JUDGMENT : Sureshwar Thakur, J. 1. All these petitions are being disposed of by a common order as common question of fact and law are involved in these petitions. 2. The land/property, in dispute, is alleged, to have been encroached upon by the petitioners. As a prelude, to the issuance of show cause notices upon the petitioners, under the provisions of Himachal Pradesh Public Premises and Land (Eviction and Rent Recovery) Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act"), calling upon them to show cause as to why they be not evicted from the land/property in dispute, the halqua Kanungo, with the aid of Patwari halqua concerned, had carried out demarcation of the land/property in dispute. In sequel to the demarcations, it was detected that the petitioners had constructed/raised shops/house/orchard etc., on the land/property in dispute. Pursuant to the petitioners having been served with notice to show cause as to why they be not evicted from the land/property in dispute, they appeared before the Collector-cum Divisional Officer concerned, exercising powers under the Act of 1971. The Officer(s), aforesaid, after having permitted the petitioners as well as the respondents, to, adduce evidence in support of their respective claims, on a perusal of the evidence, as adduced on behalf of the parties at contest, as also after having given them full opportunity of being heard, rendered orders for their eviction from the land/property in dispute. A perusal of the orders, passed by the Collector-cum-Divisional Forest Officer, divulges that the petitioners had contended before the officer, who rendered the aforesaid orders, (a) the fact of theirs having acquired title to the suit property by way of adverse possession; (b) that the demarcations having been untenably carried out, in as much, as, they having not been carried out by the Assistant Collector of either grade, who, otherwise are empowered, to demarcate the land/property in dispute, rather, it having been unwarrantably carried out by the Kanungo. The Officers, who rendered the orders aforesaid, discountenanced the above contention, raised before them by the petitioners, consequently, the petitioners were ordered to be evicted from the property in dispute. 3. The petitioners had preferred appeals before the Divisional Commissioner, Mandi, who, after having afforded full opportunity to the contesting parties, to, project their respective stands, had proceeded to dismiss the appeals, as preferred before him against the orders, aforesaid. 3. The petitioners had preferred appeals before the Divisional Commissioner, Mandi, who, after having afforded full opportunity to the contesting parties, to, project their respective stands, had proceeded to dismiss the appeals, as preferred before him against the orders, aforesaid. In sequel, the petitioners prefer the instant petitions before this Court. 4. The petitioners' challenge to the impugned orders is manifold; (a) the proceedings, which culminated in the rendition of impugned orders, are, vitiated in as much, as, no notice, in terms of provisions of the Act, prior to the commencement of the proceedings, was issued to the petitioners; (b) that the petitioners were not associated in the demarcation of the land/property in dispute by the revenue officials concerned and (c) that the petitioners had acquired the title to the suit property by way of adverse possession, hence, the respondents were incompetent to dislodge/displace the petitioners from the land/property in dispute. 5. While construing the strength and vigour of the contention of the learned counsel appearing for the petitioners, that the impugned orders falls apart, in the face of, no statutory notice, in terms of the provisions of the Act, having been issued to the petitioners, the said contention is rendered rudderless, in as much, as, a perusal of the said impugned orders, reveals that representations on behalf of the petitioners were made before the Tehsildar concerned. Consequently, even if, assumingly, no notices, prior to the commencement of the proceedings, under the provisions of the Act, were served upon the petitioners, yet in the face of the petitioners having come to be represented by counsels, before the authority, who, pronounced the order of the eviction of the petitioners from the land in dispute, renders the proceedings, as well as, the impugned orders to be uninfected by any vice. Therefore, the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners that with the petitioners never having come to be served upon any notice, prior to the launching of the proceedings, hence, were condemned unheard, also staggers. Therefore, the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners that with the petitioners never having come to be served upon any notice, prior to the launching of the proceedings, hence, were condemned unheard, also staggers. (b) Even if, assuming the petitioners were not associated in the demarcation of the land in dispute by the revenue officials concerned, yet, in the face of the petitioners having moved an application for regularization of the encroachment, as carried out, at the instance of the petitioners, personifies, the fact of theirs acquiescing to the findings, recorded by the demarcating officers, who carried out the demarcations of the land/property in dispute and in pursuance thereto, detected the petitioners to have encroached upon the land/property in dispute. As a sequitur, theirs purported absence has no legal impact on the validity of the demarcation. Consequently, the absence of association of the petitioners in the demarcations, carried out by the demarcating officers, does not, for reiteration, affect the efficacy of the findings, recorded by the demarcating officer. 6. Moreover, the submission of the learned counsels for the petitioners of theirs having acquired title to the suit property by way of adverse possession, also has a consequential legal ramification, in as much, as, it, too, bespeaks of the petitioners having acquiesced to theirs having encroached upon the land/property in dispute, hence, theirs being not entitled to retain it. Even if, assumingly, the petitioners may have acquired title to the suit property by way of adverse possession, the said contention would have succored vindication, in case, the petitioners had placed on record a decree granted in their favour by a Civil Court of competent jurisdiction declaring them to have become owners of the land/property in dispute by statutory prescription. However, such evidence is amiss. Consequently, in the absence of a decree of Civil Court of competent jurisdiction in their favour and its declaring them to have become owner of the suit property by way of adverse possession, there is no substance or vigour in the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners that they have acquired the title to the suit property by way of adverse possession and that, it, bars the respondents to recover possession of the land/property in dispute from them. 7. 7. The upshot of the above discussion is that the instant petitions are wholly misconceived and the same are dismissed as such, along with pending application(s), if any. No costs.