JUDGMENT Mr. Rajiv Narain Raina, J.:- In this petition the order dated 15th July, 2013 (P-7) passed by the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division), Panchkula in Civil Suit No.35 of 2009; M/s Maa Bhagwati Associates v. Ravi Bansal is challenged. The application filed by the defendant, the petitioner before this Court, under Order VI Rule 17 of the Code of Civil Procedure (for short the ‘Code’) in the suit praying for amending the written statement has been declined. The application was filed on 22nd March, 2013 together with an application under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code praying for rejection of the plaint on the ground that section 69 (2) of the Indian Partnership Act, 1932 (for short the ‘IPA’) barred the suit. The plaintiff firm, which is the owner and landlord of the disputed premises, filed replies to the both the applications on 4th April, 2013. The application under Order VI Rule 17 of the Code was dismissed on 15th July, 2013 and the one under Order VII Rule 11 was rejected on 19th July, 2013. A last opportunity was given to the defendant to lead his entire evidence on 1st August, 2013. For his inability to lead the remaining evidence on the date fixed, the defendant’s evidence has been closed by the impugned order dated 1st August, 2013. 2. Against the order dismissing the application for amendment, the petitioner has filed CR No.4915 of 2013. A separate petition has been filed impugning the order dismissing the application under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code which is CR No.4923 of 2013. The third petition i.e. CR No.4894 of 2013 has been filed against the order dated 1st August, 2013 closing the defendant’s evidence by order on 1st August, 2013. 3. The three petitions were taken up and heard together and are being disposed of by this common judgment and order. 4. The facts common to the three petitions which are necessary for decision making and not disputed may be noticed. 5. The petitioner is the sole proprietor of firm M/s New Bansal Electronics run in a part of the ground floor and basement of Shop-cum- Office No.385, Sector 8, Panchkula and is the defendant in the suit. The plaintiff firm and its partners are the landlord of SCO No.385, Sector 8, Panchkula then run under an unregistered partnership deed. 5. The petitioner is the sole proprietor of firm M/s New Bansal Electronics run in a part of the ground floor and basement of Shop-cum- Office No.385, Sector 8, Panchkula and is the defendant in the suit. The plaintiff firm and its partners are the landlord of SCO No.385, Sector 8, Panchkula then run under an unregistered partnership deed. Shri Harish Kumar Sawhney (for short ‘Sawhney’) is the general power of attorney holder of several partners of the firm which is the plaintiff in the suit and respondent herein. 6. Sawhney in his capacity as holder of general power of attorney of the partners of the plaintiff acting on behalf of all the partners entered into an Agreement of Licence (henceforth ‘Licence Agreement’) with the defendant, the present petitioner, letting out a part of the SCO and handing over possession of the demised premises to him. The Licence Agreement was executed by the parties on 2nd May, 2004. The licence was to expire on 14th April, 2014. An amendment extended the life till 30th April, 2014. 7. On 23rd December, 2008 plaintiff instituted a suit against the defendant for possession by ejectment from the demised premises. A prayer was also made for recovery of Rs. 38,234/- being arrears of rent together with recovery of pendente lite and future mesne profits @ Rs. 4 lacs per month together with pendente lite and future interest @ 12% per annum on principal amount. 8. The present suit was filed in the Court of Civil Judge (Senior Division), Panchkula after serving notice under section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (in short ‘TPA’) upon the defendant determining his licence. Indisputably, the Haryana Urban (Control of Rent & Eviction) Act, 1973 was then not applicable to the building, a part of which was licenced to the defendant. Notice under the TPA had the effect of cutting short the life of the licence by determining it claiming eviction. The defendant appeared in the suit on 4th February, 2009. He filed his written statement and reply to the injunction application on 4th May, 2009. Suffice it to say that the objections taken later on in the application under Order VII Rule 11 and the one under Order VI Rule 17 of the Code, subject matter of these three petitions, were not taken in the written statement. He filed his written statement and reply to the injunction application on 4th May, 2009. Suffice it to say that the objections taken later on in the application under Order VII Rule 11 and the one under Order VI Rule 17 of the Code, subject matter of these three petitions, were not taken in the written statement. In the suit issues were framed by the trial court on 30th July, 2009 and the first date fixed for plaintiff’s evidence was 23rd October, 2009. The plaintiff produced and closed its oral evidence on 3rd October, 2011. The matter was adjourned to 14th November, 2011 for production of documentary evidence of the plaintiff as well as for evidence of the defendant. The plaintiff tendered documents in support of its case on 14th November, 2011 and closed its evidence. The case was adjourned to 30th November, 2011 for defendant’s evidence to be produced at his own responsibility. The evidence of the defendant was not present on 30th November, 2011 or on 22nd December, 2011 when last opportunity was granted by court to the defendant to lead his evidence. On 23rd February, 2012, only one witness was examined by the defendant and further opportunity was granted for remaining evidence subject however to costs of Rs. 1000/-. The matter was adjourned to 29th February, 2012. On this day also no witness of the defendant was present for recording evidence. 9. At this juncture, instead of producing evidence at his own risk and responsibility, as ordered, the defendant filed an application under Order XIV Rule 1 and 5 of the Code on 29th February, 2012 for framing additional issues. A reply was called for by 19th March, 2012 when it was filed and the case was adjourned to 30th November, 2012. On 30th November, 2012, the Court framed the additional issues accepting the prayer of the defendant and the matter was adjourned to 22nd December, 2012 for defence evidence at his own responsibility. The trial Court in its order dated 30th November, 2012 re-cast the issues agreeing with the defendant that the basic disputes were with respect to the relationship between the parties and with regard to the terms and conditions of the Licence Agreement thus the re-cast issues would more correctly reflect the stand of the parties. The trial Court in its order dated 30th November, 2012 re-cast the issues agreeing with the defendant that the basic disputes were with respect to the relationship between the parties and with regard to the terms and conditions of the Licence Agreement thus the re-cast issues would more correctly reflect the stand of the parties. However, the trial Court while allowing reframing of issues found it fair to do so since it would not require leading of any additional evidence other than earlier recorded and defendant’s evidence yet to come in. Nevertheless, an assurance was given by the defendant to the Court that on the next effective opportunity, he will conclude his evidence on all the issues. The right of the plaintiff to lead rebuttal evidence stood preserved. 10. The next date fixed in the trial was 22nd December, 2012 but the defendant remained obdurate and kept parrying off production of evidence with no witnesses in attendance despite giving an undertaking to the court that he would do so by the adjourned date. The court still adjourned the trial to 26th February, 2013 for leading the entire defence evidence at defendant’s own responsibility. On 26th February, 2013, again no witness was present and the Court once again thought it fit to adjourn the case to 22nd March, 2013 by granting the indulgence of another last opportunity. Except asking for adjournments and last opportunities the defendant has done precious little in the trial other than managing to elongate it. 11. Instead of leading defence evidence on 22nd March, 2013, the defendant preferred two applications; one under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code and the other was under Order VI Rule 17 of the Code. Notice was issued on the applications and the plaintiff filed reply to both of them on 4th April, 2013. Both the applications were heard and the impugned orders have followed, one on 15th July, 2013 dismissing the application for amending the written statement and the second on 19th July, 2013 declining the application under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code. Even thereafter the learned trial judge patiently granted further opportunity once again to the defendant to lead his evidence on 1st August, 2013. Even thereafter the learned trial judge patiently granted further opportunity once again to the defendant to lead his evidence on 1st August, 2013. Obdurate in his reluctance to produce evidence in defence of suit on 1st August, 2013 and in absence of the witnesses in attendance the learned trial court closed the evidence of the defendant by order. The third petition arises out of this order. This is where the chapter stands closed. 12. A few words on the above two applications may be in order for purposes of understanding the cases to render final opinion in the three clubbed matters arising out of the proceedings in the suit. 13. In the first application filed under Order VI Rule 17 of the Code, the proposed amendments in the written statement sought by the defendant were in addition to the preliminary objections taken in the original written statement and it was proposed to introduce the following pleadings by way of amendment : - 1. “The plaintiff being an unregistered partnership firm cannot maintain the present suit and no cause of action is disclosed in favour of the plaintiff for filing the present suit.” 2. “That the suit of the plaintiff in the present form is not maintainable nor the plaintiff has not got any locus standi to file the same. The plaintiff being an unregistered partnership firm cannot maintain the present suit and no cause of action is disclosed in favour of the plaintiff for filing the present suit.” In para. 4 of the application it was said that the amendment asked for was legal in nature and no new case was being made out by such introduction, if permitted. It meant that the amendment sought is only an elaboration of the legal proposition that an unregistered partnership firm cannot maintain a suit against a third party where the dispute arises out of contract and, therefore, the plaint does not disclose a cause of action and deserves to be rejected by virtue of embargo in section 69 (2) of the IPA. 14. Insofar as the application under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code for rejection of plaint and dismissal of the suit is concerned, the objection entered was to the following effect : - “That M/s Maa Bhagwat Associates is the owner and landlord of SCO No.385, Sector 8, Panchkula. 14. Insofar as the application under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code for rejection of plaint and dismissal of the suit is concerned, the objection entered was to the following effect : - “That M/s Maa Bhagwat Associates is the owner and landlord of SCO No.385, Sector 8, Panchkula. Shri Harish Kumar Sawhney alongwith Shri Sunil Gupta, Mrs.Pooja Gupta, Mrs.Suman Sawhney, Shri Raj Kumar Arora, Mrs.Sudesh Rani, Shri Ashok Kumar Garg and Mrs.Rekha Garg are the partners of M/s Maa Bhagwati Associates. Shri Sunil Gupta, Mrs.Pooja Gupta, Mrs.Suman Sawhney, Shri Raj Kumar Arora, Mrs.Sudesh Rani, Shri Ashok Kumar Garg and Mrs.Rekha Garg have appointed Shri Harish Kumar Sawhney son of Shri G.L.Sawhney, resident of House No.202, Sector 10, Panchkula as their General Power of Attorney to deal with the SCO No.385, Sector 8, Panchkula.” (underlined for emphasis) 15. In the application, it was averred that Sawhney was one of eight partners of M/s Maa Bhagwati Associates and was a GPA holder of the remaining partners to deal with the property; a perusal of the plaint reveals that it is not a registered partnership firm and therefore Sawhney has not filed the present suit as attorney of the partners but it is only M/s Maa Bhagwati Associates which has filed the case through one of its partners. It is all the partners who collectively can engage in business in the name and style of M/s Maa Bhagwati Associates, thus Sawhney had no locus standi to file the present suit as a general power of attorney holder of the partners. These applications were contested by the plaintiff as being in abuse of the process of law. 16. The learned trial Court has dismissed the application under Order VI Rule 17 of the Code for the reasons that the suit was filed in January, 2009 after terminating the license/tenancy of the defendant and the trial had progressed to near conclusion; the application filed is nothing but an abuse of the process of law and the same is devoid of merit. The learned trial judge observes that the defendant’s request for framing additional issues was allowed on 30.11.2012 with a rider that only one last opportunity would be given to the defendant to conclude his evidence, but there was failure to do so. Instead, the present application was moved. The learned trial judge observes that the defendant’s request for framing additional issues was allowed on 30.11.2012 with a rider that only one last opportunity would be given to the defendant to conclude his evidence, but there was failure to do so. Instead, the present application was moved. The Court was conscious that amendments in pleadings can be allowed liberally at the stage of commencement of the trial but once the trial is in progress, the applicant has to show sufficient reasons beyond his control in not incorporating the proposed amendment in the pleadings. The Court has also held that a legal plea need not be incorporated in the pleadings as it can always be urged. For these reasons, the application has been declined. 17. I have heard the learned senior counsel appearing for the parties at length and have perused the paper placed before me, together with the case law cited and the relevant paragraphs thereof, as pointed at, read. I have the following to say with respect to each of the petitions dealt in three parts of this order seriatim. Part I. CR No.4915 of 2013 (Re: Order VI Rule 17 of the Code) 18. The reasons which lead me to dismiss this petition by upholding the impugned order dated 15th July, 2013 passed by the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division), Panchkula are as follows : - 19. The defendant in his application presented under Order VI Rule 17 of the Code admits that the proposed amendments are purely legal pleas for which no additional evidence is required to be adduced. It is only the material facts as are necessary to claim relief prayed for or in defence of the suit need be incorporated in pleadings but not the evidence by which they may be proved. It is trite that law is not to be pleaded or proved. In considering a request for amendment of pleadings, the Court would look at the stage of the proceedings, the nature of the case, the reasons why amendment is sought, whether they are necessary for resolving the controversy, failure to take all available pleas at the commencement of the suit or soon thereafter etc. including the conduct of the party and whether there is any negligence in prosecuting or defending the case. But it is always open to parties to canvass legal pleas at any stage of the proceedings. including the conduct of the party and whether there is any negligence in prosecuting or defending the case. But it is always open to parties to canvass legal pleas at any stage of the proceedings. It is also not a case where new or material facts not previously known have suddenly come to light which obviously could not be pleaded earlier, or by exercise due diligence could not have been incorporated in the written statement. The legal pleas projected by the senior counsel for the petitioner with respect to section 69 (2) of the IPA are dealt with in detail in Part II of the judgment next following and require no repetition here. Having considered the case in Part I and heard arguments on both sides I find no error of jurisdiction or misconception of law and facts in the impugned order rejecting the application. There is no cogent or germane reason to interfere with the order and the same is upheld. The amendment asked for is not necessary to be accepted in the pleadings. Part II CR No.4932 of 2012 (Re: Order VII Rule 11 of the Code) 20. The prayer in the application for rejection of plaint is that the suit is barred by law i.e. section 69 (2) of the IPA. Section 69 reads as follows : - “1. No suit to enforce a right arising from a contract or conferred by this Act shall be instituted in any Court or on behalf of any person suing as a partner in a firm against the firm or any person alleged to be or to have been a partner in the firm unless the firm is registered and the person suing is or has been shown in the Register of firms as a partner in the firm. 2. No suit to enforce a right arising from a contract shall be instituted in any Court by or on behalf of a firm against any third party unless the firm is registered and the persons suing are or have been shown in the Register of Firms as partners in the firm.” 21. 2. No suit to enforce a right arising from a contract shall be instituted in any Court by or on behalf of a firm against any third party unless the firm is registered and the persons suing are or have been shown in the Register of Firms as partners in the firm.” 21. Section 69(2) mandates that a suit to enforce a right arising out of a contract shall not be instituted by or on behalf of the firm in any Court against a third party unless the firm is registered and shown in the Register of Firms including the identity/description of its partners. 22. Mr.Manmohan Singh, learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioner-defendant submits that section 69(2) bars the suit against the defendant since it seeks to enforce a right arising from the Licence Agreement which is in the nature of a contract between the parties. Therefore, the suit was not maintainable. 23. He submits that the issue is covered by the ratio of the decision of the Supreme Court in Raptakos Brett Co. Ltd. v. Ganesh Property; (1998) 7 SCC 184 . The factual matrix in Raptakos may be briefly noticed. The plaint as framed by the plaintiff therein was based on a composite cause of action consisting of two parts. One part was with reference to breach of covenant when the defendant failed to deliver vacant possession of the suit property to the plaintiff lessor on the expiry of the lease period. The second part of the cause of action was based on a statutory obligation of the defendant lessee when it failed to comply with the statutory obligation under section 108 (q) read with section 111 (a) of the TPA. Section 108 (q) lays down: “(q) on the determination of the lease, the lessee is bound to put the lessor into possession of the property”. The factual distinction between Raptakos and the present case is twofold; One, that the action in Raptakos was brought after the expiry of lease period against a tenant holding over under section 116 of the TPA and in the present case, the suit was instituted in 2009 with 5 years remaining for the expiry of the Licence Agreement; Two, the Supreme Court dealt with leasehold rights, not a licence. 24. Mr.Manmohan Singh places his reliance on paragraphs 9 and 27 of Raptakos case. The paragraphs are thus reproduced below:- “9. 24. Mr.Manmohan Singh places his reliance on paragraphs 9 and 27 of Raptakos case. The paragraphs are thus reproduced below:- “9. Coming back to the consideration of the requirements of Section 69 sub-section (2) under which bar to file such a suit would arise on the part of the unregistered firm it may be noted that on the facts of the present case it is not in dispute between the parties that when the suit was filed in 1986 the first condition for attracting this bar squarely got attracted namely, that the respondent firm was not a registered firm though it was wrongly mentioned in the plaint that it was a registered firm. Second condition for attracting the bar was also found satisfied as the appellant was a third party being erstwhile tenant against whom the suit was filed. It is the third condition which is the bone of serious contention between the parties. Learned senior counsel Shri Nariman for the appellant submitted that the third condition was also satisfied on the facts of the present case as the suit filed by the respondent-plaintiff unregistered firm was for enforcement of the right of the respondent-plaintiff arising from the contract of lease which was entered into between the parties in 1964 for a period of 21 years and which had expired at the end of 15th March, 1985. It is this contention of learned senior counsel Shri Nariman that has been vehemently contested by learned senior counsel Dr. Singhvi for the respon-dentplaintiff. At the outset he submitted that for deciding the question whether the suit is barred under Section 69 subsection (2) of the Partnership Act or not only averments in the plaint as a whole will have to be seen...” “21. It is easy to visualise that convenant mentioned in paragraph 2 of the plaint regarding the appellant’s liability to hand over vacant and peaceful possession of the suit property to the plaintiff lessor would come into operation only after the period of the lease is over; Therefore, it cannot be said that the said covenant would not remain effective and pending between the parties after the lease gets determined by efflux of time. To that extent the extreme contention of Dr. Singhvi that this part of the cause of action did not arise out of the contract of lease cannot be accepted.” 25. To that extent the extreme contention of Dr. Singhvi that this part of the cause of action did not arise out of the contract of lease cannot be accepted.” 25. It is the contention of petitioner that termination of licence prior to expiration of the period agreed was premature and unlawful. He bases his case in sum and substance on the terms and conditions of the Licence Agreement to submit that for determination of licence the covenants empowered only the licencee to revoke/terminate the agreement for any reason whatsoever by giving to the Licensor-plaintiff two months notice in writing at the address of the licensor. The right of licensor to revoke or terminate the agreement was only in the event of default on the part of the licencee to pay the licensor, the licence fee. Therefore, if the licencee was not in arrears of rent or licence fee (both words being used in the agreement), plaintiff would have no right under the agreement to terminate the licence except upon the expiration of the period i.e. by 30th April, 2014 and that date is not yet an accomplished fact. Still further, Clause 2 of the agreement deals with the expiry of licence and prescribes that in case of violation of any of the terms and conditions, including non-payment of rent/fee, that would by itself be a deemed notice and no fresh notice is required and the licencee would have to vacate the demised premises immediately. But this event has not occured. Clause 2(b) lays down that the licence is revokable by efflux of time and not otherwise. In short, the submission is that that the lessor was disabled from bringing suit for eviction anytime prior to 30th April, 2014 in terms of the Licence Agreement even by invocation of section 106 of the TPA to determine the tenancy/licence. He contends that the ratio in Raptakos can be applied only in situations emerging after the expiry of the period of the lease and not prior thereto. This observation of the Supreme Court is the true ratio decidendi culled out from the ruling and the legal principle upon which the decision is founded. 26. He contends that the ratio in Raptakos can be applied only in situations emerging after the expiry of the period of the lease and not prior thereto. This observation of the Supreme Court is the true ratio decidendi culled out from the ruling and the legal principle upon which the decision is founded. 26. In any event, both the learned senior counsel rely on the judgment in Raptakos but in its different paragraphs but agree that this decision of the Supreme Court is the magna carta of the law on the subject of section 69 (2) of the IPA. 27. On the other hand, Mr.Sunil Chadha, learned senior counsel appearing for the plaintiff-respondent has also with great vigour relied upon Raptakos and especially para. 27 thereof to contend that the present case is covered by the dicta laid down. He says no other verdict needs to be read other than Raptakos which is self contained on the subjectsection 69 (2) and common law principles lying beyond contract. He submits that the cause of action does not arise out of the Licence Agreement in the present case and therefore, the case does not fall as one under the bar of section 69(2) protecting third parties and not parties to the licence. He refers to para. 10, 27 and 34 in his support. They are reproduced with emphasis added: - “10. Based on these averments, the plaintiff has prayed for decree for khas possession and mesne profits (g) Rs, 200 per day or at such rate as the Court may determine from 16th March, 1985 till recovery of khas possession. Our attention was invited by learned senior counsel for the parties on the moot question as to how the averments in the plaint have to be construed, Shri Nariman invited our attention to a decision of this Court in Udhav Singh v. Madhav Rao Scindia, [1976] 2 SCR 246. In the said report at page 254, Sarkaria, J, speaking for the Court made the following pertinent observations : “We are afraid, this ingenious method of construction after compartmentalisation, dissection, segregation and inversion of the language of the paragraph, suggested by Counsel, runs counter to the cardinal cannon of interpretation, according to which, a pleading has to be read as a whole to ascertain its true import. It is not permissible to cull out a sentence or a passage and to read it out of the context; in isolation, Although it is the substance and not merely the form that has to be looked into, the pleading has to be construed as it stands without addition or substraction of words, or change of its apparent grammatical sense. The intention of the party concerned is to be gathered, primarily, from the tenor and terms of his pleading taken as a whole.” 27. The net effect of this discussion, therefore, is that the plaint as framed by the plaintiff respondent is based on a composite cause of Action consisting of two parts. One part refers to the breach of the covenant on the part of the defendant when it failed to deliver vacant possession to the plaintiff lessor on the expiry of the lease after 15th March, 1985 and thereafter all through out and thus it was guilty of breach of covenants 14 and 17 of the lease. The second part of the cause of Action, however, is based on the statutory obligation of the defendant lessee when it failed to comply with its statutory obligation under Section 108(q) read with Section 111(a) of the Property Act. So far as this second part of the cause of Action is concerned it cannot certainly be said that it is arising out of the erstwhile contract.” 34. We, prima fade, find substance in what is contended by Dr. Singhvi for the respondent. It is obvious that even if the suit is filed by an unregistered partnership firm, against a third party and is treated to be incompetent as per Section 69 sub-section (2) of the Partnership Act, if pending the suit before a decree is obtained the plaintiff puts its house in order and gets itself registered the defect in the earlier filing which even though may result in treating the original suit as still born, would no longer survive if the suit is treated to be deemed to be instituted on the date on which registration is obtained. If such an approach is adopted, no real harm would be caused to either side. As rightly submitted by Dr. If such an approach is adopted, no real harm would be caused to either side. As rightly submitted by Dr. Singhvi that, Order 7 Rule 13 of the CPC would permit the filing of a fresh suit on the same cause of Action and if the earlier suit is permitted to be continued it would continue in the old number and the parties to the litigation would be able to get their claim adjudicated on merits earlier while on the other hand if such subsequent registration is not held to be of any avail, all that would happen is that a fresh suit can be filed immediately after such registration and then it will bear a new number of a subsequent year. That would further delay the adjudicatory process of the court as such a new suit would take years before it gets ready for trial and the parties will be further deprived of an opportunity to get their disputes adjudicated on merits at the earliest and the arrears of cases pending in the court would go on mounting. It is axiomatic to say that as a result of protracted litigation spread over tiers and tiers of court proceedings in hierarchy, the ultimate result before the highest court would leave both the parties completely frustrated and financially drained off. To borrow the analogy in an English poem with caption “death the leveller”, with appropriate modification, the situation emerging in such cases can be visualised as under. “upon final court’s purple alter see how victor victim bleed”. All these considerations in an appropriate case may require a re-look at the decision of the two member Bench of this Court in [1989] 3 SCC 476 (supra). However, as we have noted earlier, on the facts of the present case, it is not necessary for us to express any final opinion on this question or to direct reference to a larger Bench for reconsidering the aforesaid decision. With these observations we bring down the curtains on this controversy. Point No. 2, therefore, is answered by observing that it is not necessary on the facts of the present Case in the light of our decision on the first point to decide this point one way or the other. Point No. 2 is, therefore, left undecided as not surviving for consideration.” 28. Mr. Point No. 2, therefore, is answered by observing that it is not necessary on the facts of the present Case in the light of our decision on the first point to decide this point one way or the other. Point No. 2 is, therefore, left undecided as not surviving for consideration.” 28. Mr. Chadha argues that when the plaintiff invoked section 106 of the TPA, it was a statutory right available which was procedural in nature to ignite the jurisdiction of the trial court and pave the way to a decree based on general law or what is known as principles of common law in absence of any specific relief provided by law, and without falling on the Licence Agreement. Such a course can legally be adopted. He admits that the agreement is silent on lessors’ right to terminate the license. But that would not deter the suit, according to him. 29. The plaint is framed for possession by eviction and for restoration of possession which is a common law right in determining tenancy at the will of the landlord in absence of an agreement to the contrary. A complaint was not made of breach of the provisions except that for certain period, the tenant was in arrears of licence fee/rent and that part of the prayers is severable, but necessary to claim, in terms of bar of Order 2 Rule 2, of the Code to claim all reliefs in one suit against the same party under the same title and not compel the landlord to claim them in a separate money suit which would lead to multiplicity of proceedings. Non-payment of arrears of rent can give an independent right of eviction under the Licence Agreement but is clearly severable from the main prayer based on the common law. 30. Paragraph 27 of Raptakos sufficiently indicates that in a composite cause of action, if there are two independent parts; one arising out of contract and one arising out of common law rights, then the cause of action on the common law principle is sustainable and would not bar the suit under section 69 (2) merely because the partnership is not registered with the Registrar of Firms and Societies. The defendant would thus appear not to have a right to continue as a tenant/licencee claiming protection of the licence agreement alone. 31. The defendant would thus appear not to have a right to continue as a tenant/licencee claiming protection of the licence agreement alone. 31. When section 69 (2) speaks of a dispute arising out of contract it necessarily has a nexus to a contract entered in the course of a business transaction with customers by an unregistered firm, the idea being to protect those who deal with the firm to know the names of partners before they engage in business with them and are made aware with whom they may deal with to predict to guard themselves before entering into business relationships. 32. The only issue which then falls for determination is whether the plaintiff had a right to determine the licence against the licencee during the life time of the agreement and whether the defendant had a right to continue as a licencee till the expiration of the licence period on principles of contract law, transfer of property law, Easementary law or by the well accepted principles of common law founded on dictates of natural justice, reason and plain common sense. 33. Mr.Manmohan Singh submits that the plaintiff had no absolute right to terminate the licence/contract since the agreement did not give him any such right. The right to terminate the contract was within the exclusive domain of the licencee. It could be only lack of due performance of payment of licence fee-rent on scheduled time that terminatiion of licence would follow automatically without further notice. But such is not the case here. 34. In my view when common law principles are at play and invoked through notice under section 106 of the TPA upon tenants determining tenancy upon due service then upon expiration of the period of the notice, common law rights can be triggered de hors the Licence Agreement by a suit brought simpliciter against which there are no legally available defences, such as those available under the tenancy laws of the State. The Licence Agreement does not protect or give immunity against such action initiated by a simple quit notice. The Licence Agreement does not protect or give immunity against such action initiated by a simple quit notice. Even if the suit is found to be a device to evict the defendant by foreclosing the licence, it was legally permissible to the plaintiff to choose not to act on the Licence Agreement but by resort to remedies lawfully available to enforce and preserve his common law right to regain possession of property let out to a licencee. In such a situation, the Licence Agreement and its terms and conditions curtailing licensor to exercise right to terminate the licence before its expiration holds no water. Similarly, exercise of such rights of licensor cannot be read in favour of the defendant to protect his continued possession of property even before expiration of the period fixed after notice to quit is received. 35. To my mind, to maintain a suit after quit notice under section 106 of the TPA or by notice simplicitor when duly served upon the defendant, the plaintiff is not enjoined by law to plead or show any cause of action or reason of foreclosure, as may be required in other suits, except proof of service of notice in the manner prescribed in section 106 of the Act or akin to it on for a simple notice to quit which by itself becomes the cause of action to bring forth a suit for possesssion by determining the licence. 36. The rights of a licencee are defined in The Indian Easements Act, 1882 (for short ‘IEA’). The term ‘licence’ is statutorily defined in section 53 of the IEA which reads :-. “52. “Licence” defined Where one person grants to another, or to a definite number of other persons, a right to do, or continue to do, in or upon the immovable property of the grantor, something which would, in the absence of such right, be unlawful, and such right does not amount to an easement or an interest in the property, the right is called a licence.” 37. The rights of a licencee of revocation and of eviction are codified in sections 63 and 64 of the IEA. The provisions read as under: “63. The rights of a licencee of revocation and of eviction are codified in sections 63 and 64 of the IEA. The provisions read as under: “63. Licensee’s rights on revocation Where a licence is revoked, the licensee is entitled to a reasonable time to leave the property affected thereby and to remove any goods which he has been allowed to place on such property. 64. Licensee’s rights on eviction Where a licence has been granted for a consideration, and the licensee, without any fault of his own, is evicted by the grantor before he has fully enjoyed, under the licence, the right for which he contracted, he is entitled to recover compensation from the grantors. 38. Therefore, the remedy available to the defendant on revocation can at best be a suit for breach of licence-contract sounding in damages which is a right governed and protected by Ss. 63 and 64 supra. This is how the right accrues to plaintiff to revoke licence even before the expiry of the period fixed in the licence before the defendant has fully enjoyed the right under the licence which he had contracted. This is in terms of section 64 of the IEA. It may hurt the defendant but it is more a matter of legal options and remedies which law affords to the plaintiff. Defendant may feel deprived by the by-passing of the covenants or circumnavigating them which may appear to be conjuring a trick but if the law permits and confers jurisdiction on the trial court in the present proceedings, then there is no scope left to rescue the defendant who continues to be a licencee. It is not the case of the defendant that he is protected by the provisions of the rent laws applicable to the property. 39. There appears to me to be sufficient authority in Raptakos to indicate that when statutory rights and common law doctrines are pressed together in a suit, then it cannot be said that the cause of action arises out of contract, if it were one by definition, and if it is in consonance with the prayers made in the suit. For this, the plaint needs to be read and the prayers made therein to test the case on the anvil of Order VII Rule 11 of the Code. For this, the plaint needs to be read and the prayers made therein to test the case on the anvil of Order VII Rule 11 of the Code. It then cannot be said that the suit was barred by section 69 (2) of the IPA, as neither the plaint nor the prayers made arose out of or touched upon the Licence Agreement and were independent of it. If the plaintiff resorted to an independent private right to remedy under the TPA, the provisions of which were not mutually excluded in the licence agreement by express or necessary implication, then such an agreement is not immune from proceedings arising from section 106 of the TPA. Then it may not be possible to order retracing of steps to put the plaintiff back in time on the asking of the defendant, which steps were firmly rooted in common law for a landlord to ask his tenant, and worse still a licencee, to quit his premises upon notice duly served. In an action brought under section 106 of the TPA, there are no statutory protections or safeguards offered to a tenant under licence, the defences under the rent laws being not available as statutory protections in a proceeding started through section 106 of the TPA. 40. Sections 106 and 111 of the TPA deal with notice and determination of lease and read: “106. Duration of certain leases in absence of written contract or local usage In the absence of a contract or local law or usage to the contrary, a lease of immovable property for agricultural or manufacturing purposes shall be deemed to be a lease from year to year, terminable, on the part of either lessor or lessee, by six months’ notice expiring with the end of a year of the tenancy; and a lease of immovable property for any other purpose shall be deemed to be a lease from month to month, terminable, on the part of either lessor or lessee, by fifteen days’ notice expiring with the end of a month of the tenancy. Every notice under this section must be in writing, signed by or on behalf of the person giving it, and either be sent by post to the party who is intended to be bound by it or be tendered or delivered personally to such party, or to one of his family or servants at his residence, or (if such tender or delivery is not practicable) affixed to a conspicuous part of the property.” “ 111. Determination of lease A lease of immovable property determines- (a) by efflux of the time limited thereby, (b) to (g) x x x (h) on the expiration of a notice to determine the lease, or to quit, or of intention to quit, the property leased, duly given by one party to the other.” So far one has assumed that the agreement, the protection of which the defendant seeks; is a ‘contract’ and in the nature of a ‘lease’ as urged by the petitioner because it talks of both rent and licence fee and looks like a contract binding on the parties. Is this assumption correct? Let us see what the answer may be. For one thing, a contract must be capable of being enforced by either party against the other. In order to be a contract there should be a bilateral transaction. It must be bilateral in all respects and intentions. But in the present cases a licence agreement is involved and not a lease deed. Assuming arguendo, that the agreement was a lease or in the nature of a lease then it would have to be compulsorily registered under the Registration Act, 1908 being for more than a year. If it is unregistered and stamp duty stands not paid to revenue then the document cannot be tendered in evidence. 41. A licence is simply a permission to use land. It allows someone access to the land of another for an agreed purpose. It is an authority given to a person that justifies what would otherwise be a trespass. The defendant becoming an unauthorised occupant on revocation. A licence does not confer any interest in land. At its foundation, truly speaking, a licence is not really a contract, but a lower species of property interest recognised by a grant to use and occupy premises for an agreed purpose. The defendant becoming an unauthorised occupant on revocation. A licence does not confer any interest in land. At its foundation, truly speaking, a licence is not really a contract, but a lower species of property interest recognised by a grant to use and occupy premises for an agreed purpose. It is a permission to use something, to do a particular thing, or to carry on a trade or business to their common advantage. It is not a tenancy or a contract stricto sensu of the status of lease. It may appear to look like one but is not in effect. Leases are enforceable contracts. By definition, an agreement enforceable by law is a contract. {see section 2 (h) of the Indian Contract Act, 1872}. All contracts are agreements but not all agreements are contracts. There was no legal obligation upon the licensor in the Licence Agreement to act or forbear from acting in a particular manner in terminating the agreement and determining the licence. In the present case the licensor had studiously left unsaid in the agreement the mode and manner of exercise of his right to evict and to his positional advantage which the defendant willingly signed. 42. Thus, all what the parties signed up for was a permissive use of the described premises under licence though defined by a life span. The plaintiff did not part with any right or interest in land or building in favour of the defendant except for its user right on periodic payment of licence fee or rent to protect possession for the time being dependent on faithful performance. The question is really one of intention of the parties in signing up the Licence Agreement. Did the parties intend it as a contract or a mere licence and how revocation would take place by the lessor. I find no inhibitions therein on the lessor. The Licence Agreement does not deny right of foreclosure by the lessor in any particular manner or on the happening of an event. The way revocation of a licence express or implied works is statutorily prescribed by section 61 of the IEA. Illustration (a) of section 61 is express while Illustration (b) is implied revocation. The provision reads:- “61. Revocation express or implied The revocation of a Licence may be express or implied. The way revocation of a licence express or implied works is statutorily prescribed by section 61 of the IEA. Illustration (a) of section 61 is express while Illustration (b) is implied revocation. The provision reads:- “61. Revocation express or implied The revocation of a Licence may be express or implied. Illustrations (a) A, the owner of a field, grants a licence to B, to use a path across it. A with intent to revoke the licence, locks a gate across the path. The licence is revoked. (b) A, the owner of a field, grants a licence to B to stack hay on the field. A lets or sells the field to C. The licence is revoked. 43. It for these reasons that the Licence Agreement does not speak of plaintiff’s right, and to repeat, on how it may terminate the licence even though the licence was signed for a period of 10 years. One would think that short of the expiry of the period, come rain, hail or snow the licencee could not be touched with a bargepole. Suffice it to say that such a right of determination or revocation was inherent in the plaintiff as title holder which he never parted away. A landlords’ right to let includes the right to take back that which was given by way of permission. However, eviction on common law principles can be only through the due process of the law. The defendant can take no more than what section 64 of IEA gives. When the licence agreement as drawn is read harmoniously in full text it points to a one-way street where the gate can be shut by the hands of the lessor illustrated by (a) of section 61 of the IEA. It may seem harsh at first blush but the result is inevitable over which the court can have no control by any judicially manageable standards. 44. The defendant therefore did not have a ‘license’ to sit complacently on the ‘licence’ till the end of 30th April 2014, notwithstanding timely remittance of rent/licence fee which is much hyped by the petitioner as his defence against the action denuding lessors’ right to evict prematurely. 45. To my mind, and strictly speaking, section 106 the TPA itself would not apply since it deals with leases and their determination and not licences or how they can be foreclosed. 45. To my mind, and strictly speaking, section 106 the TPA itself would not apply since it deals with leases and their determination and not licences or how they can be foreclosed. The two things cannot be mixed up to make a heady cocktail. A simple notice to quit as the one dated 22nd September 2008 is in its intent, was enough under the general law to serve on the defendant to determine the licence when statutory rent law protections were not available to the parties. The fact that it was served on the defendant by mentioning section 106 of the TPA or not does not make any significant difference as it is only a procedural law. The receipt of which notice was not disputed. It remains a notice pure and simple to quit premises. In the result, I do not think any of the provisions of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 or of the TPA, 1882 apply in the case of a licencee governed by a seperate enactment i.e. IEA. This appears to me to be the grim scenario. 46. Mr.Manmohan Singh then relies on the decision of the Calcutta High Court in Sunderlal and sons v. Yagendra Nath Singh and another; AIR 1976 Calcutta 471 to submit that the plea of bar of suit by law can be taken even at the post decree stage and legal objections are open to reception in the executing court in order to show that the decree is unexecutable for one or the other reason. There is no dispute with this proposition since legal pleas/objections can always be taken at any stage and even during execution proceedings and thereafter when law permits. It is for this reason that the application under Order VI Rule 17 of the Code was dismissed on the admission of the defendant that purely legal pleas were raised in support of the application for amendment which could be raised on their own steam without the formal process of amendment in pleadings. The petitioner’s argument that the Licence Agreement is a classic contract is not sound in law. The Licence Agreement per se is not strictly a contract in relation to property such as a lease deed or a Rent Note is. It is a mere licence, voluntarily signed by the defendant. The petitioner’s argument that the Licence Agreement is a classic contract is not sound in law. The Licence Agreement per se is not strictly a contract in relation to property such as a lease deed or a Rent Note is. It is a mere licence, voluntarily signed by the defendant. It was open to the defendant not to accept the licence and look for better options in the very beginning to do his business. 47. Learned senior counsel then submits that the plaintiff’s suit is hit by section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act by reason of part performance of agreement. I have already found that the said Act cannot help the defendant in any manner due to inapplicability to the facts of the present case. He cites Maneklal Mansukhbhai v. Hormusji Jamshedji Ginwalla and sons; AIR 1950 SC 1 , to further this point and would submit that the defendant had performed his part of the licence and, therefore, could not have been proceeded against for eviction in terms of the agreement which gave no power or authority to plaintiff to seek defendant’s eviction except for non-payment of rent/licence fee. The defendant had offered the six cheques in advance dated bi-annually and he could not be said to have derelicted from duty enjoined by agreement. The 15% agreed enhancement in rent as per the terms and conditions of the agreement was also fulfilled. The argument based on part performance also forms part of contract traceable to the agreement but the argument is falacious since the plaintiff did not resort to or invoke the agreement and he needn’t have since it/he/they exercised an independent right to remedy under the common law. I am inclined to believe that the argument based on part performance is wholly misdirected and misconceived and thus not acceptable. 48. I am inclined to believe that the argument based on part performance is wholly misdirected and misconceived and thus not acceptable. 48. He further relies on a large selection of case law citing the following decisions : -AIR 1940 Privy Council 1; AIR 1968 SC 534 ; AIR 1971 SC 1015 ; AIR 1977 SC 336 ; AIR 1989 SC 1769 ; Haldiram Bhujia Wala and another v. Anand Kumar Deepak Kumar and another; (2000) 3 SCC 250 ; C.M.Beena v. PN Ramchandra Rao; (2004) 3 SCC 595 ; VithalBhai (P) Ltd. v. Union Bank of India, [2005(2) Law Herald (P&H) 125 (SC)] : (2005) 4 SCC 315 ; Baldev Singh and others v. Manohar Singh and another; [2006(3) Law Herald (SC) 2324] : (2006) 5 SCC 498; New Bus Stand Shop Owners Association v. Corporation of Kozhikode and another; [2010(1) Law Herald (SC) 366] : (2009) 10 SCC 455 ; Abdul Rehman and another v. Mohd. Ruldu and others; [2012(6) Law Herald (SC) 4726 : 2012(4) Law Herald (P&H) 3486 (SC)] : (2012) 11 SCC 341 and of the High Courts : AIR 1939 Lahore 57; AIR 1964 Punjab 270; AIR 1964 Punjab 346; Dukhi Ram v. Union Territory, Chandigarh and others; [2012(1) Law Herald (P&H) (DB) 866 : 2012(1) Land L.R. 502] : 2012 (1) RCR (Civil) 879; AIR 1971 J & K 109; AIR 1961 Bombay 136; AIR 1976 Calcutta 471; AIR 2003 Andhra Pradesh 418; AIR 1960 Orissa 123; AIR 1991 Patna 250; AIR 1992 Delhi 92; AIR 1965 M.P. 275 ; AIR 1953 Ajmer 47; Rai Chand Jain v. Miss Chandra Kanta Khosla; 1991 (1) RCR 128; AIR 1946 Madras 310; AIR 1941 Bombay 346; Union Bank of India v. Vithalbhai Pvt. Ltd., AIR 2002 Calcutta 144. 49. I have gone through these judgments with care and some interest but find none from them pat on the point which could turn the tables in favour of the defendant. None of them require any special reference in the context of the present case. They are mostly proliferation of well accepted legal principles on the subject matter. Moreover, a blind reliance on decisions is not proper. See para 21 of Haryana Financial Corporation v. Jagadamba Oil Mills, (2002) 3 SCC 496 . 50. None of them require any special reference in the context of the present case. They are mostly proliferation of well accepted legal principles on the subject matter. Moreover, a blind reliance on decisions is not proper. See para 21 of Haryana Financial Corporation v. Jagadamba Oil Mills, (2002) 3 SCC 496 . 50. The next limb of the petitioner’s submission is the question of multiple partners and that all the partners could only have collectively filed a joint suit. I would only say that in the case of an unregistered partnership one partner duly authorised by the remaining partners under properly executed General Power of Attorney could act for the remaining partners in bringing suit. Merely, because the suit was brought in the name and style of the firm through partner Sawhney is not sufficient ground to non-suit the plaintiff-respondent. Though an unregistered partnership firm cannot sue in its own name, since it is not a juristic person but can sue only through its partners if all of them have agreed and consented to sue by executing GPAs to empower one of its partners then the suit can well lie and cannot be thrown out as not maintainable. The expression ‘firm’ is a compendious term which describes an association of several persons who are interested in a business. Partners of a firm can sue or be sued in the name of their firm. A suit filed by a firm is really a suit filed by all the partners. In the application for amendment of written statement the petitioner is clearly mixed up when he pleads that the firm M/s Maa Bhagwati Associates is the “owner and landlord” of the property. On this premise, the petitioner builds his case distinguishing the firm’s trade name from its partners as distinct things. If he thinks the firm is the owner, then as a tenant or licencee he is estopped from questioning landlords title or authority to deal with immmovable property and question where it lies whether in the firm name or in the partners in view of rule of estoppel contained in section 116 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 and thus of the right to eviction at the hands of the “owner and landlord”. Defendant cannot approbate and reprobate at the same time, in the same breath. Defendant cannot approbate and reprobate at the same time, in the same breath. I am therefore of opinion that the trial Court committed no error in rejecting the application under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code by refusing to throw the suit out as one barred by law. The pleas taken in the applications under Order VI Rule 17 of the Code and Order VII Rule 11 of the Code are so intertwined that the impact of one would affect the other. The reasons for upholding the order of the trial Court under Order VII Rule 11 can be read into the order passed by this Court on the first application. For the common reasons recorded above, both the applications did not deserve entertainment and were rightly dismissed by the learned trial judge. The order is sustained. For the variety of reasons recorded above, I would dismiss this petition as being without merit. 51. This leaves me with the third petition with respect to the application for setting aside the order closing evidence of the defendant. Part III CR No.4894 of 2013 (Re: Order closing evidence of defendant) 52. To examine whether the order closing evidence was justified or not in the facts and circumstances of the case, to my mind, does not involve any serious legal issue open to forensic dissection. An order closing evidence of the defendant for failure to lead evidence is an issue falling purely in the discretion of the trial Court when exercised judiciously on the facts and circumstances of the case. To answer the question, the conduct of the party in the past life of the suit is relevant consideration. An order closing evidence of the defendant for failure to lead evidence is an issue falling purely in the discretion of the trial Court when exercised judiciously on the facts and circumstances of the case. To answer the question, the conduct of the party in the past life of the suit is relevant consideration. The conduct of the defendant after he put in appearance in the suit on 4th February, 2009, and then letting issues be settled and framed on 30th July, 2009, and then claiming additional issues or by recasting them on 30th November, 2012 though by favourable order of the trial court without leading an iota of evidence before or after, except one witness examined on 23rd February, 2012 I think does not deserve any further indulgence from the Court other than what he managed by protraction with several last opportunity indulgences granted to him before and after the additional issues were framed on 30th November, 2012 and that too after the dismissal of the applications under Order VI Rule 17 of the Code and Order VII Rule 11 of the Code before the Court was left at its wits end to close evidence by order on 1st August, 2013 and rightly so. This conduct speak volumes of his trying to succeed by delay alone. If he took umpteen opportunities and some last ones granted by court misusing its liberality with such non-seriousness and casualness he did so at his own peril. With respect to last opportunities granted by court, I had occasion to deal with the issue in some detail in CR No.1556 of 2014; Bharat Rajput v. Amrik Singh Aulakh and others rendered on 3rd March, 2014 where I felt compelled to observe as follows : - “Where trial Courts find litigating parties resorting to delaying tactics and devious means aimed at prolonging trials without any just cause or legal justification, then to deal with such people with an iron hand including imposition of heavy costs that appear to hurt pockets. It should be made known to the litigating public at once that where last opportunities are granted by court to do acts and things towards steps in the proceedings such orders should be vigorously enforced. There is nothing like ‘last opportunity’ in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 or last opportunity given many times over or last final opportunity, ultimate opportunity and penultimate opportunity. There is nothing like ‘last opportunity’ in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 or last opportunity given many times over or last final opportunity, ultimate opportunity and penultimate opportunity. This is endless compassion. Therefore, there is greater need for the trial judge to consciously and carefully weigh all attending circumstances in a given case to secure the ends of justice before the first such order is issued. There is no place for losing temper here or reacting. All this largely falls in the domain of discretion exercised judiciously from case to case. I am sorry to observe that the liberality and disinterested generosity of courts has been misused over many decades by both litigant and counsel. The Court can no longer stand mute spectator to unjustified adjournments in fear and submission to any extra legal pressure tactics or intimidation applied in courtrooms by anyone and it should boldly conduct the business of the Court dispassionately, disinterestedly, courteously and firmly. Such people should be warned at the earliest and then day in and day out that the High Court supports its judicial officers and protects them in passing firm and tough orders during the life of a suit and it’s well known milestones before the suit matures for final hearing.” 53. The discretion exercised judiciously by the learned Trial Court in dismissing the present application is not open to interference in exercise of power of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution of India as I find nothing remiss in the reasoning though it may not be the most articulately put. I agree with the conclusions arrived at in all the three orders as being fair and proper. In the result, the present petition also fails and is ordered to be dismissed. 54. Notwithstanding the above, the trial court will not be swayed by this order while dealing with the case on merits and in appreciating the oral evidence, and materials already on record and those to be let in, if any, through rebuttal since such material has not been examined in these petitions except insofar as are on the file of these cases and were thought relevant to decide the disputed legal issues falling for determination, which were so stoutly pressed by the respective learned senior counsel before this court for a judicial opinion. 55. Accordingly, the three petitions are dismissed. ---------0.B.S.0------------