JUDGMENT L.K. Mohapatra; ACJ. The petitioner who has been detained by order of the District Magistrate, Imphal West dt. 6.11.2013 under sub section 3 of Section 3 of the National Security Act, 1980( for short NSA), has filed this writ application challenging the said order of detention as well as the order of confirmation passed by the State Govt. 2. From the grounds of detention in Annexure-A/2, it appears that the petitioner is alleged to have joined a banned organization namely, United National Liberation Front (UNLF) in May, 1993. It further appears from the grounds of detention that he took training and also occupied different posts in the organization. It is alleged that he had taken an important role in snatching arms and ammunitions from Kotlen MR post on 10.1.1995 for which a case had been registered in Lamsang PS. On 21.10.2013 at about 5.45 AM he was arrested by a team of CDO/IW from near Poknapham Press Building and one Honda Activa Two wheeler, Driving Licence, RC Book, Voter Identity Card and Mobile set were seized from him. He was handed over to the Officer in- Charge, Imphal Police Station with a written report and seized articles. On the strength of the said report, a case was registered u/s 121/121-A of IPC read with Sect. 16/20 UA(P)A Act vide FIR Case No.282(10)2013. In course of the investigation of the said case, he was again arrested on 21.10.2014 while in custody and was remanded to police custody till 28.10.2013. On 28.10.2013 when he was produced before the Court for judicial remand, he was again formally arrested in connection with FIR Case No.2(1)1995 Lamsang PS and was remanded to police custody till 6.11.2013. While in police custody, District Magistrate, Imphal West passed the order of detention on the last day of police custody i.e. 6.11.2013 3. Shri Ch. Ngongo, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner assails the impugned order of detention on the ground that the subjective satisfaction recorded by the District Magistrate, Imphal West in the order of detention is without any basis. According to the learned counsel for the petitioner on the date the order of detention was passed, no application for bail had been moved by the petitioner and therefore exercise of power under sub section 3 of section 3 of the NSA, 1980 at that stage was not necessary. According to the learned counsel for the petitioner on the date the order of detention was passed, no application for bail had been moved by the petitioner and therefore exercise of power under sub section 3 of section 3 of the NSA, 1980 at that stage was not necessary. Apart from the above, no document was placed before the District Magistrate with regard to his subjective satisfaction to the effect that the petitioner may be released on bail in the near future as bails are granted in similar cases by the criminal Courts. 4. Mr. Vashum, learned State counsel as well as Mr. Amarjit Naorem, learned CGSC appearing for the respondent No.4 referring to their respective counter affidavit, submitted that the petitioner is an active member of the UNLF and was first involved in commission of an offence in the year 1995 but could not be apprehended. Only when he was arrested in Oct, 2013, during custody period, he was formally arrested in connection with case of 1995. It was further contended by the learned counsel for the respondents that the subjective satisfaction recorded by the District Magistrate is based on the fact that in similar cases bail has been granted by the criminal courts and District Magistrate was of the view that as and when petitioner also moves an application for bail, he shall be released. Therefore, it cannot be said that the subjective satisfaction recorded by the District Magistrate is without any basis. 5. The points for consideration are as to whether there was any necessity of passing the order of detention on 6.11.2013 when the petitioner was in police custody and had not moved any application for bail; and as to whether any material had been placed before the District Magistrate to show that in similar cases bail had been granted by the criminal court. 5. Admittedly, on 6.11.13 when the impugned order of detention was passed the petitioner was in custody and had not moved any application for bail. There is nothing on record to show that in any of the two cases any co-accused had been released on bail. In the case of Rekha V. State of Tamil Nadu & Ors., (2011) 5 SCC 244 the Apex Court made the following observation in paragraph 26 and 27 of the judgment as quoted below: “26. There is nothing on record to show that in any of the two cases any co-accused had been released on bail. In the case of Rekha V. State of Tamil Nadu & Ors., (2011) 5 SCC 244 the Apex Court made the following observation in paragraph 26 and 27 of the judgment as quoted below: “26. It was held in Union of India V. Paul Manickam that if the detaining authority is aware of the fact that the detenu is in custody and the detaining authority is reasonably satisfied with cogent material that there is likelihood of his release and in view of his antecedent activities he must be detained to prevent him from indulging in such prejudicial activities, the detention order can validly be made. 27. In our opinion, there is a real possibility of release of a person on bail who is already in custody provided he has moved a bail application which is pending. It follows logically that if no bail application is pending, then there is no likelihood of the person in custody being released on bail, and hence the detention order will be illegal. However, there can be an exception to this rule, that is, where a coaccused whose case stands on the same footing had been granted bail. In such cases, the detaining authority can reasonably conclude that there is likelihood of the detenu being released on bail even though no bail application of his is pending, since most courts normally grant bail on this ground. However, details of such alleged similar cases must be given, otherwise the bald statement of the authority cannot be believed.” 6. In view of the above law laid down by the Apex Court, when the petitioner was in custody and had not moved any application for bail and when there is nothing on record to show that any of the co-accused had been granted bail, the subjective satisfaction recorded by the District Magistrate that he may be released on bail, is without any basis and makes the order of detention invalid. So far the second ground of challenge is concerned, from the grounds of detention we find that no document was placed before the District Magistrate to show that the accused persons involved in commission of similar offence had been granted bail by the criminal court. So far the second ground of challenge is concerned, from the grounds of detention we find that no document was placed before the District Magistrate to show that the accused persons involved in commission of similar offence had been granted bail by the criminal court. In absence of any such document, it is not known as to how the District Magistrate recorded such subjective satisfaction that in similar cases bail had been granted by the criminal court. On this ground alone also order of detention is liable to be set aside. 8. For the reasons stated above and on consideration of the two grounds taken by the petitioner, we find that in absence of any application for bail pending consideration by the criminal court on behalf of the petitioner, the order of detention becomes invalid. Accordingly, we quash the detention and the confirmation orders and direct that the petitioner namely, Wahengbam Ibosana Meitei @ Ibomcha be set at liberty forthwith unless his detention is required in connection with any other case.