JUDGMENT N.V. Anjaria, J. 1. The appellants of this Second Appeal are original plaintiffs. Their Civil Suit for partition of the joint family properties and for handing over possession thereof to the extent of the share claimed therein, came to be dismissed by the trial Court. Regular Civil Appeal No. 404 of 1980 preferred against the trial Court's judgment was also dismissed. 1.1. The appellants therefore, challenged judgment and order dated 6th April, 1996 of learned 2nd Extra-Assistant Judge, Vadodara, dismissing the said Regular Civil Appeal No. 404 of 1980, by way of this Second Appeal before this Court. Substantial Questions of Law: At the time of admission of this Appeal, the following substantial questions of law were formulated. "(i) Whether on the facts and circumstances of the case, Sec. 8 of the Limitation Act would override the provisions of Secs. 6 and 7 thereof? (ii) Whether the limitation for the plaintiff's suit would be governed by Art. 110 of the Limitation Act? (iii) Whether on the facts and circumstances of the case, even if the suit is otherwise time-barred, the reliefs sought by the plaintiff in respect of his share in the property of Ravjibhai-defendant No. 1, who died pending the Appeal, would not be time-barred?" Facts and Pleadings 2. The facts of the case and the controversy involved may be outlined. 2.1. Plaintiff No. 1 was the son of deceased Shamalbhai Motibhai, whereas plaintiff No. 2 was widow of Shamalbhai. Motibhai Lallubhai was the grandfather of plaintiff No. 1 and father of Shamalbhai Patel. Motibhai Lallubhai's other three sons-the brothers of Shamalbhai and uncle of plaintiff No. 1 named Ravjibhai, Arvindbhai and Chhotabhai were the defendant Nos. 1 to 3 in Regular Civil Suit No. 174 of 1977 instituted by the appellants-plaintiffs before the Court of Joint Civil Judge (J.D.), Karjan-Shinor. As per the plaint originally filed, it was plaintiffs' case that the father Shamalbhai expired in the year 1955, leaving plaintiff No. 1 as the only son and plaintiff No. 2-the widowed mother. The grandfather Motibhai Lallubhai expired on 19th November, 1960. Said Motibhai distributed all his ancestral properties prior to 19th November, 1960 and handed over possession of the respective share to each son during his life time, and a writing was executed. It was stated that at that time entries were mutated in the Government records. The plaintiff No. 1 was minor at that time. Said Motibhai distributed all his ancestral properties prior to 19th November, 1960 and handed over possession of the respective share to each son during his life time, and a writing was executed. It was stated that at that time entries were mutated in the Government records. The plaintiff No. 1 was minor at that time. 2.1.1. According to the plaintiffs, deceased Motibhai retained towards his share, in all 6 Acres and 7 Gunthas of agricultural lands, comprised of Survey No. 508 admeasuring 2 Acres and 25 Gunthas; Survey No. 302 Paiki admeasuring 12 Gunthas; Survey No. 189 Paiki admeasuring 13 Gunthas; Survey No. 367 Paiki admeasuring 2 Acres and 8 Gunthas and Survey No. 472 Paiki admeasuring 29 Gunthas, all situated at Village Gamaradi. It was the case that after the death of Motibhai, the said properties were to be partitioned amongst the heirs of the deceased Motibhai. It was further stated that the defendants taking advantage of the minor age of plaintiff No. 1, did not give his share, instead got mutated the properties in their names in the Government records. 2.1.2. The plaintiff No. 1 became major on 1st March, 1974. The plaintiffs claimed that after plaintiff No. 1 became major, he asked for his share in the properties; but the defendants expressed to say that they would give his share on payment of additional amount of Rs. 5,000/- in two instalments. It was a further case put forth by plaintiffs that upon negotiations, the defendants were permitted to cultivate the land for three years, and thereafter, they were required to surrender the share of the plaintiffs by handing over possession. The defendants did not act accordingly to the said understanding; the possession of the share in the properties was not given. The plaintiffs therefore served notice dated 8th August, 1977 and then the suit for partition and possession was instituted on 15th October, 1977. 2.2. The defendants contested the suit by filing written statement at Exh. 11, and contended that the properties of their father deceased Motibhai was divided into equal shares including that of plaintiffs' during lifetime of Motibhai. The defendants accepted that the properties of the deceased Motibhai were divided and distributed during his lifetime, but they denied about execution of any writing on 29th November, 1960 in that regard as claimed by the plaintiffs. The defendants stated that no property was left for partitioning. The defendants accepted that the properties of the deceased Motibhai were divided and distributed during his lifetime, but they denied about execution of any writing on 29th November, 1960 in that regard as claimed by the plaintiffs. The defendants stated that no property was left for partitioning. They stated that as plaintiff No. 1 was minor at that time, his share was given to his mother-plaintiff No. 2. It was also contended that the plaintiffs had not filed their suit within three years from the date of attaining majority, hence the same was time-barred. 2.2.1. It was next contended that properties bearing Survey Nos. 367, 189 and 302 were acquired by them under tenancy rights, and therefore, they were not liable to be partitioned. As per defendants case, amongst the suit properties, the open gabhan grazing ground land was purchased by defendant No. 2 by registered sale-deed during lifetime of Motibhai and the said property also was not a joint property. The allegations of the plaintiffs about denial of share to plaintiff No. 1 and that upon plaintiff No. 1 becoming major he requested for giving his share, and that there was an understanding between him and the defendants and that accordingly, the defendants were permitted to cultivate the land for three years, etc., were specifically denied by the defendants. 2.3. Initially, the trial Court framed the following issues at Exh. 12, (1) Whether plaintiffs prove that they got 1/4 share in the property of deceased Motibhai Lallubhai?; (2) Whether plaintiffs prove that properties described in Para four was to be distributed after death of Motibhai Lallubhai in equal shares amongst his heirs?; (3) Whether plaintiffs prove that the alleged settlement took place between them and defendants in the year 1974?; (4) Whether defendants prove that they got S. No. 367 under Tenancy Act?; (5) Whether suit is bad for misjoinder of parties? If yes, what is the effect?; (5A) Whether defendants prove that the land admeasuring A-13 G. of S. No. 189 and A-12 G. of S. No. 302 got by defendants No. 3 as a tenant?; (5B) Whether defendants prove that open gabhan of 9254 ft. No. 208 is of ownership of defendants No. 2?; (5C) Whether suit is time-barred? If yes, what is its effect? and (6) Whether plaintiffs are entitled to reliefs sought for? 2.3.1. On 17th October, 1980, the trial Court dismissed the plaintiffs suit. No. 208 is of ownership of defendants No. 2?; (5C) Whether suit is time-barred? If yes, what is its effect? and (6) Whether plaintiffs are entitled to reliefs sought for? 2.3.1. On 17th October, 1980, the trial Court dismissed the plaintiffs suit. The trial Court held with reference to issue No. 2 that the defendants acted to mutate their names in the revenue records in respect of the properties after death of Motibhai Lallubhai. Exh. 44 was the statement/reply to the revenue authorities wherein it was stated by the defendants that properties mentioned at Exh. 43 were left undivided during the life-time of deceased Motibhai Lallubhai. The trial Court observed that revenue authorities did not issue Notice under Sec. 135D of the Bombay Land Revenue Code to any of the plaintiffs which was a mandatory requirement. The case of the plaintiffs in the plaint that there was an understanding and settlement between them and the defendants with regard to handing over share in the property after plaintiff No. 1 attained majority etc., was not believed by the trial Court. It held that the plaintiffs had not proved any such understanding or settlement. 2.3.2. It on the basis of evidence on the record came to the conclusion that out of the suit properties, Survey Nos. 189, 302 and 267/1 were purchased by the defendants' under the Tenancy Act. About the Gabhan land, the issue was held in favour of the defendants and it was recorded that the same was purchased by defendant No. 2 by registered sale-deed and that there was nothing to show that it was ever in the name of Motibhai. 2.3.3. The claim of the plaintiffs in respect of rest of the properties was not accepted for any relief as the suit was held to be time-barred on the consideration that it was not filed within three years from the date of plaintiff No. 1 attaining majority. Sub-Proceeding: xxx xxx xxx 2.6.1. The first appellate Court ultimately dismissed Regular Civil Appeal on 6th April, 1996 which is the impugned judgment. Findings Recorded by Courts: 2.7. At this stage the findings recorded by both the Courts below may be overviewed for having a complete picture. The trial Court held that deceased defendant No. 1-Rayjibhai was competent to execute Will in respect of the properties which had fallen in his share and that Will (Exh. 131) was duly proved. Findings Recorded by Courts: 2.7. At this stage the findings recorded by both the Courts below may be overviewed for having a complete picture. The trial Court held that deceased defendant No. 1-Rayjibhai was competent to execute Will in respect of the properties which had fallen in his share and that Will (Exh. 131) was duly proved. The execution thereof was proved from appreciation of evidence of defendant No. 1-Arvindbhai (Exh. 56), evidence of Bhikhabhai Chhaganbhai (Exh. 65), evidence of one Babarbhai Bhailal, who was the writer of the Will (Exh. 109), the witness Sureshbhai Ramanbhai (Exh. 110). Upon consideration and reading of all the said evidence together, the trial Court recorded its findings as per discussion in Paragraphs 13 to 18 of the judgment dated 9th October, 1986. As the Will was proved, it was held that defendant No. 2 became sole owner of the properties. The first appellate Court revisited the facts and evidence on record on the said aspect and endorsing to the conclusions of the trial Court on those aspects, recorded concurrent findings of fact. 2.7.1. About the rival claim on deceased Ravjibhai's property, both the Courts below elaborately discussed the evidence. The case of defendant Nos. 2 and 3 in their written statement at Exh. 73 about deceased Ravjibhai having executed a Gift-Deed in favour of defendants in the year 1970, and thereafter, for technical reasons said Ravjibhai executed Will in the year 1980, came to be accepted on appreciation of evidence. It was observed and held that Ravjibhai was in conscious and sound state of mind. The properties of Ravjibhai, recorded the Courts below, were mutated in the name of defendant No. 2 in the revenue record and the mutation entries (Exh. 95) were made, that in the revenue proceedings the Deputy Collector found defendant No. 2 to be in possession of the said properties (Exh. 96). 2.7.2. On the question of suit being time-barred, the first appellate Court concurred with the findings of the trial Court to hold that in view of the provisions of Sec. 6 and Sec. 8 of the Limitation Act, 1963 and that Sec. 6 was subject to control of Sec. 8, the plaintiffs having not filed their suit within three years from the date of attaining majority, the same was beyond the period of limitation. With regard to three of the Survey numbers in respect of which the case of the defendants that they were received under the Tenancy Law, the first appellate Court differed with the finding of the trial Court, but then held that since the suit itself was barred by limitation, the answer to the said aspect was of no consequence. In respect of case of the plaintiffs with regard to share in the property of deceased Ravjibhai the first appellate Court affirmed the findings of the trial Court that the execution of Will (Exh. 131) was proper and was duly proved on evidence, which made defendant No. 2 the sole owner of the properties of Ravjibhai. The plaintiffs claim for share in Ravjibhai's property was thus held not acceptable and tenable in law. Contentions of Appellants: 3. In the Memorandum of Appeal, me appellant raised grounds to contend that the Courts below did not properly appreciated the evidence and that they ought to have held that the deceased Ravjibhai was not in sound position. In respect of finding that the suit was barred by limitation, it was contended that me lower appellate Court did not properly read Sec. 6 of the Limitation Act which entitled a minor to institute suit within the prescribed period of limitation after disability ceased. It was contended that Courts ought to have held that as per Article of the Limitation Act, period of 12 years and not just three years was available. It was pleaded that both the Courts erred in applying Sec. 8 of me Act which in the facts of the case was not applicable. 3.1. Learned Advocate Mr. Joitabhai Patel for the appellants reiterated and elaborated various grounds raised in the Memorandum of Appeal. He relied on decision in Darshan Singh v. Gurdev Singh, AIR 1995 SC 75 on the scope of Secs. 6 and 8 of me Limitation Act, in particular on the observations in Paragraph 4 thereof. For similar purpose, he relied on a Madras High Court decision in Chinnaiah Kownder v. Kattayya Kownder, AIR 1978 Mad. 51 . He contended that cause of action had arisen for me plaintiffs in the year 1968 and me period of limitation available was 12 years and the limit of three years contemplated under Sec. 8 would not curtail the total period. 3.2. 51 . He contended that cause of action had arisen for me plaintiffs in the year 1968 and me period of limitation available was 12 years and the limit of three years contemplated under Sec. 8 would not curtail the total period. 3.2. Learned Advocate for the appellant next submitted by pressing into service Supreme Court's decision in Vidya Devi @ Vidya Vati (Dead) by L.Rs. v. Prem Prakash, 1995 (4) SCC 496 that the plaintiffs suit was for partition and for partition suit, no period of limitation was prescribed under the Limitation Act. He submitted, that therefore, the suit of the plaintiffs could not have been treated as time-barred. In support of this contention, learned Advocate relied on a decision of the Supreme Court in Govindamaal v. R. Perianal, AIR 2007 SC 204 . Learned Advocate relied on yet another decision of Punjab and Haryana High Court in Naroti Dass v. Smt. Phul Kaur, [ AIR 2007 P.&H. 157 ] to contend that right to sue for partition is a continuing right. 3.3. He, therefore, submitted that on the date of cessation of disability, in this case attainment of age of majority, the period of limitation available to institute the suit is more than three years, in that case Sec. 8 will not have its effect and it would be permissible to institute the suit within the original period available. In other words, in such event, full period of limitation would be available and the outer limit of three years contemplated in Sec. 8 would not apply. Learned Advocate also submitted that in the instant case, the cause of action arose on 7th December, 1968 because till that date, the suit properties were running in the name of deceased Motibhai-the grandfather and had retained the status of joint family property. 3.4. Learned Advocate for the appellant then made an alternative submission that the suit was one which could be said to have been governed by Art. 110 of the Limitation Act, 1963, wherein the period provided was 12 years. According to learned Advocate since cause of action arose in 1968 when the defendants mutated their names in the revenue record and calculated from the said point of time, a total period of 12 years was available as period of limitation and thus the suit which was instituted in October, 1977, was within time as was within 12 years. According to learned Advocate since cause of action arose in 1968 when the defendants mutated their names in the revenue record and calculated from the said point of time, a total period of 12 years was available as period of limitation and thus the suit which was instituted in October, 1977, was within time as was within 12 years. Submissions by Respondents: 3.5. On the other hand, learned Advocate Mr. J.M. Patel for the respondents contended that both the Courts below properly interpreted Secs. 6 and 8 of me Limitation Act, 1963 to hold the suit as time-barred. It was submitted that the plaintiff No. 1 who was minor at the time of accrual of cause of action was required to institute suit within three years from the date of his attaining majority. He submitted that the plaintiff was entitled to the benefit of Sec. 6 but then the period of three years provided in Sec. 8 would govern his case. 3.6. Learned Advocate for the respondents also relied on the decision in Darshan Sing, [ AIR 1995 SC 75 ] relied on by learned Advocate for the appellants to highlight the scope and working of Secs. 6 and 8 of the Act. Learned Advocate for the respondent next relied on the decisions in Bailochan Karan v. Basant Kumari Naik, 1992 (2) SCC 310 of the Supreme Court and of this Court in Jadav Prabhatbhai Jethabhai v. Parmar Karsanbhai Dhulabhai, 2001 (1) GLR 16 (FB) and further the oral judgment dated 6th August, 2012 in Kantabai Wd/o. Chhitabhai Rancnodbhai v. Ukadbhai Bhaijibhai Tadvi, being Second Appeal No. 72 of 1991 in which Jadav Prabhatbhai, [ 2001 (1) GLR 16 (FB)] was relied on which were also in respect of the effect of Secs. 6, 7 and 8 of the Limitation Act, 1963. State of Punjab v. Gurdev Singh and Ashok Kumar, AIR 1992 SC 111 as well as a decision of this Court in Prajaram Vitthalji Seth v. Maganlal Vitthalji Seth, 1970 GLR 602 relied on, on the aspect as to when the cause of action can be said to accrue. Sections 6 and 8 of the Limitation Act: 4. Having noticed the controversy and the rival contentions, proceeding to address the substantial questions and to consider the provisions of Sec. 6 and Sec. 8 of the Limitation Act, 1963, and their applicability to the facts of the case, Secs. Sections 6 and 8 of the Limitation Act: 4. Having noticed the controversy and the rival contentions, proceeding to address the substantial questions and to consider the provisions of Sec. 6 and Sec. 8 of the Limitation Act, 1963, and their applicability to the facts of the case, Secs. 6, 7 and 8 of the Limitation Act are special provisions in respect of the period of limitation. While Sec. 3 of the Act provides that if period prescribed in the Schedule to the Act for a suit or proceedings of particular kind gets expired then such suit, etc., would become barred by limitation. Section 3 at the same time says that the limitation period gets modified by provisions of Secs. 4 to 24 of the Act. Section 6 is one such Section which modifies the period of limitation in respect of persons suffering from legal disability. It confers a personal privilege to such class of persons which privilege is confined to them in personal capacity. 4.1. Section 6 reads as under: "Section 6 : Legal disability (1) Where a person entitled to institute a suit or make an application for the execution of a decree is, at the time from which the prescribed period is to be reckoned, a minor or insane, or an idiot, he may institute the suit or make the application within the same period after the disability has ceased, as would otherwise have been allowed from the time specified therefor in the third column of the Schedule. (2) Where such person is, at the time from which the prescribed period is to be reckoned, affected by two such disabilities, or where, before his disability has ceased, he is affected by another disability, he may institute the suit or make the application within the same period after both disabilities have ceased, as would otherwise have been allowed from the time so specified. (3) Where the disability continues up to the death of that person, his legal representative may institute the suit or make the application within the same period after the death, as would otherwise have been allowed from the time so specified. (4) Where the legal representative referred to in sub-sec. (3) is, at the date of the death of the person whom he represents, affected by any such disability, the rules contained in sub-secs. (1) and (2) shall apply. (4) Where the legal representative referred to in sub-sec. (3) is, at the date of the death of the person whom he represents, affected by any such disability, the rules contained in sub-secs. (1) and (2) shall apply. (5) Where a person under disability dies after the disability ceases but within the period allowed to him under this Section, his legal representative may institute the suit or make me application within the same period after the death, as would otherwise have been available - to that person had he not died. Explanation :- For the purposes of this Section "minor" includes a child in the womb." 4.2. Section 7 deals with disability of one of several persons. This provision is not relevant for the purpose of this case, however it is a part of Secs. 6 to 8 grouped. Section 8 providing for special exception reads as under: "Section 8 : Special Exceptions: Nothing in Sec. 6 or in Sec. 7 applies to suits to enforce rights of preemption, or shall be deemed to extend, for more man three years from the cessation of the disability or the death of the person affected thereby, the period of limitation for any suit or application." Scope Discussed: 4.3. It is clear that Secs. 6, 7 and 8 of the Limitation Act supplement each other. They are mutually inclusive. Section 6 is an enabling Section for a person with legal disability such as minor, insane, idiot. It entitles such person to sue after legal disability comes to an end. The cause of action which might have accrued during the currency of such legal disability-in the instant case the minor age - would not defeat right of a person under such disability, and by virtue of Sec. 6 he is entitled to institute a suit or make an application within the same period after the disability has ceased as would otherwise have been allowed from time to time specified therefor in the third column of the Schedule. This is, however, subject to Sec. 8. Section 8 operates as a proviso and is a controlling Section. It says that in no case for a person who was under disability, entitled to a benefit of Sec. 6, period of limitation would extend beyond three years from the date the disability of such person has ceased. 4.4. This is, however, subject to Sec. 8. Section 8 operates as a proviso and is a controlling Section. It says that in no case for a person who was under disability, entitled to a benefit of Sec. 6, period of limitation would extend beyond three years from the date the disability of such person has ceased. 4.4. In Darshan Singh, [ AIR 1995 SC 75 ] the Supreme Court explained the combined effect of Sec. 6and Sec. 8 stating as under: "Section 8 is a proviso to Sec. 6 or 7. A combined effect of Secs. 6 and 8 read with third column of the appropriate Article would be that a person under disability may sue after cessation of disability within the same period as would otherwise be allowed from the time specified therefor in the third column of the Schedule. But special limitation as an exception has been provided in Sec. 8 lying down that extended period after cessation of the disability would not be beyond three years from the date of cessation of the disability or death of the disabled person. Thus, Sec. 8 is a special exception to Sec. 6 or7 and the period of limitation through barred under Sec. 3, remained available to persons under disability specified in Sec. 6 or 7 and the right to lay the suit or application after disability ceased under Sec. 6 or 7 is regulated by the limitation prescribed by Sec. 8. In each case, the litigant is entitled to a fresh starting period of limitation from the date of cessation of disability subject to the condition that in no case the period extended by this process under Sec. 6 or 7 shall exceed three years from the date of cessation of the disability." 4.4.1. In Darshan Singh, [ AIR 1995 SC 75 ] the facts were that the respondent was a minor at the time of death of his father. He had attained majority on 17th April, 1977. Thereafter he filed suit for possession of the property on 4th November, 1982. The suit was within period of three years contemplated under Art. 65 of the Schedule of the Limitation Act. He had attained majority on 17th April, 1977. Thereafter he filed suit for possession of the property on 4th November, 1982. The suit was within period of three years contemplated under Art. 65 of the Schedule of the Limitation Act. The Supreme Court upheld the contention of the appellant that the suit ought to have been filed within three years from the date of cessation of respondent's disability but since was filed beyond three years, it was barred by limitation. The Supreme Court held that special exceptions under Sec. 6 though may be available, it was regulated by the maximum period of three years prescribed in Sec. 8. It was held: "In other words, in each case, the litigant is entitled to a fresh starting period of limitation from the date of cessation of disability subject to the condition that in no case the period extended by this process under Sec. 6 or 7 shall exceed three years from the date of cessation of the disability. Considered from this perspective, we are clearly of the opinion that the suit of the respondent is barred by limitation. But unfortunately, the attention of the High Court was not drawn to Sec. 8 of the Act which laid down to its contra conclusion." 4.5. In Jadav Prabhatbhai, [ 2001 (1) GLR 16 (FB)] while considering the question of limitation in suit to set aside alienation of minor's property by de facto guardian, the Court held that the suit to set aside such alienation must be filed within three years of the minor attained majority. The Court explained the scope of Sec. 6 and effect of Sec. 8 of the Limitation Act in the context of the facts. "Upon a dispassionate and close examination of the relevant decisions, proposition which has emerged and which has been explained and expanded is that the period of limitation prescribed in Art. 60assumes wider significance in a case when the minor on attaining the majority files a suit for possession on me premise that the de facto guardian had alienated his property without authority and that there was no legal necessity for the de facto guardian to alienate the property. The suit for setting aside such a transaction is required to be filed within a period of three years from me date of attaining majority." 4.5.1. Reiterating that the combined reading of Secs. The suit for setting aside such a transaction is required to be filed within a period of three years from me date of attaining majority." 4.5.1. Reiterating that the combined reading of Secs. 6 and 8 and Art. 60, the suit, in fact situation like case on hand, is required to be filed within a period of three years from the date of attaining the majority. The Court observed: "Section 8 is proviso to Sec. 6 of Sec. 7. A conjoint reading of Secs. 6 and 8 read with third column of the appropriate Article would be that the person under disability may sue after fixation of the disability within the same period as would otherwise be allowed from time specified or in the third column of the schedule. It may be emphasized that such an extended period in no case go beyond the period of three years from the date of cessation of the disability. It, therefore, clearly emerges that the right to institute a suit of the party shall get expired at the end of three years from the date of his attaining majority." 4.5.2. It stated: "It is, therefore, very clear that a ward on his attaining the age of majority like that on cessation of the disability, fails to pursue the legal remedy or to initiate a legal battle by filing a suit, he would not be entitled to file suit, and therefore, the person in possession of me property would get his possession or title as the case may be perfected upon the extinguishment of the right to file a suit in relation to a property." 4.6. The propositions which emerge from the reading of the provisions and their interpretation by the Courts are (i) If the disability ceases before expiry of the original period and the time left is more than three years, then no extension of time is available; (ii) If the disability ceases before the expiry of original period of limitation and the time left is three years, then also no extension of further time would be available. In both such cases, a person who was previously under disability, would have to institute the suit or initiate the proceedings within three years from the date of the cessation of disability; (iii) Where the disability ceases before expiry of original period; (a) if the original period left is more than three years or equal to three years, in that case, three years time will be available; (b) if the original period of limitation left is less than three years, then such actual time of less than three years would be available; (iv) If the disability ceases after the expiry of original period, then if (a) the original period is more than or equal to three years, the time available is three years, (b) original period is less than three years, time available is such remainder period left in the original period of limitation. Thus the main effect of Sec. 8 of the Act on Secs.6 and 7 is that a person may be entitled to benefit of Sec. 6, in no case the period for him shall be extended beyond three years after cessation of disability. Plaintiffs Suit how time-barred: 5. Reverting to the facts of the case in light of the above principles, the case pleaded by the plaintiffs was that in the year 1960, a partition of properties of deceased Motibhai took place and writing was executed and at that time taking advantage of minor age of plaintiff No. 1, he was denied his share, for which he was entitled to as his father-Shyamalbhai Motibhai had died before. If the year 1960 is to be taken as point of time when cause of action for the plaintiffs could be said to have been accrued, he attained majority on 1st March, 1974 and instituted the suit on 15th October, 1977, which was clearly time-barred. 5.1. However, learned Advocate for the appellants was right in submitting that actual cause of action for the plaintiffs accrued in the year 1968 when the defendants got their names mutated in the revenue record (Exh. 44 and 45). A right to sue accrues when there is a right to seek relief by legal means. 5.1. However, learned Advocate for the appellants was right in submitting that actual cause of action for the plaintiffs accrued in the year 1968 when the defendants got their names mutated in the revenue record (Exh. 44 and 45). A right to sue accrues when there is a right to seek relief by legal means. It was in the year 1968 when the names of the defendants came to be mutated in respect of the suit properties without following procedure by the revenue authorities, as per the findings rightly recorded by both the Courts below, it marked the accrual of cause of action for the plaintiffs. It could said that the plaintiff No. 1 was effectively denied his right in the properties, and he became entitled to seek legal recourse. Plaintiff No. 1 was minor at that time. Benefit of Sec. 6 was available to him, but when he attained the age of majority on 1st March, 1974, it was incumbent for him to institute the suit within the period of three years being the maximum period available under Sec. 8 of the Act. The three years period would start from 1st March, 1974, therefore the suit ought to have been instituted before 1st March, 1977. The same having been instituted on 15th October, 1977, the same was manifestly beyond limitation. The view taken by the Courts below was based on correct interpretation and application of Sec. 6 read with Sec. 8 of the Act, and booked no error. Partition Suit and Limitation: 6. Learned Advocate for the appellants wanted to contend that since for partition suit, no period of limitation is prescribed under the Limitation Act, 1963, the plaintiffs' suit could not be held as time-barred and he could file a suit any time. In order to further this contention, learned Advocate relied on decision of the Supreme Court in Vidya Devi, [ 1995 (4) SCC 496 ] and Govindamaal, [ AIR 2007 SC 204 in which Vidya Devi (supra) was referred to. In decision of Vidya Devi (supra), the Apex Court observed that the legislature has not prescribed any period of limitation for filing a suit for partition because there is always a running cause of action for seeking partition by one of the co-sharers if and when he decides not to keep his share joint with other co-sharers. In decision of Vidya Devi (supra), the Apex Court observed that the legislature has not prescribed any period of limitation for filing a suit for partition because there is always a running cause of action for seeking partition by one of the co-sharers if and when he decides not to keep his share joint with other co-sharers. It observed that therefore a time from which such period would commence could not have been provided possibly by the legislature. It then observed that, it did not mean that a co-sharer who is arrayed as a defendant in the suit cannot raise the plea of adverse possession against the co-sharer who has prayed for partition of his share in the joint property. In Govindamaal, [ AIR 2007 SC 204 ] what was held was that a co-sharer giving notice claiming partition of the suit properties and claiming possession but thereafter did not pursue would not be sufficient to show that he had lost his right by adverse possession. 6.1. The decisions relied on by learned Advocate for the appellants was referable to the cause of action in relation to a partition suit. The Apex Court did not rule that partition suit was not subjected any limitation period. The accrual of cause of action is decisive. In Krishna Pillai Rajasekharan Nair (dead) by L.Rs. v. Padmanabha Pillai (Dead) by L.Rs., 2004 (12) SCC 754 the Supreme Court pertinently observed that for a suit for partition, starting point of limitation is-when right to sue accrues, that is plaintiffs have notice of their entitlement to partition being denied. 6.2. In Raghunath Das v. Gokal Chand, AIR 1958 SC 857 the Supreme Court held that in respect of a suit by an heir against another heir to recover his share of movable estate of a deceased person is not one for specific movable property wrongfully taken such as is contemplated by Art. 49, but is governed by Art. 120 of the Limitation Act, 1908 (corresponding to Art. 113 of 1963 Act). The Court observed that such a suit was a suit for partition and held, "The substance of the plaintiff's claims in both cases is for separating his share out of the estate and for allotment and delivery to him of his share so separated. The Court observed that such a suit was a suit for partition and held, "The substance of the plaintiff's claims in both cases is for separating his share out of the estate and for allotment and delivery to him of his share so separated. In short, such a suit is nothing but a suit for partition or division of the movable properties held jointly or as tenants-in-common by the parties and there being no specific Article applicable to such a suit, it must be governed by Art. 120." 6.3. The contention that there is no limitation for partition suit thus rests here being without any substance. In this case, as the cause of action accrued in the year 1968, the plaintiffs' partition suit was subjected to three years period of limitation under Art.113 of the Limitation Act and Sec. 6 read with Sec. 8 of the Limitation Act would apply. 6.4. At one stage a feeble attempt was made even to contend that the suit in question was not a partition suit. This contention appeared to have been raised in the context of alternative submission made by learned Advocate for the appellants that the suit of the plaintiffs ought to have been treated as governed under Art. 110 of the Limitation Act which submission is dealt with hereinafter. It booked no two opinion, having regard to the pleadings and prayer of the suit of the plaintiffs that the suit was for partition. In Shub Karan Bubna @ Shub Karon v. Sita Saran Bubna, 2009 (9) SCC 689 , the Supreme Court observed that partition is a redistribution or adjustment of pre-existing rights amongst co-owners/ co-parceners, resulting in a division of lands or other properties jointly held by them into different lots or portions and delivery thereof to the respective allottees. The effect of such division is that the joint ownership is terminated and the respective shares vest in them in severally. The Court thus explained: "A partition of a property can be only among those having a share or interest in it. A person who does not have a share in such property cannot obviously be a party to a partition. "Separation of share" is a species of "partition". When all co-owners get separated, it is a partition. The Court thus explained: "A partition of a property can be only among those having a share or interest in it. A person who does not have a share in such property cannot obviously be a party to a partition. "Separation of share" is a species of "partition". When all co-owners get separated, it is a partition. Separation of share(s) refers to a division where only one or only a few among several co-owners/co-parceners get separated, and others continue to be joint or continue to hold the remaining property jointly without division by metes and bounds." Even if Art. 110 was to apply: 7. Dealing with the contention that the suit was one required to be treated under Art. 110 of the Act, limitation starts running once right to sue accrues. Right to sue accrues when infringement of claimed right is felt. Section 6 does not arrest the running of original limitation period which may be applicable in a given case. It only entitles a person with disability to wait until the cessation of disability. It was always open for a person with disability to institute a suit or initiate legal action through his best friend within the limitation period normally prescribed when right to sue for him accrues. Thus a person with disability has a choice. However, if such person with disability opts to wait until his disability ends, then Sec. 8 will apply and the period of limitation, then in no case extend beyond three years from the date of cessation of disability, in the instant case attainment of majority by plaintiff No. 1. In Prem Sing v. Birbal, 2006 (5) SCC 353 , The Supreme Court observed that if a deed was executed by the plaintiff when he was a minor and it was a void, he has two options to file a suit to get the property purportedly conveyed thereunder. 7.1. In Udhavji Anandji Ladha v. Bapudas Ramdas Darbar, AIR 1950 Bom. 94 , it was held that "the scheme of the Limitation Act is to determine the period of limitation not merely by looking at the first Schedule but by looking at the first schedule in conjunction with Secs. 4 to 25 of the Act. 7.1. In Udhavji Anandji Ladha v. Bapudas Ramdas Darbar, AIR 1950 Bom. 94 , it was held that "the scheme of the Limitation Act is to determine the period of limitation not merely by looking at the first Schedule but by looking at the first schedule in conjunction with Secs. 4 to 25 of the Act. Reading the first schedule along with Sec. 6 of the Act, the period of limitation prescribed for a suit by a minor is not the period mentioned in the first schedule, but a special period as mentioned in Sec. 6.". 7.2. Therefore, if the suit is to be viewed for the purpose of limitation in the context of Art. 110 treating it to be suit governed by the said Article, no different result would ensue. The cause of action which had started in the year 1968, had 12 years period of limitation as provided in Art. 110. When the disability of minority ended, it ceased before the expiry of original period of limitation, that is 12 years. The original period of limitation remaining on the date of cessation of disability was more than three years, however once the plaintiff No. 1 became major, his cause of action started and was subject to ceiling of three years provided in Sec. 8. Therefore, plaintiff No. 1 was statutorily bound to observe the said period for instituting the suit even if the suit was to be treated to be one falling under Art. 110. 8. The concurrent findings recorded by both the Courts below about the defendant No. 2 having become owner of the properties of deceased Ravjibhai by virtue of the Will and that the Will was duly proved, were finding of facts based on appreciation of evidence. Those findings were properly recorded without any irregularity in the reading of evidence. In that view, the proper and necessary conclusion was that the plaintiff No. 1 was not entitled to any share in those properties. Therefore, the issue whether suit relief for plaintiff's share in the properties of defendant No. 1-Ravjibhai was time-barred, did not survived and no question of law, much less substantial question of law existed in that respect. 8.1. In view of above discussion, it is clear position of law that Sec. 8 of the Limitation Act would override the provisions of Secs.6 and 7 thereof. 8.1. In view of above discussion, it is clear position of law that Sec. 8 of the Limitation Act would override the provisions of Secs.6 and 7 thereof. The suit of the plaintiffs which was for partition was clearly time-barred having been not instituted within three years from the date of attainment of majority. Even if the suit was to be viewed and treated to be governed by Art. 110 of the Limitation Act, the suit of the plaintiffs was time-barred. Therefore, the impugned judgment and order dated 6th April, 1996 by learned 2nd Extra-Assistant Judge, Vadodara in Regular Civil Appeal; No. 404 of 1980 confirming the judgment and order of the trial Court dismissing the suit of the plaintiffs has to be upheld on the above reasons and the same is upheld. The present Second Appeal is dismissed. Interim relief, if any in operation, shall stands vacated. Registry shall send back the Record and Proceedings.