ORDER 1. This petition fileld under Article 226 of the Constitution is directed against the order Annexure P-4 whereby respondents have provisionally assessed Rs.19,302/- against the petitioner relating to her alleged act of electricity theft. 2. The case of the petitioner is that she is residing in the residential premises situated in Khurje Wala Mohalla, Lashkar, Gwalior. She occupied the residential premises after the death of her husband. It is urged that a complaint under section 135 of the Electricity Act, 2003 is filed against the petitioner. The said complaint was frivolus and, therefore, the Special Court in Special Session No.1083/2012 exonerated the petitioner. It is submitted that after her exoneration respondents are not justified in asking payment from the petitioner which was assessed in provisional assessment order dated 7.10.2011 (Annexure P-4). It is submitted that petitioner has already discharged her entire civil liabilities by making payment of electricity bills. Copy of bill dated 26.7.2013 is filed as Annexure P-5. 3. Shri Chandresh Shrivastava, learned counsel for the petitioner submits that electricity is essential amenity in present scenario. Depriving any citizen from electricity means violation of fundamental rights flowing from Article 21 of the Constitution. To bolseter his submission he relied on 1987(II) MPWN 67 (Kallo v. Ratan Devi) and 1989(II) MPWN 54 (Lallamal Sharma v. Islami Begum). By relying on 2009(1) MPLJ 366 (Sangita v. State of M.P.). Shri Chandresh Shrivastava submits that respondents have no authority, jurisdiction and competence to press Annexure P-4 into service after petitioner’s exoneration by Special Court. 4. Per contra, Shri Anil Mishra, learned counsel for the other side supported the order Annexure P-4. Shri Mishra submits that civil liabilities and duties are prevailing against the petitioner and, therefore, action of the respondents is in accordance with law. He heavily relied on the judgment of Supreme Court reported in AIR 2003 SC 1354 (J.M.D. Alloys Ltd. appellant v. Bihar State Electricity Board and others). He also relied on the judgment of Allahabad High Court reported in AIR 2010 Allahabad 115 (Rais Ahmad v. U.P. Power Corporation Ltd. and others). He heavily relied on the judgment of Supreme Court reported in AIR 2003 SC 1354 (J.M.D. Alloys Ltd. appellant v. Bihar State Electricity Board and others). He also relied on the judgment of Allahabad High Court reported in AIR 2010 Allahabad 115 (Rais Ahmad v. U.P. Power Corporation Ltd. and others). By placing reliance on letters dated 12.8.2010 Annexures R-1 and R-2 written by Special Judge (Electricity Act) it is urged that this letter of the learned presiding Judge makes it clear that in view of judgment of Supreme Court in JMD Alloys (supra), despite exoneration of the accused in criminal case, civil liability continues and it is open to respondent company to recover the said civil liability. 5. No other point is pressed by learned counsel for the parties. 6. I have bestowed my anxious consideration on the rival contentions of the parties and perused the record. 7. The bone of contention of petitioner is that pursuant to provisional assessment order dated 7.10.2011, a complaint Annexure P-3 was filed before Special Judge which was registered as Special Session Case No.1083/2012. In para 8 of this complaint was prayed that civil liabilities be determined and recovered from the present petitioner. The Court below dismissed the said complaint on 7.3.2013. Petitioner submits that after adjudication of matter by Special Court and in absence of determining and imposing any civil liability on the petitioner, it is no more open to the respondents to implement Annexure P-4. Whereas the stand of the respondents is that it can be done in the light of judgment of Supreme Court and Allahabad High Court, quoted above. 8. In case JMD (supra), a FIR was lodged against the appellant. Criminal case was registered under section 39/44 of the Indian Electricity Act which culminated in submission of a final report. The final report which was produced before the Magistrate was accepted and appellant was exonerated. The apex Court in para 13 of said judgment opined that mere acceptance of final report by the Magistrate cannot amount to a finding by the criminal Court that theft of electricity was not committed. The accused was not even summoned, no charge was framed nor any evidence was recorded. In such a situation, it cannot be held that the criminal Court has recorded any finding to the effect that the petitioner has not committed theft of electricity. The accused was not even summoned, no charge was framed nor any evidence was recorded. In such a situation, it cannot be held that the criminal Court has recorded any finding to the effect that the petitioner has not committed theft of electricity. That apart, the purpose of a trial under section 39/44 of the Indian Electricity Act is entirely different and the object is to punish and sentence the person who is alleged to have committed the offence. The trial of an accused in a criminal case can have no bearing in the matter of assessment made in accordance with the tariff of the value of electricity dishonestly abstracted or consumed. Therefore, the contention raised on the basis of alleged acceptance of the final report in the criminal case has absolutely no merit. 9. Aforesaid paragraph of judment of JMD Alloys (supra), makes it clear that criminal case was closed because final report was accepted. No full fledged trial took place. Apart from this, purpose of trial under section 39/44 of Electricity Act is entirely different and its object is to punish and sentence the person who is allelged to have committed the offence. A minute reading of this judgment further shows that in JMD, the Chief Engineer of elelctricity company issued show cause notice to JMD Alloys regarding assessment of amount with a view to give opportunity to put forth its case. After hearing the JMD Alloys, a final amount was determined by Chief Engineer. On the basis of these findings, the assessment has been made about compensatory amount under clause 16.9 of the tariff. Allahabad High Court in aforesaid judgment relied on the judgment of Supreme Court in the case of JMD Alloys. In that case also no full fledged trial took place and criminal case came to an end because of acceptance of closure report. 10. In the present case, the petitioner-accused was summoned before the Special Court. Evidence was led and after marshalling the evidence, charges were not found proved against the petitioner. It is not case where acquittal is based on acceptance of closure report. Thus, in the present factual scenario; judgment of JMD Alloys and Allahabad High Court in Rais Ahmad (supra), cannot be pressed into service. Apart from this, it is apt to mention that section 135 of the Electricity Act deals with theft of electricity. It is not case where acquittal is based on acceptance of closure report. Thus, in the present factual scenario; judgment of JMD Alloys and Allahabad High Court in Rais Ahmad (supra), cannot be pressed into service. Apart from this, it is apt to mention that section 135 of the Electricity Act deals with theft of electricity. Section 152 deals with compounding of offence. Section 153 is an enabling provision for constitution of Special Court. State Government has appointed Special Courts for the purpose of speedy trial of offences referred to in sections 135 to 140 and section 150 of the Electricity Act. The procedure and power of Special Court is defined in section 154. The word “civil liability” is defined in explanation to sub-section (6) of section 154 which reads as under : Explanation : For the purposes of this section “civil liability” means loss or damage incurred by the Board or licensee or the concerned person, as the case may be, due to the commission of an offence referred to in sections 135 to 139. Section 154(5) and (6) read as under : 154. Procedure and power of Special Court. -- (5) The Special Court shall determine the civil liability against a consumer or a person in terms of money for theft of energy which shall not be less than an amount equivalent to twotimes of the tariff rate aplicable for a period of twelve months preceding the date of detection of theft of energy or the exact period of theft if determined whichever is less and the amount of civil liability so determined shall be recovered as if it were a decree of civil Court. (6) In case the civil liability so determined finally by the Special Court is less than the amount deposited by the consumer or the person, the excess amount so deposited by the consumer or the person, to the Board or licensee or the concerned person, as the case may be, shall be refunded by the Board or licensee or the concerned person as the case may be, within a fortnight from the date of communication of the order of the Special Court together with interest at the prevailing Reserve Bank of India prime leading rate for the period from the date of such deposit till the date of payment. (Emphasis supplied) 11. (Emphasis supplied) 11. Sub-section (5) of section 154 of the Electricity Act makes it clear that it is obligatory and mandatory on the part of Special Court to determine the civil liability. It is noteworthy that by Act 26 of 2007 (w.e.f. 15.6.2007) legislature has substituted the words “Special Court may” and in lieu thereof inserted the words “Special Court shall”. Thus, intention of the legislature is clear that Special Courts are bound and under a statutory and mandatory duty to determine the civil liability against the consumer. Special Court in the present case conducted a full fledged trial and exonerated the petitioner. It has not determined the civil liability against the petitioner. Civil liability needs to be determined by Special Court as per section 154 of the Act. If it has failed to do so, it cannot be permitted to be determined in any other manner and, therefore, provisional assessment cannot be pressed into service after delivering the judgment by the Special Court. This is settled in law that if something is required to be done in a particular manner pursuant to a legal provision, it has to be done in the same manner or not at all. [See : AIR 1959 SC 93 (Shri Baru Ram v. Smt. Prasanni and others), (2002)1 SCC 633 (Commissioner of Income Tax, Mumbai v. Anjum M.H. Ghaswala and others), 2011(2)MPLJ 690 (Satyanjay Tripathi and another v. Banarasi Devi)]. 12. At the cost of repetition, in the opinion of this Court, in the present case, the petitioner was subjected to full fledged trial before the Special Court. The Special Court has not come to the conclusion that petitioner has committed any offence or caused any loss or damage to the Board. In absence of any “civil liability” determined by the Court, Annexure P-4 cannot be enforced. If respondents were aggrieved by the order of Special Court in exonerating the petitioner or in not determining the “civil liability”, they could have challenged the said order before the higher forum. In absence thereto, Annexure P-4 cannot be pressed into service. 13. In JMD Alloys (supra), assessment was made by the Chief Engineer after affording adequate opportunitytothe apellant therein. The acquittal in that case was solely based on acceptance of closure report. No full fledged trial was conducted. In absence thereto, Annexure P-4 cannot be pressed into service. 13. In JMD Alloys (supra), assessment was made by the Chief Engineer after affording adequate opportunitytothe apellant therein. The acquittal in that case was solely based on acceptance of closure report. No full fledged trial was conducted. Judgment of JMD Alloys (supra), and judgment of Allahabad High Court in Rais Ahmad (supra), are based on acceptance of closure report and, therefore, have no application in the facts and circumstances of the present case. So far letters dated 12.8.2010 Annexure R-1 and R-2 written by Special Judge (Electricity Act) Gwalior are concerned, said letters are also of no assistance because in the said letters reliance is placed in JMD Alloys and Rais Ahmad (supra). Apart from this, this is settled in law that Judges speak through their judgments. There is no need to pass any executive/administrative order like Annexures R-1 and R-2 to explain the legal position. At the cost of repetition, I am constrained to observe that the Special Judge Electricity Act was not required to write such letters Annexures R-1 and R-2. The general letters Annexures R-1 and R-2 are of no assistance to the respondents in the present case. After delivering the judgment Annexure P-2, the Special Judge Electrcity Act has become functious officio. It is his judgment which will determine the rights and liabilities of the parties inter se. No executive order like Annexures R-1 and R-2 can determine the rights and liabilities. 14. As analyzed above, respondents have erred in taking the stand that “civil liability” is still there against the petitioner based on Annexure P-4. Thus, petition deserves to be and is accordingly allowed. It is made clear that after the judgment (in absence of challenging it before appropriate legal forum) in favour of the petitioner dated 7.3.2013, it is not open to the respondents to take any action based on Annexure P-4 against the petitioner. Thus, Annexure P-4 cannot be pressed into service against the petitioner in any manner whatsoever. 15. Petition is allowed to the extent indicated above. No costs. .............