JUDGMENT Rajiv Sharma, Judge: This petition is instituted against order dated 2.5.2013 rendered by learned Rent Controller (7) Shimla in case No. 3-2 of 2009/06. 2. Pertinent facts necessary for the adjudication of this petition are that the petitioner-land lord (hereinafter referred to as ‘petitioner’ for brevity sake) filed a petition under Section 14 of the H.P. Urban Rent Control Act, 1987, against the original tenant (Avadh Bihari Lal). Issues were framed by the learned Rent Controller on 1.8.2007. Case was thereafter fixed for petitioner’s evidence on 8.10.2007. On 16.11.2007, respondent No. 1 filed an application under Order 1 Rule 10 read with Section 151 of the Civil Procedure Code for arraying/ impleading the legal heirs of Avadh Bihari Lal (original tenant). Learned Rent Controller allowed the application on 7.1.2008 and ordered impleadment of the legal heirs of late Avadh Bihari Lal. Respondents No. 3 and 5 did not appear before the learned Rent Controller on 7.3.2008. They were proceeded ex parte. Respondents No. 2 and 6 were ordered to be served for 22.5.2008 through ordinary process as well as through registered post. Since respondents No. 2 and 6 could not be served by way of ordinary process as well as through registered post, petitioner filed an application under Order 5 Rule 20 of the Civil Procedure Code for effecting service upon them by way of substituted service. Application was allowed by the learned Rent Controller on 7.6.2008. They were ordered to be served by way of publication on 2.12.2008. Respondents No. 2 and 6, failed to put in appearance and were proceeded ex parte. In the meantime, an application under Order 9 Rule 7 of Civil Procedure Code was filed on behalf of respondents No. 3 to 5 for setting aside ex parte order dated 7.3.2008. Application was allowed by the learned Rent Controller on 9.4.2009. Respondents No. 3 to 5 were relegated to their original position. Application under Order 9 Rule 7 of Civil Procedure Code was filed on behalf of respondent No.2 for setting aside ex parte order dated 2.12.2008. Application was contested by the petitioner. Learned Rent Controller allowed the application on 2.5.2013, hence this petition. 4. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and also gone through the record carefully. 5. Mr. Application was contested by the petitioner. Learned Rent Controller allowed the application on 2.5.2013, hence this petition. 4. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and also gone through the record carefully. 5. Mr. Suneet Goel, Advocate has vehemently argued that the learned Rent Controller failed to exercise jurisdiction vested in him in a judicious manner. He then contended that respondent No. 2 was duly served by way of publication. 6. Mr. Ashok Sood and Mr. Neeraj Gupta, Advocates, have supported the impugned order and have vehemently argued that the name of respondent No. 2 was ‘Yogesh Goel’ and not ‘Yogesh Kumar’ and name of father of respondent No. 2 was ‘Avadh Bihari Lal’ and not ‘Anand Bihari Lal’. 7. What emerges from the facts enumerated herein above is that respondent No.1 supplied the name and address of respondent No. 2 as per Annexure P-1, which reads as under: “1. Sh Yogesh Kumar S/O Sh Avadh Bihari Lal Pansari Bazar, Saharanpur (UP)” 8. Respondent No. 2 could not be served by way of ordinary service as well as registered post. Process issued in the name of Yogesh Kumar was received back with the report dated 30.4.2008 to the following effect: “After visiting again and again, the receiver could not found. It was found that he had gone out and it was not known as to when he would return. 24.4.2008, 25.4.2008, 26.4.2008, 28.4.2008 and 29.4.2008, gone out, intimation given.” 9. It is in these circumstances that the petitioner has moved an application under Order 5 Rule 20 of Civil Procedure Code for serving respondent No. 2 by way of publication. Respondent No.2 was served by way of publication for 2.12.2008. However, there was no representation on his behalf. He was proceeded ex parte. 10. Learned Rent Controller has erred in recording findings to the effect that respondent No. 2 was ‘Yogesh Goel’ and not ‘Yogesh Kumar’. Name of respondent No. 2 has been supplied by his own brother Narender Kumar, as per annexure P-1. Name of father of respondent No. 2 is Avadh Bihari Lal though by clerical mistake, name of father of respondent No. 2 has been shown as Anand Bihari Lal. It can not be said that since name of the father of respondent No. 2 was shown as Anand Bihari Lal instead of Avadh Bihari Lal, he was misled. Name of father of respondent No. 2 is Avadh Bihari Lal though by clerical mistake, name of father of respondent No. 2 has been shown as Anand Bihari Lal. It can not be said that since name of the father of respondent No. 2 was shown as Anand Bihari Lal instead of Avadh Bihari Lal, he was misled. It can not be believed that respondent No.2 was not aware of the proceedings pending before learned Rent Controller since the year 2006. Moreover, interest of respondent No. 2 was protected by respondents No. 1 and 3 to 5. 11. The address mentioned in registered letter sent to respondent No. 2 was correct. Publication has also been ordered on the same address. Version of respondent No. 2 that he did not read newspaper can not be believed. Respondent No. 2 was proceeded ex parte on 2.12.2008. Application has been filed under Order 9 Rule 7 Civil Procedure Code after more than four years of the passing of order dated 2.12.2008. 12. It is held that respondent No. 2 was duly served. He has rightly been ordered to be proceeded ex parte on 2.12.2008. Respondent No. 2 has not shown any good cause for setting aside order dated 2.12.2008. Respondent No. 2 has not filed a separate application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act alongwith application under Order 9 Rule 7 of Civil Procedure Code, for setting aside order dated 2.12.2008. Only averment made in the application is that application was within limitation from the date of knowledge. According to the petitioner, application was barred by limitation. 13. In AIR 2007 (Kerala) 301, learned Single Judge has held that application under Order 9 Rule 7 CPC is governed by Article 137, which prescribed a period of three years. Learned Single Judge has held as under: “6. It is difficult to accept Mr. Krishnanunni’s arguments in respect of Ext. P1 order. It is true that there is distinction between applications which are filed under Order IX, Rule 13 and those filed under Order IX, Rule 7, in that while the former seeks cancellation of decrees finally disposing of suits, the latter seeks cancellation of only orders setting the applicant ex parte, thus preventing him from participating in further proceedings in the suit. It is also true that unlike applications under Order IX, Rule 13, there is no article in the Limitation Act providing any specific period of limitation for applications under Order IX, Rule 7. But Mr. Krishnanunni’s argument that since no time limit is specifically provided in the Limitation Act for filing applications under Order IX, Rule 7, such applications can be filed at any time cannot be accepted. Such applications, in my opinion, will be governed by Article 137, the residuary article which prescribes a period of three years. Mr. Krishnanunni’s argument was that sub rule (3) of Rule 105 of Order XXI deals only with orders finally disposing of execution petitions and not orders passed at various earlier stages of the execution proceedings. According to the learned counsel, the word “application” used in Rule 105 refers only to execution petitions and not to execution applications. The above argument is to be repelled straightway since sub-rule (1) of Rule 105 speaks clearly of applications “under any of the foregoing rules”, i.e. Rule 1 to Rule 104 of Order XXI. The Civil Rules of Practice which regulates the procedure and practice of subordinate civil Courts in the State gives an inclusive definition for the word “application” which takes in execution petitions, execution applications, cheque applications and interlocutory applications, whether oral or written, Rule 105 deals with the hearing of applications which can either be the main execution petition or an execution application. The Rule says that if the opposite party who has been issued with notice fails to appear the Court shall hear the application ex parte and proceed to pass any order deemed fit. These orders, according to me, can be orders finally disposing of the execution petition or orders deciding any specific issue, say, regarding the executability of the decree which is often decided on the basis of objections filed by judgment debtors in response to notice under Rule 22 or the liability for arrest often decided pursuant to notice under Rule 37 or even settlement of draft proclamation decided in response to notice under Rule 65. Rule 106(1) of Order XXI contemplates cancellation of all types of ex parte orders passed under Rule 105(3) and orders for default passed under Rule 105(2). Rule 106(1) of Order XXI contemplates cancellation of all types of ex parte orders passed under Rule 105(3) and orders for default passed under Rule 105(2). It follows therefore that the period of limitation prescribed under sub-rule (3) of Rule 106 applies to applications submitted by petitioner for setting aside ex parte orders passed against him at any given stage of the proceedings. The position could have been different under the old Rule 105 which had sub-rule (4) also in it. But in view of the existing rule position, the execution Court has not power to condone the delay caused in the matter of filing applications under Order XXI Rule 106(30. Ext. P1 therefore, does not suffer from any infirmity and is only to be approved.” 14. In the instant case, respondent No. 2 was proceeded ex parte on 2.12.2008. No separate application has been filed by respondent No. 2 for condonation of delay. 15. Mr. Ashok Sood and Mr. Janesh Gupta, learned advocates have placed reliance upon 2012 (1) Himachal Law Reporter 361. In the instant case, learned Single Judge has relied upon judgment rendered by this Court in case titled as Mussadi and others Vs. Jai Gopal and others reported in Shimla Law Journal 1994(1) 90. Learned Single Judge in the case supra, has held as under: “16. Even the other and more technical plea raised by the learned counsel for the respondents that separate applications ought to have been made, one under Section 5 of the Limitation Act cannot be accepted for the reasons that in case an application is made praying for an appropriate relief by stating therein the reasons for not approaching the Court within the period of limitation and the facts as stated therein make out a sufficient cause for not approaching the Court in time, the prayer for condoning the delay is implied and it is not necessary that the applications should also bear a caption having been under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. 18. Law also does not require for making separate applications for grant of reliefs, such as for bringing on record the legal representatives under Order 22 Rule 3 or Rule 4, for setting aside abatement under Order 22 Rule 9 fo the Civil Procedure Code.. 18. Law also does not require for making separate applications for grant of reliefs, such as for bringing on record the legal representatives under Order 22 Rule 3 or Rule 4, for setting aside abatement under Order 22 Rule 9 fo the Civil Procedure Code.. and under Section 5 of the Limitation Act for condoning delay in moving application for setting aside abatement, which can be claimed in one single composite application. In case the facts so stated by the applicant in the applications are sufficient to enable the Court to record a finding that the applicants were prevented from making the applications within time, the Court will not be powerless to exercise jurisdiction in favour of the applicants. Since there is no prohibition in law in making a composite application for claiming the aforementioned three prayers, on the principle that every procedure unless prohibited is permissible, one application moved by the petitioners, who in fact had made out sufficient ground would not debar the court from passing appropriate orders thereupon. Also the mere fact that the application did not show that eh same had made under Order 22 Rule 9 or under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, will not prevent the Court from giving appropriate relief in the facts and circumstances of the case. (See: Alphenso Nazareth vs. Xavier Dias and others, AIR 1971(Mysore, 99, Firm Kaura Mal Bishan Dass vs. Firm Mathra Dass Atma Ram Ahmedabad and others, AIR 1959 Punjab 646 and Unniraman vs. Padmanabhan and another, AIR 1988 Kerala 257.” 16. Facts of above case are distinct. In that case, foundation was made for condonation of delay in the application itself filed under Order 22 Rule 9 Civil Procedure Code. In the instant case, no averments have been made in the application why the application could not be filed within limitation. 17. Their Lordships of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Mathri Vs. State of Punjab reported in AIR Supreme Court 1964 993, have explained the distinction between ‘good cause’ and ‘sufficient cause’ as stated under Order 9 Rule 7 Civil Procedure Code, as under: “(8) Before proceeding to deal with the arguments addressed to us by Mr. 17. Their Lordships of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Mathri Vs. State of Punjab reported in AIR Supreme Court 1964 993, have explained the distinction between ‘good cause’ and ‘sufficient cause’ as stated under Order 9 Rule 7 Civil Procedure Code, as under: “(8) Before proceeding to deal with the arguments addressed to us by Mr. Setalvad, learned Counsel for the appellant, it would be convenient to mention a point, not seriously pressed before us, but which at earlier stages was thought to have considerable significance for the decision of this question viz., the difference between the woods “good cause” for non-appearance in O. IX, R. 7 and “sufficient cause” for the same purpose in O. IX, R. 13 as pointing to different criteria of “goodness” or “sufficiency” for succeeding in the two proceedings; and as therefore furnishing a ground for the inapplicability of the rule of res judicata. AS this ground was into seriously mentioned before us, we need not examine it in any details, but we might observe that we do not see any material difference between the facts to be established for satisfying the two tests of “good cause” and “sufficient cause”. We are unable to conceive of a “good cause”, which is not “sufficient” as affording an explanation for nonappearance, nor conversely of a “sufficient cause” which is not a good one and we would add that either of these is not different from “good and sufficient cause” which is used in this context in other statutes. If, on the other hand, there is any difference between the two it can only be that the requirement of good cause” is complied with on a lesser degree of proof than that of “sufficient cause” and if so, this cannot help the appellant, since assuming the applicability of the principle of res judicata to the decisions in the two proceedings. If the Court finds in the first proceeding, the lighter burden not discharged, it must a fortiori bar the consideration of the same matter in the later where the standard of proof of that matter is, if anything, higher.” 18. Accordingly, the petition is allowed. Order dated 2.5.2013 is set aside. The matter is pending before learned Rent Controller since the year 2006, as such, same is ordered to be decided within a period of three months from today positively. Accordingly, the petition is allowed. Order dated 2.5.2013 is set aside. The matter is pending before learned Rent Controller since the year 2006, as such, same is ordered to be decided within a period of three months from today positively. The parties through their counsel are directed to appear before the learned trial Court on 18.6.2014. Pending application(s), if any, also stand disposed of. No costs.