JUDGMENT : THOTTATHIL B. RADHAKRISHNAN, J. 1. This is a writ appeal by an assessee under the Kerala General Sales Tax Act, 1963, for short, 'Act'. Pursuant to an earlier judgment, the statutory authorities had to rework on a notice issued under Section 17D of the Act, which provides for fast track method of completion of assessment. The writ petitioner's challenge against such further proceedings stands repelled by the learned single Judge. Hence, this appeal. Heard learned counsel for the appellant and the learned Government Pleader. The challenge advanced by the appellant to the impugned action is that it is barred by limitation and that there is no prior sanction of the Commissioner. Factual grounds were also projected as to the levy as against the goods dealt with by the appealing writ petitioner. 2. Sub-section 1 of Section 17D of the Act opens up with a non obstante clause and therefore, the said provision of fast track completion of assessment can be initiated and completed de hors any other provision contained in any other law for the time being in force. Obviously therefore, any prescription as to law of limitation in any other provision would have no application. We affirm that finding of the learned single Judge. 3. However, the learned single Judge, even after holding as aforesaid, had left the aforesaid issue open, to be dealt with in any statutory appeal, on the premise that the other issues were not being dealt with in writ jurisdiction. But, on the issue of law as regards Section 17D, what is stated in the preceding paragraph is the law. That declaration as to that relevant principle as regards the statutory provision in hand is final and binding on the assessee and the Revenue notwithstanding anything stated in the impugned judgment. We hereby declare so, because certainty and consistency are inexcusable salutary doctrines to be adhered to in adjudication. This is so because, after such a finding is rendered by the jurisdictional High Court, the statutory authorities, lower in the hierarchy, under the statute cannot and should not hold to the contrary. 4. As regards the plea as to the requirement of prior permission of the Commissioner, clause (d) of sub-section (2) of Section 17D interdicts reopening completed assessments. Completed assessments can be reopened only in the event of receipt of fresh materials pertaining to tax evasion. 4. As regards the plea as to the requirement of prior permission of the Commissioner, clause (d) of sub-section (2) of Section 17D interdicts reopening completed assessments. Completed assessments can be reopened only in the event of receipt of fresh materials pertaining to tax evasion. But, the proviso to that clause says that the assessment may be reopened with the prior permission of the Commissioner. The content of that proviso is not an added condition for reopening. It is an alternative; meaning hereby, that reopening would be permissible even without receipt of fresh materials; provided the Commissioner grants permission. We hold so and declare that what we have stated herein is the law on the point. 5. The aforesaid are the only two issues which may have some impact on the jurisdictional factor. All other issues are mixed questions of law and fact and are such which ought not to be answered in writ jurisdiction, more particularly, because of the availability of the statutory appellate remedy as provided for. 6. The aforesaid position notwithstanding, the learned counsel for the appellant submitted that on the date of the impugned judgment as rendered by the learned single Judge, the Department has issued final assessment order. We have to keep our hands off from any such complaint since that again is a matter, which the appellant, if so advised, will have to carry before the appropriate authority in accordance with law. 7. In the result, subject to what we have stated above on the relevant laws, this writ appeal is dismissed.