JUDGMENT : R.D. Kothari, J. Facts of the case are somewhat strange and interesting also. In a case where land was acquired under Land Acquisition Act for the petitioners, the course of events has taken such a turn that petitioners have had to resort to the provisions of the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act,1971 against the respondents wherein the competent authority had passed an eviction order. In Appeal, the District Court quashed and set aside the said order of competent authority. Hence, the present petition before this Court with a prayer to quash the order of the District Court. 2. Few relevant facts and sequence of events are, thus; Notification under Section 4 was issued on 1.12.1982. Notification under Section 6 was issued on 28.4.1986. Thereafter, award was passed by the Land Acquisition Officer on 24.8.1987. The claimants have preferred SCA No.7394 of 1989 challenging the acquisition proceedings initiated by the State for the benefit of the petitioners. Said petition was dismissed on 25.10.1989, however, Court had passed an order not to dispossess the claimants till 31.12.1989. Then on 29.12.1989, in MCA No.2330 of 1989, time was further extended upto 31.1.1990. However, the petitioners have said to have taken over the possession on 6.1.1990. Much argument was advanced on 'possession', to which a reference may be made little later. Against dismissal of petition, claimants have preferred SLP No.1222 of 1990 which came to be disposed of by the Supreme Court observing that controversy has become academic and SLP has become in-fructuous. It was disposed of by an order dated 11.8.1995. Then, on 22.12.2000 a show cause notice under the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 was issued to the respondents/claimants. The claimants appeared and filed their reply/objections. The competent authority passed an order of eviction on 9.2.2001. Claimants have filed an appeal before the District Court. While so, the claimants have filed another writ petition being SCA No.4655 of 2004 wherein, relief, inter-alia, was claimed that there is delay, laches and acquiescence on the part of other side and therefore, notification of withdrawal under Section 48 may be ordered to be issued. Said petition was disposed of mainly on the ground that the claimants have preferred an appeal before the District Court. The District Court in the end had allowed the appeal. Said petition was disposed of mainly on the ground that the claimants have preferred an appeal before the District Court. The District Court in the end had allowed the appeal. It is the say of the petitioner that said order of the District Court is bad and illegal. 3. Heard learned Senior Advocate Shri S.N.Shelat with learned advocate Ms.Lilu K. Bhaya on behalf of the petitioners and learned Senior Advocate Shri R.R.Marshall with Ms.Kapadia for the respondents. Learned advocate Shri Anshin Desai has supported the submission of Shri R.R.Marshall. 4. Learned Senior Advocate Shri S.N.Shelat has pointed out that it is erroneous to say that order passed by the District Court is by consent. Shri Shelat has also pointed out that on careful reading of the order, it would appear that disposal of the appeal by the District Court is not by consent. Shri Shelat has further pointed out that petitioners have duly taken the possession of the land in question and in the circumstances of the case, present petition deserves to be allowed by quashing and setting aside the order of the District Court. After the completion of submission, brief written submissions is also submitted on behalf of the petitioner. 5. In the written submissions, the petitioners have submitted mainly on following points : (1) Whether acquisition is abandoned ? (2) Does the order of the Supreme Court protect the possession of land holder ? (3) The possession is validly taken. (4) Whether this Court should deny the relief because construction undertaken by the respondent during the pendency of the proceedings. (5) Challenge to order dated 9.2.2001. (6) Whether principle of natural justice are breached ? (7) Whether the order is consent order. 6. On the other hand, learned Senior Advocate Shri Marshall for the respondents, referring the order of the District Court, has pointed out that stand taken by the petitioners is wholly unsustainable. Referring the material on record, Shri Marshall has pointed out that petition deserves to be dismissed. 7. Learned advocate Shri Anshin Desai has mainly placed reliance on a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Pune Municipal Corporation & Anr. v. Harakchand Misirimal Solanki & Ors., reported in (2014) 3 SCC 183 . Referring the material on record, Shri Marshall has pointed out that petition deserves to be dismissed. 7. Learned advocate Shri Anshin Desai has mainly placed reliance on a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Pune Municipal Corporation & Anr. v. Harakchand Misirimal Solanki & Ors., reported in (2014) 3 SCC 183 . Further, Shri Desai has submitted that if we refer the memo of petition, it is a classic example of vague pleading and the petition is drafted in very casual manner. It was submitted that only order of the District Court is attached along with the petition as Annexure-A. It was only when the respondents have filed detailed affidavit, petitioners have come up with other materials. 8. The findings of the District Court are as under : (a) That till the initiation of the proceeding under the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act,1971, actual possession was not with the acquiring body i.e. GEB, yet on misconception of law and fact, the proceedings are initiated under the said Act and order to vacate in the end came to be passed. (b) On examining the record, it 'reveals' that LAQ Officer or any other officer has not taken the possession as provided under Section 16 of the Act. Consequently, the land in question neither vest in the Government nor in acquiring body. (c) That the order of the competent authority is contradictory in nature inasmuch as [contrary to above stated factual position] the competent authority claims that possession of the acquired land is already taken under Section 16. (d) That the competent authority does record that respondents/claimants have submitted written submissions/representations, however, nowhere it is stated that what contentions taken by the claimants and what competent authority has taken into consideration. (e) The order is violative of principle of natural justice as it is unreasoned order and it does not record any finding on the submissions/representations made by the claimants. (f) What is finding of competent authority, - in the opinion of the District Court - is reproduced and quoted in Para.11 by the District Court. (g) Satisfaction recorded by the competent authority is contrary to, 'previous factum of taking over possession under Section 16 of the Act. (f) What is finding of competent authority, - in the opinion of the District Court - is reproduced and quoted in Para.11 by the District Court. (g) Satisfaction recorded by the competent authority is contrary to, 'previous factum of taking over possession under Section 16 of the Act. (h) That competent authority cannot exercise power under the Act once the competent authority is satisfied that claimants have never handed over the possession of land shown in schedule either to the Board or to the LAQ Officer. (i) The provisions of Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act,1971 would not be attracted as the actual possession of the land in question was never handed over either to GEB or to the LAQ Officer and that the possession has remained with respondent/appellant herein. (j) "Concession" and "Consent" is recorded in Para.14, which reads, thus; "14. The aforesaid actual scenario has been admitted by both the learned Advocates in presence of Superintending Engineer, Navsari and Executive Engineer (Construction) GETCO, who are present in the court today. In view of aforesaid discussion, in the present case, larger public interest is involved. In the result, the learned advocates for both the sides have also shown willingness to arrive at an amicable solution and settle the matter out of court before the Land Acquisition Officer of Collector, considering the prevalent rate of land so that the agriculturist can be adequately compensated for the land acquired as the proceeding has been initiated before about 25 years back and yet the possession has not been taken over. In the meantime, the price escalation has taken place in exorbitant manner. Under the circumstances, equity on the part of acquiring body as well as on the part of agriculturist both are required to be taken into consideration. It would also be in the interest of all concerned that without taking this matter further before the higher forum, let the parties hereto approach before the Collector, Surat for reaching to an amicable settlement acceptable to both the parties, and let the learned advocates be allowed to assist in settling the matter in its letter and spirit, not as a legal practitioner, but only keeping in view the larger public interest involved in the matter, keeping in mind the interest of the company and the agriculturist who is losing his agricultural land. In that view of the matter, the parties may find one just compensation keeping in view the current scenario. The competent authority of the Acquiring Body shall have to take into consideration the prevalent escalated price of land while taking over the possession of the land in question, which is presently available i.e.11,281 sq. mtrs., as rest of the land has already gone in the Town Planning Scheme during the pendency of the present proceeding/appeal. In the result, the competent authority of the Respondent Co. is required to be directed to take this matter very seriously and to convene meeting with the Collector, Surat in presence of learned advocates for both the parties to fix the price of the land in question available for construction of 66 KV Sub-Station, and preferably arrive at an amicable solution within 3 months..........." Conclusion is recorded by the District Court that proceeding before the competent authority under the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 is not maintainable as the land was never vested in the Government and the provisions of the Act would not, therefore, be attracted. Hence, the order is non-est, ultra vires and without the jurisdiction. 9. The question herein is legality and correctness of the judgment of the District Court. The said Court has allowed the appeal filed by the respondents under Section 9 of the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971. The finding of the District Court is referred above. The conclusion of the District Court that order of competent authority is without jurisdiction, bad and illegal is based mainly on two premises, viz., order is violative of principle of natural justice and secondly, initiation of proceeding by the competent authority under the provisions of the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 is bad and illegal inasmuch as alleged taking of possession of land in question under the Land Acquisition has never taken place and the land had never vested in the State or in acquiring body. Second premise may be taken first. It may be recalled that notification under Section 4 was issued on 1.12.1982. Notification under Section 6 was issued on 28.4.1986. Notice under Section 9 was given to the respondents on 11.9.1986. Award was declared by the LAQ Officer on 24.8.1987. Second premise may be taken first. It may be recalled that notification under Section 4 was issued on 1.12.1982. Notification under Section 6 was issued on 28.4.1986. Notice under Section 9 was given to the respondents on 11.9.1986. Award was declared by the LAQ Officer on 24.8.1987. It may also be stated that land in question is a part of Survey Nos.46 and 47 of Block No.26 of village Jahangirpura, Taluka - Choryasi, District - Surat. The land acquired is 16064 sq. mtrs. land. It is the say of the respondents that total area of the said block is of 76653 sq. mtrs. land. 10. It is the say of the petitioners that Land Acquisition Officer had taken the possession by drawing panchnama in presence of panchas on 6.1.1990. In this regard, attention was drawn to Page Nos.56 and 132. If we refer Page-56, it is panchnama of taking possession. It says about taking over of possession of acquired land. It says that panchas have handed over possession to Addl. Land Acquisition Officer. It also records that land is an open piece of land, however, different crops were found on the said land. It also records that respondents are present and on being asked to sign, the respondents have refused to sign the panchnama. Then, page- 132 is 'Kabja Receipt'. It is of the same date i.e. 6.1.1990. It bears signature of Addl. Land Acquisition Officer and Dy. Engineer (GEB). It says that former officer has handed over the possession and later officer has accepted and received the possession. The receipt is issued by Dy. Engineer (GEB). 11. Before referring case laws on the point, it may be stated that one of the principal contentions of respondents is, - this Court in Misc. Civil Application No.2 of 1990 (earlier numbered as Civil Application No.7394 of 1989) in SCA No.7394 of 1989 has extended the stay qua dispossession till 31.1.990. That alleged taking over of the possession by the petitioners on 6.1.1990, therefore, is bad and illegal. 12. How the possession is to be taken? What is mode of taking possession? At the time of hearing, attention was drawn to recent decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Banda Development Authority, Banda v. Moti Lal Agarwal & Ors., reported in (2011) 5 SCC 394 . 12. How the possession is to be taken? What is mode of taking possession? At the time of hearing, attention was drawn to recent decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Banda Development Authority, Banda v. Moti Lal Agarwal & Ors., reported in (2011) 5 SCC 394 . In the said decision, it is laid down that; "(i) No hard-and-fast rule can be laid down as to what act would constitute taking of possession of the acquired land. (ii) If the acquired land is vacant, the act of the concerned State authority to go to the spot and prepare a panchnama will ordinarily be treated as sufficient to constitute taking of possession. (iii) If crop is standing on the acquired land or building/structure exists, mere going on the spot by the concerned authority will, by itself, be not sufficient for taking possession. Ordinarily, in such cases, the concerned authority will have to give notice to the occupier of the building/structure or the person who has cultivated the land and take possession in the presence of independent witnesses and get their signatures on the panchnama. Of course, refusal of the owner of the land or building/structure may not lead to an inference that the possession of the acquired land has not been taken. (iv) If the acquisition is of a large tract of land, it may not be possible for the acquiring/designated authority to take physical possession of each and every parcel of the land and it will be sufficient that symbolic possession is taken by preparing appropriate document in the presence of independent witnesses and getting their signatures on such document. (v) If beneficiary of the acquisition is an agency-instrumentality of the State and 80% of the total compensation is deposited in terms of Section 17(3A) and substantial portion of the acquired land has been utilised in furtherance of the particular public purpose, then the Court may reasonably presume that possession of the acquired land has been taken." 13. While laying down the above law, the Court has considered the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Balwant Narayan Bhagde v. M.D.Bhagwat & Ors., reported in AIR 1975 SC 1767 . It is one of the earliest case on the point. This case may be referred closely. In that case, on the point of mode of taking possession, the Court was divided. It is one of the earliest case on the point. This case may be referred closely. In that case, on the point of mode of taking possession, the Court was divided. Majority was not agreeable to the view taken by Untwalia, J. on the point of taking possession. Untwalia,J. had referred and relied on Order 21, Rule 35 , 36 and 95 etc. of CPC. In that case, prayer was to quash the decision of withdrawal of acquisition of part of land? Therein, very large area of land was acquired for the purpose of agriculture college. The land was situated at village Umrai, Taluka-Akola. Over 236 Acres of land was acquired. Petitioner claimed to be tenant of part of the land in question. The said land is part of Survey No.30/2. The petitioner claimed to be tenant of 12 Acres 23 Gunthas of land. It appears that in that case notification under Section 4 was issued on 24.1.1959. Urgency clause was invoked and hearing of objection under Section 5A was dispensed with. Notification under Section 6 was issued on 17.2.1959. An order was passed to hand over the possession within 15 days of issuance of notification under Section 9. Notice under Section 9 was issued on 6.3.1959. Then on 24.3.1959, Land Acquisition officer ordered Tahsildar, Akola to deliver the possession of acquired land to the agriculture college. Tahsildar took the possession and handed over the same to the agriculture college on 3.4.1959. He also made a report to the Authority about it. Thereafter, on 7.4.1959 Land Acquisition Officer has written a letter to the Collector mentioning that appellant had represented before him saying that stay order is issued by Minister of Agriculture in respect of Survey No.30/2. In the end, in that case, release order was passed qua that land. The question before the Court was, whether the order of release of land in the circumstances is valid and proper or not. 14. In the above facts and circumstances of the case, the question also arose of mode of taking possession under Sections 16 and 17 of the Act. Majority, in very short order, has held, thus; "1. We agree with the conclusion reached by our brother Untwalia, J., as also with the reasoning on which the conclusion is based. 14. In the above facts and circumstances of the case, the question also arose of mode of taking possession under Sections 16 and 17 of the Act. Majority, in very short order, has held, thus; "1. We agree with the conclusion reached by our brother Untwalia, J., as also with the reasoning on which the conclusion is based. But we are writing a separate judgment as we feel that the discussion in the judgment of our learned brother Untwalia, J., in regard to delivery of 'symbolical' and 'actual' - possession under Rules 35, 36, 95 and 96 of Order 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure, is not necessary for the disposal of the present appeals and we do not wish to subscribe to what has been said by our learned brother Untwalia, J., in that connection, nor do we wish to express our assent with the discussion of the various authorities made by him in his judgment. We think it is enough to state that when the Government proceeds to take possession of the land acquired by it under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, it must take actual possession of the land since all interests in the land are sought to be acquired by it. There can be no question of taking 'symbolical' possession in the sense understood by judicial decisions under the Code of Civil Procedure. Nor would possession merely on paper be enough. What the Act contemplates as a necessary condition of vesting of the land in the Government is the taking of actual possession of the land. How such possession may be taken would depend on the nature of the land. Such possession would have to be taken as the nature of the land admits of. There can be no hard and fast rule laying down what act would be sufficient to constitute taking of possession of land. We should not, therefore, be taken as laying down an absolute and inviolable rule that merely going on the spot and making a declaration by beat of drum or otherwise would be sufficient to constitute taking of possession of land in every case. We should not, therefore, be taken as laying down an absolute and inviolable rule that merely going on the spot and making a declaration by beat of drum or otherwise would be sufficient to constitute taking of possession of land in every case. But here, in our opinion, since the land was lying fallow and there was no crop on it at the material time, the act of the Tahsildar in going on the spot and inspecting the land for the purpose of determining what part was waste and arable and should, therefore, be taken possession of and determining its extent, was sufficient to constitute taking of possession. It appears that the appellant was not present when this was done by the Tahsildar, but the presence of the owner or the occupant of the land is not necessary to effectuate the taking of possession. It is also not strictly necessary as a matter of legal requirement that notice should be given to the owner or the occupant of the land that possession would be taken at a particular time, though it may be desirable where possible, to give such notice before possession is taken by the authorities, as that would eliminate the possibility of any fraudulent or collusive transaction of taking of mere paper possession, without the occupant or the owner ever coming to know of it. 2. We are of the view, on the facts and circumstances of the present case, that the Tahsildar took actual possession of that part of the land which was waste or arable and handed it over to the Principal of the Agricultural College. It is true that the Special Land Acquisition Officer in his letter dated 13th December, 1961 to the Commissioner stated that possession of the entire land was still with the appellant and it was not actually taken possession of by the Principal, Agricultural College, But it is obvious that this statement was made by the Special Land Acquisition Officer because he thought that actual possession of the land could not be regarded as having been taken, unless the appellant was excluded from the land and since the appellant immediately, without any obstruction, entered upon the land and continued in possession, "the land was not actually taken possession of by the Principal, Agricultural College". This was plainly erroneous view, for the legal position is clear that even if the appellant entered upon the land and resumed possession of it the very next moment after the land was actually taken possession of and became vested in the Government, such act on the part of the appellant did not have the effect of obliterating the consequences of vesting. There can, therefore, be no doubt that actual possession of 19 acres 16 gunthas of waste and arable land was taken by the Tahsildar on 3rd April, 1959 and it became vested in the Government. (Neither the Government nor the Commissioner could thereafter withdraw from the acquisition of any portion of this land under S. 48 (1) of the Act." (emphasis supplied) 15. Untwalia, J. has concluded, thus; 29. .... Viewed in the light of the discussion of law I have made above, it would be noticed that possession of the land, in any event, was taken on the spot and it vested in the Government. The appellant's resuming possession of the land after once it was validly taken by the Government had not the effect of undoing the fact of the vesting of the land in the Government. The Government or the Commissioner was not at liberty to withdraw from the acquisition of any portion of the land of which possession had been taken, under Section 48 (1) of the Act." 16. At the time of hearing, attention was also drawn to a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Sita Ram Bhandar Society, New Delhi v. Lt. Governor, Govt. of NCT Delhi & Ors., reported in AIR 2010 SC 1143 . Therein, the Supreme Court has followed Bhagda's case (supra). 17. In the present case, the possession is taken and handed over by preparing the panchnama in that regard. There is also Kabja Receipt as referred above. Generally speaking, taking possession by preparing panchnama cannot be said to be not in accordance with law. This mode of taking possession is a recognised mode. Prima facie, both the documents i.e. panchnama of taking possession and Kabja Receipt are reliable. Neither of them appear to be got up one. There is also Kabja Receipt as referred above. Generally speaking, taking possession by preparing panchnama cannot be said to be not in accordance with law. This mode of taking possession is a recognised mode. Prima facie, both the documents i.e. panchnama of taking possession and Kabja Receipt are reliable. Neither of them appear to be got up one. We may also believe that Land Acquisition Officer may have gone to the site along with panchas and that it may not be a mere 'paper panchnama.' The presence of respondents at that time at that place, as alleged by the petitioners, may also be believed. In the circumstances of the present case, finding and conclusion of the District Court is proper and legal? 18. There is considerable force in the submission of learned Senior Advocate Shri S.N.Shelat that petitioners may be hauled up for taking possession in violation of the order of the Court but, it cannot be said that possession is not taken by the petitioners or that mode of taking possession is not proper or recognised mode. It was also pointed out that petitioners have not committed any breach as the petitioners were not party to SCA. It was submitted that breach, if at all, is committed by the Land Acquisition Officer. In this regard, reliance was placed on unreported judgment of this Court in the case of Patel Shantaben Bhagwanbhai w/o Bhagwanbhai Jethabhai v. Patel Bharatkumar Babulal & Ors., rendered in SCA No.4097 of 2011. 19. Section 16 deals with taking of possession. It reads, thus; "16.Power to take possession. - When the Collector has made an award under Section 11, he may take possession of the land, which shall thereupon [vest absolutely in the [Government]], free from all encumbrances." 20. Bare reading of the provisions would show that Section 16 has three essentials, viz., "take possession", "thereupon vest absolutely" and "free from all encumbrances." The Act or the provision does not provide how the possession is to be taken nor there is any specific Rule in this regard. The possession is to be taken as the nature of land and the circumstances of the case permit. In the present case, one of the essential features of Section 16, viz., 'thereupon vest absolutely' surfaces for consideration. The possession is to be taken as the nature of land and the circumstances of the case permit. In the present case, one of the essential features of Section 16, viz., 'thereupon vest absolutely' surfaces for consideration. It is the say of the petitioner that panchnama has power to vest the property in petitioner and the possession is taken by executing panchnama. The consequence of taking possession is owner would be divested from the property. Divesting of interest in the immovable property ought to be on some surer foundation. Panchnama of taking possession in defiance of the order of the Court not to dispossess would be lacking in sanctity. Is it that the panchnama of taking possession is only formality? Is the panchnama is idle ritual to be observed? Fairly short and simple provision (Section 16) is considered in quite few cases by the Court. Taking possession by preparing panchnama is accepted and recognised mode of taking possession. Thus, the panchnama has power and force to vest the property in the Government. The property would be vested absolutely and without any encumbrance. That being so, panchnama cannot be read as an idle formality. Panchnama prepared herein leaves considerable room for the other side to urge that panchnama is in violation of law. 21. In this regard, reference may be made to Bhagde's case (supra). Reentering into possession by the appellant after taking over of possession by Tahsildar and after handing over of possession to acquiring body was held as bad and illegal. Reentering into possession had taken place in that case only within 3 days of taking over of possession. However, same was held as impermissible. Similar is the case herein, or perhaps the respondent is far better placed than appellant in Bhagde's case. In that case, reentering into possession had taken place pursuant to the stay order later on issued by the authority/Minister. Conversely, in the present case, despite the stay order, the petitioners had taken the possession. Stay order in that case was of no consequence as it was issued after taking over and handing over of the possession. While in the present case, authority proceeded to take possession despite the stay order. In the circumstances of the case, submission that petitioners were not the party to SCA is not of much importance or consequence. Stay order in that case was of no consequence as it was issued after taking over and handing over of the possession. While in the present case, authority proceeded to take possession despite the stay order. In the circumstances of the case, submission that petitioners were not the party to SCA is not of much importance or consequence. The point is sanctity of panchnama, validity of divesting of interest of respondents and the question that whether the property would vest absolutely in the Government in the circumstances of the case. In this regard, a reference may also be made to the submissions of learned advocate for the respondent, particularly the submissions of learned advocate Mr.Desai. Learned advocate Mr.Desai has rightly drawn attention to the decisions of the Supreme Court in the case of Chandigarh Housing Board v. Major-General Devinder Singh (Retd.) & Anr., reported in 2007 (9) SCC 67 and N. Padmamma & Others v. S. Ramakrishna Reddy & Ors., reported in 2008 (15) SCC 517 , wherein importunacy of property right is recognised by the Supreme Court by elevating right to property as a human right. It was held therein that any act seeking to divest from such right must be strictly construed. Submission of learned advocate for the petitioners is difficult to accept. (emphasis supplied) 22. Reliance placed on unreported judgment of this Court in Patel Shantaben Bhagwanbhai's case (Supra) is also misplaced. In that case, the co-ordinate Bench of this Court has refused to set aside the order dated 15.3.2011. It appears that dispute in that case was in respect of land referred as Final Plot No.214 of T.P.Scheme No.5. The grievance of the petitioner was that despite the order of the status-quo, - which was confirmed by the appellate court - respondent Nos.3 to 5 had passed an order to hand over the possession of suit plot to respondent No.2/1 and other respondents. In that case, it would appear that respondent No.2/1 and others had also instituted a suit i.e. Regular Civil Suit No.53 of 1993 in respect of the suit land wherein present petitioner was also a party. Then, petitioner had instituted a suit i.e. Regular Civil Suit No.224 of 2002 against respondent Nos.2/1 and other respondents and also against the officers under T.P.Act, praying that use and possession of suit land of petitioner may not be disturbed during the pendency of the suit. Then, petitioner had instituted a suit i.e. Regular Civil Suit No.224 of 2002 against respondent Nos.2/1 and other respondents and also against the officers under T.P.Act, praying that use and possession of suit land of petitioner may not be disturbed during the pendency of the suit. Interim order was passed in favour of petitioner. It is true that in that case grievance of passing of an order to hand over the possession to respondent No.2/1 and other respondents despite the order of status-quo was answered observing that petitioner has remedy under Order 39, Rule 2A . However, the cited case is clearly distinguishable as it would appear from the holding in that case. Therein, this Court has held, thus; "4.1 ...there is an inter se dispute with respect to ownership of the land for which the civil suit is pending and therefore, the rights of the respective parties shall be crystallised and decided by the Civil Court in the aforesaid proceedings and necessary consequences shall follow. 4.0 The learned advocate appearing on behalf of the petitioners made a categorical statement that the petitioners - original plaintiffs are not challenging and/or questioning the legality and validity of the Town Planning Scheme which has become final and recording the aforesaid statement, this Court disposed of the aforesaid Civil Revision Application No.21/2004. Thus, when the legality and validity of the Town Planning Scheme has not been challenged by the petitioners in the aforesaid suit and when respondent Nos.3 to 5 have passed impugned order dated 15.03.2011 under the provisions of the Act, 1976 and directed to hand over the possession to respondent Nos.2/1 to 2/4, it cannot be said that respondent Nos.3 to 5 have committed any illegality." 23. Reference and context in that case was quite different. Similarly, the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of M/s. Larsen and Turbo Ltd. v. State of Gujarat & Ors., reported in AIR 1998 SC 1608 is also possible to distinguish. Interestingly, the said case appears to support the case of acquiring body when we consider the case of acquiring body in abstract and in general. However, on re-reading, it would appear that it does not carry the case of the petitioner herein any further. Interestingly, the said case appears to support the case of acquiring body when we consider the case of acquiring body in abstract and in general. However, on re-reading, it would appear that it does not carry the case of the petitioner herein any further. It is the ratio and the principle laid down in the case that helps the party and binds the Court and not seemingly attractive facts of the case cited that can be read as a precedent. Attention was drawn to Para.13 of the said decision it reads, thus : "13. High Court held that actual physical possession of the land subject matter of the acquisition proceeding was not handed over to the appellant while it was the contention of the appellant as well as the State Government that possession of the land was handed over to L&T Ltd. on July 5, 1989. At the time the possession was taken over a Panchanama was prepared duly witnessed by two farmers of the Village Magdalla and singed by the Circle Officer evidencing handing over of possession and also by M.H. Adhikari an officer of the L&T Ltd. for taking over possession. The possession receipt of the same date duly signed by the Circle Officer and the officer of the L&T Ltd. was given. L&T Ltd. thus took possession of the land in presence of the panchas. Panchanama recites that both the witnesses (Panchas) had been intimated in advance by Mamlatdar, Choryasi and that possession of the concerned land that day taken over in their presence by the Circle Officer and that the land was an open spot and there was no construction or crops grown therein. Possession of the land was taken over along with the trees standing thereon. As noted above, possession was thereafter delivered to the representative of the L&T Ltd. at that time itself. In the High Court it was contended that no actual physical possession of the land had been taken. The petitioners filed affidavits of the Panchas who had signed the Panchanama. In these affidavits they stated that they were called to the office of the Panchayat and that their signatures were obtained on blank papers and that they had not gone to the site and that neither the landlord was present not the actual possession was delivered to the acquiring body. In these affidavits they stated that they were called to the office of the Panchayat and that their signatures were obtained on blank papers and that they had not gone to the site and that neither the landlord was present not the actual possession was delivered to the acquiring body. Ready with these affidavits High Court noticed from the recitation in the Panchanama that it was nowhere mentioned that the panchas had gone to the site from the office of the panchayat. It was not disputed that in the revenue records it was L&T Ltd. who was shown in possession of the land. Affidavits of the Panchas filed in the High Court which contained statements contrary to what was recorded in the Panchanama and against the revenue entries are quite meaningless and in our opinion High Court unnecessarily put undue reliance on the same. High Court could not convert itself into a revenue court and hold that in spite of the Panchanama and the revenue records actual physical possession of the acquired land had not been handed over to the acquiring body. High Court, in our opinion, has not correctly analysed the two judgments of this Court in Balmokand Khatri Educational and Industrial Trust, Amritsar v. State of Punjab [1996] 4 SCC 212 and Balwant Narayan Bhagde v. M.D. Bhagwat and Ors. [1976] 1 SCC 700 to come to the conclusion that actual physical possession of the land was not taken over by the State." 23.1 In that case, it would appear that panchas of the panchnama of taking possession of land had filed an affidavit before the High Court making assertion contrary to the assertion made in the panchnama. Panchas have stated in the affidavit that they have not gone to the site. They have also alleged that neither the landlord was present nor the actual possession was delivered to the acquiring body. Placing reliance on affidavit by the High Court and disbelieving the taking over of possession was in the circumstances of the case disapproved by the Supreme Court. Herein the question is propriety of taking possession by the State while there was an order of maintaining status-quo in respect of land in question. Instance of panchas filing of affidavit disowned the panchnama, cannot help the petitioner. Herein the question is propriety of taking possession by the State while there was an order of maintaining status-quo in respect of land in question. Instance of panchas filing of affidavit disowned the panchnama, cannot help the petitioner. Further, it may be mentioned that in M/s.Larsen & Toubro's case (supra), entering of name of the acquiring body in the revenue record had also weighed with the Supreme Court. In the present case, name of the petitioner was mutated in revenue record as late as in 2000, while panchnama is of 1990 and acquisition is of 1982. 24. The present case comes more closure to Manchi Thakorbhai Prabhubhai Patel's case - SCA No.9716 of 1999. The respondents had rightly drawn attention to this unreported judgment. In that case, the land was situated at village Bhensan, District - Surat. It was of Survey No.84. One set of land owned by inheritance by Bhikhiben and Chimiben and another set of land owned by Thakorbhai Prabhubhai. The land owners of both set of land had filed declaration form qua their land under Section 6 of ULC Act. The competent authority had passed an order declaring certain area of land as an excess land. That order was carried in appeal and thereafter, in revision etc. In the end, SCA No.6995 of 1997 filed before this Court. This Court had passed an interim order to maintain the status-quo. Despite the said order of status-quo, the Government proceeded to take possession of excess land by preparing the panchnama. Thereafter, SCA No.6945 of 1997 disposed of by this Court directing the Government to decide the representation of the petitioner afresh in accordance with law. Admittedly, the remand proceeding had never disposed of thereafter. In later petition i.e. SCA No.9716 of 1999, this Court had considered whether the Government has taken possession of excess land before repealing of ULC Act in lawful manner or not. It was submitted at the time of hearing that above order was carried in appeal. The Division Bench has affirmed it and SLP against it was dismissed. This Court has concluded, thus; "9. Combined effect of these facts would be that the Government cannot be stated to have taken possession of the land from the land-holders legally on the date when the Repeal Act became effective. The Division Bench has affirmed it and SLP against it was dismissed. This Court has concluded, thus; "9. Combined effect of these facts would be that the Government cannot be stated to have taken possession of the land from the land-holders legally on the date when the Repeal Act became effective. Proceedings under the Ceiling Act with respect to such declaration regarding survey No.84 must be treated to have abated. The petition is therefore, allowed with above declaration. The symbolic though unauthorised act of the Government of having taken over possession of the land is set aside. The petition is disposed of. Rule is made absolute accordingly." It was pointed out at the time of hearing that Division Bench in LPA against the above order has dismissed the LPA and SLP against that order is also dismissed. 25. It may also be noted that in the present case, officers of the petitioners conceded before the District Court that actual possession of land is not taken (Para.13 & 14 etc.) This concession concludes the issue. Say of the District Court in this regard is reasonably specific and clear. It is an 'admission' by the party and not by advocate alone. The suit can be decreed (Order 12 etc.) and petitions may be disposed of relying on concession and admission made by the party. 26. In view of above discussion, finding of the District Court that initiation of proceeding under Public Premises Act is bad and illegal, is possible to accept. 27. As to the finding of the District Court that order of competent authority is bad and illegal and non-est as it is violative of principle of natural justice, the District Court gives two reasons; firstly, no finding is given by the competent authority and that without recording any finding, order is passed by the authority and secondly, the order does not refer submission/representation of the respondents. That the authority ought to have recorded the same and it ought to have given its finding on these submission and representation. 28. As to the submission that competent authority has passed an order without recording any finding in support of its conclusion, learned Senior Advocate Shri S.N.Shelat has pointed out that at least three reasons can be culled out on careful reading of the order. 28. As to the submission that competent authority has passed an order without recording any finding in support of its conclusion, learned Senior Advocate Shri S.N.Shelat has pointed out that at least three reasons can be culled out on careful reading of the order. It was also pointed out that authority has recorded that - (a) Even after the notice the respondents have not handed over the possession of premises described in the schedule. (b) Thereby the respondents have acted in contravention of statute - i.e. LAQ Act etc. - and in contravention of order and decision of the Court and (c) That the respondents are unauthorised occupant of the premises. 29. Is it possible to agree with the submission of Shri Shelat in this regard? In the case of Siemens Engineering and Manufacturing Co. of India Ltd. v. The Union of India & Anr., reported in AIR 1976 SC 1785 , in this regard the Supreme Court has held that reasons should be sufficiently clear and explicit. On this test, the order of competent authority fails. It may also be stated that one of the tests is to ask question whether the order is appealable or not. The order of the competent authority in the present case is appealable order and therefore also, the authority is required to give specific and clear reasons. All the same, if this be the sole ground found by the District Court as vitiating legal order, then proper course would be to remand the case. Nothing much turns on it. 30. The other vitiating ground found by the District Court, viz., non mentioning by the authority in its order that what submissions and contentions raised by the respondents before the said authority. This ground has substance. It was not pointed out at the time of hearing how this finding of the District Court is bad or erroneous. 31. As to the other submission that acquired land mutated in the name of the petitioners in the revenue record in 2000, it is not of much importance or consequence in view of the above discussion. Similarly, strong reliance placed by other side on the public advertisement issued by the petitioners in newspaper, may not be gone into. 31. As to the other submission that acquired land mutated in the name of the petitioners in the revenue record in 2000, it is not of much importance or consequence in view of the above discussion. Similarly, strong reliance placed by other side on the public advertisement issued by the petitioners in newspaper, may not be gone into. It was pointed out by the respondents that the petitioners have invited public-bid whereby members of public were called upon to place their bid in respect of their land as the petitioners intend to purchase the same for its own purpose. This public advertisement was issued in 2012. In view of above discussion, it is not necessary to consider relevance and consequence of issuance of this advertisement. It may be stated that at the time of hearing it was urged by learned advocate for the respondents that list of different areas mentioned in the advertisement include the disputed area also. 32. Lastly, reference may be made to one important submission advanced by learned advocate Mr.Anshin Desai. Mr.Desai has drawn attention to latest Act i.e. Act of 2013. Said Act replaces the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. The new Act is known as 'Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation, Re-settlement Act,2013' It has come into force from 1.1.2014. Relevant provision of it is considered by the Supreme Court in Pune Municipal Corporation's case (Supra). In that case, Pune Municipal Corporation has resolved to set up forest garden in 2002 and had sent a proposal for acquisition of land. Notification under Section 4 was issued on 30.9.2004. Notification under Section 6 was issued on 2.2.2006. Notice under Section 9 was issued on 31.1.2008. Thereafter, the Land Acquisition Officer had passed an award under Section 11. The land owners had filed a writ petition before the Bombay High Court in 2008, challenging the acquisition on various grounds. Said petition was allowed. In Appeal filed by Pune Municipal Corporation before the Supreme Court, respondent had invoked Section 24(3) of 2013 Act. Section 24 reads, thus; "24. Land acquisition process under Act No.1 of 1894 shall be deemed to have lapsed in certain cases. Said petition was allowed. In Appeal filed by Pune Municipal Corporation before the Supreme Court, respondent had invoked Section 24(3) of 2013 Act. Section 24 reads, thus; "24. Land acquisition process under Act No.1 of 1894 shall be deemed to have lapsed in certain cases. - (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, in any case of land acquisition proceedings initiated under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, - (a) Where no award under section 11 of the said Land Acquisition Act has been made, then, all provisions of this Act relating to the determination of compensation shall apply; or (b) Where an award under said section 11 has been made, then such proceedings shall continue under the provisions of the said Land Acquisition Act, as if the said Act has not been repealed. (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), in case of land acquisition proceedings initiated under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, where an award under the said section 11 has been made five years or more prior to the commencement of this Act but the physical possession of the land has not been taken or the compensation has not been paid the said proceedings shall be deemed to have lapsed and the appropriate Government, if it so chooses, shall initiate the proceedings of such land acquisition afresh in accordance with the provisions of this Act: Provided that where an award has been made and compensation in respect of a majority of land holding has not been deposited in the account of the beneficiaries, then, all beneficiaries specified in the notification for acquisition under section 4 of the said Land Acquisition Act, shall be entitled to compensation in accordance with the provisions of this Act." 33. Plea of the respondents referred in Para. 6, which reads, thus; "6. It is argued on behalf of the landowners that by virtue of Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act, the subject acquisition shall be deemed to have been lapsed because the award under Section 11 of the 1894 Act is made more than five years prior to the commencement of 2013 Act and no compensation has been paid to the owners nor the amount of compensation has been deposited in the court by the Special Land Acquisition Officer." 34. Accepting the submissions of respondent, it was held, thus; "11. Section 24(2) also begins with non obstante clause. Accepting the submissions of respondent, it was held, thus; "11. Section 24(2) also begins with non obstante clause. This provision has overriding effect over Section 24(1). Section 24(2) enacts that in relation to the land acquisition proceedings initiated under 1894 Act, where an award has been made five years or more prior to the commencement of the 2013 Act and either of the two contingencies is satisfied, viz; (i) physical possession of the land has not been taken or (ii) the compensation has not been paid, such acquisition proceedings shall be deemed to have lapsed. On the lapse of such acquisition proceedings, if the appropriate Government still chooses to acquire the land which was the subject matter of acquisition under the 1894 Act then it has to initiate the proceedings afresh under the 2013 Act. The proviso appended to Section 24(2) deals with a situation where in respect of the acquisition initiated under the 1894 Act an award has been made and compensation in respect of a majority of land holdings has not been deposited in the account of the beneficiaries then all the beneficiaries specified in Section 4 notification become entitled to compensation under 2013 Act. 12. To find out the meaning of the expression, "compensation has not been paid", it is necessary to have a look at Section 31 of the 1894 Act. The said Section, to the extent it is relevant, reads as follows: "31. Payment of compensation or deposit of same in Court. - (1) On making an award under section 11, the Collector shall tender payment of the compensation awarded by him to the persons interested entitled thereto according to the award, and shall pay it to them unless prevented by some one or more of the contingencies mentioned in the next sub-section. (2) If they shall not consent to receive it, or if there be no person competent to alienate the land, or if there be any dispute as to the title to receive the compensation or as to the apportionment of it, the Collector shall deposit the amount of the compensation in the Court to which a reference under section 18 would be submitted:" 35. In the present case, it cannot be disputed that physical possession is not taken by the petitioners. There is material on record showing plans etc. sanctioned by the Municipal Corporation. In the present case, it cannot be disputed that physical possession is not taken by the petitioners. There is material on record showing plans etc. sanctioned by the Municipal Corporation. These were submitted by the respondent before the Municipal Commissioner. It is in respect of acquired land. Besides this, the very fact that the petitioner has initiated proceeding under the Public Premises Act itself is sufficient to believe and to hold that physical possession is still not taken. Shri Desai has submitted that in the present case also acquisition lapses as possession is not taken within 5 years as provided under section 24(2) of the Act. 36. Learned Senior Advocate Shri Shelat has taken interesting plea. It was urged that in a petition filed by the acquiring body against the order of the appellate authority in cases arising under Public Premises Act, whether the respondents can raise such a plea? It was also urged that in Pune Municipal Corporation's case (supra), respondent had filed a petition challenging the acquisition. Unlike the said case, in the present case the order of the District Court under Public Premises Act is under challenge. Thus, reliance on Pune Municipal Corporation's case (Supra) is misplaced and such plea is impermissible in this proceeding. 37. Quite persuasive submission made by Shri Shelat is not possible to accept. It is true that in the present petition, the order passed by the District Court in a proceeding under the Public Premises Act is under challenged. But the above discussion would show that the arguments of learned advocates for the parties revolves around the Land Acquisition Act and mainly on Section 16 i.e. validity of the possession. With whom the possession lies was agitated with vehemence at the time of hearing. The District Court had allowed the appeal. One of the main ground for allowing the appeal is that since the possession was always with the respondent, the proceeding under the Public Premises Act is not maintainable. It is not that the competent authority or the District Court has considered and decided the limited question arising under Special Statute i.e. Public Premises Act. Whether notice issued by the competent authority is legal and valid or not in the sense that it is issued in prescribed form or not and/or whether it is issued by proper Authority or not etc. Whether notice issued by the competent authority is legal and valid or not in the sense that it is issued in prescribed form or not and/or whether it is issued by proper Authority or not etc. and whether respondent is "unauthorised occupant" under the Act or not etc. were not the issues the authority has decided in its order. It may also be stated that competent authority, while passing the order under Public Premises Act, says that land is acquired and possession of acquired land is taken under Section 16 of the Land Acquisition Act. It may also be bear in mind that before the Supreme Court, plea was raised by the respondent and it appears that plea of applicability of 2013 Act was raised for the first time before the Supreme Court. 38. Difficulties that may be faced by the Court exercising appellate or even revisional jurisdiction would not come in the way of a writ Court. This Court while exercising writ jurisdiction is free to pass appropriate order and issue suitable direction the circumstances of the case called for. This would include consideration of plea raised by the respondent. Further still without challenging the finding of the District Court, the opponent can support the order under challenge invoking the latest law applicable to the case. Therefore, objection raised by the learned Senior Advocate Mr.S.N.Shelat is not possible to accept. It is clear that as per Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act, after passing of the award under Section 11 of 1894 Act, possession was not taken for over five years. Hence, the acquisition lapsed under Section 24(2) of 2013 Act. The case of petitioner fails on this plea also. It may be stated that otherwise also the petition fails and in that sense, the objection raised by learned advocate for the petitioner on this plea, does not affect the conclusion. 39. In view of the above, SCA No.8081 of 2010 is hereby dismissed. Rule is discharged with no order as to costs. 40. In view of order passed in SCA No.8081/2010, Civil Application No.9842/2010 and Special Civil Application No.2498/2011 do not survive and stand disposed of accordingly. Notice is discharged. Interim relief, if any, granted earlier stands vacated. Petition dismissed.