Judgment 1. The unsuccessful defendants who suffered a decree for permanent injunction, which came to be confirmed by the lower appellate court, are the appellants in the present second appeal. The respondent herein filed the suit O.S.No.246/1999 on the file of the learned District Munsif, Tambaram for a permanent injunction restraining the appellants herein/defendants from interfering with her peaceful possession and enjoyment of plaint 'A' schedule property and her use of plaint 'B' schedule property as an access to reach plaint 'A' schedule property. The claim of the respondent/plaintiff was based on her contention that she was the absolute owner of plaint 'A' schedule property and the plaint 'B' schedule property was a public passage in natham poramboke. 2. The appellants/defendants resisted the suit contending that the suit 'B' schedule property form part of their house site over which they had put up houses and the place left by them for their convenience was now sought to be projected as a public passage by the respondent/plaintiff. Besides such contention, the appellants/defendants had also taken a plea that since the plaintiff's alleged right over the 'B' schedule property was disputed, the suit for bare injunction without a prayer for declaration was not maintainable. 3. The learned trial Judge, after trial, rejected the defence plea and upheld the plea of the respondent herein/ plaintiff with the result that she was granted a decree for permanent injunction as prayed for. The said decree dated 26.4.2005 was challenged by the appellants herein/defendants before the lower appellate court, namely the court of the Principal Subordinate Judge, Chengalpattu in A.S.No.27/2006. The learned lower appellate judge, after hearing, re-appraised the evidence and dismissed the appeal confirming the decree passed by the trial court. The above said decree of the lower appellate court dated 18.1.2007 is the subject matter of challenge in the present second appeal. 4. As per Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, an appeal from the appellate decree of a court subordinate to the High Court shall lie to the High Court only on a substantial question of law. The party filing such a second appeal before the High Court shall precisely formulate the substantial questions of law involved in the second appeal and incorporate the same in the grounds of appeal under a distinct title. The party filing such a second appeal before the High Court shall precisely formulate the substantial questions of law involved in the second appeal and incorporate the same in the grounds of appeal under a distinct title. The High Court shall, at the first instance, find out whether such a substantial question of law or any other substantial question of law is involved in the second appeal and if it finds the answer in the affirmative, it shall admit the second appeal for detailed hearing and while doing so, the substantial question of law should be identified and precisely recorded in the order of admission. In this case, at the time of admission, two substantial questions of law came to be identified and recorded, based on which, the second appeal came to be admitted. The following are the substantial questions of law, thus, formulated at the time of admission: Substantial Questions of Law: "1) Whether the suit for bare injunction without seeking for declaration over the suit property when the plaintiff is not the owner, is not maintainable? 2) Whether the plaintiff is entitled to use the suit property as a pathway when alternative pathway is available to reach the main road?" 5. The arguments advanced by Mr. V. Chandrakanthan, learned counsel for the appellants and by Mr. D. Pariventhan, learned counsel for the respondent are heard. The materials available on record are also perused. 6. The learned counsel for the appellants/defendants advanced his arguments reiterating the contention of the appellants that the two questions formulated by the court at the time of admission are the substantial questions of law involved in the second appeal. Apart from making his submissions on the above said lines, the learned counsel for the appellants also conceded that no other substantial question of law is involved in the second appeal for the decision of this court. Let us now consider whether the above said questions formulated are, in fact, substantial questions of law involved in the second appeal and if so, whether the decree passed by the trial court, which stands confirmed by the appellate court, is to be interfered with by this court in exercise of its power of appeal in this second appeal. 7. Let us now consider whether the above said questions formulated are, in fact, substantial questions of law involved in the second appeal and if so, whether the decree passed by the trial court, which stands confirmed by the appellate court, is to be interfered with by this court in exercise of its power of appeal in this second appeal. 7. The first and foremost contention of the learned counsel for the appellants is that when the title of the respondent/plaintiff is not admitted and on the other hand, rival claim was made by the appellants/defendants claiming title to the plaint 'B' schedule property, the suit filed by the respondent/plaintiff for bare injunction should have been dismissed as not maintainable. In this regard, it is pertinent to note that the title of the respondent/ plaintiff as claimed by her in respect of plaint 'A' schedule property is not in dispute. The appellants/defendants do admit that the respondent/plaintiff is the owner of plaint 'A' schedule property. What the appellants/defendants contend is that the respondent/plaintiff does not have a right of passage through plaint 'B' schedule property, as the plaint 'B' schedule property, according to them, forms part of their properties. The case of the respondent/plaintiff is not that she is a co-owner of plaint 'B' schedule property or that the same is a common property belonging to her and the appellants/defendants, on the other hand, it is her claim that plaint 'B' schedule property is a public passage. Her claim is that her right to use the passage as an access to her property, namely 'A' schedule property, should not be hindered by any act of the appellants/defendants. 8. When the respondent/plaintiff does not claim any title over the plaint 'B' schedule property, there is no question of her seeking a declaration of her title regarding the same. Even otherwise, the contention that a suit for bare injunction when the title of the plaintiff is in dispute is not maintainable, is an untenable contention, because there is no provision of law debarring a plaintiff claiming injunction based on assertion of title from filing and maintaining a suit for injunction to protect his/her possession or enjoyment. Even otherwise, the contention that a suit for bare injunction when the title of the plaintiff is in dispute is not maintainable, is an untenable contention, because there is no provision of law debarring a plaintiff claiming injunction based on assertion of title from filing and maintaining a suit for injunction to protect his/her possession or enjoyment. Such an embargo is provided under Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 dealing with the grant of declaratory decrees, the provision of which states that no court shall make any declaration where the plaintiff, being able to seek further relief than a mere declaration of title, omits to do so. The said provision is to the effect that no declaration in air can be granted when a further relief besides declaration could have been sought for and the plaintiff has omitted to seek such further relief. But such an embargo is conspicuously absent in the provisions dealing with the grant of injunction, namely Chapter III of the Specific Relief Act, 1963. In none of the sections contained therein, it has been provided that a suit for injunction will not be maintainable in the absence of a prayer for declaration when title of the plaintiff is in dispute. 9. In this regard, reference can also be made to Section 27(a) of the Tamil Nadu Court Fees and Suits Valuation Act, 1955, which is to the effect that, if the statement contained in the plaint reveals that the title of the plaintiff is disputed or if an issue regarding the title of the plaintiff is framed, court fee shall be paid on half of the market value of the suit property. The said provision itself will indicate that a suit for bare injunction will be maintainable, even if the plaint averment reveals that the plaintiff's title to the property is disputed by the defendant. The other sub clause is attracted at a later stage when an issue regarding title is framed. However, the relief of injunction being a discretionary relief, courts have declined to grant decree for bare injunction in the cases in which the courts came across complicated questions of title, unsuitable for resolution in a suit for injunction, wherein court is empowered to incidentally go into the question of title. The fact that the court declines to grant injunction does not mean that the suit is not maintainable. The fact that the court declines to grant injunction does not mean that the suit is not maintainable. It is only by a rule of convenience, the courts adopt such a procedure of not granting injunction in such cases which involve complicated questions of title. Even in such cases, the rule of equity requires the court not to dismiss the suit with a blanket dismissal order, but to relegate the plaintiff to a more comprehensive suit of declaration and further reliefs. 10. The said position has been amplified by the Hon'ble Apex Court in Anathula Sudhakar v. P. Buchi Reddy (Dead) by LRs reported in 2008 (6) CTC 237, wherein, their Lordships of the Supreme Court have classified the cases in which the courts can conveniently deal with the question of title in a bare injunction suit and type of cases in which the prudence of the court will dictate relegating the parties to a more comprehensive suit of declaration and further reliefs. Ultimately in the said case, the Apex Court found the question of title to be more complicated and it gave leave to the plaintiff therein to file a comprehensive suit for declaration and other reliefs. The same was followed by this court in Syed Dhasthakeer vs. Navab John [Name of Syed Akbar shown as 2nd Respondent is given up with the permission of the Court on 14.9.2012] reported in 2012 (6) CTC 892 , a judgment rendered by myself, following the above said judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court. The same will provide a fitting answer to the contention of the learned counsel for the appellants. Therefore, the first substantial question of law is answered against the appellants/defendants holding that the suit for bare injunction filed by the respondent/plaintiff is very much maintainable and it cannot be dismissed as not maintainable. 11. The second substantial question of law also deserves to be answered against the appellants/defendants. It is not the case of the respondent/plaintiff that she is claiming the right of passage as an easement of necessity over the property of the appellants/ defendants so that there shall be scope for the appellants/defendants that there is an alternative approach, which will disentitle the respondent/plaintiff from claiming an easement by way of necessity. It is not the case of the respondent/plaintiff that she is claiming the right of passage as an easement of necessity over the property of the appellants/ defendants so that there shall be scope for the appellants/defendants that there is an alternative approach, which will disentitle the respondent/plaintiff from claiming an easement by way of necessity. Even assuming for argument sake that the claim of the respondent/plaintiff may be even taken as an easement of necessity, unless the appellants/defendants are able to show the existence of the alternative passage, as the claim is resisted only based on such plea, the plaintiff deserves to succeed. In this case, though the appellants/defendants pleaded that there was an alternative approach to plaint 'A' schedule property from the main road, there is no evidence on the side of the appellants/defendants to substantiate it. On the other hand, the respondent/plaintiff has led sufficient evidence which stands uncontroverted showing that the plaint 'B' schedule property alone is the access available to the plaint 'A' schedule property from the main road. Therefore, the second substantial question of law is also answered against the appellants/defendants. 12. The respondent/plaintiff has made clear pleading and adduced evidence to show that the plaint 'B' schedule property is a public passage leading to her property from the main road. But, the appellants/defendants have not led any evidence to prove that the said property, namely plaint 'B' schedule property forms part of their properties. When they have not proved the plaint 'B' schedule property to be belonging to the appellants/defendants, there will be no question of disentitling the respondent/plaintiff from getting the relief of injunction on the premise that her claim would amount to easement and the denial of title of the servant tenement would disentitle the respondent/plaintiff, the owner of the dominant tenement. Such a case does not arise in this case. For all the above said reasons, this court comes to the conclusion that there is no merit in the second appeal and the appeal deserves to be dismissed. In the result, the second appeal is dismissed. The decree of the trial court which stands confirmed by the lower appellate court is confirmed. However, there shall be no order as to cost as the same is not pressed by the learned counsel for the respondent/plaintiff. Consequently, the connected miscellaneous petition is closed.