Judgment This is a second appeal filed by the defendant no. 2 under Section 100 of the Code of Civil procedure Code against the judgment and decree dated 2.9.2013 passed by Civil Judge, Kamrup in Money Appeal No.01 of 2008 which in turn arise out of judgment/decree dated 2.5.2008 passed by Munsiff No.1, Kamrup in Money Suit No.519 of 2008. By impugned judgment/decree the first appellate court dismissed the first appeal filed by the defendant no. 2 and in consequence upheld the judgment/decree passed by the civil judge which had decreed the plaintiff’s money suit for recovery of Rs. 1,89,296/-. So the short question, which arises for consideration in this second appeal, is whether it involves any substantial question of law within the meaning of Section 100 ibid? Heard Mr. P Upadhyay, learned counsel for the appellant and Mr. J Deka, learned counsel for the respondent. Having heard the learned Counsel for the appellant (defendant no. 2) and on perusal of the record of the case, I am of the considered opinion that this second appeal does not involve any substantial question of law as required to be made out within the meaning of Section 100 ibid. Here is a case where plaintiff is the financial institution whereas the original defendant nos. 1 and 2 are son and father respectively. The son (defendant no.1) took a loan from the plaintiff – financial corporation for running the factory and installed certain machinery in the said factory on the strength of hire purchase agreement. The defendant no. 2 – father stood as guarantor for his son. Since the loan was on hire purchase basis and defendant no. 1 failed to repay it and hence plaintiff in terms of the hire purchase agreement, took possession of the machinery installed in the factory and sold in public auction for Rs. 20,000. Since the entire loan amount was not adjusted against the auction amount and hence the suit out of which this second appeal arises was filed for recovery of Rs.1.89, 286/- against the borrower (son) and guarantor (father). It was contested by the defendants. The trial court decreed the suit. The defendant No.1 filed first appeal but the first appellate court dismissed the appeal and confirmed the money decree for Rs. 1,89,286/- which was passed against the defendants. It is against this concurrent decree the second appeal by the guarantor (defendant no. It was contested by the defendants. The trial court decreed the suit. The defendant No.1 filed first appeal but the first appellate court dismissed the appeal and confirmed the money decree for Rs. 1,89,286/- which was passed against the defendants. It is against this concurrent decree the second appeal by the guarantor (defendant no. 2) has filed this second appeal. The only argument of learned counsel for the appellant (defendant no. 2) was that suit was barred by time and it should have been dismissed as being barred. The trial court and the first appellate court rejected this objection and I am in agreement with this finding. In my opinion the suit was filed within time. The cause of action to file a suit to recover balance amount arose only after the auction was held and auction amount was received. The suit therefore had to be filed within three years from the date of auction. The reason was that plaintiff could come to know of the balance amount only when the auction was conducted and money realized in the auction by sale of properties. It was not disputed that suit was filed within 3 years from the date of auction. The courts therefore rightly entertained the suit holding the same to be within time and rightly decreed for the amount after adjusting the auction money. No substantial question of law therefore arises on this issue. Yet another argument of learned counsel for the appellant that the money realized in auction was less and that the plaintiff took unreasonable time to sell the machinery due to which value of machinery got diminished has no merit. It is for the reason that firstly neither the appellant and nor the borrower made any effort to bring any better buyer. Secondly, no evidence was adduced by the defendants to show the actual value of the machinery and to what extent due to any delay in auction proceedings it was reduced. In the light of this material evidence, I am unable to entertain this factual submission for the first time in second appeal. It does not involve any substantial question of law within the meaning of Section 100 ibid. In the light of this material evidence, I am unable to entertain this factual submission for the first time in second appeal. It does not involve any substantial question of law within the meaning of Section 100 ibid. In the light of foregoing discussion, I am of the view that appeal does not involve any substantial question of law within the meaning of Section 100 and the one proposed by the appellant does not arise in the case and nor it has any merit. As a consequence, the appeal fails and is dismissed in limine. No cost.