ORDER This W.P.(Cr.) has been filed on behalf of petitioner Kalyan Maity, the then General Manager (Mines), Kiriburu Iron Ore Mines of Steel Authority of India Ltd. (Raw Materials Division), to quash the order of cognizance dated 27.05.2011 passed by learned Addl. Chief Judicial Magistrate, Chaibasa in connection with C/7 Case No. 102 of 2011 Whereby and whereunder the petitioner has been directed to be summoned to face trial for the offences punishable u/s 22A of the Minimum Wage Act (hereinafter referred to as the 'Act' for short for short) be and the order dated 05.09.2011 by which the petition dated 18.08.2011 filed by the petitioner was rejected and the case was adjourned for substance of accusation. 2. It is submitted that M/s Steel Authority of India Ltd. has not been made accused in the present case and the petitioner was not responsible for the day to day working at the relevant site rather Shri Ravi Narayan Satpati, Assistant General Manager cum Head (Personnel Administration), Kiriburi Iron Ore Mines was the incharge and he may be held liable to answer the charges, if any. The petitioner has made this contention in writing before the Court in the petition dated 18.08.2011 and the Office Order dated 29.12.2008, Reference No. KIOM/GM/08/3660 was also enclosed to bring on record that Shri Ravi Narayan Satpati, Assistant General Manager cum Head (Personnel Administration), Kiriburi Iron Ore Mines was assigned to functions as head of Personnel & Administration Department; (i) Industrial Relation, (ii) Contract Labour Management, (iii) Liaison with Central & State Government Authorities, Compliance of Statutory obligations under various Labour Laws, and (iv) General Administration & Personnel Matters It is also made clear that Shri Satpati will be the person responsible for the above mentioned functions. 3. It is contended that the petitioner is not at all responsible for the offences, as alleged in the complaint. Furthermore, the company has not been made accused and therefore, the findings given by Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Aneeta Hada Versus Godfather Travels & Tours (P) Ltd. reported in (2012) 5 SCC 661 para 32, 38 and 39 are relevant. Furthermore, the company has not been made accused and therefore, the findings given by Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Aneeta Hada Versus Godfather Travels & Tours (P) Ltd. reported in (2012) 5 SCC 661 para 32, 38 and 39 are relevant. The petitioner has also relied on the judgment pronounced by Hon'ble Supreme Court in connection with Special Leave Appeal (Crl.) No(s).853 of 2007 dated 21.09.2007, the relevant part of the order is as under: “Appellants herein who are the Directors and Officers of the National Thermal Power Corporation, which is a company within the meaning of the provisions of Section 53 of the said Act, are sought to be prosecuted without the Company being impleaded as a party. The Statute provides for vicarious liability on the part of the officers concerned, although in law they may not be otherwise liable, only in the event the statutory requirements are fulfilled. In such a situation, it was obligatory on the part of the complainant respondents to comply with the statutory requirement by impleading the Company as a party as an accused.” 4. On the other hand, the counsel appearing for the respondent has submitted that Section 22C(2) of the Act is applicable in respect of the petitioner and he cannot escape by transferring liability on the shoulder of other. It is very clear under Section 22C(2) of the Act which reads as follows: “Notwithstanding anything contained in subsection(1), where an offence under this Act has been committed by a company and it is provided that the offence has been committed with the consent or connivance of, or that the commission of the offence is attributable to any neglect on the part of any director, manager, managing agent or any other officer of the company, such director, manager, managing agent or such other officer shall also be deemed to be guilty of that offence and shall be liable to be prosecuted against and punished accordingly.” It is further submitted that the Court has rightly taken cognizance and the petitioner, who has been released on bail is liable to be prosecuted. 5. I have gone through the materials placed before me and the judgments referred to above. The petition dated 18.08.2011 filed by the petitioner stood rejected by order dated 05.09.2011 by the learned A.C.J.M., Chaibasa giving all details and he has refused to exonerate him from the charges. 5. I have gone through the materials placed before me and the judgments referred to above. The petition dated 18.08.2011 filed by the petitioner stood rejected by order dated 05.09.2011 by the learned A.C.J.M., Chaibasa giving all details and he has refused to exonerate him from the charges. The Judgment reported in Aneeta Hada Versus Godfather Travels & Tours (P) Ltd. (supra) relates to the offences punishable under Section 138 of the N.I. Act. The Hon'ble Apex Court has taken account of Section 141, Section 138, 7, 139, 118 and 140 while deciding the criminal liability of a person under vicarious liability. On plain reading of Section 141(2) of N.I. Act and Section 22C(2) of the Act it appears that the contention made in both the sections is almost similar but then we have to keep in mind that the offences punishable under Section 138 of the N.I. Act makes a drawer liable for the offence and if the drawer is the company on whose behalf cheque has been issued for the discharge of whole or any part of any debt or any other liability and the cheque so issued remained unpaid either because of the amount of money standing to the credit of that account is insufficient to honour the cheque or that it exceeds the amount arranged to be paid from the account of said drawer, such person shall be deemed to have committed an offence. Section 141 of the N.I. Act deals with for the offence committed by the company under Section 138 of the N.I. Act. In view of Section 141 of the N.I. Act the company as well as every person who, at the time the offence was committed, was in charge of and was responsible to the company for the conduct of the business of the company as well as the company shall be deemed to be the guilty of the offence and shall be liable to be prosecuted against and punished accordingly. Thus, criminal liability on account of dishonour of cheque primarily falls on drawer company and extends to its officers (the authorized signatory) only when conditions incorporated in Section 141 stands satisfied. Thus, criminal liability on account of dishonour of cheque primarily falls on drawer company and extends to its officers (the authorized signatory) only when conditions incorporated in Section 141 stands satisfied. What I would like to distinguish is that in a case of dishonour of cheque, if the drawer of the cheque is a company, the company owe the liability to discharge its monetary obligation and the person responsible to act on behalf of the company, if found guilty for not discharging his part of obligation, he shall also be liable to be punished. Considering the distinguished facts, circumstances and the ingredients of offences committed, the judgment cited by the petitioner does not appear to be helpful. On the other hand, for the offence punishable under Section 22A of the Minimum Wages Act, the person responsible is liable to be punished if the offence is proved. If any offence under Section 22C of the Minimum Wages Act is committed by a company, the company as well as every person in charge of, and responsible to the company for the conduct of its business at the time of the commission of the offence shall be deemed to be guilty of the offence and shall be liable to be prosecuted against and punished accordingly. Though the words appearing in Section 141 of the N.I. Act and Section 22C of the Minimum Wages Act are almost similar but the individual act of the person responsible to discharge his obligation on behalf of the company in a case of Minimum Wages Act can be distinguished and that may be considered an independent act of that officer or incharge for the business of the company. No doubt the Company is bound to comply with the provisions of Minimum Wages Act but the individual Officer who is under obligation of employment is equally liable to follow the statute in this regard. If it is found that the person even after instruction of the Company neglects to perform his part of obligation he cannot escape only on the ground that the Company has not been made accused. If it is found that the person even after instruction of the Company neglects to perform his part of obligation he cannot escape only on the ground that the Company has not been made accused. The Company being a juristic can be prosecuted for the wrong committed by the Company but the then day to day working is to be done by a human being and if he fails to discharge his part of obligation and commits wrong constituting offence punishable under the Minimum Wages Act , he can well be prosecuted. 6. Now, coming to the facts appearing in the case at hand. The averments made in the complaint clearly indicates that there was violation of Rules 22, 26(5), 26(1), 25(2) & 21(4) of the Minimum Wages Central Rules 1971 and that constitutes offences punishable under Section 22A of the Minimum Wages Act. The petitioner has fairly filed a petition before the trial Court disclosing therein as to who was responsible to answer the charges and he has also furnished Office Order dated 28.12.2008. The petitioner has brought on record name of the person incharge for the said site where the offences are alleged to have been committed. Thus, it is apparent that the petitioner was not responsible for the site where the offence alleged to have been committed. Therefore, I feel inclined to quash that part of order by which the petitioner has been summoned to face the trial. 7. Now coming to the impugned order which is under challenge. It is settled law that cognizance of the offence is taken and not against the offender. Since the averments made in the complaint prima facie attracts the ingredients of Section 22A of the Minimum Wages Act, cognizance of the offence taken, cannot be quashed and that part of the order stands upheld. 8. The next question arises as to who will be prosecuted for the offence alleged? In this regard, the complainant shall be at liberty to do needful by taking recourse to Section 319 of the Criminal Procedure Code. 9. With these observations, this Writ Petition (Cr.) stands disposed