Judgment : K.M. Joseph, J. 1. These two cases being connected, they are disposed of by this common Judgment. 2. Writ petitioner is the appellant (hereinafter referred to as the appellant). In the Writ Petition, the appellant calls in question Exts.P1 to P6. It further seeks a declaration that the item pickle sold by the appellant comes under Entry 49 of the third schedule to the Act. Alternatively, a declaration is sought that the item pickle would come under Entry 84(29) of the KVAT Act, ie. HSN Code 2001 of the third schedule if it does not come under Entry 49 of the third schedule of the KVAT Act, 2003. 3. The appellant is a registered dealer under the Kerala Value Added Tax Act, 2003 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). Ext.P1 is the order passed by the Commissioner of Commercial Taxes (hereinafter referred to as the Commissioner), purporting to be a clarification issued under Section 94 of the Act. It is, inter alia, stated that under the caption “vegetable rolls” the rate of tax is to be 4% in regard to the pickles other than those sold under brand name “registered under the Trade Mark Act, 1999”. Reference is made to Entry 49(1) of the third schedule. It is further stated as follows: “All kinds of pickles other than those sold under brand name registered under the Trade Mark Act, 1999 are taxable @ 4% vide Entry No.49(1) of 3rd Schedule to KVAT Act, 03, as amended by KVAT Act, 05. Pickles, if sold under brand name registered under the Trade Mark Act, 1999 will attract tax @ 12.5%.” Ext.P2 purports to be the assessment order for the year 2006- 2007. According to the appellant, the pickles sold by the appellant are not registered under the Trade Mark Act and, therefore, it is taxable at 4% under Entry 49 of the 3rd Schedule. Complaint of the appellant is that relying on Ext.P1 order of the Commissioner, pre-assessment notices under Section 25A of the Act have been issued for the assessment years 2007-08, 2008- 09, 2009-10 and 2010-11 and which are produced as Exts.P3 to Ext.P6. Appellant seeks to quash the same. 4. Appellant filed the Appeal in question purporting to call in question Ext.P1 clarification. 5. We heard Shri Raju Joseph, learned senior counsel for the appellant and the learned Government Pleader, Shri Bobby John. 6. Appellant seeks to quash the same. 4. Appellant filed the Appeal in question purporting to call in question Ext.P1 clarification. 5. We heard Shri Raju Joseph, learned senior counsel for the appellant and the learned Government Pleader, Shri Bobby John. 6. Learned senior counsel for the appellant would address the following submissions before us: Pickles sold by the appellant are not registered under the Trade Mark Act. It is, therefore, taxable only at 4%. The further argument is that in Ext.P2 which is the revised order of assessment for the year 2006-07 dated 27.4.2012, the assessing officer had proceeded on the basis that the appellant has sold pickles under the brand name “Happy” label with the emblem registered under the Trade Mark Act, 1999 and repelled the case of the appellant that the appellant has not registered pickles under the Trade Mark Act. It is submitted that the reasoning adopted by the Officer is unsustainable, as the vegetable pickles of the appellant is not registered under the Trade Mark Act. Certain other products of the appellant had been registered with the label “Happy”, but, no registration had been obtained specifically in respect of pickles. Therefore, the appellant is liable to be taxed only at the rate of 4%. The further argument of the learned senior counsel for the appellant is that the Commissioner has in issuing the impugned clarification, assumed illegally and erroneously that the item pickle, if it is not included under Entry 49 of the 3rd Schedule, is liable to be taxed at 12.5%. In arriving at the said conclusion, the Commissioner, it is complained, has overlooked the fact that Entry 84(29) of the 3rd Schedule of the Act will embrace within its scope “pickles” and, therefore, pickles can be taxed only at 4%. It is contended that the clarification is not supported by any reasons, that the arguments are not considered, and on that score also, it is vulnerable. He would submit that it is settled law that there is no equity about tax. Tax cannot be imposed by resort to intendment attributed to the Legislature. A person must be exigible to tax on the clear terms of the charging Section. Otherwise, he cannot be brought within the tax net, he points out. 7. Per contra, learned Government Pleader would contend that by no stretch of imagination, can pickles come within Entry 84(29) of the 3rd Schedule. A person must be exigible to tax on the clear terms of the charging Section. Otherwise, he cannot be brought within the tax net, he points out. 7. Per contra, learned Government Pleader would contend that by no stretch of imagination, can pickles come within Entry 84(29) of the 3rd Schedule. Pickles, is specifically enumerated in Entry 49 of the 3rd Schedule. He would submit that there is a scheme as to taxation in regard to pickles. He points out that goods covered by the 1st Schedule are exempt from tax. Entry 24A of the 1st Schedule reads as follows: “Handmade soaps, squashes and pickles sold under registered kudumbasree brand” Then there is Entry 49 of the 3rd Schedule which we shall advert to at a later stage, and finally under Entry 103 of SRO.No.82/06, tax at the rate of 12.5% being the residuary Entry is provided for. He would submit that there is a clear intention revealed by the scheme of the Act. Wherever pickles is sought to be exempted, the law giver has succinctly articulated the same as is evident from the wording of Entry 24A of the 1st Schedule. The Legislature has evinced its intention to tax pickles at 4% except when pickles are sold under a brand name registered under the Trade Mark Act, 1999. Where it is consequently sold under a registered brand name, it must necessarily fall under Entry 103 of the Notification, suffering a higher rate of tax. He would rebut the case of the appellant that taxing statutes are impervious to the application of the interpretative tool based on purpose and intention. As far as Entry 84(29) is concerned, he would submit that pickles would not fall within its ambit. He would point out the contents of the pickles marketed by the appellant. 8. Learned counsel for the petitioner sought to draw our attention to the Harmonized Commodity Description & Coding System Vol.I published by the Customs Co-operative Council (Ext.P13). Therein, it is stated that pickle and mustard pickle would come under HSN 20.01 which reads as follows: “Entry 20.01 - Vegetables, fruit, nuts and other edible parts of plants, prepared or preserved by vinegar or acetic acid.” Ext.P14 in the Writ Petition purports to be a Report of the Centre for Taxation Studies submitted to the Union of India. Therein, it is stated that pickle and mustard pickle would come under HSN 20.01 which reads as follows: “Entry 20.01 - Vegetables, fruit, nuts and other edible parts of plants, prepared or preserved by vinegar or acetic acid.” Ext.P14 in the Writ Petition purports to be a Report of the Centre for Taxation Studies submitted to the Union of India. Therein also, it is pointed out that pickles had been included under the heading “Vegetables, fruits, nuts and other edible parts of plants, prepared or preserved by vinegar or acetic acid.” It is contended that under the Rules of Interpretation of the Schedules under the Act, the commodities which are given four digit HSN Code shall include all those commodities coming under the heading of HSN. It is pointed out that Entry 84(29) of the 3rd Schedule has the HSN No.20.01. Entry 84(29) reads as follows: “Vegetables, fruits, nuts and other edible parts of plants, prepared or preserved by vinegar or acetic acid.” He would, therefore, contend that pickles would certainly come within the scope of Entry 84(29). According to him, this is made clear by the Rules of Interpretation of Schedules provided in the Appendix. It, inter alia, reads as follows: “Those commodities which are not given with HSN Code Number should be interpreted as the case may be in common parlance or commercial parlance. While interpreting any commodity, if any inconsistency is observed within the meaning of the commodity without HSN Number and the meaning of the commodity with HSN Number, the commodity should be interpreted by including it in that Entry which is having the HSN Number.” Therefore, the argument is that in so far as there is no HSN Number as against the item pickles in Entry 49 of the 3rd Schedule as against 20.01 (HSN Number) mentioned against Entry 84(29), pickles should be interpreted as falling within the scope of Entry 20.01 found against Entry 84(29) and, therefore, it should be taxed at 4%. This is further on the basis of the Rules of Interpretation which provides as follows: “HSN Numbers are allotted in the Schedules either in four digits or in six digits or in eight digits. The four digit numbers indicate the heading in the HSN classification, six digit numbers indicate the sub-heading and the eight digit numbers indicate the specific commodity number. The four digit numbers indicate the heading in the HSN classification, six digit numbers indicate the sub-heading and the eight digit numbers indicate the specific commodity number. While interpreting the commodities in the Schedules, the following guidelines may be followed: i. The Commodities which are given four digit HSN Number shall include all those commodities coming under that heading of the HSN. ii. The commodities which are given six digit HSN Number shall include all those commodities coming under that sub-heading of the HSN. iii. The commodities which are given eight digit HSN Number shall mean that commodity which bears that HSN Number.” He would also refer us to Clause (5) of the Rules of Interpretation which reads as follows: “v. Where the term 'other' is used in subentries or in sub-sub-entries, it should be construed by using the doctrine of ejusdem generis. (When specific words are followed by general words, the general words should be interpreted as having the meaning identical to the meaning attributed to the specific words).” He would, therefore, contend that on the said score also, pickles would fall under Entry 84(29). He would submit that as of now, pickles marketed by the appellant are not registered under the Trade Mark Act, 1999 and, therefore, at any rate, would fall under Entry 49. He makes the submission based on Entry 84 (29) on the basis that if the pickles are registered under the Trade Mark Act, going by the impugned clarification, they would be taxable under Entry 84(29) and not at 12.5%. Learned Government Pleader would join issue with the appellant in regard to the manner of applying the Rules of Interpretation. 9. There are two aspects in this case. Firstly, there is a clarification issued under Section 94 of the Act. The Commissioner has, acting on the request of another assessee, issued the clarification dated 03.7.2006. Therein, as far as vegetable pickles are concerned, he has stated that it will attract tax at the rate of 4% except those sold under the brand name registered under the Trade Mark Act, 1999. Reference is made to Entry 49 of the 3rd Schedule. Thereafter, as we have already noted, it is noted that pickles which were sold under the brand name registered under the Trade Mark Act will attract 12.5%. The appellant is selling goods under a brand name, namely “Happy”. Reference is made to Entry 49 of the 3rd Schedule. Thereafter, as we have already noted, it is noted that pickles which were sold under the brand name registered under the Trade Mark Act will attract 12.5%. The appellant is selling goods under a brand name, namely “Happy”. Annexure A produced in the Writ Petition along with the Statement filed on behalf of the first respondent would tend to indicate that the appellant is indeed selling pickle (garlic) under the brand name “Happy”. The ingredients of the same are garlic, salt, synthetic, vinegar, E-260, gingelly oil, ginger, powders of chilli, mustard, turmeric, cumin, fenugreek and asafoetida. It is also stated that it contains permitted class of preservative sodium benzoate E-211. Annexure B is produced along with the Statement to indicate that the appellant has held out that the “Happy” brand includes fruit squash, syrups, crushes, soft drink concentrates, fruit jams, sauces, pickles, vinegar and RTS beverages. Annexure C produced along with the Statement of the first respondent, purports to be information from the web site regarding the ingredients. Therein, it is stated, inter alia, that the pickles contain appropriate quantity of vegetables, condiments, gingelly oil (sesame oil), salt, synthetic vinegar, asafoetida and permitted preservative. 10. It is the case of the respondent that the appellant is not dealing exclusively in vegetable pickles. Annexures D and E are produced to show that the appellant is also dealing in prawn pickle. It is the case of the State that the appellant is representing and selling pickles as a branded item coming under the registered brand name “Happy”. A bill of lading is produced as Annexure G. So also, the audit statement of the appellant is produced as Annexure F. Therein, it is mentioned that pickles is coming under Entry 49(1) of the 3rd schedule and no HSN Code is applicable. 11. Learned senior counsel for the appellant would point out that the appellant was under the belief as there is no registered trade mark, it will be taxed only at 4% which falls under Entry 49. But, if in law and on facts, pickle was liable to be taxed under Entry 84(29), any statement made cannot advance the case of the respondents, he contends. 12. The word “pickles” is used in the Entries to the Act twice. But, if in law and on facts, pickle was liable to be taxed under Entry 84(29), any statement made cannot advance the case of the respondents, he contends. 12. The word “pickles” is used in the Entries to the Act twice. Firstly, pickles is used as an exempted item falling under Entry 24A of the 1st schedule. Pickles is exempt under the said item, when it is sold under the registered kudumbasree brand. Next, pickles are mentioned under Entry 49 of the 3rd schedule. Entry 49 to 3rd Schedule, inter alia, reads as follows: “49. Food products like pickles, corn flakes, savouries, sweets made of groundnuts, gingelly, other than those sold under brand name registered under The Trade Marks Act, 1999 (1) Pickles” Goods coming under the 3rd schedule is liable to be taxed at 4%. Section 6 is the charging Section. Section 6, inter alia, provides that the liability to pay tax shall be on the taxable turnover, in the case of goods coming under the 2nd and 3rd schedules at the rates specified therein and all points of sale of such goods within the State. The Explanation provides that the Rules of Interpretation of the Schedules appended to the Schedules to the Act will apply to the interpretation of HSN Codes mentioned in the Clause. Section 6A(c) provides that in the case of transfer of right to use any goods for any purpose or not for a specified period, tax is attracted at 4% and at point of such transfer. Section 6D provides that in the case of goods which do not fall under Clauses (a) or( c ) will attract tax at 12.5%. Coming back to Entry 49, it categorically refers to pickles. There is no HSN Code mentioned against the same. According to the appellant, however, even if it is registered under the Trade Mark Act, pickles sold by the assessee would still fall within the four walls of Entry 84(29). According to him, the Commissioner has completely ignored Entry 84(29). He issued the clarification that pickles which are registered under the Trade Mark Act will attract tax at 12.5%. According to the appellant, having regard to Section 6D, it is only if the goods do not fall in the 3rd Schedule, can they be taxed at 12.5%. According to him, the Commissioner has completely ignored Entry 84(29). He issued the clarification that pickles which are registered under the Trade Mark Act will attract tax at 12.5%. According to the appellant, having regard to Section 6D, it is only if the goods do not fall in the 3rd Schedule, can they be taxed at 12.5%. Merely issuing a notification and providing for a residuary clause which, in fact, itself only provides that the goods which are not falling under any of the Entries specifically enumerated in the Schedules will be taxable at 12.5% will not do, it is submitted. A perusal of Entry 103 would show that it is intended to cover goods which are, inter alia, not falling under any of the Schedules to the Act. Therefore, pickles even if they are sold under a name registered under the Trade Mark Act will fall under Entry 84(29) and it cannot be taxed under Entry 103 of the Notification of goods taxable at 12.5%, it is submitted. Therefore, we must consider the question whether the pickles even if they are registered under the Trade Mark Act, 1999 would fall under Entry 84(29). 13. No doubt, the learned senior counsel for the appellant has arrayed before us the following material: Ext.P19 is a request made to the Public Information Officer, Central Excise, Kozhikode Division by one Shri M. Sharafuddeen. Questions asked are whether the assessees are paying Central Excise duty on the manufacture of vegetable pickles. Secondly, the query is under which tariff heading/sub heading the item vegetable pickle is classified. The answer given in Ext.P20 is as follows: “Vegetable pickles are classified under the tariff heading No.20019000 (vegetable, fruit, nuts and other edible part4s of plants, prepared or preserved by vinegar or acetic acid)”. It is, therefore, contended that this is a relevant input which tends to show that pickles would fall under the tariff heading No.20.01 and it falls under Entry 84(29) of the 3rd Schedule. It is pointed out that Chapter 20 of the Harmonized Commodity Description and Coding System deals with preparation of vegetables, fruits, nuts or other parts of plants. Under the heading 20.01, it is stated as follows: “20.01 - Vegetables, fruit, nuts and other edible parts of plants, prepared or preserved by vinegar or acetic acid. It is pointed out that Chapter 20 of the Harmonized Commodity Description and Coding System deals with preparation of vegetables, fruits, nuts or other parts of plants. Under the heading 20.01, it is stated as follows: “20.01 - Vegetables, fruit, nuts and other edible parts of plants, prepared or preserved by vinegar or acetic acid. 2001.10 - Cucumbers and gherkins 2001.20 - Onions 2001.90 - Other This heading covers vegetables (see Note 3 to this Chapter), fruits, nuts and other edible parts of plants prepared or preserved by means of vinegar or acetic acid, whether or not containing salt, spices, mustard, sugar or other sweetening matter. These products may also contain oil or other additives. They may be in bulk (in casks, drums, etc.) or in jars, bottles, tins or airtight containers ready for retail sale. The heading includes certain preparations known as pickles, mustard pickle, etc. The goods covered by this heading differ from sauces of heading 21.03 in that the latter are generally liquids, emulsions or suspensions containing practically no pieces of fruit, vegetables or other edible parts of plants. The principal products preserved by the methods described in this heading are cucumbers, gherkins, onions, shallots, tomatoes, cauliflowers, olives, capers, sweet corn, artichoke hearts, palm hearts, yams, walnuts and mangoes.” Reliance is placed on the statements to the effect that the heading includes pickles. It is specifically contended that in view of the employment of the four digits, it will include all those commodities coming under the heading of HSN. Therefore, it is pointed out that pickles would be comprehended under Entry 84(29). 14. Per contra, learned Government Pleader would contend that pickles is understood differently in different parts of the world. Pickles as understood in the USA may not be the same as it is understood in India. He would also emphasise the ingredients of the product pickles manufactured and marketed by the appellant. He would submit that it cannot be treated as vegetables or other edible parts of plants prepared or preserved by vinegar or acetic acid. He would submit that there may be, for example, a case where mango is preserved in vinegar or acetic acid, which may be covered by Entry 84(29). The item pickles is a different commodity altogether. It is submitted that the State has a great degree of flexibility in the matter of classification in taxation matters. He would submit that there may be, for example, a case where mango is preserved in vinegar or acetic acid, which may be covered by Entry 84(29). The item pickles is a different commodity altogether. It is submitted that the State has a great degree of flexibility in the matter of classification in taxation matters. The State has, in this case, classified pickles specifically and separately. He would submit that pickles will fall under Chapter XXI coming under the heading “Miscellaneous edible preparations” The clear intention of the law giver for obvious reasons is that pickles which is sold under a brand name which is registered under the Trade Mark Act should be taxed at a higher rate than at 4%. 15. We are of the view that the Commissioner is right in finding that pickles sold under brand name registered under the Trade Mark Act will be taxed at 12.5 per cent. While it is true that the goods can be taxed at 12.5 per cent only, if they do not fall under Schedule I or III having regard to Section 6 (1)(d) of the Act, the question would be whether pickles which are sold under brand name which is registered, will fall under Entry 84 (29). Entry 84(29) deals with vegetable fruits, nuts and other edible parks of plants prepared or preserved by vinegar or asetic acid. The HSN Code shown is 2001. The description of goods which come under HSN Code 2001, is exactly the same as given in Entry 84(29). 16. In this case, we have already noted the ingredients of the pickles produced and marketed by the appellant. Further more, we notice that the State Legislature has specifically provided for pickles and sought to tax it at 4% unless it is sold under brand name which is registered under the Trade Mark Act, 1999. In fact, there can be no quarrel that pickles which are not sold under a brand name registered under the Trade Mark Act will not fall in Entry 84(29). No HSN Code is indicated as against the word “pickles”. Thus, the Legislature has, even assuming for argument sake pickles could be brought otherwise within Entry 84(29), in the well established powers of classification for the purpose of taxation, classified pickles as falling under Entry 49. No HSN Code is indicated as against the word “pickles”. Thus, the Legislature has, even assuming for argument sake pickles could be brought otherwise within Entry 84(29), in the well established powers of classification for the purpose of taxation, classified pickles as falling under Entry 49. The only area of dispute is that once it is found that pickles are being sold under brand name which has been registered under the Trade Mark Act 1999, can the appellant be permitted to seek shelter under the HSN Code 2001 in respect of vegetable pickles ? 17. In answering this question, we must consider as to what is the principle or principles of interpretation applicable in this area. Undoubtedly, it is true that the taxing statute is to be strictly construed. Rowlatt, J. has held in Cape Brandy Syndicate v. IRC (1921) 1 KB 64) as follows: “In a taxing statute, one has to look greatly as to what is clearly said. There is no room for any intendment. There is no equity about a tax. There is no presumption as to tax. Nothing is to be read, nothing is to be implied. One can only look fairly at the language used.” If words used are ambiguous and reasonably open to two interpretations, the benefit of interpretation is to be given to the subject (see The Central India Spinning and Weaving and Manufacturing Co. Ltd. & Another v. The Municipal Committee, Wardha ( AIR 1958 SC 341 ) and C.A. Abraham v. Income-tax Officer, Kottayam and Another ( AIR 1961 SC 609 ). We must, however, note, at the same time, we must not be persuaded to hold that the principle of purposive interpretation is inapplicable, in a taxing statute. We extract the following passages from Principles of Statutory Interpretations by G.P. Singh: “The shift from literal to purposive construction has not left taxing statutes untouched leaving them “as some island of literal interpretation”. The context, scheme of the relevant Act as a whole as its purpose are as relevant in construing a taxing Act as in construing any other Act. Therefore, the rule, that object of the Legislature has to be kept in view and a construction consistent with the object has to be placed on the words used if there be ambiguity, is also applicable in construing a taxing enactment. Therefore, the rule, that object of the Legislature has to be kept in view and a construction consistent with the object has to be placed on the words used if there be ambiguity, is also applicable in construing a taxing enactment. Every taxing statute has a fiscal philosophy a feel of which is necessary to gather the intent and effect of its different clause.” In M/s. Oxford University Press v. Commissioner of Incometax( AIR 2001 (1) SC 886), the Apex Court, inter alia, held as follows: “36. Giving a purposeful interpretation of the provision, it will be reasonable to hold that in order to be eligible to claim exemption from tax under Section 10(22) of the Act the assessee has to establish that it is engaged in some educational activity in India and its existence in this country is not for profit only. This interpretation of Section 10 (22) neither causes violence to the language of the provision nor does it amount to re-writing the same. On the other hand, it only gives a harmonious construction of the provision which subserves the object and purpose for which the provision is intended to serve.” We also notice that in a recent decision of the Apex Court in Catholic Syrian Bank Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income-tax [(2012) 343 ITR 270), the Court, inter alia, held as follows: “Clear legislative intent of the relevant provisions and unambiguous language of the circulars with reference to the amendments to section 36 of the Act demonstrate that the deduction on account of provision for bad and doubtful debts under section 36(1)(viia) is distinct and independent of the provisions of section 36(1)(vii) relating to allowance of the bad debts. The legislative intent was to encourage rural advances and the making of provisions for bad debts in relation to such rural branches. Another material aspect of the functioning of such banks is that their rural branches were practically treated as a distinct business, though ultimately these advances would form part of the books of account of the principal or head office branch. Thus, this court would be more inclined to give an interpretation to these provisions which would serve the legislative object and intent, rather than to subvert the same.” 18. We feel that there is a scheme under the different Schedules to the Act. Thus, this court would be more inclined to give an interpretation to these provisions which would serve the legislative object and intent, rather than to subvert the same.” 18. We feel that there is a scheme under the different Schedules to the Act. As already noted, when pickles is sold under the registered kudumbasree brand, it is completely exempt under Entry 24(A) of the Ist Schedule. When pickles are sold which are not having any registration under the Trade mark Act is sold, it is brought to tax at the considerably low rate of 4%. The rationale behind pickles which are sold under registered kudumbasree brand not being subjected to any tax, is not hard to find. It is apparently to encourage the kudumbasree movement and to promote their activities that their products are not subjected to any tax. The Legislature has clearly understood pickles as not falling under HSN Code 2001, as otherwise, there was no reason at all to carve out pickles as a separate food product under Entry 49. When such is the scheme and when the Legislature did not intend to confer benefit of 4% tax rate on the pickles which are sold under a brand name which is registered under the Trade Mark Act, we would think that we would be adopting an interpretation in consonance with the scope, setting, scheme and object of the taxing statute, if we agree with the clarification that such products attract tax at higher rate. We would think that the scheme of the KVAT Act contemplated pickles being exempt from tax when sold by registered kudumbasree brand, pickles without brand name registered under the Trade Mark Act, 1999 being taxed at 4% and pickles which have been registered under the Trade Mark Act, 1999 being exposed to higher rate of tax. When pickles have been got registered under the Trade Mark Act, we are essentially to imagine the pickles being manufactured, marketed and sold on a more organized level, than pickles without registration. It would have a better name in the market. The pricing would be normally higher. Such manufacturers can afford to reach the higher economic segments. We do not think such considerations can be brushed aside as alien in considering the scope of the Entry under which a particular commodity would fall for the purpose of taxation. It would have a better name in the market. The pricing would be normally higher. Such manufacturers can afford to reach the higher economic segments. We do not think such considerations can be brushed aside as alien in considering the scope of the Entry under which a particular commodity would fall for the purpose of taxation. It may be true that as already noted by us, there could be cases where a commodity like mango which is simply preserved in vinegar or ascetic acid, may possibly come under Entry 84(29). But, in the case at hand, we are dealing with a product sold as vegetable pickles and we have already adverted to the ingredients. We are of the clear view that even on the basis of our understanding of the HSN Code and on the basis that pickles could be embraced within the scope otherwise, having regard to the connotation of the word “pickles” as it is understood in our country, it would not come under Entry 84 (29). As already noted by us, any other view would frustrate the object and be against the scheme of taxation in regard to pickles which we find to be clear otherwise. 19. The Rules of Interpretation, no doubt, provides that while interpreting a commodity, if any inconsistency is observed between the meaning of the commodity without HSN number and meaning of the commodity with HSN number, the commodity should be interpreted by including it in that Entry which is having HSN number. It is true that as against the word “pickle” in Entry 49 of the 3rd Schedule, there is no HSN number, while there is a HSN number as against Entry 84(29), namely 20.01. It is also true that on going by the Rules of Interpretation, commodities which are given four digits HSN numbers, will include all those commodities coming under the heading of HSN. However, the crucial element which is to be borne in mind is that for applying the rule that the Entry which is having a HSN number, must gain predominance as against any Entry which is without a HSN number, is that there must be inconsistency in the meaning of the commodity without HSN and with HSN numbers. However, the crucial element which is to be borne in mind is that for applying the rule that the Entry which is having a HSN number, must gain predominance as against any Entry which is without a HSN number, is that there must be inconsistency in the meaning of the commodity without HSN and with HSN numbers. We are of the view that the word “pickles” as used in Entry 49 of the 3rd Schedule is a distinct food product and not plant or vegetable which is preserved in vinegar or acetic acid. Pickles as understood in India with all the ingredients has a special connotation. At any rate, whatever be the approach the excise authorities or the customs authorities may take, we would think that the hands of the State Legislature is not tied in the matter of classification. The law giver in the State has chosen to specifically refer to the word “pickle” perceiving the product as specific food item to be dealt with on a separate basis from merely the vegetable as prepared or preserved in acetic acid or vinegar. We have already extracted the ingredients of pickles sold by the appellant itself. No doubt, it could be argued that as indicated in Ext.P13, the product covered by 20.01 may contain salt, spices, mustard, sugar or other sweetening matter and they may also contain oil or other additives. 20. Learned senior counsel for the appellant attacked the clarification issued by the Commissioner on the score that it is an unreasoned order. He would point out that a clarification issued binds not only the assessee concerned, but also all the authorities under the Act. Even though the impugned clarification was not issued at the instance of the appellant, it is contended therefore, that it becomes binding on the authorities as is evident from the impugned proceedings wherein reliance is placed by the officers on the clarification. 21. Learned Government Pleader would point out that the appellant was not the applicant. The arguments which have been addressed before this Court, may not have been addressed before the Commissioner by the applicant before him. It is not shown that the applicant therein has challenged the clarification. In this context, it is necessary to refer to Section 94, which, inter alia, reads as follows: “94. The arguments which have been addressed before this Court, may not have been addressed before the Commissioner by the applicant before him. It is not shown that the applicant therein has challenged the clarification. In this context, it is necessary to refer to Section 94, which, inter alia, reads as follows: “94. Power of Authority to issue clarification.- (1) If any dispute arises, otherwise than in a proceedings before any appellate or revisional authority or in any court or tribunal, as to whether, for the purpose of this Act,- (a) any person is a dealer; or (b) any transaction is a sale; or © any particular dealer is required to be registered; or (d) any tax is payable in respect of any sale or purchase, or if tax is payable, the point and the rate thereof; or (e) any activity carried out in any goods amounts to or results in the manufacture of goods; such disputer shall be decided by an authority consisting of three Officers in the rank of Joint Commissioner or Deputy Commissioner nominated by the Commissioner on application by a dealer or any other person. (1A) If the dispute relates to the tax rate of a commodity, the details of the first seller, or the manufacturer of such goods in the State, as the case may be, shall be furnished by the applicant and they shall be made necessary parties to such application. (2) The authority shall decide the question after giving the parties to the dispute a reasonable opportunity to put forward their case and produce evidence and after considering such evidence and hearing the parties pass orders within three months or within such time as may be extended by the Commissioner. Commissioner may considering the fact in issue decide whether such orders have prospective operation only. Commissioner may considering the fact in issue decide whether such orders have prospective operation only. (2A) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, where a clarification has been issued under this Section clarifying the rate of tax of any goods and the registered dealers were paying tax at lower rates on the sale of those goods before the issuance of such clarification,then if the manufacturer or first seller of the goods within the State, who shall also be a registered dealer, pays the entire tax due on the turnover of such goods sold by him at the Maximum Retail Price, then subsequent registered dealers who had purchased those goods and has sold the same shall not be assessed or penalized for the differential tax payable: Provided that such payment of tax under this sub-section shall be subject to the conditions and restrictions as may be prescribed. Explanation:- For the purpose of this section, Maximum Retail Price in respect of the goods mentioned means the maximum price printed on the packagee of any goods at which such goods may be sold to the ultimate oncumer and where such pricse is not so printed on the package, the price charged on the sale to the ultimate consumer. (3) Every application by a dealer or any other person other than an Officer acting on behalf of the Government under sub-section (1) shall be in such for as may be prescribed and shall be accompanied by a fee of five hundred rupees. (4) Where any question arises from any order passed or any proceedings recorded under this Act, or any earlier law no such question shall be entertained for determination under sub-section (1). (5) Every order issued by the authority under sub-section (1) shall, subject to the provisions of Section 62, be final and binding on the applicant and all authorities subordinate to the Commissioner including Deputy Commissioner (Appeals) and Assistant commissioner (Appeals). (6) If no unanimous decision is arrived at by the authority, the matter shall be referred to the Commissioner who shall decide the same as if the application is filed before him. (6) If no unanimous decision is arrived at by the authority, the matter shall be referred to the Commissioner who shall decide the same as if the application is filed before him. (7) If the order passed by the authority mentioned in sub-section (1) is found to be prejudicial to the revenue; the Commissioner may exercise his powers of suomoto revision, and may cancel, amend or vary such order: Provided that no order shall be passed under this sub-section, until the party is given an opportunity of being heard. (8) Where the Authority/Commissioner finds on a representation made to it by any Officer or otherwise, that an order passed by it was obtained by the applicant by fraud or mis-representation of facts, it may, by order, declare such order to be void ab initio and thereupon all the provisions of this Act shall apply to the applicant as if such order had never been made. (a) Power of Commissioner to revise a clarification: The clarification once made does not bar the statutory authority from making another clarification on the same entry, if the first once was found patently wrong. (b) No retrospective effect: The later clarification issued by the commissioner overruling the earlier clarification cannot have retrospective effect as the assessee's right under the Act to collect tax is denied. © Application of the clarification to be limited to the item on which clarification is sought for: If the clarification was issued for an item sold by a particular assessee, the other dealers are not entitled to the benefit of such clarification.” Therefore, a perusal of the aforesaid provisions shows that disputes which can be settled, include the tax rate of a commodity. 22. In the circumstances of the case, we are not inclined to think that the clarificatory order is liable to be interfered with on the score that it is unreasoned. The material on the basis of which the applicant before the Commissioner had approached the Commissioner, is not placed before us. Apparently, the applicant has not called in question the order of the Commissioner on the score that it does not disclose reasons which were germane in the context of the issues which were projected before the Commissioner. No doubt, it is open to a third party to question the clarification. Apparently, the applicant has not called in question the order of the Commissioner on the score that it does not disclose reasons which were germane in the context of the issues which were projected before the Commissioner. No doubt, it is open to a third party to question the clarification. But then, could it be said that without reference to the disputes which were really projected before the Commissioner being raised before the Court and in a case where the applicant therein has no complaint against the clarification, it should be interfered with for the reason that the arguments which are raised by a third party, have not been considered by the Commissioner. We would think that it may not be appropriate to permit the appellant to question the order on the ground that reasons which may be germane in the facts of this case, are not forthcoming in the order. Apparently, the Commissioner has given his clarification on the various items which include vegetable pickles. He has rested his decision on the basis of Entry 49 of the 3rd Schedule. We do not know whether he was called upon to compare Entry 49 and Entry 84(29) of the 3rd Schedule. Equally fallacious is the contention that principles of natural justice stand breached. Under the Act, no doubt, the Commissioner is obliged to afford an opportunity to the applicant. It is in this context necessary to bear in mind that Section 94(2) contemplates giving parties to the dispute a reasonable opportunity to put-forward their case and producing evidence and also hearing all the parties. It cannot be stretched by us to hold that the appellant should have been heard. At any rate, we would think that no purpose would be served to remit the matter, in view of the plain scheme which we have already adverted to. 23. Now let us examine the case of the appellant that the Assessing Officer has acted illegally in holding that the general registration of the brand name of the appellant is sufficient to get registration on all goods. 24. It is true that the appellant is selling pickles under the brand name “happy”. Appellant in its objections, however, took the contention that they have registered only the following goods under the Trade Mark Act: “1. Item No.29 of the Trade Mark Registry. ---Appl. 24. It is true that the appellant is selling pickles under the brand name “happy”. Appellant in its objections, however, took the contention that they have registered only the following goods under the Trade Mark Act: “1. Item No.29 of the Trade Mark Registry. ---Appl. No: Appl Date Journal No. Certificate No. ---- 1307149 06-09-2004 1329(S-1) 550596 25. Meat, Fish, Preserved, Dried and Cooked Fruits, Vegetables, Jellies, Jams, Milk and other Dairy Products. 26. Coffee, Tea, Cocoa, Sugar, Flour And Preparations made from cereals, Breads, Biscuits, Cakes, Pastry and Confectionaries, Vinegar, Spices. 27. Agricultural Grains not included in other fresh fruits, Vegetables, Food Stuffs included in Class 31.” It was contended, inter alia, that pickle is neither animal food stuff, nor vegetable food stuff and it could not come under Class 29. It was further contended that Class 30 also does not take in pickles. Class 31, it was pointed out,consisted mainly of land products not included in any other Classes. It was contended that the appellant registered only items as specified in Classes 29, 30 and 31 and that it is selling Jams, Sauces, concentrates and syrups tax which are goods registered under the Trade Mark Act. 25. The Officer refers to the provisions of the Act. A further notice was issued dated 12.3.2012. The appellant reiterated that pickle was not registered and even if it is sold under brand name, tax at 12.5 per cent need not be paid for want of registration with the authority concerned. The Officer further pointed out in the notice that in all the emblems “happy”, the products including pickles are shown with the circle with “(x)”. It is pointed out that as no statutory warning is given in the labels that pickles was not registered under the Trade Mark Act, it indicates that either the consumer is willfully confused or falsely fascinated towards the brand. To the same, the appellant gave clarification. The appellant pointed out that the sole question is whether pickle is sold under trade mark which is registered. It is contended that pickle does not come under Class 30. It was pointed out that assuming for argument sake, the appellant has shown the pickle around their trade mark, it did not affect a matter of fact which has not been proved with positive evidence. It was found that there was no statutory provision to give a statutory warning. It is contended that pickle does not come under Class 30. It was pointed out that assuming for argument sake, the appellant has shown the pickle around their trade mark, it did not affect a matter of fact which has not been proved with positive evidence. It was found that there was no statutory provision to give a statutory warning. The Officer finds as follows: The appellant has itself admitted in both its reply that pickles are sold under the name “happy” registered with the trade mark registry. The validity of the clarification under Section 94 was not objected or questioned. The application No.1307149 dated 06.09.2004 is put in Form TM51 paying Rs.7,500/= as registration fee for obtaining registration of trade mark “happy” label. Under Section 18(2) and Rule 25(2), for Classes 29, 30 and 31, it is stated that the law contemplates a single application for registration of a trade mark for different classes of goods or services (other than collective mark or a certification trade mark). Certificate in Form O-2 was issued under Section 23(2) and Rule 62(1) during August, 2006 for multi-class application. Section 2(l)(w) of the Trade Mark Act, 1999 defines a registered trade mark as meaning a trade mark which was actually on the register and remain in force. The Officer states that “happy” label is remaining in force during the period of assessment. Application Forms for various goods, like Jam, Ketchup/Sauce, Soft Drinks, Syrups and Fruit Jams filed by the appellant were cross-checked with the Registry which revealed that they are in Form TM1, for the States of Tamil Nadu (Jam Group) and West Bengal (Jam Group) (Soft Drinks, etc.). Thereafter it is stated that, therefore, the item pickle was rightly sold by the dealer under the trade mark registered under Multi-class application obtained from the Registry concerned. The contention that pickle cannot find a place under Class 30 of the Registration was rejected as without merit as it has obtained registration under either Classes also. Thereafter it is stated that, therefore, the item pickle was rightly sold by the dealer under the trade mark registered under Multi-class application obtained from the Registry concerned. The contention that pickle cannot find a place under Class 30 of the Registration was rejected as without merit as it has obtained registration under either Classes also. Reference is made to Rule 22(2) of the Trade Mark Rules, 2002 to uphold that the Ivth Schedule only provides a means by which the general content of numbered International Classes can be quickly identified, which indicates that broad line classification only was made in the Ivth Schedule and it is upto the dealer to properly include goods in the Class in which it has obtained registration, unless there is any dispute from other dealers. “Pickle” will be sold under the brand name “happy” label registered vide Certificate No.1307149. On the said basis, the contention of the appellant was over-ruled. Taking note of the contention of the appellant that “happy” brand name is wellknown in market and whether registered under the Trade Mark Act or not, is immaterial to decide the market of the products as things stood now. It is pointed out that the dealer has the infrastructure to be aware of the penal provision for representing a trade mark as registered. There is reference made to the details in the web site to find that the appellant has published for information of the public and consumers that the “happy” brand includes among other products “pickles”. Reference was also made to the clarification. Thereafter, it is found that the appellant has sold pickle under the brand name “happy” label with emblem registered under the Trade Mark Act, 1999. Hence, the intention of the Legislature has to be gathered from the language of the statutory provisions and the same cannot be ascertained from what it has failed to say. It is stated that if words are capable of more than one meaning, the Authority must accept the meaning which will be in consonance with the spirit and purpose for which such an Act was enacted. 26. We notice that the appellant has produced a communication from the Assessing Officer to the Trade Mark Registry. He refers to Entry 49 of Schedule III. Reference is made to trade mark Nos.465494 B under Class 29 item shown as “Jam group”. 26. We notice that the appellant has produced a communication from the Assessing Officer to the Trade Mark Registry. He refers to Entry 49 of Schedule III. Reference is made to trade mark Nos.465494 B under Class 29 item shown as “Jam group”. Then, there is reference to 465496 B under Class 29 which is “Ketchup/sauce group”. Still further, there is reference to 465497 B under Class 29. The items therein are “Soft drinks, syrups and fruit juices included in Class 32”. The Assessing Officer points out that the dealer's contention is thatpickles is not particularly registered. The question which was posed was whether specific registration of each and every item is essential with Trade Mark Act to get the status of sales under registered trade mark or general registration of the brand is sufficient. The item “pickles” was also registered as a specific item, it is stated. The answer by the Trade Mark Registry dated 19.3.2012 is extracted hereunder: “With reference to the above, I am enclosing herewith a copy of application on Form TM- 51/Form TM-1 for registration of the trade mark “happy” label per se bearing No.1307149, 465494, 465496 & 465497 and also a copy of the application details in respect of the above numbers, which show that the said trade mark is not applied for registration in respect of the goods “Pickles”. I am to inform that specific registration of each and every item is essential under the Trade marks Act, 1999 to get the status of registered trade mark for those items.” 28. According to the appellant, the office letter is dated 19.3.2012 and the reply which we have referred to from the Trade Mark Registry is dated 23.3.2012. But, the Assessing Officer has not cared to refer to the question or the answer in fact in the order. 29. We are of the view that the assessee must be a person who has obtained registration of its brand in respect of pickles to suffer tax at 12.5%. It is not sufficient that there is general registration obtained. Going by the reply given by the Trade Mark Registry which we cannot hold to be illegal or wrong (in fact it has been issued by the Deputy Registrar of Trade Marks), though the appellant may be using the brand name “happy” (label), there is no registration for the trade mark for the product “pickles”. Going by the reply given by the Trade Mark Registry which we cannot hold to be illegal or wrong (in fact it has been issued by the Deputy Registrar of Trade Marks), though the appellant may be using the brand name “happy” (label), there is no registration for the trade mark for the product “pickles”. It may be true that the appellant may be advertising its products under the label “happy”. It may also be true that the appellant has obtained registration in respect of many of its food products under the Trade Mark Act, 1999 with the trade mark “happy” (label). But, to deprive the appellant of the benefit of the concessional rate of taxation (4%) provided in Entry 49, we are of the view that the appellant must have obtained registration for the trade mark in respect of pickles. We must remind ourselves that we are dealing with a provision relating to assessment to tax and while it may be true that the principle of purposive interpretation is not alien to the law of taxation, to carry it to the extent the Assessing Officer has done is, in our view, impermissible. Appellant has admittedly registered for the class of goods contained in Classes 29, 30 and 31. Registration of the trade mark confers certain statutory rights, namely the right to obtain relief in respect of infringement of trade mark. The upshot of the above discussion is as follows: We dismiss the Appeal. As far as the Writ Petition is concerned, in view of our finding that the product “pickles” marketed by the petitioner though it may be under a brand name, as the same has not been specifically registered under the Trade Mark Act 1999, the view taken by the Assessing Officer that the pickles cannot be taxed under Entry 49 of the III Schedule is unjustifiable. Accordingly, we quash Exts.P2, P3, P4, P5 and P6 and the matter will be redone in accordance with law.