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2014 DIGILAW 702 (KER)

Benson v. State of Kerala, represented by The Public Prosecutor

2014-09-01

K.RAMAKRISHNAN

body2014
JUDGMENT 1. This criminal miscellaneous case was filed by the petitioner, who is a convicted prisoner undergoing imprisonment in Central Prison Viyyur, seeking the relief of concurrence of sentence in different cases, in which he was convicted and sentenced under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. (hereinafter called the 'Code'). 2. It is alleged in the petition that, the petitioner was an accused in five cases on the file of the Judicial First Class Magistrate Court-I, Chavakkad, and Sessions Court (Adhoc-II), Kottayam. He was convicted and sentenced in all these cases. Appeal filed against the order of conviction in those cases were dismissed by the appellate court. He is in jail since 06.04.2003. Almost ten years were lapsed after he was incarcinated in jail. The offences alleged against him are punishable under Section 379 of the Indian Penal Code evidenced by Annexure-A1 to A4. He is suffering from different types of ailments and undergoing treatment from Medical College, Thrissur, evidenced by Annexure-5. He has to be in jail for more than 23 years. Further all these sentence are allowed to suffer, his prime young age and opportunity to have a decent life in future will be lost to him. So he has no other remedy, except to approach this court, seeking the following relief: "It is most humbly prayed that this hon'ble court may be pleased to give direction to the respondents to run the sentence in all the five cases (CC158/2004 JFCM-I, Chavakkad, CC390/2004 JFCM-I, Chavakkad, CC1039/2003 JFCM-I, Chavakkad, CC1168/2006 of JFCM, Kunnamkulam, S.C.171/2005, Sessions Court, Adhoc-II, Kottayam) concurrently". 3. On the basis of the allegations in the petition, a statement has been called for by the 2nd respondent and 2nd respondent filed a statement, which reads as follows: 1. It is most humbly submitted that convict prisoner No.9964, Benson, S/o.Lonappan, Kozhukullikkaran Veedu, Anthikkad P.S, Desom & Anthikkad P.O., Thrissur District, was admitted in Central Prison, Viyyur on 01.04.2012 as transferred from Central Prison, Thiruvananthapuram. 2. It is submitted that, originally petitioner was convicted and sentenced to undergo Rigorous Imprisonment for 3 years in CC No.613/2003 by the Judicial First Class Magistrate Court, Thrissur on 20.11.2003. He obtained bail for this case on 24.11.2013 but continued in the jail itself for the pending cases. Later on 04.12.2003 he got out from the jail after getting bail for all the pending cases. He obtained bail for this case on 24.11.2013 but continued in the jail itself for the pending cases. Later on 04.12.2003 he got out from the jail after getting bail for all the pending cases. He was re-admitted in the Central Prison, Viyyur on 26.04.2004 on confirming of the sentence in CC.No.612/2003 by the appeal court. Hence he has been in the prison continuously from 26.4.2004 onwards. 3. It is submitted that, at present he is sentenced for total of 29 years of imprisonment for 12 cases by various courts. In addition to the substantive sentences of 29 years he is fined for Rs.18,000/- in various cases and in default of fine, he has to undergo one year and 9 months of sentence for various cases. Out of 12 cases sentenced by various courts, the sentence in 6 cases have already been completed. Hence sentence in 6 cases remains. On calculating all the cases, the date of release falls on 02.09.2021 without fine and after calculating set off period, including fine it will be on 02.06.2023. 4. It is submitted that petitioner was convicted and sentenced for 12 cases by different courts. The details of each crime in his name is submitted herewith for kind perusal of this Hon'ble court. They are following; i) In CC.No.613/2003 he was convicted and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for 3 years U/s.379, 34 of IPC by Judicial First Class Magistrate Court-I, Thrissur on 20.11.2003. Bail granted on 24.11.2003, re-admitted pm 26.04.2004 / set off allowed for 97 days. ii) In CC.No.533/2004 he was convicted and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for 2 years U/s.392 of IPC by the Judicial First Class Magistrate Court-II, Thrissur on 08.05.2005 (set off allowed from 23.06.2003 to 22.10.2003 and 05.05.2004 to 07.06.2004-521 days). iii) In CC.No.529/2004 he was convicted and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for 3 years U/s.141, r/w 34 of IPC by the Judicial First Class Magistrate Court-II, Thrissur on 14.06.2005. (st off from 26.06.2003 to 21.10.2003 and 05.05.2004 to 13.06.2005-493 days). iv) In CC No.1270/2003 he was convicted and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for 2 years and fine of Rs.10,000/- i/d 2 months U/s. 451, 380 IPC by the Judicial First Class Magistrate Court, Changanassery on 18.06.2005 (set off allowed from 14.07.2003 to 04.12.2003 and 26.11.2004 to 17.06.2005 - 348 days). iv) In CC No.1270/2003 he was convicted and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for 2 years and fine of Rs.10,000/- i/d 2 months U/s. 451, 380 IPC by the Judicial First Class Magistrate Court, Changanassery on 18.06.2005 (set off allowed from 14.07.2003 to 04.12.2003 and 26.11.2004 to 17.06.2005 - 348 days). v) In CC.No.1115/2003 petitioner was convicted and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for 2 years and fine of Rs.2,000/-i/d. 2 months U/s.379, r/w 34 of IPC by the Judicial First Class Magistrate Court, Irinjalakkuda on 04.07.2005 (set off 26.06.2003 to 13.08.2003 and 17.06.2004 to 03.07.2005 - 402 days) vi) In CC.No.932/2003 petitioner was convicted and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for 2 years and fine of Rs.2,000/-i/d. 2 months U/s. 379 of IPC by the Judicial First Class Magistrate Court, Irinjalakkuda on 04.07.2005 (set off 26.06.2003 to 13.08.2003 and 17.06.2004 to 03.07.2005 - 465 days). vii) In SC No.171/2005 petitioner was convicted and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for 5 years U/s.392 & 120(b) of IPC by the Additional District and Sessions Court (Adhoc-II) Kottayam on 23.09.2008. (set off allowed from 06.04.2004 to 28.05.2005-418 days). viii) In CC No.390/2004 petitioner was convicted and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for 2 years and fine of Rs.1,000/-i/d. for payment of fine rigorous imprisonment for 3 months U/s.379, 414, r/w 34 of IPC by Judicial First Class Magistrate Court, Chavakkad on 25.01.2013. Appeal in this case was dismissed by the Sessions Court, Thrissur (set of allowed from 07.02.2006 to 26.06.2006-141 days). ix) In CC.No.1039/2003 petitioner was convicted and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for 2 years and fine of Rs.1,000/-i/d RI for 3 months U/s. 379, r/w 34 of IPC by the Judicial First Class Magistrate Court-I, Chavakkad on 26.06.2006. The appeal was dismissed by the Sessions Court, Thrissur on 16.01.2013 (set off allowed from 31.10.2005 to 27.06.2006-240 days). x) In CC No.1168/2006 petitioner was convicted and sentenced to undergo SI for 1 year and fine of Rs.1,000/- i/d SI for 6 months U/s. 379, r/w 34 of IPC by the Judicial First Class Magistrate Court, Kunnamkulam. (set off allowed from 11.11.2003 to 24.11.2003 -14 days) set of also allowed from 02.08.2006 to 30.12.2008). xi) In CC.No.274/2004 petitioner was convicted and sentenced to undergo SI for 3 years U/s. 205, r/w.419 of IPC by the Judicial First Class Magistrate Court, Kodungallur on 30.09.2008 (set off 13.08.2007 to 29.09.2008 - 414 days). (set off allowed from 11.11.2003 to 24.11.2003 -14 days) set of also allowed from 02.08.2006 to 30.12.2008). xi) In CC.No.274/2004 petitioner was convicted and sentenced to undergo SI for 3 years U/s. 205, r/w.419 of IPC by the Judicial First Class Magistrate Court, Kodungallur on 30.09.2008 (set off 13.08.2007 to 29.09.2008 - 414 days). xii) In CC.No.158/2004 petitioner was convicted and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for 2 years and fine of Rs.1,000/-i/d. SI for 3 months U/s. 379, 414, 39 of IPC by the Judicial First Class Magistrate Court, Chavakkad on 28.06.2006 (set off 16.07.2005 to 27.06.2006 -347 days). 4. Heard the learned counsel for the petitioner, learned Government Pleader appearing for the State and also the Additional Director General of Prosecution Shri. Abdul Rasheed. 5. Considering the nature of importance and question of law involved, this court has appointed Senior Counsel Shri. Raman Pillai, as Amicus curiae to help the court. 6. The learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that, he was accused in several cases, of which, most of the sentences have been completed. He is at present undergoing sentence in five cases, which will be over in the normal course only in 2021. He has already in jail for the last ten years. He is only 28 years. He is an youngster and, if he has to undergo the entire sentence, he will be loosing his prime young age. After release, he will not be able to lead a happy life as well. Further this court has got power under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, in appropriate cases to consider this aspect and direct the sentences to run concurrently, though he was convicted in several cases. So he prayed for allowing the application. He had relied on the decision reported in ( 1983 KLT 452 ) Subramanian v. State of Kerala. 7. The learned Government Pleader and Additional Direction General of Prosecution argued that, Section 427 is not applicable to the facts of this case, as it cannot be said to be an offence committed in a single transaction. Further the offences alleged are distinct and different and committed in several places at different points of time. Further he is an habitual offender and he is not entitled to get any sympathy and there is no possibility of reformation as well. So the petitioner is not entitled to get the relief claimed. 8. Further the offences alleged are distinct and different and committed in several places at different points of time. Further he is an habitual offender and he is not entitled to get any sympathy and there is no possibility of reformation as well. So the petitioner is not entitled to get the relief claimed. 8. The learned Senior Advocate Shri. Raman Pillai, Amicus Curie appointed by this court submitted that, Section 428 of the Code deals with the right of the accused to get set off, of the period of detention undergone by him in connection with the case. It is a right vested in the accused. Section 427 of the Code deals with the manner in which the sentences have to be dealt with, if he is convicted in several cases. Normal rule as according to Section 427 is, they will have to run consecutively, unless ordered to run concurrently by the courts below. It is not a right vested in the accused to get concurrent running of sentences imposed on him in several cases. Further the courts have liberally construed that under Section 482 of the Code, court can in extreme cases order running of concurrent sentence in different cases. But that will depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case. 9. It is an admitted fact that, the petitioner is a habitual offender and he was convicted in several cases of similar nature and he had successfully underwent the sentence in most of the cases. Now there are only five cases left, namely, C.C.No.158/2004, C.C.No.390/2004, C.C.No.1039/2003 of Judicial First Class Magistrate Court-I, Chavakkad, CC.No.1168/2006 of Judicial First Class Magistrate Court-Kunnamkulam and S.C.No.171/2005 of Additional Sessions Court (Adhoc-II), Kottayam. I have called for a report, regarding the character of the accused and also the period which the accused has to undergo further from the jail authorities and the jail authorities have sent a report, which reads as follows: "Kind attention is invited to the reference cited above. I am submitting herewith the report of convict No.9964 Benson S/o. Lonappan. He was lodged at different Central jails in Kerala from 06.04.2004 onwards and his last admission at Central Prison, Viyyur was on 01.04.2004. He had 12 convictions in different theft cases amounts to 28 years of total conviction. His expected date of release falls on 02.09.2021excluding the fine sentence. He was lodged at different Central jails in Kerala from 06.04.2004 onwards and his last admission at Central Prison, Viyyur was on 01.04.2004. He had 12 convictions in different theft cases amounts to 28 years of total conviction. His expected date of release falls on 02.09.2021excluding the fine sentence. During the last 10 years of incarceration, his remission sheet did not contain any history of jail punishment. But during 2008 there was an incident in which he tried to escape from the escort police custody. The timely intervention of police officers and public prevented him from that attempt. This attempt proves that even though he was in custody from 2004 to 2008 there was no change in his behavior and he was not ready to succumb to the law and existing rule. He tried to evade from the law. After that in 2013 also he assaulted another inmate in jail and it becomes a police case. All these prove that after 10 years of continuous jail term also, Mr.Benson is not showing any improvement in his behavior of abiding law, tolerance to fellow prisoners, adjustments with officers etc. Several times he is making problems with peripheral security police officers while they are frisking him as a part of their routine checking. In jail, he was not showing any responsibility in doing his assigned works. He used to change his assigned duties occasionally by pointing simple and silly reasons. He does not have the ability to co-operate with his fellow workers. Presently his is at rest from his jail job. He is not having enough contact with his family members during his jail period. He rarely had interview with his relatives. While analysing his behavior it feels that he is a man who is very well bothered about his rights but he does not have any responsibility towards his duties. After 10 years of continuous incarceration also Benson S/o.Lonappan does not improve his character and he is not able to adjust with the law, co-operate with the fellow prisoners, and also abide the orders of the officials. In these circumstances, I am not satisfied with his character and behavior. All the above mentioned facts are the conclusion which made by analysing his character inside the prison and also by making interview with him. In these circumstances, I am not satisfied with his character and behavior. All the above mentioned facts are the conclusion which made by analysing his character inside the prison and also by making interview with him. For detailed and scientific analysis of his character and its improvement, a technical study by a psychologist may be preferred. This report is submitted for necessary action". 10. Before going to the law under this aspect, let me consider the provision of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which deals with set off and concurrence of sentence. Section 428 deals with set off, which reads as follows: 428. Period of detention undergone by the accused to be set off against the sentence of imprisonment.- Where an accused person has, on conviction, been sentenced to imprisonment for a term [not being imprisonment in default of payment of fine,] the period of detention, if any, undergone by him during the investigation, inquiry or trial of the same case and before the date of such conviction, shall be set off against the term of imprisonment imposed on him on such conviction, and the liability of such person to undergo imprisonment on such conviction shall be restricted to the remainder, if any, of the term of imprisonment imposed on him. [Provided that in cases referred to in section 433A, such period of detention shall be set off against the period of fourteen years referred to in that section.] 11. Section 427 of the Code deals with, how the sentence of an offender already sentenced in another case has to be reckoned, which reads as follows: 427. Sentence on offender already sentenced for another offence.-(1) When a person already undergoing a sentence of imprisonment is sentenced on a subsequent conviction to imprisonment or imprisonment for life, such imprisonment or imprisonment for life shall commence at the expiration of the imprisonment to which he has been previously sentenced, unless the Court directs that the subsequent sentence shall run concurrently with such previous sentence: Provided that where a person who has been sentenced to imprisonment by an order under Section 122 in default of furnishing security is, whilst undergoing such sentence, sentenced to imprisonment for an offence committed prior to the making of such order, the later sentence shall commence immediately. (2) When a person already undergoing a sentence of imprisonment for life is sentenced on a subsequent conviction to imprisonment for a term or imprisonment for life, the subsequent sentence shall run concurrently with such previous sentence. 12. It is clear from Section 428 that, it is a right conferred on the accused to get set off, for the period of detention already undergone by him in connection with the investigation, enquiry or trial of the same case. Section 427 (1) of the Code deals with, when a person already undergoing sentence of imprisonment is the sentenced on subsequent conviction to imprisonment or imprisonment for life, such imprisonment or imprisonment for life shall commence at the expiration of the imprisonment to which he has been previously sentenced, unless the court directs that, the subsequent sentence shall run concurrently with such previous sentence. 13. Sub Section (2) of Section 427 shays that, when a person already undergoing the sentence of imprisonment for life is sentenced and on a subsequent conviction to imprisonment for a term or imprisonment for life, the subsequent sentence were run concurrently with such previous sentence. So in all other cases, the sentence imposed on a convicted prisoner subsequently will normally run consecutively and not concurrently unless otherwise ordered by the convicting court or appellate court in the subsequent case. 14. In the decision reported in [(2013) 7 Supreme Court Cases 211] V.K. Bansal v. State of Haryana and another, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed in paragraph 10 of the judgment as follows: "We are in the case at hand is concerned more with nature of power available under Section 427 (1) of the Code, which in our opinion stipulates the general rule to be followed, except in three situations, one falling under the proviso to sub Section (1) of Section 427 and the 2nd falling under sub Section 2 there of and 3rd where the courts directs that, the sentences shall run concurrently. It is manifest on Section 427(1) that, the court has the power and the discretion to issue a direction, but in the very nature of the power so conferred upon the court, the discretionary power shall have to be exercised along with judicial lines and not any mechanical, wooden or patantic manner. It is difficult to lay down any straight jacket approach in the matter, exercise of such discretion by the courts. It is difficult to lay down any straight jacket approach in the matter, exercise of such discretion by the courts. There is no cut and dried formula for the court to follow in the mater of issue or refusal of a direction, within the contemplation of Section 427(1), whether or not a direction ought to be issued in a given case would dependent upon the nature of the offence or offences committed and the fact situation in which the question of concurrence running of the sentence arises". 15. Further in the decision reported in ( 1988 (4) SCC 183 ) Mohd. Akhtar Hussain @ Ibrahim Ahmed Bhatti v. Assistant Collector of Customs (Prevention), Ahmedbad and Another, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that, the basic rule of conviction arising out of the single transaction, justifying concurrent running of sentences and in para 10 of the judgment it was observed as follows: "The basic rule of thumb over the years has been so called single transaction rule for concurrent sentence. If a given transaction constitutes two offenses under two enactments generally it is wrong to have consecutive sentence and it is proper and legitimate to have concurrent sentences, but this rule has no application, if the transactions relating to offences is not the same or the fact constituting the two offences are quite different". 16. In the decision reported in (1978 KLT page 6) Bhaskaran v. State of kerala, this court has considered the question, regarding the power under Section 482 of the Code to be exercised after disposal of the criminal cases, to direct to run the subsequent sentences concurrently and observed as follows: "It is now well settled that the inherent power is not to be invoked to serve purposes for which there are express provisions of law and also where is express provision barring a particular remedy. The criminal Procedure Code forbid review or alteration of judgments once it is signed. If Section 427(1) alone regarding mode of suffering imprisonment can be made either at the time of pronouncing the later judgment or some time afterwards. But in the later case, it offends Section 362 of the Code. It follows that, the power should be exercised at the time of pronouncing the later judgment and not on a motion made thereafter. In other words, a subsequent motion is barred under Section 362 of the Code. But in the later case, it offends Section 362 of the Code. It follows that, the power should be exercised at the time of pronouncing the later judgment and not on a motion made thereafter. In other words, a subsequent motion is barred under Section 362 of the Code. A person who is afforded an opportunity to represent his case and get the relief and who omits to avail of it at the proper time should not be allowed to approach the court on a later date, for the same remedy by invoking the inherent power of the Hon'ble High Court. There is another reason also, why inherent power should not be exercised in a case like the present one. The inherent power is available only to the High Court, while the directions under Section 31(1) or 427(1) can be exercised, both the trial court and also by the appellate court or revisional court. The cases where no appeals or revision petitions are filed or appeals and revision petitions are disposed of by the courts other than the High Court, there is no question of direction to be issued under Section 31(1) of Section 427(1), subsequent to the disposal of the case, as that would amount to alteration of the judgment. It does not stands to reason that, an additional privilege of approaching the court under the inherent power should be available in cases, disposed of by the High Court, where same remedy is not available, when the cases were disposed of under similar circumstances by the subordinate courts". 17. But this decision was overruled in ( 1983 KLT 452 ) Subramanian v. State of Kerala by the Division Bench of this court in which the Division Bench of this court has observed as follows: "The general rule is that a sentence commences to run from the time of it being passed but S.427 creates an exception in the case of persons already undergoing imprisonment and postpones the operation of the subsequent sentence until after expiry of the previous sentence. Thus punishments are normally made cumulative but the court is given a discretion to make the subsequent sentence run concurrently with such previous sentence. Thus punishments are normally made cumulative but the court is given a discretion to make the subsequent sentence run concurrently with such previous sentence. It would be competent for the High Court in exercise of its inherent power to direct that the sentence under a subsequent conviction to imprisonment may run concurrently with the previous sentence even if the stage for exercise of discretion under S. 427 of the Code is over in circumstances, where it would serve any of the three purposes mentioned in S.482 to give effect to any order under the Code or to prevent the abuse of the process of the court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. A direction that a subsequent sentence should run concurrently with an earlier sentence does not amount to alteration of sentence". But in view of the subsequent decision of the Supreme Court in [(2013) 7 Supreme Court Cases 211] V.K. Bansal v. State of Haryana and another, this is no longer good law now. 18. Further in the decision reported in (2012 (1) KLD 219) Sebastian @ Yesudas v. State of kerala, this court has held as follows: "The procedure to invoke Section 428 of the Code by use of miscellaneous applications as indicated even long after the passing of the conviction, but while the sentence imposed against the accused remains in force and continues to be suffered by him has to be appreciated in the back drop of the mandate of the section for passing an appropriate order for reducing the term of imprisonment, awarded, taking into account the period of detention already suffered by him during investigation/trial of the case. In case, the jail authorities face any difficulty in reckoning the period to be provided, as set off in the above cases, it is open to them or even the accused to move the magistrate before which he was tried and convicted for issuing appropriate orders, after perusal of the records and such enquiry as required to fix and determine the period of set off allowing to the accused in the above cases. But he is not entitled to get the relief by invoking Section 482 of the Code, to seek for concurrent running of the sentences imposed in different cases". 19. But he is not entitled to get the relief by invoking Section 482 of the Code, to seek for concurrent running of the sentences imposed in different cases". 19. Further in the decision reported in ( 2000 (9) S.C.C. 749 ) Ammavasai and another v. Inspector of Police Valliyanur and others, though the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed that, the running of sentences concurrently sentence in different cases can be possible, but even in that case, the Supreme Court has held that, they cannot be claimed as of right but invoking the plenary power, the Supreme Court has reduced the imprisonment. In that decision, no proposition of law or any guideline has been given regarding this aspect as well. In that case, the Supreme Court has invoked the power under Article 143 of the Constitution of Indian and exercised the plenary power to meet the ends of justice. 20. Though in the decision reported in 1988 (4) SCC 183 ) Mohd. Akhtar Hussain @ Ibrahim Ahmed Bhatti v. Assistant Collector of Customs (Prevention), Ahmedbad and Another, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that, where the 2nd offence is distinct and different from the first one, the subsequent sentence should normally run consecutively to the first one. But in the same decision it has been observed that, if person has been convicted for the same offence under two different Acts, then in such cases, it is proper to direct the sentence is to run concurrently instead of running the sentences consecutively. Same view has been cited reiterated in the decision reported in (2009 (2) SCC (Crl.) 650) State of Punjab v. Madan Lal. In that case, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has granted the benefit, taking into account that, it was a family transaction and it was relating to offence under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instrument Act and taking that as an exception granted the relief of running the sentences concurrently, those sentence in several cases of the same nature. 21. In that case, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has granted the benefit, taking into account that, it was a family transaction and it was relating to offence under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instrument Act and taking that as an exception granted the relief of running the sentences concurrently, those sentence in several cases of the same nature. 21. In the decision reported (2007 (Crl.L.J.) 763) M.R. Kudva v. State of Andhra Pradesh, the Hon'ble High Court has held that, after the accused was convicted and sentenced in different cases, thereafter applications under Sections 482 and 427 of the Criminal Procedure Code praying that sentences imposed in both the cases be directed to run concurrently is not maintainable and in that case, it has been held that, the inherent jurisdiction was not appropriate remedy, when neither the trial court nor the High Court had exercised the jurisdiction under Section 427 of the Code, while passing the judgment. The same view has been followed by Gujarat High Court in the decision reported in (2007 (Crl.L.J.) 634) Sumlo @ Sumla Himla Bhuriya v. State of Gujarat and another. In that case it has been held that, the accused were convicted or sentenced for a common offence, but there were three distinct session cases tried at three different places, the rule of single transaction even if stretched to any extent, will not bring cases under the umbrella of single transaction rule and rejected the application for the benefit under Section 427(1) of the Code, when an application was filed under Section 482 of the Code. 22. Further in the decision reported in (1988 KHC 626) Sukumaran Nair v. State of Kerala, this court has held that, in the case of habitual offenders, one sentence takes after another and sentencing court has the jurisdiction to impose that sentence should run concurrently or consecutively. Same view has been reiterated in the decision reported in (1994 KHC 349) Chellappan v. State of Kerala. 23. So it is clear from the above dictums that, normally the High Court should not invoke the power under Section 482 of the Code to give the benefit under Section 427 of the Code to the accused, long after he was convicted and sentenced by the trial court and the appellate court confirmed the same, in the appeal or revision filed by him. But in some cases, it has been observed that, in appropriate cases some leniency can be shown, taking into account, the possibility of the accused reforming himself, if such a benefit is given. Further, normally reformative theory is the one to be taken by the courts, while imposing the sentence or considering the question as to whether the sentence has to run concurrently or consecutively, depending upon the nature of offence or offences committed, the conduct of the accused, possibility of reformation, the circumstances under which the offence was committed, whether the premature release of the accused will be welcomed by the society and releasing him from jail prematuredly will be a menace to the society etc. 24. It is seen from the report of the jail authorities that, while he was in jail, he did not try himself to reform and once he had tried to escape from the custody, while he was taken to court, but it was successfully prevented by the escort police officials. It is also seen from the report of the jail authorities that, while was in jail, he had committed another crime, for which a case has been registered. Further he was not co-operative with the fellow prisoners and not adjusting with them as well. He is also causing problem with the peripheral security police officers, while they were frisking him as part of their routine checking. So all these things will go to show that, though in spite of ten years of incarceration, there is no change in his attitude. I have also called for a report from the District Probation Officer, regarding the aspect of providing him the benefit and the District Probation Officer has conducted enquiry and found that, though his father is leading a respectable life in the society with his 2nd wife after the death of his first wife, he had opinion that, though he is prepared to take him, that will not improve his life condition and he will be a threat to the society. The enquiry made by the Probation Officer in the locality also shows that, there is no possibility of reformation in him and releasing him will be a threat to the society and he had opined that, it is not possible for a reformation in the prisoner and releasing him pre-maturedly will only cause threat to the society and also to the family members. So under the circumstances, these things also will go to show that the petitioner is not entitled to get the benefit or discretion of this court, so as to give the benefit under Section 427 of the Code to direct the sentences run concurrently in cases where he is now undergoing sentence. In view of the discussion made above, this court feels that, the petitioner is not entitled to get the relief and the petition is liable to be dismissed. In the result, the criminal miscellaneous case is dismissed.