT KM 38.75 L-D-P ROAD It was decided/that maximum parts which are lying/buried in the river bed and are not beyond economic retrieval shall be retrieved. For this purpose recovery and gas cutting equipment will be provided by the department. Commander 23 TF was asked to send draft amendment letter for incorporating in the CA as per procedure. For this purpose recovery and gas cutting equipment will be provided by the department. Commander 23 TF was asked to send draft amendment letter for incorporating in the CA as per procedure. After retrieval of balance parts a technical board of officers would be detailed by the CE to assess the serviceability of retrieved items which can be re-used and also the items c which are not reusable and there by total loss would be established. Contractor was also advised to hire and make use of the mechanical winch available with M/s. Gammon India Ltd.” 14. The relevant portion of the minutes of the meeting at HQ CE (P) Pushpak on 17.3.1998 at para 3(iii) is also reproduced herein below: “3. (iii) DESIGN AND CONSTRUCTION OF BUG BRIDGE ON RIVER MENGPUILUIAT KM 38 ON LDP ROAD UNDER 23 BRTF SECTOR It has been intimated by rep of firm that approximately 47 MT of BUG br components could not be retrieved from the site. The items recovered have been identified for serviceability and sorted. The missing components will have to be fabricated at MHR Works (P) Ltd, Calcutta and will be sent to site. The contractor rep said that the fabrication works will be taken up by June 1998. The erection work will start after Durga Puja in the month of October 1998. The erection work will be completed within. 02 months by end of November 1998. The GM. Shri Dastidar confirmed that the bridge decking will be completed by 31st January, 1998. Further, it was suggested by him that some of the steel components fabricated for central span of Karnaphully bridge could be diverted to this work, if need be, in order to speed up. During discussion Shri Dastidar has requested to expedite the payment on account accepted risk at any early date so the purchase of steel components for fabrication can be expedited. It was reiterated by him that as considerable expenditure has been incurred in retrieval work, priority may kindly be given for accepted risk compensation. It was explained that since the matter needs clarification/advice of higher authority, the issue cannot be finalised immediately. Whereas the department shall endeavour to expedite decision on the case, the contractor must arrange for finance for the work.” 15. It was explained that since the matter needs clarification/advice of higher authority, the issue cannot be finalised immediately. Whereas the department shall endeavour to expedite decision on the case, the contractor must arrange for finance for the work.” 15. Under the General Conditions of Contract, “accepted risk” is defined as under: “l.(p) “Accepted Risks” means the risks on the Site accepted by the Accepting Officer or the C.W.E. in case of Contracts accepted by G.Es., of riots (otherwise than among Contractor’s employees), war, invasion, act of foreign enemies, hostilities, civil war, rebellion, revolution, insurrection, military or usurped power, damage from air craft and acts of God such as earthquake, lightening, unprecedented floods and tornado.” Clause 48 of the General Conditions of Contract under Damage and Loss states as under: “48. Damage and Loss. - (a) All plant, temporary building, equipment, and things on the Site provided by or on behalf of the Contractor for the construction of, but not for incorporation in the Works shall stand at the risk and be in the sole charge of the Contractor arid the Contractor shall be responsible for, and with all possible speed make good, any loss or damage thereto arising from any cause whatsoever, including the accepted risk. (b) Save as above, the Works and all materials and things whatsoever including such as may have been provided by Government on the Site in connection with and for the purpose of the Contract shall stand at the risk and be in the sole charge of the Contractor and the Contractor shall be responsible for, and with all possible speed make good, any loss or damage thereto arising from any cause whatsoever, other than the accepted risks and shall deliver up all the Works to the Engineer-in-charge in a clean state, complete in every particular. In the event of any loss or damage to Works and materials on the Site from any of the accepted risks, or loss or damage from accepted risk and fire to Government buildings handed over to contractor for execution of works referred to in Condition 47, the following provisions shall have effect: (i) the Contractor shall, as may be directed in writing by the Engineer-in-charge, remove from the Site any debris and so much of the Works as shall have been damaged, taking to the G.E.’s store such articles and/or materials as my be directed; (ii) the Contractor shall, as may be directed in writing by the Engineer-in-charge, proceed with the erection and completion of the Works under and in accordance with the provisions and conditions of the Contract; and (iii) there shall be added to the Contract Sum the net amount due, ascertained in the same manner as for deviations, or as prescribed for payment, in respect of the re-execution of the Works lost or damaged, the replacement of any materials and things lost or damaged but not incorporated in the Works at the date when the loss or damage occurred, and the removal by the Contractor as provided above the debris and damaged Work referred to therein: Provided always that the Contractor shall not be entitled to payment under this Condition in respect of so much loss or damage as has been occasioned by any failure on his part to perform his obligations under the Contract. (c) Save as provided above, the Contractor shall at his own expense reinstate and make good to the satisfaction of the G.E. or make compensation for any injury, loss or damage occasioned to any property or right whatever including property and rights of Government (or agents, servants, or employees of Government) being injury, loss or damage arising out of or in any way in connection with the execution or purported execution of the Contract and further, the Contractor shall indemnify Government against all claims enforceable against Government (or any agent, servant or employee of Government) or which would be so enforceable against Government were Government, a private person, in respect of such injury (including injury resulting in death), loss or damage to any person whomsoever or property, including all claims which may arise under the Workmen’s Compensation Act or otherwise.” 16. Under the Arbitration Act of 1996, section 34 provides as under: “34. Application for setting aside arbitral Award. - (1) Recourse to a Court against an arbitral Award may be made only by an application for setting aside such Award in accordance with sub-section (2) and sub-section (3). (2) An arbitral Award may be set aside by the court only if – (a) the party making the application furnishes proof that -(i) a party was under some incapacity, or (ii) the arbitration agreement is not valid under the law to which the parties have subjected it or, failing any indication thereon, under the law for the time being in force; or (iii) the party making the application was not given proper notice on the appointment of an arbitrator or of the arbitral proceedings or was otherwise unable to present his case; or (iv) the arbitral Award deals with a dispute not contemplated by or not falling within the terms of the submission to arbitration, or it contains decision on matter beyond the scope of the submission to arbitration: Provided that, if the decision on matters submitted to arbitration can be separated from those not so submitted, only that part of the arbitral Award which contains decision on matters not submitted or arbitration may be set aside; or (v) the composition of the arbitral tribunal or the arbitral procedure was not in accordance with the agreement of the parties, unless such agreement was in conflict with a provision of this Part from which the parties cannot derogate, or, failing such agreement, was not in accordance with this Part; or (b) the court finds that - (i) the subject-matter of the dispute is not capable of settlement by arbitration under the law for the time being in force, or (ii) the arbitral Award is in conflict with the public policy of India. Explanation - Without prejudice to the generality of sub-clause (ii) it is hereby declared, for the avoidance of any doubt, that an Award is in conflict with the public policy of India if the making of the Award was induced or affected by fraud or corruption or was in violation of section 75 or section 81. Explanation - Without prejudice to the generality of sub-clause (ii) it is hereby declared, for the avoidance of any doubt, that an Award is in conflict with the public policy of India if the making of the Award was induced or affected by fraud or corruption or was in violation of section 75 or section 81. (3) An application for setting aside may not be made after three months have elapsed from die date on which the party making that application had received the arbitral Award or, if a request had been made under section 33, from the date on which that request had been disposed of by the arbitral tribunal: Provided that if the court is satisfied that the applicant was prevented by sufficient cause from making the applicant within the said period of three months it may entertain the application within a further period of thirty days, but not thereafter. (4) On receipt of an application under sub-section (1), the court may, where it is appropriate and it is so requested by a party, adjourn the proceedings for a period of time determined by it in order to give the arbitral tribunal an opportunity to resume the arbitral proceedings or to take such other action as in the opinion of arbitral will eliminate the grounds for setting aside the tribunal Award.” 17. From a consideration of the materials available on record, it is seen that the contract agreement was entered on 24.3.1994 and thereafter the work order dated 12.5.1994 was issued. The entire work was to be completed by 11.11.1994. The respondents submitted 4 sets of G.A. Drawings and 4 sets of Design Calculation Sheets for approval by letter dated 24.4.1994 which was again revised and re-submitted on 15.7.1994. The appellants thereafter gave its approval on 7.10.1994. It is also noticed that the respondents had submitted the Time and Progress on 22.11.1994 wherein the site works accounted for 110 days. The appellants had handed over the site to the respondents to put the steel structure only on 28.2.1995. This is not under dispute by both the parties. 18. This court is of the opinion that when the site for laying the steel structure was handed over to the respondents only on 22.8.1995, there was, therefore, absolutely no question of completing the contract by 11.11.1994. This is not under dispute by both the parties. 18. This court is of the opinion that when the site for laying the steel structure was handed over to the respondents only on 22.8.1995, there was, therefore, absolutely no question of completing the contract by 11.11.1994. It is also the considered opinion of this court that as the site for laying the steel structure was handed over to the respondents only on 28.2.1994, the work-plan for 110 days should be computed only w.e.f. 28.2.1995 as envisaged in the contract agreement. 19. The respondents had also carried out the works for retrieving the washed away portions of the bridge material which was communicated to the Chief Engineer, Project Pushpak by letter dated 26.6.1997 and thereafter had submitted its second RAR Bill amounting to Rs. 48,80,170 Apart from that, the appellants had been assuring the respondents for compensation as per the accepted risk clause which was later denied by the appellants. Considering the accepted risk clause, this court is also of the opinion that as directions for retrieving the washed away portions of the bridge parts were given by the appellants to the respondents, the appellants are, therefore, duty bound to make payment as per the second RAR Bill submitted by the respondents after completing the exercise for retrieving such washed away portions of the bridge parts. 20. This court has also considered the arbitral award dated 24.11.2006 passed by the sole arbitrator. On consideration of the same, this court does not find any infirmity in the said award nor does it find any reasons to accept the grounds taken by the appellants against the said arbitral award. Further, this court also does not find any merit in the challenge made to the judgment and order dated 28.2.2011 passed by the learned Addl. District & Sessions Judge, Aizawl. This court also finds that the authorities relied upon by the learned CGC also is not applicable to the case in hand. 21. The hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Snehadeep (supra) has held as under: “38. “The preamble of the Interest Act shows that the very objective of the Act was “to provide for and regulate the payment of interest on delayed payments to small-scale and ancillary industrial undertakings and for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto”. 21. The hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Snehadeep (supra) has held as under: “38. “The preamble of the Interest Act shows that the very objective of the Act was “to provide for and regulate the payment of interest on delayed payments to small-scale and ancillary industrial undertakings and for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto”. Thus, as far as interest on delayed payment to small-scale industries as well as connected matters are concerned, the Act is a special legislation with respect to any other legislation, including f the Arbitration Act.” “47. The requirement of pre-deposit of interest is introduced as a distinctive to prevent dilatory tactics employed by the buyers against whom the small scale industry might have procured and award, just as in case of a decree or order. Presumably/the legislative intent behind section was to target buyer, who, only with the end of pushing off the ultimate event of payment to the small-scale industry undertaking, institute challenges against the award/ decree/order passed against them. Such buyers cannot be allowed to challenge arbitral awards indiscriminately, especially when the section requires pre-deposit of 75% interest even when appeal is preferred against an award, as distinguished from an order or decree.” 22. The Division Bench of this court in RFA No. 15 of 2011 has also held as under: “In the case of Snehadeep (supra) the hon’ble Supreme Court has held that an appeal against an arbitral award would also attract section 7 of the Interest on Delayed Payments to Small Scale and Ancillary Industrial Undertakings Act, 1993. The said Act has been replaced with 2006 Act. After going through the provisions of both the laws, we are of the opinion that deposit of 75% decreetal amount is precondition. Hence, the admission of this appeal is subject to the deposit of the said money within a period of two months from today. The deposit shall be made in the form of bank draft in the name of the respondent.” 23. The Supreme Court in the case of G. Ramachandra Reddy (supra) has held at para 19 as under: “19. We may, at the outset, notice the legal principles governing the dispute between the parties. Interpretation of a contract may fall within the realm of the arbitrator. The court while dealing with an award would not re-appreciate the evidence. The Supreme Court in the case of G. Ramachandra Reddy (supra) has held at para 19 as under: “19. We may, at the outset, notice the legal principles governing the dispute between the parties. Interpretation of a contract may fall within the realm of the arbitrator. The court while dealing with an award would not re-appreciate the evidence. An award containing reasons also may not be interfered with unless they are found to be perverse or based on a wrong proposition of law. If two views are possible, it is trite, the court will refrain itself from interfering (see State of U.P. v. Allied Constructions.)” 24. Lastly, this court in the case of B.K. Construction (supra) at para 18 has held as under: “11. In support of his submission Mr. Baruah, has relied on two decisions of the Apex Court, namely, (1) Rama Chandra Reddy & Co. v. State of Andhra Pradesh and Ors., (2001) 4 SCC 241 , and (2) Indu Engineering and Textiles Ltd. v. Delhi Development Authority, (2001) 5 SCC 691 . In Rama Chandra Reddy’s case (supra) the Apex Court in paragraphs 5 and 7 held that the court has the power for remitting an award if there is error of law apparent on the face of the award itself. That remission of the awards is a discretion of the court and the power of the court are circumscribed by the provision of section 16 of the Arbitration Act, 1940, (‘the Old Act’). A court may be justified in remitting an award if the same is erroneous on the face of it. The court held that an error of law on the face of the award would mean that one can find in the award or a document actually incorporated thereto stating the reasons for a judgment some legal proposition which are basis of the award and which can be said to be erroneous. It was ruled therein that an arbitrator being a creature of the agreement, unless the agreement either specifically or inferentially provides for a higher rate to be awarded for any additional or excess work done by the contractor, it would not be permissible for the arbitrator to award for the so-called additional work at a higher rate. It was ruled therein that an arbitrator being a creature of the agreement, unless the agreement either specifically or inferentially provides for a higher rate to be awarded for any additional or excess work done by the contractor, it would not be permissible for the arbitrator to award for the so-called additional work at a higher rate. In Indu Engineering’s case (supra), the Apex Court held that the plausible view taken by the arbitrator shall not be interfered with unless the view of arbitrator is vitiated by a manifest error on the face of the award or is wholly improbable or perverse. In view of the law laid down by the Supreme Court as cited above, Mr. Baruah has urged that impugned award has been vitiated by manifest error of law on the face of it and, hence, the impugned order and the arbitral award are liable to be set aside.” 25. The pleadings made in the present appeal as well as the other materials available on record has been considered. Further, on a consideration of the relevant laws in force as well as the ratio laid down by the hon’ble Supreme Court as well as by this court, this court does not find any infirmity in the arbitral award dated 24.11.2006 as well as in the judgment and order dated 28.2.2011 passed by the learned Addl. District & Sessions Judge, Aizawl. In view of the above, this court does not find any merit in the present appeal and the same is accordingly dismissed. The arbitral award dated 24.11.2006 passed by the sole arbitrator is accordingly upheld. 26. From the records of the present appeal, it is seen that the appellant had deposited an amount of Rs. 17,07,602 only being the 75% of the awarded amount of Rs. 22,76,802 before the Registry of this court as directed by this court on 27.9.2011. As the appeal has been dismissed, the said amount of Rs. 17,07,602 shall be released to the respondent along with interest, if any accrued, after proper identification and verification. This court has also noticed that deposit of 75%, i.e., Rs. 17,07,602 is without interest and, therefore, the appellant shall pay the awarded amount minus the amount already deposited, however, with interest on the whole amount awarded by the arbitrator.