JUDGMENT Deepak Gupta; C.J.:- This appeal is directed against the award, dated 3rd January 2005, passed by the learned Commissioner, Workmen's Compensation, West Tripura, Agartala in T.S.(W.C.)58 of 1999, whereby the learned Commissioner awarded nil amount in favour of the claimants. 2. The short question which arises in this case is whether the deceased employee who was a Head Clerk in a Tea Estate can be termed to be a workman within the meaning of the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923 as it stood on 05.08.1998 or whether he is treated to be an employee in terms of the Employee's Compensation Act, 1923 as it exists today. 3. The learned Commissioner rejected the claim petition only on the ground that the deceased being a Head Clerk was working in clerical capacity and hence did not fall within the definition of workman in terms of Section 2(n) of the Workmen's Compensation Act which reads as follows: (n) "workman" means any person who is-- (i) a railway servant as defined in [Clause (34) of section 2 of the Railways Act, 1989 (24 of 1989)], not permanently employed in any administrative, district or sub-divisional office of a railway and not employed in any such capacity as is specified in Schedule II, or 4[(ia)(a) a master, seaman or other member of the crew of a ship, (b) a captain or other member of the crew of an aircraft, (c) a person recruited as driver, helper, mechanic, cleaner or in any other capacity in connection with a motor vehicle, (d) a person recruited for work abroad by a company, and who is employed outside India in any such capacity as is specified in Schedule II and the ship, aircraft or motor vehicle, or company, as the case may be, is registered in India, or;] (ii) employed in any such capacity as is specified in Schedule II, whether the contract of employment was made before or after the passing of this Act and whether such contract is expressed or implied, oral or in writing; but does not include any person working in the capacity of a member of [Armed Forces of the Union]; and any reference to a workman who has been injured shall, where the workman is dead, include a reference to his dependants or any of them. It would be pertinent to mention that in the Employee's Compensation Act the word 'workman' is no longer in use and the word employee is defined in Clause (dd) which is similar to the definition of workman in the previous Act. 4. Reference may be made to Schedule-II of the Workmen's Compensation Act and assuming for the sake of appreciating the argument of the learned counsel for the appellant that the deceased was working in a premises wherein a manufacturing process was being carried out then also in terms of Schedule -II as it existed prior to 18.01.2010 the words used were 'employed, otherwise than in clerical capacity, in any premises wherein or within the precincts whereof a manufacturing process .........................' Therefore a person employed in clerical capacity was not a workman within the meaning of the Workmen's Compensation Act. The Workmen's Compensation Act was amended and renamed as The Employee's Compensation Act, 1923 by amendment Act 45 of 2009 and now the words 'other than in clerical capacity' have been deleted. 5. Sri S K Datta, learned counsel for the appellant, submits that the Workmen's Compensation Act is a social welfare piece of legislation and once the legislature though includes 'persons working in clerical capacity' in the definition of employee of the Government the benefit should be extended to all old cases also. 6. There is no manner of doubt that the Act is a piece of social security and welfare legislation but rights of the parties have to be decided as per the law which exists on the date when the accident took place. This question is no longer res integra and has been decided in a number of judgments. Reference may be made of the judgments of the Apex Court in Pratap Narain Singh Deo vs Srinivas Sabata and Anr., (1976)1 SCC 289 ; Kerala State Electricity Board and Anr. Vs. Balsala K. and Anr., (1999) 8 SCC 254 and Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Khajuni Devi and Ors., (2002) 10 SCC 567 . 7. The Apex Court in Kerala State Electricity Board (supra) held that though the Act is a social welfare legislation the compensation has to be determined by taking into consideration the maximum wages which could be taken into consideration on the date of the accident. The Apex Court clearly held that subsequent amendments are prospective in nature unless specifically made retrospectively. The Apex Court in Kerala State Electricity Board (supra) held that though the Act is a social welfare legislation the compensation has to be determined by taking into consideration the maximum wages which could be taken into consideration on the date of the accident. The Apex Court clearly held that subsequent amendments are prospective in nature unless specifically made retrospectively. The following observations of the Apex Court are relevant: 2. Various High Courts in the country, while dealing with the claim for compensation under Workmen's Compensation Act have uniformly taken the view that the relevant date for determining the rights and liabilities of the parties is the date of the accident. 3. A four Judge Bench of this Court in Pratap Narain Singh Deo v. Srinivas Sabata, (1976) 1 SCC 289 : ( AIR 1976 SC 222 : 1976 Lab IC 222) speaking through Singhal, J. has held that an employer becomes liable to pay compensation as soon as the personal injury is caused to the workman by the accident which arose out of and in the course of employment. Thus, the relevant date for determination of the rate of compensation, is the date of the accident and not the date of adjudication of the claim. 4. A two Judge Bench of this Court in The New India Assurance Company Limited v. V. K. Neelakandan, Civil Appeal Nos. 16904-16906 of 1996, decided on 6-11-1996, however, took the view that Workmen's Compensation Act, being a special legislation for the benefit of the workmen, the benefit as available on the date of adjudication should be extended to the workmen and not the compensation which was payable on the date of the accident. The two Judge Bench in Neelakandan's case (supra), however, did not take notice of the judgment of the larger Bench in Pratap Narain Singh Deo's case ( AIR 1976 SC 222 : 1976 Lab IC 222) as it presumably was not brought to the notice of their Lordships. Be that as it may, in view of the categorical law laid down by the larger Bench in Pratap Narain Singh Deo's case, the view expressed by the two Judge Bench in Neelakandan's case is not correct. 5. Our attention has also been drawn to a judgment of the Full Bench of the Kerala High Court in United India Insurance Co. 5. Our attention has also been drawn to a judgment of the Full Bench of the Kerala High Court in United India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Alavi, 1998 (1) Ker LT 951 (FB) wherein the Full Bench precisely considered the same question and examined both the above noted judgments. It took the view that the injured workman becomes entitled to get compensation the moment he suffers personal injuries of the types contemplated by the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act and it is the amount of compensation payable on the date of the accident and not the amount of compensation payable on account of the amendment made in 1995, which is relevant. The decision of the Full Bench of the Kerala High Court, to the extent it is in accord with the judgment of the larger Bench of this Court in Pratap Singh Narain Singh Deo v. Srinivas Sabata ( AIR 1976 SC 222 : 1976 Lab IC 222) (supra) lays down the correct law and we approve it. 8. In this case there is nothing to show that the amendments made are retrospective in nature. On the date when the occurrence took place, the deceased was working as a Head Clerk in a clerical capacity and would not fall within the definition of workman. Therefore though this Court may be sympathetic towards the deceased it is bound by the law laid down by the Apex Court and as such, there is no merit in this appeal which is accordingly dismissed. Send down the LCRs forthwith.