JUDGMENT Nishita Mhatre, J.: 1. The challenge in this petition is to an order passed by the West Bengal Administrative Tribunal in O.A. No.5416 of 1999. The Tribunal has dismissed the application filed by the petitioner which is a trade union registered under the Trade Unions Act, 1926. The Tribunal has held that the petitioner’s claim for benefits for its members, who were employees of the D. N. De Homoeopathic Medical College and Hospital from 27th December, 1982 cannot be sustained and is without merit. 2. The petitioner is a trade union representing the cause of its members who were all employed by the D. N. De Homoeopathic Medical College and Hospital as non-teaching and non-medical staff. In the year 1982, the Government of West Bengal decided to take over the management of the College and Hospital and to subsequently acquire the same. An Act known as the D. N. De Homoeopathic Medical College and Hospital (Taking Over of Management and Subsequent Acquisition) Act, 1983 (for short the Act of 1983) was promulgated for this purpose. The object of the Act was to take over the institution for a limited period and its subsequent acquisition, if necessary. The purpose was to make better provisions for the control, management and maintenance of the institution in public interest with a view to promoting public health. Under Section 1(2) of the Act of 1983, it is deemed to have come into force on 27th December, 1982. Section 3 provides for the taking over of the management and control of the institution by issuing an order to that effect. Such an order for taking over the institution was to remain in force for a period of 5 years from the date of its publication in the Official Gazette as stipulated in Section 3(2). This period of 5 years has been extended from time to time to 6 years, 8 years, 10 years and lastly to 15 years in 1994 by amending the Act of 1983. Section 3(2) provides that such an order made under Sub-Section (1), taking over the management and control of the institution would remain in force for the period stipulated from the date of publication in the Official Gazette or in the case of acquisition of the institution under Section 4, till the date of such acquisition which ever was earlier. 3. Section 3(2) provides that such an order made under Sub-Section (1), taking over the management and control of the institution would remain in force for the period stipulated from the date of publication in the Official Gazette or in the case of acquisition of the institution under Section 4, till the date of such acquisition which ever was earlier. 3. Section 4 makes it possible for the State Government to acquire the institution by notification during the period stipulated under Section 3(2). Section 4 reads as follows: “4. Acquisition of the institution.-(1) The State Government may, if it so thinks fit, at any time within the period of fifteen years referred to in sub-section (2) of section 3, acquire the institution by notification. Section 4 reads as follows: “4. Acquisition of the institution.-(1) The State Government may, if it so thinks fit, at any time within the period of fifteen years referred to in sub-section (2) of section 3, acquire the institution by notification. (2) On and from the date of the notification referred to in sub-section (1) (hereinafter referred to as the date of vesting), - (i) the institution shall stand transferred to, and vest absolutely in, the State Government, free from all encumbrances; (ii) the institution shall be run by the State Government as a State institution; (iii)any contract, whether express or implied, or other arrangement, whether made under any statute or otherwise, in relation to the management of any property or other affairs of the institution, and in force immediately before the date of vesting shall be deemed to have terminated on and from the date of vesting; (iv) every person (not being a part-time or over-aged employee) who has been an employee of the institution before the date of vesting shall, on and from the date of vesting, become an employee of the State Government and shall hold office on the same terms and conditions as would have been admissible to him if there had been no such vesting and shall continue to do so unless and until his employment under the State government is duly terminated or until the terms and conditions of his service are duly altered by the State Government by rules made in this behalf: Provided that the services of every person who expresses his unwillingness to continue in service in terms of the provisions of this clause shall stand terminated with effect from the date of vesting or from any other date to be notified by him; (v) notwithstanding anything contained in any law for the time being in force or in any contract, custom or usage, to the contrary, the transfer of the service of any employee of the institution to the service of the State Government shall not entitle such employee to any compensation on any account whatsoever and no claim in this behalf shall be entertained by any court, tribunal or authority.” 4. Section 5 speaks about the compensation payable, for the lands and buildings, which was to be determined by the competent authority under the Act applying the provisions of Land Acquisition Act, 1894 mutatis mutandis. Section 5 speaks about the compensation payable, for the lands and buildings, which was to be determined by the competent authority under the Act applying the provisions of Land Acquisition Act, 1894 mutatis mutandis. Section 6 delineates the effect of the taking over of the management of the institution. Section 7 speaks about the appointment of an Administrator for managing the institution in accordance with the Act after the take over of the management. Section 13 stipulates that contracts, agreements, settlements, awards, standing orders and other instruments in force in relation to the institution immediately before the appointed day would remain suspended, if the Government thought it expedient to do so. The Act of 1983 had an overriding effect, notwithstanding any inconsistency with any other law. 5. Thus from a perusal of the Act of 1983 it is apparent that the vesting of the properties of the management of the institution in the State Government occurred on 27th December, 1982 by a notification. The acquisition of this institution was complete on 22nd June, 1994. 6. The petitioner espoused the cause of its members who are all non-medical and non-teaching staff of the D. N. De Homoeopathic Medical College and Hospital, and submitted representations on various dates on behalf of its members to the State Government. The main thrust of these representations of the petitioner was that all non-medical and non-teaching staff must be extended all the benefits of Government employees, including the revisions of pay and allowances rules, promotion, etc. with effect from 27th December, 1982 which is the date of vesting. The petitioner contended in its representations that the Government could not illegally deprive the employees of the benefits by framing rules which were contrary to the aforesaid Act. The rules which are known as the D. N. De Homoeopathic Medical College and Hospital (Absorption of Employees and Conditions of Services) Rules, 2001 (for short the Rules of 2001) and which were notified on 6th April 2001, provided for the absorption of employees of the D. N. De Homoeopathic Medical College and Hospital in the corresponding cadre in Government service from 1st August, 1994, i.e., the appointed day stipulated in Rule 2(1)(b). The Rules of 2001 also specify that pay and other allowances available to Government employees would be extended after absorption in service as a Government employee. The Rules of 2001 also specify that pay and other allowances available to Government employees would be extended after absorption in service as a Government employee. As its representations fell on deaf ears, the petitioner approached the West Bengal Administrative Tribunal by preferring O.A. No.526 of 1998. The Tribunal directed the Secretary of the department to hear the petitioner and pass a reasoned order. The Government passed an order rejecting the contention of the petitioner. The petitioner then approached the Tribunal once again by preferring O.A. No.5416 of 1999. The Tribunal found that in view of Section 4(2)(iv) of the Act, the members of the petitioner were entitled to benefits only with effect from 1st August, 1994, i.e., the appointed date mentioned in the notification issued under the aforesaid Section on 22nd June, 1994. 7. The issue before us is the fate of the employees between 27th December, 1982 and 22nd June, 1994. Do such employees become employees of the State Government only on acquisition in 1994? Are they entitled to all service benefits payable to Government employees with effect from 27th December, 1982? 8. Mr. Aniruddha Chatterjee, learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner, submitted that the Act clearly indicates that the date of vesting which is 27th December, 1982 is the date from which all employees of the D. N. De Homoeopathic Medical College and Hospital became employees of the State Government. He pointed out that Section 4 provides for the effect of the takeover in case the Government decide not to acquire the institution. He submitted that under the Act all employees of the institution became employees of the Government on and from 27th December, 1982 and were thus entitled to the benefits of being Government employees from 27th December, 1982. The learned Counsel pointed out that the medical staff of the college was extended the benefits available to Government employees with effect from 27th December, 1982, pursuant to an order of a learned Single Judge of this Court dated 13th December, 1995 passed in Civil Rule No.4559 (W) of 1988 and other connected petitions. He, therefore, urged that the respondents cannot discriminate against the members of the petitioner who belong to the non-teaching and non-medical category without any justifiable reasons. 9. Mr. He, therefore, urged that the respondents cannot discriminate against the members of the petitioner who belong to the non-teaching and non-medical category without any justifiable reasons. 9. Mr. Pranab Dutta, learned Counsel appearing for the State Government and other respondents, pointed out that the petitioner being a trade union, was not entitled to file an application under the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 since it cannot be considered as “a person aggrieved”. According to him, under Section 19 it is only “a person aggrieved” by any order pertaining to any matter which falls within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal who can make an application to the Tribunal to redress his grievances. He submitted that a trade union has no locus to file such an application on behalf of its members as none of its legal rights were violated by the State. Mr. Dutta then drew our attention to the provisions of Section 4(2)(iv) and submitted that it is only after the acquisition is complete that the terms and conditions of service of erstwhile employees of the institution would be governed by the service rules applicable to employees of the State Government. Although initially Mr. Dutta had argued that the employees of the D. N. De Homoeopathic Medical College and Hospital became employees of the State Government only in 1994, he later conceded that the employees did, in fact, become Government employees with effect from the date of vesting, i.e., 27th December, 1982. However, according to the learned Counsel, they were not entitled to the benefits of Government service till the institution was acquired, i.e., from the appointed day, 1st August, 1994. The learned Counsel has also relied on the Rules of 2001 to emphasise this submission. 10. The first issue which arises for consideration is whether the petitioner which is a trade union registered under Trade Unions Act, 1926, can prefer an application under Section 19 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 on behalf of its members. There is no dispute that this issue was not raised by the Government before the Tribunal or in its affidavit in opposition filed before this Court. However it is an important question which goes to the root of the matter and therefore we are dealing with it. There is no dispute that this issue was not raised by the Government before the Tribunal or in its affidavit in opposition filed before this Court. However it is an important question which goes to the root of the matter and therefore we are dealing with it. Section 19(1) of the Administrative Tribunals Act reads as follows: “19(1) Subject to the other provisions of this Act, a person aggrieved by any order pertaining to any matter within the jurisdiction of a Tribunal may make an application to the Tribunal for redressal of his grievance.” 11. Reliance has been placed by Mr. Dutta on the judgments of the Supreme Court in the case of Mani Subrat Jain & Others v. State of Haryana & Ors reported in (1977) 1 SCC 486 , 12, I. C. Bose Road Tenants’ Association v. Collector of Howrah and Others reported in AIR 1977 Calcutta 437 and Siliguri Inter District Minibus Owners’ Association & Ors v. Sri Bijon Krishna Bhowmick reported in (1993) 2 CLJ 99 in support of his submission that the union has no legal right and therefore, cannot maintain an application before the Tribunal. The petitioner in this case is a union registered under Trade Unions Act, 1926. The object of a union is to protect the rights of its members and to redress their grievances which may arise against their employer. It is now well-settled that a trade union has the right to espouse the cause of its members against their employer. The issue is whether it can be considered as “a person aggrieved” under the Administrative Tribunals Act. In the case of Mani Subrat Jain (supra) the Supreme Court was dealing with the matters relating to issuance of a mandamus against the Government to appoint the Additional District and Sessions Judges. The Supreme Court dismissed these appeals by observing that a writ of mandamus cannot be asked for nor can such a writ be issued without there being a legal right. The Court observed that there must be a judicially enforceable right as well as a legally protected right before a party who has a grievance can seek a writ of mandamus. The person can be said to be aggrieved only when a person is denied a legal right by someone who has a legal duty to do something or to abstain from doing something. 12. The person can be said to be aggrieved only when a person is denied a legal right by someone who has a legal duty to do something or to abstain from doing something. 12. In the case of 12, I. C. Bose Road Tenants’ Association (supra) the aforesaid judgment in Mani Subrat Jain’s case (supra) was relied on by this Court while dealing with the question as to whether a tenants’ association could challenge a declaration under Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act. The Division Bench of this Court held that the association which was registered under the West Bengal Societies Registration Act did not have a legal right or a fundamental right to maintain a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Similarly, in the Siliguri Inter District Minibus Owners’ Association’s case (supra) the Division Bench of this Court again dealt with the issue as to whether the association could seek leave to appeal before the Division Bench when it was not a party to a writ petition decided by a learned Single Judge. The Court observed that before any leave could be granted to prefer the appeal against the order it was necessary for the association to establish its locus standi to file the application for preferring an appeal. The Court observed that an appeal is a statutory right and a stranger can be permitted to prefer an appeal under certain conditions. It is in this context that the Court was of the view that the association could not be granted leave to file an appeal. 13. Mr. Chatterjee has objected to the respondents raising the issue of locus before this Court. He pointed out that the issue of locus must be raised at the first available instance and not before this Court. To counter this argument, Mr. Dutta submitted that it was a jurisdictional issue as to whether the petitioner could maintain an application under Section 19 of the Administrative Tribunals Act. By relying on the judgments in the cases of, R. J. Singh Ahuluwalia v. The State of Delhi reported in (1970) 3 SCC 451 , The State of Rajasthan and another v. M/s. Karamchand Thappar and Bros. By relying on the judgments in the cases of, R. J. Singh Ahuluwalia v. The State of Delhi reported in (1970) 3 SCC 451 , The State of Rajasthan and another v. M/s. Karamchand Thappar and Bros. reported in AIR 1965 SC 913 , S. Subramaniam Balaji v. State of Tamil Nadu and Others reported in 2013 (9) 651, Sheo Nath Singh v. Appellate Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax, Calcutta reported in (1972) 3 SCC 234 , District Basic Education Officer and Another v. Dhananjai Kumar Shukla And Another reported in (2008) 3 SCC 481 , the learned Counsel submitted that a jurisdictional point on the subject matter of a case can be raised at any stage, even for the first time before the Supreme Court. There is no doubt that it may be possible to question the jurisdiction of a Court or Tribunal at any stage. However the issue of locus of a party to file proceedings before a Court or Tribunal cannot be a jurisdictional issue. The jurisdiction of the Tribunal to decide an application filed under Section 19 of the Act is not in question in this case. There is no dispute that the subject matter of the application is “a service matter” as defined under Section 3(q) of the Administrative Tribunals Act. Therefore, the jurisdiction of the Tribunal is not in question. It is only the locus of a trade union and its right to file an application on behalf of its members that is to be considered. A trade union, it is now well-settled, is a juristic entity recognised as a body corporate under section 13 of the Trade Unions Act. It is entitled under that Act to take up cudgels on behalf of its members to redress their grievances by adopting legal means, including approaching the Courts of Law on behalf of its members. The Administrative Tribunals Act has been enacted to provide for the redressal of disputes and complaints with respect to the service conditions and recruitment of persons appointed to the public services and posts in connection with the Union or any State or any local or other authority. Thus, the Administrative Tribunals Act is a piece of welfare legislation available to the employees of the Government. Thus, the Administrative Tribunals Act is a piece of welfare legislation available to the employees of the Government. There is no dispute that the Government employees are entitled to form a union in order to ensure that any injustice done to them is rectified. A registered trade union is enjoined to protect the legal rights of its members. Therefore, a union must be considered to be “a person aggrieved” as it acts for and on behalf of the employees who are aggrieved. Instead of several employees individually filing proceedings before the Tribunal they entrust that responsibility to their union as its members. Section 19 must be construed liberally and in the widest possible terms as it is contained in welfare legislation. Employees cannot be deprived of their rights by raising a bogey of locus standi when their trade union espouses their cause. In the case of The Mumbai Kamgar Sabha, Bombay v. M/s. Abdulbhai Faizullabhai and Others reported in (1976) 3 SCC 832 , the Supreme Court, while dealing with the demand of bonus to employees working in establishments employing about five thousand workmen in the same neighbourhood, considered the plea taken up by the employers that a union could not be a party to a dispute which is between the workers on the one hand and the establishment on the other and therefore, the union had no locus standi. While dealing with this aspect, the Supreme Court has observed as follows: “7. Fairness to respondent’s Counsel constrains us to consider in limine a flawsome plea forcibly urged that the union figured as the appellant before us but being no party to the dispute (which was between the workers on the one hand and the establishments on the other) had no locus standi. No right of the union qua union was involved and the real disputants were the workers. Surely, there is terminological lapse in the cause title because, in fact, the aggrieved appellants are the workers collectively, not the union. But a bare reading of the petition, the description of parties, the grounds urged and grievances aired, leave us in no doubt that the battle is between the workers and employers and the union represents, as a collective noun, as it were, the numerous humans whose presence is indubitable in the contest, though formally invisible on the party array. But a bare reading of the petition, the description of parties, the grounds urged and grievances aired, leave us in no doubt that the battle is between the workers and employers and the union represents, as a collective noun, as it were, the numerous humans whose presence is indubitable in the contest, though formally invisible on the party array. The substance of the matter is obvious and formal defects, in such circumstances, fade away. We are not dealing with a civil litigation governed by the Civil Procedure Code but with an industrial dispute where the process of conflict resolution is informal, rough-and-ready and invites a liberal approach. Procedural prescriptions are handmaids, not mistresses, of justice and failure of fair play is the spirit in which courts must view processual deviances. Our adjectival branch of jurisprudence, by and large, deals not with sophisticated litigants but the rural poor, the urban lay and the weaker societal segments for whom law will be an added terror if technical mis-descriptions and deficiencies in drafting pleadings and setting out the cause title create a secret weapon to non-suit a party. Where foul play is absent, and fairness is not faulted, latitude is a grace of processual justice. Test litigations, representative actions, pro bono publico and like broadened forms of legal proceedings are in keeping with the current accent on justice to the common man and a necessary disincentive to those who wish to bypass the real issues on the merits by suspect reliance on peripheral, procedural shortcomings. Even Article 226, viewed in wider perspective, may be amenable to ventilation of collective or common grievances, as distinguished from assertion of individual rights, although the traditional view, backed by precedents, has opted for the narrower alternative. Public interest is promoted by a spacious construction of locus standi in our socio-economic circumstances and conceptual latitudinarianism permits taking liberties with individualisation of the right to invoke the higher courts where the remedy is shared by a considerable number, particularly when they are weaker. Less litigation, consistent with fair process, is the aim of adjectival law. Therefore, the decisions cited before us founded on the jurisdiction under Article 226 are inept and themselves somewhat out of tune with the modern requirements of jurisprudence calculated to benefit the community. Two rulings of this Court more or less endorse this general approach : Dabholkar and Newabganj Sugar Mills.” 14. Therefore, the decisions cited before us founded on the jurisdiction under Article 226 are inept and themselves somewhat out of tune with the modern requirements of jurisprudence calculated to benefit the community. Two rulings of this Court more or less endorse this general approach : Dabholkar and Newabganj Sugar Mills.” 14. In the present case the union has sought justice for an entire body of employees working in the same institution and who were similarly situated. Thus in our view the rights of the employees of the D. N. De Homoeopathic Medical College and Hospital cannot be defeated by the Government on the ground that the petitioner which represents the employees did not have locus to file an application before the Tribunal or indeed this petition. We are of the view that this contention is devoid of any substance, and therefore, it is rejected. 15. There is no dispute that by the judgment of a learned Single Judge of this Court, the medical staff and the teaching staff of the institution have been granted the same relief which is sought by the non-teaching, non-medical staff of the same institution in the present case. We find no reason as to why the respondents did not extend the benefit of this judgment to the non-teaching and non-medical staff. Mr. Dutta tried to submit that it was at the pain of contempt that the respondents implemented the judgment of this Court. According to him, the State is not bound by the earlier judgment of this Court, if it can establish that the earlier judgment was incorrect. Reliance has been placed on the judgment in the case of Col. B. J. Akkara (Retd.) v. Government of India and Others reported in (2006) 11 SCC 709 . This judgment has been considered by the Supreme Court in K. C. Bajaj and Others v. Union of India and Others in Civil Appeal Nos.14640-46 of 2013 and other related matters. The Supreme Court observed in this case that the final result of a case filed by a public servant with regard to his service conditions cannot be dependent on the arbitrary choice of the State to prosecute the matter before the higher courts. The Court held that a pick and choose method cannot be adopted by the Union of India in resisting the claim of similarly doctors. The Court held that a pick and choose method cannot be adopted by the Union of India in resisting the claim of similarly doctors. This approach of the Government was ex facie arbitrary, unjust and had resulted in the breach of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. In the case of State of Karnataka & Ors v. C. Lalitha reported in (2006) 2 SCC 747 the Supreme Court observed that service jurisprudence as evolved by the Court from time to time postulates that all persons similarly situated should be treated similarly. The Court held that only because one person had approached the court that would not mean that persons similarly situated should be treated differently. 16. We are not able to appreciate the argument on behalf of the State that it had implemented the decision of the learned Single Judge of this Court only because they were faced with contempt proceedings. Assuming that to be so, it was always open to the State to prefer a Special Leave Petition to the Supreme Court against the order. The State took no such action to redress this aspect or grievances, if any, that it had with regard to the judgment. All employees of the D. N. De Homoeopathic Medical College and Hospital were similarly situated on the date of vesting when the management of the institution was taken over by the Government and on the date of acquisition. The Act of 1983 does not speak of any differentiation between medical and non-medical staff or between teaching and non-teaching staff of the institution. The State has arbitrarily and whimsically chosen to draw an invidious distinction between the employees. There is no conceivable reason as to why the State did not extend the benefit of the judgment of this Court to all employees of the D. N. De Homoeopathic Medical College and Hospital. By not doing so, the State has caused unnecessary prejudice and grave hardship, to the non-medical, non-teaching staff who are at the lowest echelon in the hierarchy. 17. We have considered the case on merits and we do not find that there is any reason to differ from the view taken by the learned Single Judge in the aforesaid writ petition. Section 4(2)(iv), which has been emphasised by Mr. 17. We have considered the case on merits and we do not find that there is any reason to differ from the view taken by the learned Single Judge in the aforesaid writ petition. Section 4(2)(iv), which has been emphasised by Mr. Dutta repeatedly, provides that every person who was an employee of the institution before the vesting, i.e., before 27th December, 1982, shall on and from that date become an employee of the State Government. He is entitled to hold office on the same terms and conditions as would have been admissible to him if there had been no such vesting. He shall continue to do so until his employment under the State Government is duly terminated or the terms and conditions of his service are duly altered by the State Government by rules made in this behalf. This Clause cannot be read in isolation. It would have to be interpreted to mean that once the Government decided to acquire the institution, all acts which came into existence on the date of acquisition would relate back to the date of vesting. Thus, had there been no acquisition the employees would have continued in employment of the institution on the same terms and conditions as they had prior to the take over. Once the acquisition was complete they became entitled to all service benefits with effect from date of vesting which is 27th December, 1982, including increments, promotions etc. After the take over, the employees became employees of the State Government and were entitled to the same benefits as they were drawing earlier from the institution. However, when the acquisition occurred the State Government had no option but to treat them as their employees, entitled to all benefits of Government service with effect from the date of vesting, i.e., 27th December, 1982. 18. In our opinion, therefore, the order of the Tribunal being perverse deserves to be set aside in our writ jurisdiction. The members of the petitioner are entitled to all service benefits as Government employees from the date of the vesting i.e. 27th December, 1982. All arrears and consequential benefits of the employees shall be paid to them within four months from today.