JUDGMENT Tinlianthang Vaiphei, J. 1. The question which falls for consideration in this writ petition is whether the termination of the contractual appointment of the petitioner can be interfered with by this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution? To answer the question, a brief narration of the facts of the case, as pleaded by the petitioner, may be in order. The petitioner was appointed to the post of Block Programme Manager under the National Rural Health Mission (NRHM) on 2.6.2007 by the respondent No. 3 on contractual basis for a period of six months from the date of joining the post. He was initially placed at the disposal of the Medical Officer-in-Charge, Block Primary Health Centre, North Guwahati. A contract was accordingly executed by him with the respondents. After the expiry of the contract period, no order was issued for extension of the contractual period till the time this writ petition was filed by the petitioner. Nevertheless, he continued to discharge his duties and responsibilities. 2. It would appear that the respondent No. 2 by the order dated 24.8.2009 transferred the petitioner, among others, to Boko Block Primary Health Centre, Kamrup District and directed him to join his new place of posting within 15 days with the further stipulation that the contract signed by the petitioner would remain in force. The respondent No. 3 thereafter issued the order dated 18.9.2009 directing the petitioner to hand over the charge and complete all the formalities for joining his new place of posting within 3 days from the date of issue of the order. The petitioner immediately complied with the order and joined the post. 3. However, much to his surprise, the respondent No. 2, without giving him an opportunity of hearing, issued the order dated 25.1.2011 terminating his services purportedly in accordance with Clause 8 and 9 of the contract to be effective after 30 days from the date issue of the order. The petitioner immediately complied with the order and joined the post. 3. However, much to his surprise, the respondent No. 2, without giving him an opportunity of hearing, issued the order dated 25.1.2011 terminating his services purportedly in accordance with Clause 8 and 9 of the contract to be effective after 30 days from the date issue of the order. The function of the petitioner is to prepare the agenda notes, meeting proceedings, taking follow-up actions on the decision taken in the meeting and keeping the District informed apart from monitoring each and every institutions, conducting delivery to know whether records are kept in the delivery register or not as well as delivery records on the ANM's registers, to assist and guide ASHA in each village, assist the Medical Officer-in-Charge, Block Primary Health Centre in preparation of Village Health Plan and Block Health Action Plan, etc. 4. As usual, the monthly meeting of the Boko Primary Block Health Centre of the NRHM, Assam was held on 4.1.2011 to discuss the implementation of the Programmes which was attended by about 150 members belonging to and engaged at Boko Block Primary Health Centre (BPHC) i.e. the Medical Officers, ANM's and ASHA facilitators and other Medical Staff including the petitioner. Various resolutions were adopted in that meeting apart from reviewing the programme execution without problem. However, on the verbal complaints of Nurses and ASHA facilitators as to the taking of money by Medical Officers in case of deliveries, the petitioner did raise the issue so as to prevent future recurrence and to extend maximum benefits to the poor of the Block. This apparently provoked the Doctors of Boko Block Primary Health Centre, Community Health Centre and First Referral Unit, Kamrup District to file complaints against the petitioner which resulted in the impugned termination order. The petitioner during his tenure as Block Programme Manager had never misbehaved either with the Doctors or the Nurses of the Boko Block Primary Health Centre. It is the contention of the petitioner that the impugned termination is stigmatic and punitive in nature and was issued in violation of the principles of natural justice. It is also contended by the petitioner that the report of the respondent No. 3 dated 21.9.2011 (2010) upon which the impugned order was issued was never made available to him. He, therefore, files this writ petition challenging the legality of the impugned termination order. It is also contended by the petitioner that the report of the respondent No. 3 dated 21.9.2011 (2010) upon which the impugned order was issued was never made available to him. He, therefore, files this writ petition challenging the legality of the impugned termination order. 5. The writ petition is opposed by the respondent authorities, who have filed their affidavit-in-opposition. The case of the answering respondent is that the petitioner was issued a show cause notice earlier on 10.4.2009 for violating the financial guidelines and was, however, not terminated vide the order dated 18.5.2009 as it was for the first time on the recommendation of the Joint director of Health Services, Kamrup (respondent 3) and was at the same time warned not to repeat in future, failing which the contract would be terminated without further communication. In the past also, there were reports against him for misbehavior and misconduct towards doctors and ANMs. In the complaint made against him on 21.9.2010 before the respondent No. 3, allegations were made against him about the widespread resentment amongst the Medical Officers, ANMs, ASHA workers for his highhandedness and rude behavior. He was alleged to have defied the authority of SDM & HO, i/c of PHC as well as the Deputy Superintendent of the CHC which made it difficult to run the PHC/CH activities with him. In another report dated 31-8-2010, the SDM & HO, Boko PHC requested the respondent No. 3 to transfer the petitioner for his interfering attitude in all financial matters. In yet another report from the SDM & HO, Boko BPHC, Kamrup dated 11.1.2011, an ugly incident which occurred in the monthly review meeting held on 4.1.2011 at Boko PHC was highlighted. In that report, the petitioner was alleged to have instigated the public through ANMs to assault the doctors of BPHC with shoes: derogatory languages were used against the doctors. The report of the SDM & HO was duly signed by the doctors who were assaulted and abused. The conducts of the petitioner as evident from the series of report against him amount to violation of the terms and conditions of his contract appointment, and his contractual appointment was, therefore, liable to be terminated as was done in the impugned termination order. 6. Assailing the impugned termination order, Mr. The conducts of the petitioner as evident from the series of report against him amount to violation of the terms and conditions of his contract appointment, and his contractual appointment was, therefore, liable to be terminated as was done in the impugned termination order. 6. Assailing the impugned termination order, Mr. O.P. Bhatti, the learned counsel for the petitioner, flatly denies that the petitioner has ever violated the terms of his contractual appointment and contends that since no opportunity of hearing was given to the petitioner before issuing the impugned order, principles of natural justice have been violated: the impugned order is, therefore, arbitrary. He further submits that inasmuch as the Deputy Commissioner, Kamrup District (respondent 4), who is the Chairman of the District Health Society, Kamrup District, was never consulted before terminating the service of the petitioner, the termination is in contravention of Clause 8 of the terms of the contract, or otherwise suffers from the vice of non-application of mind, and is, therefore, not sustainable in law. To drive home his point, he presses into service the following decisions: (i) Dipti Prakash Banerjee vs. Satyuendra Nath Bose National Centre for Basic Sciences, Calcutta, (1999) 3 SCC 60 , (ii) Whirlpool Corporation vs. Registrar of Trade Marks, Mumbai, (1998) 8 SCC 1 , (iii) Dharmeswar Baishya vs. State of Assam & Ors., 2004 (2) GLT 253 and (iv) Sumal Das vs. State of Tripura, 2001 (3) GLT 404. 7. Per contra, Mrs. A. Verma, the learned standing counsel for the Health Department, maintains that since the petitioner was merely a appointed as Block Programme Manager under the National Rural Health Mission, North Guwahati PHC on contractual basis, he had no protection under Article 311(2) of the Constitution and could not, therefore, demand opportunity of hearing like normal public servant. She contends that the contractual engagement of the petitioner was rightly terminated by the impugned order by invoking Clause 8 of the terms of the contract for misconduct, etc. Though she is unable to satisfy this Court that the respondent No. 4 was actually consulted by the respondent No. 2 before issuing the impugned order, she, nevertheless, submits that such non-consultation cannot, on the facts and circumstances of this case, have the effect of vitiating the termination order. Though she is unable to satisfy this Court that the respondent No. 4 was actually consulted by the respondent No. 2 before issuing the impugned order, she, nevertheless, submits that such non-consultation cannot, on the facts and circumstances of this case, have the effect of vitiating the termination order. It is also the contention of the learned standing counsel that the impugned termination is purely a termination simpliciter and not stigmatic or punitive and has been done in accordance with the terms of the contract Finally, it is submitted by her that the termination of the service of the petitioner on the ground of his non-satisfactory performance cannot by any stretch of imagination be termed as stigmatic or punitive. In support of her contentions, she draws support from (i) State of Haryana & Anr. vs. Satyendra Singh Rathore, (2005) 7 SCC 518 , (ii) State of U.P.& Anr. vs. Ram Krishna & Anr., (1999) 7 SCC 350 , (iii) Principal Institute of Post Graduate Medical Education vs. S. Andel & Anr., 1995 Supp. (4) SCC 609 and (iv) Supta Choudhury vs. State of Assam & Ors., 2004 (2) GLT 426. 8. The legal position with respect to the legal rights of a contractual appointee came up for consideration before the Apex Court in the recent case of GRIDCO Ltd. vs. Sadananda Doloi, (2011) 15 SCC 16. After reviewing a number of decisions rendered by the Apex Court, it has been held: "38. A conspectus of pronouncement of this Court and development of law over the past few decades thus shows that there has been a notable shift from the stated legal position settled in earlier decisions, that termination of a contractual employment in accordance with the terms of the contract was permissible and the employee could claim no protection against such termination even when one of the contracting parties happened to be the state. Remedy for a breach of contractual condition was also by way of civil action for damages/compensation. With the development of law relating to judicial review of administrative actions, a writ court can now examine the validity of a termination order passed by public authority. It is no longer open to the authority passing the order to argue that its action being in the realm of contract is not open to judicial review. 39. With the development of law relating to judicial review of administrative actions, a writ court can now examine the validity of a termination order passed by public authority. It is no longer open to the authority passing the order to argue that its action being in the realm of contract is not open to judicial review. 39. A writ court is entitled to judicially review the action and determine whether there was any illegality, perversity, unreasonableness, unfairness or irrationality that would vitiate the action, no matter whether the action is in the realm of contract. Having said that we must add that judicial review cannot extend to the Court acting as an appellate authority sitting in judgment over the decision. The Court cannot sit in the armchair of the Administrator to decide whether a more reasonable decision or course of action could have been taken in the circumstances. So long as the action taken by the authority is not shown to be vitiated by the infirmities referred to above and so long as the action is not demonstrably in outrageous defiance of logic, the writ court would do well to respect the decision under challenge." (Bold and italic letters mine) 9. It can now be taken to be the law that even in contractual appointment, the power of judicial review is available to examine as to whether the decision of the executive authority suffers from the vice of illegality, perversity, unreasonableness, unfairness or irrationality that would vitiate the decision, no matter the decision is in the realm of contract. However, under the guise of exercise of the power of judicial review, a writ court cannot substitute its decision for the decision of the executive authority on the ground that its decision is more reasonable. To this extent, I find force in the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that this Court has the power to interfere even in the matter of contractual employment. In the instant case, the order of engagement dated 2.6.2007 (Annexure-A) issued by the Member Secretary, District Health society, Kamrup shows that the petitioner was engaged for a period of 6 months from the date of joining. Then, there is an order bearing dated 24.8.2009 (Annexure-C) issued by the respondent No. 2 transferring the petitioner, among others, to Boko, BPHC, Kamrup wherein it was mentioned that the contract already signed would remain in force. Then, there is an order bearing dated 24.8.2009 (Annexure-C) issued by the respondent No. 2 transferring the petitioner, among others, to Boko, BPHC, Kamrup wherein it was mentioned that the contract already signed would remain in force. However, the order dated 3.12.2009 (Annexure-B to the counter-affidavit) issued by the respondent No. 2 indicates that the engagement of the petitioner, along with a host of other contractual employee, was extended for another one year w.e.f. 1.11.2009. No documentary evidence is produced by the petitioner to show that his contractual engagement was further extended beyond 1.12.2010. In this view of the matter, it becomes crystal clear that the contractual engagement of the petitioner came to an end on or about 1.11.2010. Therefore, at the time of termination of his contractual engagement, he was no longer engaged as Block Programme Manager. However, apparently, by virtue of the interim order passed by this Court, he has been continuing in his engagement till now. This has added a new dimension in the case of the petitioner. 10. In the light of the facts as unfolded above, irrespective of the question as to whether the termination of the services of he petitioner is illegal or not, the core question to be determined now is whether the writ petition is overtaken by time and has, ipso facto, becomes infructuous? After all, this Court cannot extend the period of engagement of the petitioner: the legitimate function of the respondent No. 2 cannot be usurped by this Court. If the period of his contractual engagement were still operative now, the power of judicial review could have been exercised by this Court to examine the legality or otherwise of the termination of his engagement, but that is no longer possible in view of the expiry of contractual engagement on or about 1.11.2010, which was not extended thereafter. If there has breach of contract in the termination of the services of the petitioner, it may give rise to a cause of action for damages/compensation, for which the remedy available is a civil suit and not a writ petition. 11. This case at hand reminds me of the case of U.P. State Textile Corpn. Ltd. vs. Suresh Kumar, (2011) 15 SCC 180, which came up before the Apex Court recently. In that case, the respondent joined the service of the appellant on 7.9.1987. 11. This case at hand reminds me of the case of U.P. State Textile Corpn. Ltd. vs. Suresh Kumar, (2011) 15 SCC 180, which came up before the Apex Court recently. In that case, the respondent joined the service of the appellant on 7.9.1987. His services were however terminated vide order dated 26.4.1989 on the ground that he was in the habit of remaining absent for long periods of time without prior approval and that he had been on unauthorised absence from March, 1989. The order dated 26.4.1989 was challenged by the respondent before the U.P. Public Services Tribunal. The Tribunal vide its judgment dated 7.5.1992 held that the order impugned before it was stigmatic inasmuch as it referred to the continued absence of the respondent over a long period and in this view of the matter, it could not be sustained. The relief of reinstatement with continuity of service and back wages was accordingly ordered by the Tribunal. This order was challenged by the appellant Corporation before the Allahabad High Court. The writ petition had been dismissed vide judgment dated 21.5.2007 on similar grounds. It is in this background that the matter went up to the Apex Court. For better appreciation of the controversy, which is likely to have a direct bearing on this case, paragraph 4, 5 and 6 of the judgment in Suresh Kumar (supra) may be reproduced below: "4. The learned counsel for the appellant has raised primarily two arguments before us. He has contended that the reference to the unauthorised absence of the respondent could not in any manner be said to be stigmatic and that the finding to the contrary was unsustainable. Alternatively, he has contended that the respondent had joined the post on 7.9.1987 for a period of three years which would have come to an end on 6.9.1990 and as such the direction for reinstatement could not have been granted to him. It has been pleaded that as a consequence of the order of Tribunal and of the High Court, the respondent has been put back into service. 5. The learned counsel for the respondent has however supported the judgments of the Tribunal and the High Court. 6. It has been pleaded that as a consequence of the order of Tribunal and of the High Court, the respondent has been put back into service. 5. The learned counsel for the respondent has however supported the judgments of the Tribunal and the High Court. 6. In the facts of the case we need not examine the effect of the order dated 26.4.1989 whereby the services of the respondent had been terminated as being stigmatic or not as we are of the opinion that in the light of the fact that appointment itself was for a fixed period of three years which would have come to an end on 6.9.1990, no relief beyond that period could have been given to the respondent by the Tribunal or the High Court. We accordingly feel that these orders need to be modified to the extent that the appellant shall be deemed to be in service up to 6.9.1990 and not thereafter." The result of the foregoing discussion is that this writ petition is not maintainable for becoming infructuous, and is, therefore, dismissed, but by directing the parties to bear their respective costs. However, considering the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, I direct the respondent authorities not to recover the remunerations already drawn by the petitioner. The interim order, if any, also stands vacated. Petition dismissed