JUDGMENT : VIJAY MANOHAR SAHAI, J. 1. We have heard Mr. Prashant Pandit, learned counsel appearing for Mr. Sandip C. Bhatt, appearing for the petitioner and Ms. Nalini S. Lodha, learned counsel appearing for the respondent Bank. 2. This writ petition has been filed by the petitioner challenging the order dated 6.3.2014 passed by the Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal at Kolkata, In-charge of Mumbai by which delay condonation application being Miscellaneous Application No.53 of 2013 in Appeal No.20 of 2014 preferred by the petitioner came to be rejected. 3. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner has urged that there was delay of 355 days in preferring the appeal and the petitioner has shown sufficient cause for condonation of delay and, therefore, the delay was liable to be condoned and the appeal is required to be heard and decided on merits. The reason for delay as mentioned in the delay condonation application was that the petitioner was trying to settle the matter with the respondent Bank. The properties mortgaged with the Bank was sufficient security with the Bank to recover the dues payable by the petitioner. The Bank had agreed to the proposal of the petitioner by letter dated 1.3.2013 and the respondent Bank informed the petitioner that they have accepted the proposal of the petitioner which establishes that the petitioner's offer to settle the matter with the respondent Bank was not in vain. Therefore, delay occurred in filing the appeal. On these reasons, the petitioner wanted that delay should be condoned. The recovery was for an amount of Rs.1.78 Crores + interest. The respondent Bank accepted the proposal of the petitioner for an amount of Rs.2.05 Crores and out of the said amount, at the time of entering into compromise, the petitioner had paid Rs.21 Lacs with the respondent Bank. 4. On the other hand, Ms. Nalini Lodha, learned counsel appearing for the respondent Bank has urged that delay condonation application was rightly rejected by the Tribunal. She further urged that recovery certificate was issued in pursuance of the judgment dated 12.9.2012 passed in O.A. No.72 of 2011 by the Debts Recovery Tribunal – I, Ahmedabad. The petitioner was having full knowledge of the said proceedings. Thereafter, Recovery Proceedings No.77 of 2012 commenced before the Recovery Officer, DRT-I, Ahmedabad. She further urged that recovery certificate was issued in pursuance of the judgment dated 12.9.2012 passed in O.A. No.72 of 2011 by the Debts Recovery Tribunal – I, Ahmedabad. The petitioner was having full knowledge of the said proceedings. Thereafter, Recovery Proceedings No.77 of 2012 commenced before the Recovery Officer, DRT-I, Ahmedabad. In the said proceedings, demand notices were issued on 30.11.2012 and since the petitioner did not pay the dues of the respondent Bank, all the properties of the petitioner which are mortgaged with the respondent Bank were attached. Thereafter, a proposal was submitted by the petitioner to the respondent Bank which was accepted by the respondent Bank with certain conditions on 18.2.2013 and it was improved on 22.2.2013 and acceptance was communicated by the Bank to the petitioner on 1.3.2013. She further submitted that as the petitioner did not comply with the conditions of settlement and, therefore, became a defaulter again and the period of settlement also expired and, therefore, the Bank communicated the petitioner by letter dated 22.6.2013 to make the payment as in absence of payment, the petitioner was defaulter and the Bank was entitled to proceed with the recovery. 5. She has further urged that after the attachment, the petitioner accepted that auction of the properties may be made, but the petitioner disputed the valuation of the properties made by the Valuer and objection with regard to valuation was filed. The said objections were rejected by the Recovery Officer and the notice for auction proceedings was issued. The said auction proceedings were challenged by the petitioner under Section 30 of the Recovery of Debts due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 ('RDDB Act') by filing Appeal No.11 of 2013. Since the petitioner could not get any interim relief in the said appeal, the petitioner filed Appeal No.20 of 2014 before the Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal at Kolkata, In-charge of Mumbai along with delay condonation application being Miscellaneous Application No.53 of 2013. She has further submitted that these facts were not disclosed by the petitioner in the delay condonation application and hence, it was rightly rejected by the Tribunal. 6. After hearing the learned counsel for the parties, we are of the opinion that a very short question arises for consideration of this Court is as to whether in an appeal, delay can be condoned beyond the period of six months or not ? 7. 6. After hearing the learned counsel for the parties, we are of the opinion that a very short question arises for consideration of this Court is as to whether in an appeal, delay can be condoned beyond the period of six months or not ? 7. The Tribunal has rejected the delay condonation application mainly on the ground that Section 20 of the RDDB Act provides for a period six months for disposal of the appeal and, therefore, delay beyond the period of six months cannot be condoned. In our opinion, the view taken by the Tribunal is not correct. A bare perusal of Section 20 (3) of the RDDB Act reveals that an appeal may be filed beyond a period of 45 days and the delay in filing the appeal could be condoned if the Tribunal is satisfied that there was sufficient cause for not filing the appeal within a period of 45 days. There is no restriction that the delay caused for more than six months cannot be condoned. Section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act applies to Section 20 (3) of RDDB Act. Further, sub-clause (6) of Section 20 of RDDB Act provides that once an appeal is filed, the Tribunal is mandated to dispose of the appeal within a period of six months. But this period of six months would not mean that the delay condonation application can be filed for getting a delay condoned only of period of six months and not beyond that. In our opinion, the Tribunal committed an error in taking contrary view and holding that since the delay is for a period of more than six months, it cannot be condoned. There was a delay of 355 days. It is no doubt true that certain facts which are stated by the respondent Bank in their affidavit before the Tribunal were not disclosed by the petitioner in his delay condonation application. But one fact is that while in the delay condonation application, the reason has been mentioned that settlement was being arrived at between the parties and the parties did enter into a settlement and in compliance thereof, the petitioner had paid an amount of Rs.21 Lacs. May be that the petitioner became a defaulter subsequently, but those proceedings cannot be said to mean that the petitioner was suppressing some material fact deliberately or intentionally. May be that the petitioner became a defaulter subsequently, but those proceedings cannot be said to mean that the petitioner was suppressing some material fact deliberately or intentionally. The petitioner has been able to demonstrate that sufficient cause existed for condonation of delay. Therefore, the order of the Tribunal cannot be maintained. 8. In the result, the writ petition succeeds and is allowed. The impugned order dated 6.3.2014 passed by the Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal at Kolkata, In-charge of Mumbai in Miscellaneous Application No.53 of 2013 in Appeal No.20 of 2014 is hereby quashed and set aside. Delay of 355 days caused in preferring the appeal is condoned. The Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal Mumbai is directed to decide the appeal of the petitioner being Appeal No.20 of 2014 in accordance with law on merits expeditiously. Rule is made absolute. There shall be no order as to costs. 9. At this stage, Ms. Nalini Lodha, learned counsel appearing for the respondent Bank has made a prayer that this Court may stay the operation of the order to enable the respondent Bank to approach the higher forum. We do not find that any substantial question of law arises which requires staying of our order. Therefore, the oral request made by the learned counsel for the respondent Bank is rejected.