JUDGMENT R.R. Tripathi, J. 1. The present appeal is filed by opponent No. 1 in Workman's Compensation (Fatal) Case No. 36 of 2004 being aggrieved by judgment and order dated 21-2-2013 passed by the Workmen's Compensation Commissioner under the Workmen's Compensation Act, Labour Court, Bhuj-Kutch, whereby the Workmen's Compensation Commissioner was pleased to award a compensation of Rs. 4,33,820/- with 9% simple interest from the date of accident (4-9-2004). The Workmen's Compensation Commissioner was also pleased to award an amount of Rs. 2,16,910/- by way of penalty at the rate of 50% of the amount of compensation as the amount of compensation was not paid by opponent Nos. 1 and 3 within 30 days from the date of the accident. Opponent Nos. 1 and 3 were directed to deposit this amount within 30 days from the date of the judgment and order. The Workmen's Compensation Commissioner was pleased to award Rs. 3,000/- towards cost of the application and directed opponent Nos. 1 and 3 to jointly and severally pay that amount to the applicants-claimants. Could there be any more unfortunate case than the one which is under consideration of this Court in this First Appeal? The accident took place on 4-9-2004 at 10-30 a.m. and claimant Nos. 1 and 2 lost their son, who happens to be the husband of claimant No. 3 and father of unfortunate minor children - claimant Nos. 4 to 7. The accident took place on 4-9-2004 and there is a benevolent legislation, i.e. Workmen's Compensation Act, (VIII of 1923) in force and the Act provides that the person concerned shall pay the compensation within 30 days from the date of the accident. The Act provides that in the event, the amount is not deposited within the time prescribed, the person concerned (who is liable to pay compensation) will be liable to pay penalty as provided in law. 1.1. In the present case, the amount of compensation is deposited by the appellant only on 20-1-2014, but then that was only the amount of compensation with interest. The amount of penalty with interest was deposited only on 28-1-2014. Learned Advocate for opponent No. 3 in the Workman's Compensation case stated before the Court that opponent No. 3 deposited 50% of the amount of compensation plus penalty with interest on 3-4-2014, totalling to Rs. 4,90,000/-. The amount of penalty with interest was deposited only on 28-1-2014. Learned Advocate for opponent No. 3 in the Workman's Compensation case stated before the Court that opponent No. 3 deposited 50% of the amount of compensation plus penalty with interest on 3-4-2014, totalling to Rs. 4,90,000/-. Despite these deposits on 20-1-2014, 28-1-2014 and 3-4-2014, the claimants are still waiting for every single penny to reach to them because the judgment and order of the Workmen's Compensation Commissioner is the subject-matter of this First Appeal. 1.2. It was only when Civil Application No. 7287 of 2013 came up for consideration of this Court on 11-6-2014 filed for stay of the judgment and order of the Workmen's Compensation Commissioner that the Court deemed it proper to take up the First Appeal for final hearing out of turn. The prayer sought for by opponent No. 1 in Workman's Compensation case is as under: "5. (a) that pending hearing and final disposal of First Appeal No. 1176 of 2013, this Hon'ble Court be pleased to stay the execution and implementation of the impugned judgment and order dated 21-2-2013 in W.C. (Fatal) Case No. 36 of 2004 passed by the Commissioner under the Workmen's Compensation Act, Labour Court at Bhuj-Kachchh." 1.3. On 11-6-2014, the Court passed the following order: "Learned Advocate Ms. Karuna V. Rahevar is appearing for respondent No. 9. Learned Advocate Mr. B.Y. Mankad for the applicant prays a day's time so as to be ready to argue the First Appeal finally in light of the fact that any time invested in deciding the Civil Application for stay will be the same as may be required to decide the First Appeal. The request is granted. The matter is kept tomorrow i.e. 12-6-2014." (Emphasis supplied) 1.4. On 12-6-2014, learned Advocate Mr. B.Y. Mankad for opponent No. 1 in Workman's Compensation case did not remain present before the Court, and therefore, the Court was constrained to pass the following order: "Learned Advocate Mr. B.Y. Mankad was not present in the morning. The matter was kept in the second half. Even in the second half, learned Advocate Mr. B.Y. Mankad is not present. It was understood yesterday, at the time of hearing of the Civil Application, that the First Appeal will be taken up for final hearing today. Despite the aforesaid fact known to learned Advocate Mr. The matter was kept in the second half. Even in the second half, learned Advocate Mr. B.Y. Mankad is not present. It was understood yesterday, at the time of hearing of the Civil Application, that the First Appeal will be taken up for final hearing today. Despite the aforesaid fact known to learned Advocate Mr. B.Y. Mankad, he has chosen not to remain present before the Court. With a view to give him an additional chance, the matter is kept on 17-6-2014 making it clear that if on that day, learned Advocate Mr. B.Y. Mankad chooses not to remain present before this Court, the Court will proceed with the final hearing of the First Appeal in his absence. The Registry is directed to send a copy of this order to the applicant - Shubham Shipping Services Pvt. Ltd. for its information and necessary action." (Emphasis supplied) 1.5. It is, thereafter that, the matter appeared on 17-6-2014 and the Court passed order, relevant part of which reads as under: "2. Today, learned Advocate Mr. B.Y. Mankad states that as he had some personal difficulty, he was required to rush to his residence, and therefore, he could not remain present before the Court. 3. Besides that learned Advocate Mr. B.Y. Mankad prays for time to enable him to get the paper-book prepared by having a xerox copy of the Record and Proceedings which is received by this Court. 4. As the First Appeal is to be heard finally, request is granted. 5. S. O. to 2-7-2014 with an understanding that on that day, the First Appeal will be proceeded for final disposal." 1.6. Today learned Advocate Mr. B.Y. Mankad for the appellant submitted written submissions and also produced certain documents titling them as 'Paper Book'. The documents are 16 in number, running into 1 to 34 pages. 2. The First Appeal is taken up for final hearing and disposal. 3. Learned Advocate for the appellant was requested to argue the matter making it clear that submission of written arguments is no substitute for the submissions of the learned Advocate. Learned Advocate was kind enough to accede to the request and read the judgment and order of the Workmen's Compensation Commissioner in toto. After having read the judgment and order of the Workmen's Compensation Commissioner, learned Advocate for the appellant made his submissions. Learned Advocate was kind enough to accede to the request and read the judgment and order of the Workmen's Compensation Commissioner in toto. After having read the judgment and order of the Workmen's Compensation Commissioner, learned Advocate for the appellant made his submissions. Learned Advocate for the appellant submitted that the Workmen's Compensation Commissioner has not decided as to who is responsible to pay the compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act. Learned Advocate in support of his submission again read the relevant portion of the judgment and order of the Workmen's Compensation Commissioner, wherein the Workmen's Compensation Commissioner has observed in discussion pertaining to Issue No. 3 that, "from the written as well as oral submissions made on behalf of all the parties, it is clear that the deceased was working as workman of respondent No. 1 and respondent No. 3". Learned Advocate for the appellant submitted that thus, the Workmen's Compensation Commissioner has not given a clear finding on the question of responsibility/liability of paying compensation so far as respondent Nos. 1 and 3 are concerned. 3.1. Learned Advocate for the appellant next submitted that the Workmen's Compensation Commissioner has erred in not deciding the application Exh. 22 filed by opponent No. 1, whereby opponent No. 1-appellant herein had prayed for his deletion on the ground that opponent No. 2-Gujarat Adani Port Ltd. has issued certificate in favour of opponent No. 1-appellant to the effect that opponent No. 1 was not having any contract to work at Jetty No. 4 on the date of the accident, i.e. 4-9-2004, and therefore, appellant is not liable to pay any compensation. 4. It will be appropriate to note here that application is dated 21-12-2005. It is mentioned by Workmen's Compensation Commissioner while discussing Issue No. 2 that, "respondent No. 1 had filed an application Exh. 22 and had sought relief of being deleted". The case of the respondent No. 1-appellant herein is that on that application, no order is passed. Being aggrieved of that, respondent No. 1-appellant herein filed Misc. Application. Though its number is not mentioned in the judgment and order, learned Advocate for the appellant and learned Advocate for the claimants submitted that it is Misc. Application No. 7 of 2010 and the said application was allowed and thereafter, respondent No. 1-appellant herein and respondent No. 3 filed their written statement Exhs. 66 and 68 respectively. Application. Though its number is not mentioned in the judgment and order, learned Advocate for the appellant and learned Advocate for the claimants submitted that it is Misc. Application No. 7 of 2010 and the said application was allowed and thereafter, respondent No. 1-appellant herein and respondent No. 3 filed their written statement Exhs. 66 and 68 respectively. If this is so, the grievance made before this Court that on application Exh. 22, no order was passed does not survive. 4.1. This Court is of the opinion that at this juncture, conduct of respondent No. 1-appellant herein is required to be placed on record, duly highlighted because by conducting itself in such manner, appellant herein-respondent No. 1 is able to avoid deposit of the amount of compensation for all these years and is able to see that the claimants do no get a single penny though the bread-earner of the family had expired on 4-9-2004, succumbing to the injuries sustained by him in the accident which took place on that day while he was working as a labourer. Let it be made clear that the law for payment of workman's compensation was enacted with a definite purpose and keeping in mind that purpose (object), the law has provided that the amount of compensation to be paid within 30 days from the date of accident and in the event, amount is not paid, the person liable to pay compensation is to be saddled with penalty upto the extent of 50% of the amount of compensation. 4.2. This Court in the matter of Chiman Surakhia Vasava v. Ahmed Musa Ustad, reported in 1986 (2) GLR 1083 , while having threadbare analysis of the object of the Act, duties of the Workmen's Compensation Commissioner and the nature of the proceedings under the Workmen's Compensation Act, has observed in Paras (4), (5), (6), (7) and (8) as under: "(4) Thus a funny, but a very unfortunate, situation has arisen. Here is an employee without their being an employer. The person who took work from him and paid wages to him, either the truck owner or the owner of the quarry, has found it convenient to disown him. Here is an employee without their being an employer. The person who took work from him and paid wages to him, either the truck owner or the owner of the quarry, has found it convenient to disown him. Both of them have been able to create a smoke screen of technicalities and the learned Commissioner has not been able to come out of the hide-bound thinking influenced by the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code and Evidence Act with which he is more familiar as Civil Judge, Senior Division. He ought to have realised that the functions and duties of the Commissioner are radically different than that of a Civil Judge, Senior Division. It is unfortunate that the learned Commissioner who appears to have been obsessed by the procedural rules and technicalities of Civil Procedure Code and Evidence Act is not sufficiently aware about the underlying principles and object of the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act". In the Statement of Objects and Reasons articulated at the time of moving the Bill which ultimately resulted in passing of the Act, it is stated: ".......The growing complexity of industry in this country, with the increasing use of machinery and consequent danger to workmen, along with the comparative poverty of the workmen themselves, renders it advisable that they should be protected, as far as possible, from hardship arising from accidents." In the Statement of Objects and Reasons, it is further stated: "The general principle is that compensation should ordinarily be given to workmen who sustained personal injuries by accidents arising out of and in the course of their employment. Compensation will also be given in certain limited circumstances for disease...... .....At me same time, on unanimous recommendation of the Committee, provision has been made for Special Tribunals to deal cheaply and expeditiously with any disputes that may arise, and generally to assist the parties in a manner which is not possible for me ordinary Civil Courts." (5) Assuming for a moment that no change whatsoever has taken place since the year 1923, even then it was not permissible to the learned Commissioner to adopt a pedantic and indifferent view of the matter and frustrate the claim of the workman. The limited extent to which injured workman or his dependents should be compensated was recognised even by the colonial powers. The limited extent to which injured workman or his dependents should be compensated was recognised even by the colonial powers. They also felt that there was a need to make provision for "Special Tribunals to deal cheaply and expeditiously" with disputes regarding compensation cases. They had also felt that it was necessary "generally to assist the parties in a manner which is not possible for the ordinary Civil Courts". That which was recognised by the foreign rulers, is unfortunately, not even read and taken care of, by the learned Commissioner. This is likely to be the position with regard to all the Civil Judges, who are appointed as ex-officio Commissioner for Workmen's Compensation. The situation is lamentable because after the dawn of Independence and with the enactment of the Constitution, there is a constitutional command to all the organs of the State including the Judiciary, to see that justice-- social and economic is done to the people who are in need of the same. The learned Commissioner ought to have realised that it was his fundamental duty to respect the ideals of the Constitution (Art. 51A(a)). One of the objects and ideals set forth in the Constitution is to secure to all its citizens socio-economic justice. Moreover, as provided under Art.39A of the Constitution, the State is required to secure the operation of the legal system so as to promote justice on the basis of equal opportunity. In particular, a duty is enjoined upon the State to see that opportunities for securing justice are not denied to any citizen by reason of economic or other disabilities. Having regard to all these constitutional provisions, it becomes the imperative duty of the Judicial Officers and much more that of the Commissioners appointed under Workmen's Compensation Act, which is a welfare and beneficial legislation that the cause of any person suffering from economic or other disability is not sacrificed on account of technical or such other procedural defects. (6) The learned Commissioner is not a Civil Court and is not bound by the provisions of Civil Procedure Code or that of Evidence Act. A Division Bench of the Kerala High Court in the case of Kunchali Rudrani v. Baby, reported in 1979 (1) LLJ 306 , has held that the provisions of Evidence Act are not applicable to the proceedings before the Commissioner for Workmen's Compensation. A Division Bench of the Kerala High Court in the case of Kunchali Rudrani v. Baby, reported in 1979 (1) LLJ 306 , has held that the provisions of Evidence Act are not applicable to the proceedings before the Commissioner for Workmen's Compensation. Similar observation is made by D.A. Desai, J. (as he then was) in the case of Amubibi v. Nagri Mills Co. Ltd., reported in 1977 GLR 681 . Therein it is observed that the provisions of Evidence Act should not apply to the proceedings under the Workmen's Compensation Act. As far as the procedure to be adopted by the Commissioner is concerned, specific provision is made in the Act itself (See Sees. 23 and 25 which deal with the powers of the Commissioner with regard to administering oath and calling witnesses and prescribing method of recording evidence). As per Rule 41 of the Workmen's Compensation Rules, only some of the provisions contained in Orders V, IX, XIII, XVI, XVII and XVIII are made applicable to the proceedings before the Commissioners for Workmen's Compensation and that too insofar as they may be applicable. It may be noted that Orders VI, VII and VIII of Civil Procedure Code which pertain to "pleadings generally", "plaint" and "written statement" respectively not made applicable to these proceedings. Moreover, the provisos to the Rule which read as follows, be looked at: "Provided that-- (a) for the purpose of facilitating the application of the said provisions the Commissioner may construe them with such alterations not affecting the substance as may be necessary or proper to adopt them to the matter before him; and (b) the Commissioner may, for sufficient reasons, proceed otherwise than in accordance with the said provisions, if he is satisfied that the interests of the parties will not thereby be prejudiced." Thus, the provision of Rule 41 gives enough discretion to the Commissioner to depart from the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code some of which have been made applicable to the proceedings before him. Therefore, it is obvious that the Commissioner is not bound to follow the procedure prescribed for trial of cases in Civil Courts, nor is he bound by strict rules of evidence. Therefore, it is obvious that the Commissioner is not bound to follow the procedure prescribed for trial of cases in Civil Courts, nor is he bound by strict rules of evidence. As provided under Sec. 10A of the Act, he can even act on information received by him from any source regarding fatal accident and call upon the employer to explain as to under what circumstances death had occurred. He can also ask for the explanation of the employer whether he is or is not liable to deposit the compensation on account of the death. This provision indicates that he can even act suo motu. In our country, where most of the labour population suffers from the curse of illiteracy and poverty and is incapable of entering into legal fight with the employer, it is rather his (Commissioners) duty to remain alert and vigilant. Wherever necessary with a view to see that the provisions of the Act are strictly enforced, he must act suo motu. With a view to simplify the procedure, the nature of application to be made and the details to be given in the application for compensation are mentioned in Sec. 22 of the Act. This provision clearly indicates that the rules of pleadings embodied in the Civil Procedure Code are not to be applied to the proceedings before the Commissioner. It may also be noted that Sec. 19 of the Act clearly bars the jurisdiction of Civil Courts. (7) From the aforesaid discussion it should be clear that the duties cast upon and functions to be performed by the Commissioner are radically different than that of Civil Judge, Senior Division. The powers and duties of the Commissioner call for vigilant approach. He is required to see that the miseries of injured workmen or the dependents of the deceased workmen are mitigated, and their claims are decided cheaply and expeditiously. He is required to see that the claims of the injured workmen or their dependents are not frustrated on account of technicalities of the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code and that of the Evidence Act. He is not supposed to find faults with the pleadings of the parties. (8) It is his duty, even apart from the constitutional mandate, to be aware of the principles underlying the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923. He is not supposed to find faults with the pleadings of the parties. (8) It is his duty, even apart from the constitutional mandate, to be aware of the principles underlying the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923. It is stated in the Statement of Objects and Reasons that: "General principle is that compensation should ordinarily be given to workmen who sustain personal injuries in accidents arising out of and in the course of their employment." It is not open to him to say that the workman has become a victim of an accident arising out of and during the course of employment and that he was an employee either of the two, i.e. of the truck owner or that of the quarry owner, but it is not established as to whose employee he was, and therefore, his claim should be rejected by relying upon the defects in the pleadings. It was his bounden duty to weigh the evidence on record in the light of the underlying principles and object of the Act and keeping in mind the constitutional commands. He ought to have drawn reasonable inference. The learned Commissioner fell into serious error when he construed the application of the workmen meticulously and failed to draw the inference on the basis of the material available before him." 4.3. In the present case, the appellant-respondent No. 1 has successfully dodged not only the claimants but also the Workmen's Compensation Commissioner by not remaining present before the Workmen's Compensation Commissioner after having filed application Exh. 22-seeking deletion and Exh. 23-certificate issued by respondent No. 2-Gujarat Adani Port Ltd. 4.4. As if this was not enough, even respondent No. 3 behaved in most irresponsible manner and learned Advocate for the claimants was constrained to file application Exh. 44 praying for closure of its right to file reply, which was granted by the Workmen's Compensation Commissioner on 25-3-2009. Similarly, on 24-11-2009, learned Advocate for the claimants was required to file application Exh. 48 praying for closure of right to lead evidence of respondent Nos. 1 and 3, which was closed. 4.5. The appellant herein-respondent No. 1 had approached this Court by filing Spl. C.A. No.3702 of 2010, which was filed challenging the order of the Workmen's Compensation Commissioner dated 2-12-2009. 48 praying for closure of right to lead evidence of respondent Nos. 1 and 3, which was closed. 4.5. The appellant herein-respondent No. 1 had approached this Court by filing Spl. C.A. No.3702 of 2010, which was filed challenging the order of the Workmen's Compensation Commissioner dated 2-12-2009. By filing this Special Civil Application, it could be five years' time on the ground that a proceeding is pending before this Court, challenging the order of the Workmen's Compensation Commissioner dated 2-12-2009, contending that it was an 'ex-parte order', though it is clear from the record that respondent No. 1-appellant herein was before the Court (Workmen's Compensation Commissioner) and had filed application Exh. 22-seeking deletion and had produced certificate issued by Gujarat Adani Port Ltd. Despite the fact that right to file reply of respondent No. 1 was closed by order dated 25-2-2009, that order was not challenged before any higher forum and allowed the matter to proceed in its absence and when final order was passed on 2-12-2009, the same was challenged before this Court by filing Spl. C.A. No. 3702 of 2010. Incidentally, at the time of filing of that Special Civil Application, learned Advocate was the same who is appearing for this very appellant. Despite these glaring facts, it was contended before this Court in Spl. C.A. No. 3702 of 2010 that the order passed by the Workmen's Compensation Commissioner is an ex-parte order. 4.6. The Spl. C.A. No. 3702 of 2010 was disposed of by order dated 26-3-2010 by observing that, "under Rule 41 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, there is a remedy available to the petitioner, and therefore, this petition cannot be entertained" and the petitioner was relegated to the 'alternative remedy'. In this regard, Paras 5 and 6 of order dated 26-3-2010, by which Spl. C.A. No. 3702 of 2010 was disposed of, are reproduced for ready perusal: "5. In view of above, the petitioner is having effective, alternative and statutory remedy to file the application before W.C. Commissioner to set aside ex-parte judgment and order under Order 9 Rule 13 wherein W.C. Commissioner has power to decide such application and to pass appropriate orders in accordance with law after giving reasonable opportunity of hearing to respective parties. 6. In view of above, the petitioner is having effective, alternative and statutory remedy to file the application before W.C. Commissioner to set aside ex-parte judgment and order under Order 9 Rule 13 wherein W.C. Commissioner has power to decide such application and to pass appropriate orders in accordance with law after giving reasonable opportunity of hearing to respective parties. 6. Therefore, only on the ground that petitioner is having alternative, effective, statutory remedy available under the Rules as referred above, present petition is not entertained by this Court and same is disposed of without expressing any opinion on merits." 4.7. Is this not an abuse of process of law, resulting into mockery of justice and achieving the goal, if not by direct means by indirect means, to see that the claimants-parents, widow and four minor children are kept high and dry, depriving them of compensation for the loss of their bread-earner in an accident. 4.8. After Spl. C.A. No. 3702 of 2010 was disposed of on 26-3-2010, respondent No. 1-appellant herein filed its written submissions only on 18-6-2012, i.e. after more man two years. When it is inquired from the learned Advocate for the appellant, he has no explanation as to why the written statement was filed only on 18-6-2012. Similarly, respondent No. 3 filed its written statement only on 30-7-2012, as if there was a competition between the two in the matter of "delaying the proceedings". 5. Coming to the challenge to the judgment and order passed by the Workmen's Compensation Commissioner, this Court has carefully perused the judgment and order and found that the Workmen's Compensation Commissioner has not committed any error which requires interference at the hands of this Court. It is not in dispute that the deceased was on duty on 4-9-2004; he met with an accident and succumbed to the injuries sustained by him on that very day. The appellant-respondent No. 1 tried to seek shelter under a statement of one Mr. Alepan Jesuraj Fernandez, who gave statement to the police on 6-9-2004, wherein apparently he went out of way to oblige respondent No. 1-appellant herein. Respondent No. 1-appellant herein deliberately did not cite him as its witness and did not examine him, otherwise his cross-examination could have brought on record the remaining part of the story. If the statement of said Mr. Respondent No. 1-appellant herein deliberately did not cite him as its witness and did not examine him, otherwise his cross-examination could have brought on record the remaining part of the story. If the statement of said Mr. Alepan Jesuraj Fernandez is read, it is clear that on 4-9-2004, he directed the deceased to go to Jetty No. 4 and while he was working there, he sustained injuries and succumbed to those injuries. Respondent No. 1 very smartly obtained certificate from respondent No. 2-Gujarat Adani Port Ltd. saying that respondent No. 1 was not having any contract to work on Jetty No. 4 on the day of the accident, i.e. 4-9-2004 and did not examine this Mr. Alepan Jesuraj Fernandez to dislodge the practice, who has stated that on account of necessity by respondent Nos. 2/3, said Mr. Alepan Jesuraj Fernandez directed the deceased along with other labourers to go on work at Jetty No. 4. 5.1. Assuming for the sake of argument that Mr. Alepan Jesuraj Fernandez did not obtain any permission or order from respondent No. 1 to send labourers to Jetty No. 4, the act of an agent (Mr. Alepan Jesuraj Fernandez) is binding to the master (respondent No. 1) and the relationship of employer-employee does not get stripped off on labourers being sent on loan by the authorised agent of the master to work for somebody else for temporary period. In fact, respondent No. 1 could have examined said Mr. Alepan Jesuraj Fernandez to bring on record that there is no practice of to lend workers to each other in case of necessity, more particularly when the work is of the nature where more number of labourers may be required by one party who is having contract with respondent No. 2. Besides that, this Mr. Alepan Jesuraj Fernandez has stated that he was asked by one Mr. Mahavirsinh Zala of Adani Port to send labourers as the same were required. Respondent No. 1 has chosen not to examine this Mr. Mahavirsinh Zala also, and hence, he could not be cross-examined. Not only that, the witness who was in box on behalf of respondent No. 2-Gujarat Adani Port Ltd. was not cross-examined to bring the truth on record. 5.2. Respondent No. 1 has chosen not to examine this Mr. Mahavirsinh Zala also, and hence, he could not be cross-examined. Not only that, the witness who was in box on behalf of respondent No. 2-Gujarat Adani Port Ltd. was not cross-examined to bring the truth on record. 5.2. Very rightly it is observed by this Court in the matter of Chiman Surakhia Vasava (supra) that, "in this country, labour force is handicapped on account of its illiteracy and poverty and they hardly have any choice of selecting the work or the master". In the present case, it cannot be even dreamt that the deceased could have disobeyed the order of the authorised agent of respondent No. 1 (Mr. Alepan Jesuraj Fernandez) and could have refused to go on work on Jetty No. 4. 6. The ideal situation would have been respondent No. 3, who had asked for the labourers on loan and who was having contract of unloading the metal scrap, should have volunteered to pay just and reasonable compensation to the claimants. But, in these days of materialism, everyone is conscious of saving one's skin, may be in the matter of paying just and reasonable compensation to the claimants of a workman who died during the course of employment. This Court in the case of Chiman Surakhia Vasava (supra) has very rightly observed that, "there cannot be an employee without employer". (Emphasis supplied) 6.1. In the present case, the Workmen's Compensation Commissioner has come true to its duties and has rightly awarded compensation holding respondent Nos. 1 and 3 jointly and severally liable. It is an inter se dispute between respondent Nos. 1 and 3 which they may settle, if required by a long drawn litigation between them. But, that must not keep the claimants away from their rightful claim of compensation which they have already been waiting for last 10 years. 7. In the result, the Court finds no substance in this First Appeal. The same is dismissed with exemplary cost of Rs. 50,000/- (Rupees Fifty Thousand Only), which shall be paid directly to the claimants along with amount of compensation and penalty as ordered by the Commissioner. 8. Learned Advocate Mr. B.Y. Mankad for the appellant requested that the Court may not award any cost in this First Appeal. 9. The same is dismissed with exemplary cost of Rs. 50,000/- (Rupees Fifty Thousand Only), which shall be paid directly to the claimants along with amount of compensation and penalty as ordered by the Commissioner. 8. Learned Advocate Mr. B.Y. Mankad for the appellant requested that the Court may not award any cost in this First Appeal. 9. The request is misplaced inasmuch as, this is a little solace which the Court can grant to the claimants who are kept waiting for the amount of compensation for all along from the date of accident, i.e. 4-9-2004. The Court feels itself helpless in not able to compensate the claimants in more effective way than awarding cost. The request is rejected. 10. Learned Advocate Mr. B.Y. Mankad requested that only 50% of the amount deposited by respondent No. 1-appellant herein be appropriated towards payment to the claimants and remaining 50% amount deposited by respondent No. 3 (in W.C. Case No. 36 of 2004)-respondent No. 9 herein may be paid to the claimants. Taking into consideration the nature of the litigation pursued by respondent No. 1-appellant herein, this request is also rejected and it will be open for respondent No. 1-appellant herein to file separate proceedings for recovery of amount of 50%, by establishing its right for the same.