JUDGMENT : Sanjay Karol, J. Assailing the judgment dated 10.11.2008, passed by learned Additional Sessions Judge, Una, District Una, H.P., in Sessions Case No. 18 of 2007 (Sessions Trial No. 14 of 2008), titled as State of H.P. v. Sarwan Kumar, whereby respondents-accused stand acquitted, State has filed the present appeal under the provisions of Section 378 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. 2. It is the case of prosecution that on 26.8.2006 at 12 O' Clock (Night), accused entered the house of the prosecutrix (PW-1) who was sleeping with her children. He forcibly subjected her to sexual assault. In vain she tried to resist his acts. After he had committed the act, her sister-inlaw (Jethani) Smt. Pushpa Devi (PW-4) entered the room. Seeing her accused fled away from the spot. Neighbour Sh. Birbal (PW-3) also saw the accused fleeing away from the spot. Next day when her husband Sh. Dina Nath (PW-5) returned home, she narrated the incident to him. Prosecutrix along with her husband reported the matter to Sh. Achhar Singh (PW-8), Pradhan of the concerned panchayat, who advised them to approach the police. Accordingly prosecutrix reported the matter to the police and on the basis of her statement, F.I.R. No. 82/2006 (Ext. PW-1/A), dated 31.8.2006, was registered against the accused at Police Station Bangana, Distt. Una, H.P., under the provisions of Sections 376 and 452 of the Indian Penal Code. Prosecutrix was got medically examined from Dr. Pushpabali Raizada (PW-11) who issued MLC (Ext. PW-11/B), based on report of the chemical examiner (Ext. PW-11/A). Accused was arrested and got medically examined from Dr. Pradeep Atri (PW-13). ASI- Ram Ditta (PW-15) who conducted the investigation also recovered clothes i.e. kameez (Ext. P1) and Salwar (Ext. P2) of the prosecutrix vide memo (Ext. PW-1/B). With the completion of investigation, challan was presented in the Court for trial. 3. Accused was charged for having committed offences punishable under the provisions of Sections 376 and 450 of the Indian Penal Code to which he did not plead guilty and claimed trial. 4. In order to prove its case, in all, prosecution examined fifteen witnesses and statement of the accused under Section 313 Cr. P.C. was also recorded, in which he took up a defence of innocence and false implication. No defence evidence was led by the accused. 5. 4. In order to prove its case, in all, prosecution examined fifteen witnesses and statement of the accused under Section 313 Cr. P.C. was also recorded, in which he took up a defence of innocence and false implication. No defence evidence was led by the accused. 5. Appreciating the testimonies of prosecution witness, trial Court acquitted the accused of the charged offence. Hence, the present appeal. 6. It is well established principle of law that (i) the appellate Court should not ordinarily set aside a judgment of acquittal in a case where two views are possible, though the view of the appellate court may be more probable; (ii) while dealing with a judgment of acquittal, the appellate court must consider entire evidence on record, so as to arrive at a finding as to whether views of the trial court are perverse or otherwise unsustainable; (iii) the appellate court is entitled to consider whether in arriving at a finding of fact, trial Court failed to take into consideration any admissible fact; and/or (iv) the trial Court failed to take into consideration any admissible evidence and/or had taken into consideration evidence brought on record contrary to law. (See: Balak Ram and Anr. v. State of U.P., AIR 1974 SC 2165 ; Allarakha K Mansuri v. State of Gujarat, (2002) 3 SCC 57 ; Raghunath v. State of Haryana, (2003) 1 SCC 398 ; State of Uttar Pradesh v. Ram Veer Singh and Ors., (2007) 13 SCC 102 ; S. Rama Krishna v. S. Rami Reddy (D) by his LRs. & Ors., AIR 2008 SC 2066 ; Sambhaji Hindurao Deshmukh & Ors. v. State of Maharashtra, (2008) 11 SCC 186 ; Arulvelu & Anr. v. State, (2009) 10 SCC 206 ; Perla Somasekhara Reddy & Ors. v. State of A.P., (2009) 16 SCC 98 ; and Ram Singh alias Chhaju v. State of Himachal Pradesh, (2010) 2 SCC 445 ). 7. In Sheo Swaroop and Ors. v. State of Maharashtra, (2008) 11 SCC 186 ; Arulvelu & Anr. v. State, (2009) 10 SCC 206 ; Perla Somasekhara Reddy & Ors. v. State of A.P., (2009) 16 SCC 98 ; and Ram Singh alias Chhaju v. State of Himachal Pradesh, (2010) 2 SCC 445 ). 7. In Sheo Swaroop and Ors. v. King Emperor, AIR 1934 PC 227 , the Privy Council held that: "...the High Court should and will always give proper weight and consideration to such matters as (1) the views of the trial Judge as to the credibility of the witnesses, (2) the presumption of innocence in favour of the accused, a presumption certainly not weakened by the fact that he has been acquitted at his trial, (3) the right of the accused to the benefit of any doubt, and (4) the slowness of an appellate court in disturbing a finding of fact arrived at by a Judge who had the advantage of seeing the witnesses...." 8. In Chandrappa and Ors. v. State of Karnataka, (2007) 4 SCC 415 , the apex Court observed as under: "(1) An appellate court has full power to review, re-appreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded. (2) The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 puts no limitation, restriction or condition on exercise of such power and an appellate court on the evidence before it may reach its own conclusion, both on questions of fact and of law. (3) Various expressions, such as, "substantial and compelling reasons", "good and sufficient grounds", "very strong circumstances", "distorted conclusions", "glaring mistakes", etc. are not intended to curtail extensive powers of an appellate court in an appeal against acquittal. Such phraseologies are more in the nature of "flourishes of language" to emphasise the reluctance of an appellate court to interfere with acquittal than to curtail the power of the court to review the evidence and to come to its own conclusion. (4) An appellate court, however, must bear in mind that in case of acquittal, there is double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent court of law. (4) An appellate court, however, must bear in mind that in case of acquittal, there is double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial court. (5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court." 9. In State of Uttar Pradesh v. Banne @ Baijnath & Ors., (2009) 4 SCC 271 , the apex Court gave illustrations of certain circumstances in which the Court would be justified in interfering with a judgment of acquittal by the High Court, which principle, in our considered view, would squarely apply to the judgment under review by us. The circumstances include; (i) The High Court's decision is based on totally erroneous view of law by ignoring the settled legal position; (ii) The High Court's conclusions are contrary to evidence and documents on record; iii) The entire approach of the High Court in dealing with the evidence was patently illegal leading to grave miscarriage of justice; (iv) The High Court's judgment is manifestly unjust and unreasonable based on erroneous law and facts on the record of the case; (v) Apex Court must always give proper weight and consideration to the findings of the High Court; and (vi) the apex Court would be extremely reluctant in interfering with a case when both the Sessions Court and the High Court have recorded an order of acquittal. In the very same decision the apex Court also held that "Thus, the law on the issue can be summarised to the effect that in exceptional cases where there are compelling circumstances, and the judgment under appeal is found to be perverse, the appellate court can interfere with the order of acquittal. The appellate court should bear in mind the presumption of innocence of the accused and further that the trial Court's acquittal bolsters the presumption of his innocence. The appellate court should bear in mind the presumption of innocence of the accused and further that the trial Court's acquittal bolsters the presumption of his innocence. Interference with the decision of the trial court in a routine manner, where the other view is possible should be avoided, unless there are good reasons for such interference." (Emphasis supplied) 10. It is also a settled principle of law that in a case of a sexual offence, prosecutrix is not an accomplice and there is no rule of law that her testimony cannot be acted upon and made basis of conviction unless corroborated in material particulars. [See: Dilip and another v. State of M.P., (2001) 9 SCC 452 ] 11. It is also a settled principle of law that if testimony of prosecutrix inspires confidence; is worthy of acceptance and reliable, it would be safe to convict the accused on such solitary statement of the prosecutrix. [See: Sudhansu Sekhar Sahoo v. State of Orissa, (2002) 10 SCC 743 ] 12. It is also a settled principle of law that in a matter of rape, testimony of the prosecutrix has to be given primary consideration. But it is also a settled position of law that even in a case of assault against a woman, prosecution has to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt and there can be no presumption in law that prosecutrix would always tell the entire story truthfully. [See: Abbas Ahmed Choudhary v. State of Assam, (2010) 12 SCC 115 ] 13. In this backdrop we shall not examine the testimony of prosecution witnesses. 14. Prosecutrix (PW-1) is a married lady. She was examined by Dr. Pushpabali Raizada (PW-11), who as per MLC (Ext. PW-11/B) opined possibility of sexual assault not to be ruled out. Significantly, Doctor admits that no marks of injuries were found on the body of the prosecutrix. The alleged offence took place in the night intervening 26th - 27th August, 2006 and the prosecutrix was got medically examined on 1.9.2006. Significantly, as per version of Doctor (PW-11) prosecutrix had disclosed to her that she had been locked up in the room "by an unknown person" who "forcibly tried to sexually harass her". 15. Having minutely examined the statement of prosecutrix we find the same not to be inspiring in confidence. Significantly, as per version of Doctor (PW-11) prosecutrix had disclosed to her that she had been locked up in the room "by an unknown person" who "forcibly tried to sexually harass her". 15. Having minutely examined the statement of prosecutrix we find the same not to be inspiring in confidence. Apart from the fact that she contradicts herself, also we find each of the prosecution witnesses to have contradicted themselves, on material facts, rendering the prosecution version to be doubtful and not to have been proved beyond reasonable doubt. 16. In her examination in chief, prosecutrix (PW-1) states that in the middle of night, accused entered her house by forcibly opening the door of her house. With one hand he caught her from the neck and with the other hand opened the string of her salwar. Since her neck was throttled, she could not raise any hue and cry. Against her wishes accused sexually assaulted her. After the act was over her sister-in-law Smt. Pushpa Devi (PW-4) entered the room. Seeing her, accused fled away. Next day her husband came and the matter was reported to the Panchayat. They were advised to report the matter to the police. From the admissions made by the prosecutrix in Court, we do not find her version of forcible sexual assault to be inspiring in confidence. 17. To begin with she admits it to be correct that on the fateful day there was no light in her house. She admits that in darkness of night, one could not have identified the person entering her room. Now if there was no light, then how is it that she identified the accused to be the assailant. No test identification parade was got conducted by the police. That apart, witness admits that in the verandah of her house, her other family members, including her sister-in-law, were sleeping. She states that rapist remained in her room for two to four hours. Surprisingly not only her children who were sleeping with her in the very same room or other members of her family, did not notice the accused despite his having remained in the room for such a long period. She states that she tried to save herself from the clutches of the accused and sustained injuries, which version of hers stands belied from the MLC (Ext. She states that she tried to save herself from the clutches of the accused and sustained injuries, which version of hers stands belied from the MLC (Ext. PW-11/B) and the testimony of the Doctor (PW-11) who did not find any mark of injury on her body. 18. That apart, version of prosecutrix stands materially belied by her sister-in-law Smt. Pushpa Devi (PW- 4) who in no uncertain terms has deposed that neither did she know anything about the incident nor anything happened in her presence. Witness was cross examined by the prosecution but nothing fruitful could be found from her testimony. 19. What also renders the version of the prosecutrix to be untrue is her admission of next day having visited the house of the accused for getting lentils (daal). Now if prosecutrix had been subjected to rape by the accused, there was no reason for her to have visited his house. Also she did not disclose the incident to his wife. 20. It be also observed that offence took place on 26.8.2006 and even on 1.9.2006 when she was examined by the Doctor she did not disclose the name of the assailant. This version of hers totally renders the version of her husband Sh. Dina Nath (PW-5) and pradhan Sh. Achhar Singh (PW-8) on the question of matter having been reported to the panchayat to be absolutely doubtful if not false. We may also observe that PW-5 admits that Pushpa Devi (PW-4) had not disclosed to him anything about the occurrence of the incident. This only renders version of PW-4 of not having witnessed occurrence of the incident to be true. 21. PW-1 and PW-5 state that "they" had reported the matter to the Pradhan (PW-8) who states that it was the "prosecutrix" who had informed him about the incident. Significantly, version of Pradhan also does not inspire confidence as there is no document on record indicating any report having been lodged by the prosecutrix with the Panchayat. That apart, PW-8 was under a legal duty and obligation to report the crime to the police, which he did not do so. This fact may not be fatal. But then his statement in Court is uninspiring in confidence. There are exaggerations and improvements. That apart, PW-8 was under a legal duty and obligation to report the crime to the police, which he did not do so. This fact may not be fatal. But then his statement in Court is uninspiring in confidence. There are exaggerations and improvements. He was confronted with statement (Mark-D) in which there is no reference of prosecutrix having informed him about the incident in the morning of 27.8.2006, at about 11 a.m. 22. Contradictions in the prosecution story do not end here. Prosecution wants us to believe that accused was seen fleeing away from the spot by Birbal (PW-3) at about 10.30 - 10.45 p.m. However, version of this witness stands materially contradicted by the prosecutrix, according to whom accused entered her room in the middle of night at 12 O' Clock and remained with her for two - four hours. Obviously either of the witnesses have not come out with the truth. 23. We do not find testimony of prosecution witnesses to be worthy of credence. Witnesses cannot be said to be reliable and trustworthy. 24. We also find testimony of prosecutrix not to have been corroborated by report of the F.S.L (Ext.PW-11/A) as no blood or semen was found on her clothes. 25. There is yet another circumstance which renders the prosecution case to be doubtful. The incident took place on 26.8.2006 and matter was only reported to the police on 31.8.2006. If prosecutrix is to be believed, on 27.8.2006 itself, Pradhan had asked her to lodge the report with the police. It is not the case of prosecution that prosecutrix resides in the remotest corner of the State, having no access to police station. Village of prosecutrix is well connected by road and police station is also not far off. It is also not the case of prosecutrix that parties were trying to work out an amicable settlement which prevented them from reporting the matter to the police. As such, delay in lodging the F.I.R. in the given facts, having remained unexplained, is fatal to the prosecution case. On this issue learned counsel has invited our attention to the decision rendered by the apex Court in Rajesh Patel v. State of Jharkhand, (2013) 3 SCC 791 . The ratio laid down is in the given facts inapplicable to the instant case. On this issue learned counsel has invited our attention to the decision rendered by the apex Court in Rajesh Patel v. State of Jharkhand, (2013) 3 SCC 791 . The ratio laid down is in the given facts inapplicable to the instant case. It is not that prosecutrix was in a state of shock or in a disturbed state of mind. She visited the house of the accused next day and got lentils from his wife, yet did not disclose the incident to her. 26. Applying the principles of law as observed in the earlier part of the judgment and having perused the testimony of prosecution witnesses on record it cannot be said that prosecution has been able to prove its case, beyond reasonable doubt, by leading clear, cogent, convincing and reliable material on record. It cannot be said that findings returned by the court below are not borne out from record, are perverse, illegal, erroneous or arisen out of incomplete appreciation of the prosecution evidence. There are improvements, which are major, embellishments and contradictions, rendering the testimonies of these witnesses to be shaky and unbelievable. 27. The accused has had the advantage of having been acquitted by the Court below. Keeping in view the ratio of law laid down by the Apex Court in Mohammed Ankoos and others v. Public Prosecutor, High Court of Andhra Pradesh, Hyderabad, (2010) 1 SCC 94 , since it cannot be said that the trial Court has not correctly appreciated the evidence on record or that acquittal of the accused has resulted into travesty of justice, no interference is warranted in the instant case. For all the aforesaid reasons, present appeal, devoid of merit, is dismissed, so also pending applications, if any. Bail bonds furnished by the accused are discharged. Records of the Court below be immediately sent back. Appeal dismissed.