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Madhya Pradesh High Court · body

2014 DIGILAW 700 (MP)

Santosh Kumar Sharma v. Sooraj Prasad Shrivastava

2014-06-23

U.C.MAHESHWARI

body2014
Judgment: U.C. Maheshwari, J. 1. Heard. On behalf of the petitioner-defendant, this petition is filed being aggrieved by the order dated 31-1-2012, passed by the I Civil Judge, Class I, Katni in COS No. 71-A/11 whereby allowing the application of the respondent filed under Section 13(6) of M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961, (in short "the Act"), the defence of the petitioner available under the provisions of the Act has been struck down and simultaneously, the application of the petitioner filed to condone the delay and in extending the period with opportunity to deposit the entire arrears of rent and recurring rent of the disputed premises has been dismissed. 2. The petitioner's Counsel after taking me through the petition as well as papers placed on record alongwith the impugned order, by referring the provisions of Section 13 of the Act argued that after receiving the summon of the impugned suit, the petitioner had given his appearance before the Trial Court and took adjournment on dated 28-3-2011 and thereafter, he had filed WS on 20-5-2011 and subsequently, some talk of compromise was going on between the parties and that is why the sum of the arrears of rent was not deposited by the petitioner with the Trial Court in accordance with the provision of Section 13(1) of the Act and that is why besides the aforesaid application filed on behalf of the respondent for striking down the defence, the petitioner has also filed an application for extending time and opportunity to him to deposit the arrears of rent. Subsequently, he has deposited the entire arrears of rent on 13-2-2012 through receipt No. 47 of book No. 16621. At this stage, on asking the petitioner's Counsel whether after depositing such sum on the aforesaid date 13-2-2012 has he filed any application before the Trial Court for condoning the delay in depositing such arrears of rent, on which he submits that no such application has been filed. Also on asking the Counsel whether he is depositing the regular monthly recurring rent with the Trial Court, on which he submits that probably petitioner is depositing the same, but he does not have any positive information in this regard. Also on asking the Counsel whether he is depositing the regular monthly recurring rent with the Trial Court, on which he submits that probably petitioner is depositing the same, but he does not have any positive information in this regard. Again on asking the petitioner's Counsel whether any dispute regarding rate of monthly rent or quantum of alleged arrears on any count has been raised in the WS, on which he submits that no such objection was taken either in the WS or through reply of aforesaid application or by any independent application. 3. In the aforesaid premises, the petitioner's Counsel prayed that considering the aforesaid cause, as talk of compromise was going on between the parties, so the arrears of rent was not deposited, to be sufficient cause or in any case by invoking the jurisdiction of mercy the entire delay caused in depositing the arrears of rent be condoned and pursuant to it by setting aside the impugned order, the aforesaid application of the respondent be dismissed. 4. On the other hand, respondent's Counsel responding the aforesaid arguments by justifying the impugned order said that the same being passed in accordance with the mandatory provisions and scheme of Section 13(1) of the Act does not require any interference under the writ jurisdiction of this Court. He further said that under the writ jurisdiction, this Court can only interfere in the order of Subordinate Court if the same has been passed contrary to the law and vested jurisdiction of such Court or against the propriety of law, which is not the situation in the present matter and prayed for dismissal of this petition. 5. Having heard the Counsel at length, keeping in view their arguments, I have carefully gone through the petition as well as the papers placed on record alongwith the impugned applications and the order. 6. According to the provisions and scheme of Sections 12(1)(a) and 13(1) of the Act the tenant like the petitioner is bound to pay the entire arrears of the rent within two months from the date of receiving the demand notice of such arrears of the rent from the landlord like respondent. 6. According to the provisions and scheme of Sections 12(1)(a) and 13(1) of the Act the tenant like the petitioner is bound to pay the entire arrears of the rent within two months from the date of receiving the demand notice of such arrears of the rent from the landlord like respondent. If the same was not paid within aforesaid period, then after filing eviction suit on any of the grounds provided under the Act by the landlord, then the petitioner was bound to deposit the entire arrears and recurring monthly rent within 30 days from the date of receiving the summons of the suit. But undisputedly, such arrears of rent and recurring rent was not deposited by the petitioner as per mandatory provisions of Section 13(1) of the Act within 30 days from the date of receiving the summons of the suit. As per available record, after receiving the summon of the suit, the petitioner had given his appearance before the Trial Court on 28-3-2011 and thereafter, he had taken time to file WS and the same was filed on 20-5-2011. Till then, neither the entire arrears of rent nor recurring monthly rent at the contractual rate was deposited and subsequently on filing the impugned application on behalf of the respondent for striking out the defence of the petitioner under Section 13(6) of the Act, instead to deposit such arrears, the petitioner has filed another application to extend the time to deposit the arrears of rent without depositing any of such sum. So it is apparent that till filing the aforesaid both the applications and even till consideration of the same by the impugned order, the sum of the arrears and of recurring monthly rent of the premises was not deposited by the petitioner. So in such premises, it is apparent that the petitioner has committed default in depositing the arrears of rent and in such premises, the Trial Court did not have any other option but to allow the application of respondent and striking out the defence of the petitioner, available to defend the case on the grounds of eviction enumerated under Section12(1) of the Act. 7. 7. So far the grounds taken on behalf of the petitioner before the Trial Court as well as argued by the petitioner's Counsel that some talk of compromise was going on between the parties and that is why the sum of the arrears and recurring rent was not deposited and subsequent to passing the impugned order, the same has been deposited, is concerned, I am of the considered view that such talk of compromise could not be considered as sufficient cause contrary to the mandatory provisions of Section 12(1)(a) and Section 13 of the Act. 8. Apart from aforesaid, it is apparent that in WS neither the rate of monthly rent nor quantum of the arrears has been challenged by the petitioner with any of the explanations. So on such count also the Trial Court could not consider the aforesaid cause as sufficient to extend the time to deposit the entire arrears of rent and recurring monthly rent. 9. My aforesaid approach is fully fortified with the principle laid down by the Apex Court in the matter of Jamnalal and others v. Radheshyam, reported in (2000) 4 SCC 380 , in which it was held as under:-- “Where the dispute as to the amount of rent payable to the tenant has no nexus with the rate of rent, the determination of such dispute in a summary inquiry is not contemplated under Sub-section (2) of Section 13. Such a dispute has to be resolved after trial of the case. Consequently, it is only when the obligations imposed in Section 13(1) cannot be complied with without resolving the dispute under Sub-section (2) of that section, that Section 13(1) will become inoperative till such time the dispute is resolved by the Court by fixing a reasonable provisional rent in relation to the accommodation. It follows that where the rate of rent and the quantum of arrears of rent are disputed the whole of Section 13(1) becomes inoperative till provisional fixation of monthly rent by the Court under Sub-section (2) of Section 13, which will govern compliance of Section 13(1) of the Act. It follows that where the rate of rent and the quantum of arrears of rent are disputed the whole of Section 13(1) becomes inoperative till provisional fixation of monthly rent by the Court under Sub-section (2) of Section 13, which will govern compliance of Section 13(1) of the Act. But, where rate of rent is admitted and the quantum of arrears of rent is disputed, (on the plea that the rent for the period in question or part thereof has been paid or otherwise adjusted), Sub-section (2) of Section 13 is not attracted as determination of such a dispute is not postulated thereunder. Therefore, the obligation to pay/deposit the rent for the second and the third period afore-mentioned, referred to in Section 13(1), namely, to deposit rent for the period subsequent to notice of demand and for the period in which the suit/proceedings will be pending (that is future rent) does not become inoperative for the simple reason that Section 13(2) does not contemplate provisional determination of amount of rent payable by the tenant. As resolution of that category of dispute does not fall under Section 13(2) the tenant has to take the consequence of non-payment/deposit of rents for the said periods. If he fails in his plea that no arrears are due and the Court finds that the arrears of rent for the period in question were not paid, it has to pass an order of eviction against the tenant as no provision of Section 13 of the Act protects him.” 10. In view of aforesaid, after committing the default in depositing the entire sum of the arrears and of recurring rent in compliance of Section 13(1) of the Act, the tenant like the petitioner is bound to suffer the consequences of it and he cannot defend the case on the grounds of eviction available to the landlord like the respondent under the Act. Although under the General Laws, the petitioner has some limited right to defend the matter on which he may defend the suit. 11. In view of aforesaid discussions, I have not found any perversity, irregularity or anything against the propriety of law in the order impugned. Consequently, by affirming the same, this petition being devoid of any merits is hereby dismissed. There shall be no order as to cost.