Research › Search › Judgment

Orissa High Court · body

2014 DIGILAW 718 (ORI)

Udit Kumar Panigrahi v. Sambalpur University

2014-10-30

B.R.SARANGI

body2014
JUDGMENT Dr. B.R. SARANGI, J. - The petitioner, who was working as Technician of Sambalpur University, has filed this application to quash the order dated 31.8.2000 (Annexure-11) passed by the disciplinary authority imposing on him punishment of dismissal from service and confirmation thereof by the appellate authority vide order dated 19.12.2000, Annexure-14. 2.The facts of the case in hand are that the petitioner entered into service as a Technician of Sambalpur University on 2.4.1984. Pursuant to a news item published in Oriya dailies dated 10.6.1998 and 11.6.1998 relating to an ugly incident that took place on 19.5.1998 at University Guest House, the Registrar of the University directed the Officer-in-Charge of the Guest House to conduct an inquiry and submit his report. As a consequence thereof, the Officer-in-charge of the Guest House called for a report from the Manager of the Guest House and submitted the same to the Registrar of the University. Thereafter, the Revenue Divisional Commissioner (Northern Division), Sambalpur and the Vice-Chancellor of the University directed a detailed inquiry relating to the incident by one Mr. P.Patra, A.D.M.-cum-Administrative Officer, VSS Medical College, Burla. During inquiry, statements of 13 persons were recorded on solemn affirmation and 32 documents were exhibited. Pursuant to the inquiry report, proceedings were initiated against the petitioner as also three others, namely, Dr. Satya Narayan Pradhan, Sr. Lecturer, Department of Earth Science, Chittaranjan Tripathy, Manager of the Guest House and S.C. Paramguru, Khansama of University Guest House, Sambalpur and the following charges were framed against the petitioner vide Annexure-1 dated 23.7.1998. “(a)Moral turpitude; (b)Conduct improper on the part of an employee of the University; (c)Misuse of premises of the University; (d)Occupying University Guest House without authority; (e)Collusion with your staff for financial impropriety; (f)Misbehaviour with employees of the University; (g)Conducting business with the University by benami transaction, and thus gaining financial advantage.” The petitioner was called upon to explain as to why he should not be suitably punished under Chapter XIV, Part VI of the Orissa University Statutes, 1990 read with Orissa Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1962, in short, “1962 Rules” within 30 days, failing action as deemed proper would be taken against him presuming that he had nothing to explain. A memorandum of charges along with statement of allegations was served on the petitioner to which he submitted his explanation, vide Annexure-5 dated 7.9.1998. A memorandum of charges along with statement of allegations was served on the petitioner to which he submitted his explanation, vide Annexure-5 dated 7.9.1998. In his explanation, the petitioner had taken categorical stand that he was not supplied copies of the statements of 13 persons examined as witnesses or the documents referred to in the so-called inquiry report of Sri Patra, A.D.M.-cum-Administrative Officer, VSS Medical College, Burla and, therefore, due to non-compliance with the principles of natural justice, the proceeding itself was vitiated. Even though the petitioner made a demand for supply of copies of documents including statements of 13 persons examined by Sri P. Patra, the same went unheeded. In the inquiry four persons were examined as witnesses, namely, Tribikram Mishra, Officer-in-charge of the Guest House as P.W.1, Sunanda Mohanty, Lecturer of B.Ed. College, Sambalpur, as P.W.2, Chakradhar Biswal, Lecturer of B.Ed. College, Sambalpur as P.W.3, and one Purusottam Patra as P.W.4, who were no way connected with the alleged incident. However, P.W.1, Tribikram Mishra being the Officer in-charge of the Guest House examined as a witness, who was neither present in the Guest House at the relevant point of time nor was he any way connected with the occurrence alleged. On the basis of such perfunctory inquiry, the disciplinary authority finding the petitioner guilty of the charges imposed major penalty of dismissal from service on the petitioner vide order dated 31.8.2000 in Annexure-11. The appellate authority confirmed such order passed by the disciplinary authority vide Annexure-14. Hence, the present writ application. 3.Mr. A.K. Mishra, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner strenuously urged that the entire inquiry proceeding was vitiated due to non-compliance with the principles of natural justice, more particularly non-supply of the documents asked for by the petitioner as well as non-examination of material witnesses and above all non-supply of the inquiry report. He further submitted that the harashest punishment i..e, dismissal from service, imposed by the disciplinary authority, confirmed by the appellate authority being contrary to the provisions contained in Rule 15 of the 1962 Rules, the same is liable to be quashed. To substantiate the allegation as to non-supply of documents, Mr. Mishra has relied upon the judgments of the apex Court in Kashinath Dikshita v. Union of India and others, AIR 1986 SC 2118 , Managing Director, ECIL, Hyderabad v. B. Karunakar, etc. To substantiate the allegation as to non-supply of documents, Mr. Mishra has relied upon the judgments of the apex Court in Kashinath Dikshita v. Union of India and others, AIR 1986 SC 2118 , Managing Director, ECIL, Hyderabad v. B. Karunakar, etc. etc., AIR 1994 SC 1074 , State of U.P. and others v. Saroj Kumar Sinha, AIR 2010 SC 3131 , Nirmala J. Jhala v. State of Gujarat and another, AIR 2013 SC 1513 , Kumaon Mandal Vikas Nigam Ltd. v. Girija Shankar Pant and others, AIR 2001 SC 24 , and State of Punjab v. V.K. Khanna and others, AIR 2001 SC 343 . 4.Mr. B.K. Behuria, learned Sr. Counsel for the University refuting the allegations made by the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner, argued that there was compliance with principles of natural justice by supplying the documents, examining the material witnesses and as such no prejudice was caused to the delinquent and therefore, this Court may not interfere with the impugned orders and this being a case of moral turpitude, the Court may be very cautious to pass orders on the basis of the materials available on record. To substantiate his case, he has relied upon the judgments of the apex Court in State Bank of Patiala and others v. S.K. Sharma, AIR 1996 SC 1669 , State of U.P. and others v. Ramesh Ch. Mangalik, AIR 2002 SC 1241 , Vijay Kumar Nigam (dead) etc. v. State of M.P. and others, AIR 1997 SC 1358 , S.K. Singh v. Central Bank of India and others, (1996) 6 SCC 415 , State of U.P. v. Harendra Arora, AIR 2001 SC 2319 , Sarv U.P. Gramin Bank v. Manoj Kumar Sinha, (2010) 3 SCC 556 , Orissa Mining Corporation and another v. Ananda Ch. Prusty, (1996) 11 SCC 600 and Hira Nath Mishra and others v. The Principal Medical College, Ranchi and others, AIR 1973 SC 1260 . 5.After hearing the learned counsel for the parties and going through the records, this Court proposes to deal with the case on the basis of the allegations made, materials available on record and the law governing the field. 5.After hearing the learned counsel for the parties and going through the records, this Court proposes to deal with the case on the basis of the allegations made, materials available on record and the law governing the field. 6.(i)Inquiry proceeding is vitiated (a)The petitioner on receipt of the charges, immediately made a representation to the Registrar of the University on 29.7.1998 (Annexure-2) requesting him to supply him the copies of the statements recorded during the course of preliminary enquiry as provided under Rule 15(3) of the 1962 Rules so as to enable him to submit an effective reply to the charges. But the same was denied to the petitioner by opposite party No.2, which was communicated vide letter dated 01.08.1998 (Annexure-4) on the ground that as the statement of allegations have been prepared basing on all those recorded statements, so there is no need to supply the recorded statements of the persons. On receipt of the above letter, the petitioner vide his representation dated 10.08.1998 (Annexure-3) had pointed out that since the written statement of defence to be submitted by the delinquent is a very vital document for reference at all the stages of inquiry, so a provision has been made in Rules, 1962 to provide/supply all the documents, basing on which the charges are framed and to allow him to peruse/take extracts of the documents, which in the opinion of the delinquent are necessary for his defence. In view of the specific provision, he is entitled to get the copies of the statements recorded during the preliminary enquiry, basing on which admittedly the statement of allegations have been prepared and as such, the petitioner again requested to supply him the statements of the witnesses recorded during the preliminary enquiry. In spite of the above, the petitioner was neither supplied with the statements recorded during the preliminary enquiry nor was he supplied with the preliminary inquiry report, basing on which the charges were framed. Due to this, the petitioner finding no other alternative, had to submit his preliminary explanation on 7.9.1998 without the required documents on the charges framed with a further request to him personal hearing. Due to this, the petitioner finding no other alternative, had to submit his preliminary explanation on 7.9.1998 without the required documents on the charges framed with a further request to him personal hearing. (b)In the reply submitted by the petitioner, it was categorically pointed out that though the statement of allegations is supposed to be details of the charges, but the statement of allegations appended to the charge-sheet would go to show that the same are nothing more than a report of the so-called inquiry. Moreover, it was pointed out by the petitioner that the charge-sheet is not supported by the list of witnesses and documents and copies thereof. So far as the statements of witnesses extracted in the “statement of allegations”, the petitioner pointed out that the same are inconsistent with each other. To substantiate the same, the petitioner had pointed out that while some of the witnesses say that the lady was brought by a Car, some other say that the lady was brought by a scooter. Similarly, from the report of the Manager dated 10.6.2008, it is clear that the names of Sri Mahanandia and Dr. Pradhan was mentioned, but in the subsequent reports, his name along with his brother’s name was dragged into. (c)The petitioner was issued with a notice by the Inquiring Officer to appear before him. After receiving the above notice, the petitioner made a representation to the Inquiring Officer on 25.2.1999 (Annexure-6) to supply him the statements of 13 witnesses examined by Sri P. Patra, ADM & Administrative Officer, VSS Medical College, Burla as mentioned in Annexure-A in the statement of allegations. Moreover, as the documents listed at Sl. Nos. 11, 12, 20, 26, 27 (3) of Annexure-B were not supplied to him, request was made to supply those documents alongwith the written statement of defence submitted by other delinquents sufficiently ahead of the next date of inquiry. In the above premises, the inquiry proceeded and evidences were recorded by the Inquiring Officer. On conclusion of hearing of the enquiry proceedings, both the Marshalling Officer as well as the delinquents was directed to submit their written arguments. It is also a fact that though the charges were framed individually, the inquiry was conducted jointly even in absence of any order from the disciplinary authority to that effect. On conclusion of hearing of the enquiry proceedings, both the Marshalling Officer as well as the delinquents was directed to submit their written arguments. It is also a fact that though the charges were framed individually, the inquiry was conducted jointly even in absence of any order from the disciplinary authority to that effect. (d)The Marshalling Officer submitted his written argument (Annexure-7), wherein suggestion has been given to the Injuring Officer about his duties and responsibilities, the relevant portion of which is quoted below : “x x x In other words, it is the duty of the enquiry officer to probe into the case and ensure that the enquiry is completed and conducted in such a manner that the guilty do not escape because of some lacuna in the prosecution case and the innocent do not suffer because of an incomplete defence case. To achieve this objective, the enquiry officer must consider himself more than just a judge in a Criminal or Civil case deciding the same on the basis of the materials placed by the parties. He should not allow his attempt to get the truth to be thwarted by observance of unnecessary technicalities, which are not essential for the observance of the principles of justice and enquiry. He should not, for instance, decline to accept the evidence just because the names of witnesses were not given in the Original List or if the evidence is likely to entail the amending or changing the charges already framed. X x x Thus, from the above, it is evident that the Marshalling Officer is sure that there is some lacuna in the prosecution case and some of the evidences, which he relied upon in his arguments were not originally there in his list and for the said reason, he while submitting his arguments, did not refer much to the evidences adduced during inquiry, rather he thought it proper to refer to the evidences recorded during the inquiry conducted by Mr. P. Patra, ADM and Administrative Officer, VSS Medical College, Burla, which was done beyond the back of the petitioner. P. Patra, ADM and Administrative Officer, VSS Medical College, Burla, which was done beyond the back of the petitioner. (e)From the above, it appears that charges had been framed as per Annexure-1, the statements of allegations though had a reference with regard to the inquiry conducted by two separate authorities, namely, Officer-in-Charge of the Guest House and Sri P. Patra, A.D.M.-cum-Administrative Officer, VSS Medical College, Burla, who had recorded the statements of 13 persons on solemn affirmation as per Annexure-A and relied upon 32 nos. of documents as per the list in Annexure-B to the said report. The documents were not supplied to the petitioner even though the petitioner had asked for the same subsequently vide Annexure-2 and 6. Therefore, this was a clear case of non-supply of documents to the petitioner in a disciplinary proceeding. (f)In Kashinath Dikshita (supra) in paragraph 12, the apex Court held as follows : “The meaning of a reasonable opportunity of showing cause against the action proposed to be taken is that the Government servant is afforded a reasonable opportunity to defend himself against the charges on which inquiry is held. The Government servant should be given an opportunity to deny his guilt and establish his innocence. He can do so when he is told what the charges against him are. He can do so by cross-examining the witnesses produced against him. X x x x” (g)The decision in Kashinath Dikshita case (supra), which has also been followed in State of U.P. v. Saroj Kumar Sinha case (supra), the apex Court in para 36 has held as follows : “36. The proposition of law that a government employee facing a departmental inquiry is entitled to all the relevant statement, documents and other materials to enable him to have a reasonable opportunity to defend himself in the departmental inquiry against the charges is too well established to need any further reiteration. X x x x x (h)In the decisions referred to by Mr. B.K. Behuria, learned Sr. Counsel for the opposite parties, in State Bank of Patiala and others v. S.K. Sharma (supra), principles have been evolved by the apex Court with regard to the applicability of the principles of natural justice in the context of disciplinary proceeding and orders of punishment imposed by the employer upon the employee. B.K. Behuria, learned Sr. Counsel for the opposite parties, in State Bank of Patiala and others v. S.K. Sharma (supra), principles have been evolved by the apex Court with regard to the applicability of the principles of natural justice in the context of disciplinary proceeding and orders of punishment imposed by the employer upon the employee. The said principles have been enumerated in para 32 of the said judgment, which are as follows : “32. We may summarize the principles emerging from the above discussion. (These are by no means intended to be exhaustive and are evolved keeping in view the context of disciplinary enquiries and orders of punishment imposed by an employer upon the employee) : (1) An order passed imposing a punishment on an employee consequent upon a disciplinary/departmental inquiry in violation of the rules/regulations/statutory provisions governing such enquiries should not be set aside automatically. The Court or the Tribunal should enquire whether (a) the provision violated is of a substantive nature or (b) whether it is procedural in character. (2) A substantive provision has normally to be complied with as explained hereinbefore and the theory of substantial compliance or the test of prejudice would not be applicable in such a case. (3) In the case of violation of a procedural provision, the position is this : procedural provisions are generally meant for affording a reasonable and adequate opportunity to the delinquent officer/employee. They are, generally speaking, conceived in his interest. Violation of any and every procedural provision cannot be said to automatically vitiate the inquiry held or order passed. Except cases falling under ‘no notice’, ‘no opportunity’ and ‘no hearing’ categories, the complaint of violation of procedural provision should be examined from the point of view of prejudice, viz., whether such violation has prejudiced the delinquent officer/employee in defending himself properly and effectively. If it is found that he has been so prejudiced, appropriate orders have to be made to repair and remedy the prejudice including setting aside the inquiry and or the order of punishment. If no prejudice is established to have resulted therefrom, it is obvious, no interference is called for. In this connection, it may be remembered that there may be certain procedural provisions which are of a fundamental character, whose violation is by itself proof of prejudice. The Court may not insist on proof of prejudice in such cases. If no prejudice is established to have resulted therefrom, it is obvious, no interference is called for. In this connection, it may be remembered that there may be certain procedural provisions which are of a fundamental character, whose violation is by itself proof of prejudice. The Court may not insist on proof of prejudice in such cases. As explained in the body of the judgment, take a case where there is a provision expressly providing that after the evidence of the employer/government is over, the employee shall be given an opportunity to lead defence in his evidence, and in a given case, the inquiring officer does not give that opportunity in spite of the delinquent officer/employee asking for it. The prejudice is self-evident. No proof of prejudice as such need be called for in such a case. To repeat, the test is one of prejudice, i.e., whether the person has received a fair hearing considering all things. Now, this very aspect can also be looked at from the point of view of directory and mandatory provisions, if one is so inclined. The principle stated under (4) hereinbelow is only another way of looking at the same aspect as is dealt with herein and not a different or distinct principle. (4) (a) In the case of a procedural provision which is not of a mandatory character, the complaint of violation has to be examined from the standpoint of substantial compliance. Be that as it may, the order passed in violation of such a provision can be set aside only where such violation has occasioned prejudice to the delinquent employee. (b)In the case of violation of a procedural provision, which is of a mandatory character, it has to be ascertained whether the provision is conceived in the interest of the person proceeded against or in public interest. If it is found to be the former, then it must be seen whether the delinquent officer has waived the said requirement, either expressly or by his conduct. If he is found to have waived if, then the order of punishment cannot be set aside on the ground of said violation. If it is found to be the former, then it must be seen whether the delinquent officer has waived the said requirement, either expressly or by his conduct. If he is found to have waived if, then the order of punishment cannot be set aside on the ground of said violation. If, on the other hand, it is found that the delinquent officer/employee has not waived it or that the provision could not be waived by him, then the Court or Tribunal should make appropriate directions (include the setting aside of the order of punishment), keeping in mind the approach adopted by the Constitution Bench in B. Karunakar, (1994 AIR SCW 1050). The ultimate test is always the same, viz., test of prejudice or the test of fair hearing, as it may be called. (5) Where the inquiry is not governed by any rules/regulations/statutory provisions and the only obligation is to observe the principles of natural justice - or, for that matter, wherever such principles are held to be implied by the very nature and impact of the order/action - the out or the Tribunal should make a distinction between a total violation of natural justice (rule of audi alteram partem) and violation of a facet of the said rule, as explained in the body of the judgment. In other words, a distinction must be made between “no opportunity” and not adequate opportunity, i.e., between “no notice/”no hearing” and “no fair hearing.” (a) In the case of former, the order passed would undoubtedly be invalid (one may call it “void” or a nullity if one chooses to). In such cases, normally, liberty will be reserved for the Authority to take proceedings afresh according to law, i.e., in accordance with the said rule (audi alteram partem). (b) But in the latter case, the effect of violation (of a facet of the rule of audi alteram partem) has to be examined from the stand-point of prejudice; in other words, what the Court or Tribunal has to see is whether in the totality of the circumstances, the delinquent officer/employee did or did not have a fair hearing and the orders to be made shall depend upon the answer to the said query. (It is made clear that this principle (No.5) does not apply in the case of rule against bias, the test in which behalf are laid down elsewhere.) (6) While applying the rule of audi alteram partem (the primary principle of natural justice) the Court/Tribunal/Authority must always bear in mind the ultimate and overriding objective underlying the said rule, viz., to ensure a fair hearing and to ensure that there is no failure of justice. It is this objective which should guide them in applying the rule to varying situations that arise before them. (7) There may be situations where the interests of State or public interest may call for a curtailing or the rule of audi alteram partem. In such situations, the Court may have to balance public/State interest with the requirement of natural justice and arrive at an appropriate decision.” (i)The reliance place on the decisions in State of U.P. and others v. Ramesh Ramesh Ch. Mangalik case (supra), Vijay Kumar Nigam (dead) v. State of M.P. ad others case (supra), S.K. Singh case (supra) by the learned Senior counsel for the opposite parties has no application to the present context. On the other hand, the judgment relied upon by him in Sarva U.P. Gramin Bank case (supra) is applicable to the extent that prejudice was caused to the petitioner due to non-supply of the documents and the materials relied upon by the opposite parties had not been supplied by him even though asked for. The decision in State Bank of Patiala (supra) and Sarva U.P. Gramin Bank case (supra) relied upon by the opposite parties is squarely applicable to the case of the petitioner and goes against the opposite parties. (j)Therefore, taking the above facts and circumstances into consideration, this Court has no hesitation to come to the conclusion that the opposite parties had denied reasonable opportunity to the petitioner to defend himself in the inquiry. 7.(ii) Non-supply of inquiry report (a)On perusal of the writ application, it reveals that a letter was communicated to the petitioner on 24.6.2000 (Annexure-9) directing him to show cause as to why he shall not be dismissed from service, which shall be a future disqualification. In the said letter, it has also been stated that he has been found guilty of moral turpitude and misconduct and his further retention in the University service is undesirable. In the said letter, it has also been stated that he has been found guilty of moral turpitude and misconduct and his further retention in the University service is undesirable. After concluding about the guilt of the petitioner, he was supplied with the copy of the inquiry report as well as the report of the Vice-Chancellor/Syndicate just to meet the formalities. This action of the opposite parties runs contrary to the settled principles of law as well as Rules 1962. (b)As per Rule 15(10)(a) of the Rules, 1962, if the Inquiring Officer is not the disciplinary authority, the disciplinary authority shall furnish to the delinquent Government servant a copy of the report of the Inquiring Officer and give him a notice by registered post or otherwise calling upon him to submit within a period of fifteen days such representation as he may wish to make against the findings of the Inquiring Officer. Clause (b) of the said Rules, 1962 provides that on receipt of the representation referred to in sub-clause (a), if the disciplinary authority having regard to the findings on the charges, is of the opinion that any of the penalties specified in clauses (vi) to (ix) of Rule 13 should be imposed, he shall furnish to the delinquent Government servant a statement of its findings along with brief reasons for disagreement, if any, with the findings of the Inquiring Officer and give him a notice by registered post or otherwise stating the penalty proposed to be imposed on him and calling upon him to submit within a specified time such representation as he may wish to make against the proposed penalty. (c)On receipt of the report from the Inquiring Officer, the disciplinary authority should furnish a copy of the said report asking the delinquent to submit representation to the findings of the Inquiring Officer, whereafter, the disciplinary authority on consideration of both, i.e., the inquiry report and the representation made by the delinquent, if concludes that any of the penalties specified in Rule 13 of 1962 Rules is to be imposed, then he will issue a notice to the delinquent to show cause with regard to the proposed penalty. But in the present case, the same has been given a complete go bye. (d)So far as non-supply of the inquiry report, reliance has been placed on Mohd. But in the present case, the same has been given a complete go bye. (d)So far as non-supply of the inquiry report, reliance has been placed on Mohd. Ramzan Khan case (supra), which has also been taken into consideration in the subsequent judgment, wherein the apex Court has held that the right to represent against the findings in the inquiry report one’s innocence is distinct from the right to represent against the proposed penalty and the right to represent against the findings in the report is not disturbed in any way. In fact any denial thereof will make the final order vulnerable. Such finding has been arrived at in view of the fact that right to represent against the findings in the inquiry report to prove once innocence is distinct from the right to represent against the proposed penalty. Therefore, by virtue of the amendment in Rule 15 (10) (a) & (b) on 25.2.2000, it was obligatory to follow the procedure by supplying the inquiry report and obtaining representation of the delinquent and then to take a decision finally on the same. 8.(iii) Bias of the authorities (a)On perusal of the pleadings available on record, it reveals that the Vice-Chancellor had prepared the notes in guise of a so-called proposed action to be taken by the Syndicate much earlier to the meeting of the Syndicate and the Syndicate without any application of mind had accepted the same. This fact gets corroborated from the fact that on 30.8.2000 at 4.30 P.M., the Syndicate met and accepted the same. If at all they prepared the report on he very same day, then it was almost impossible to prepare a 23 page report after considering the show cause reply submitted by all the delinquents. The report of the Syndicate was nothing but the opinion of the then Legal Advisor thereby he Syndicate had surrendered its discretion to the Legal Advisor, who had acted as the disciplinary authority. (b)The apex Court in State of Punjab v. V.K. Khanna (supra) relying on the decision in Kumaon Mandal Vikas Nigam Ltd. (supra), in paragraph 8 has observed thus : “8. The test, therefore, is as to whether there is a mere apprehension of bias or there is a real danger of bias and it is in this score that the surrounding circumstances must and ought to be collated and necessary conclusion drawn therefrom. The test, therefore, is as to whether there is a mere apprehension of bias or there is a real danger of bias and it is in this score that the surrounding circumstances must and ought to be collated and necessary conclusion drawn therefrom. In the event, however, the conclusion is otherwise that there is existing a real danger of bias administrative action cannot be sustained. If on the other hand, allegations pertain to rather fanciful apprehension in administrative action, question of declaring them to be unsustainable on the basis therefor would not arise.” Similarly in paragraph 34, the apex Court has also observed thus : “x x x It is well settled in Service Jurisprudence that the concerned authority has to apply its mind upon receipt of reply to the charge-sheet or show-cause as the case may be, as to whether a further inquiry is called for. In the event upon deliberations and due considerations it is in the affirmative- the inquiry follows, but not otherwise and it is this part of Service Jurisprudence on which reliance was placed by Mr. Subramaniam and on that score, strongly criticized the conduct of respondents here and accused them of being biased. We do not find some justification in such criticism upon consideration of the materials on record.” Therefore, the orders impugned suffer from vice of bias of authorities. 9.For the foregoing reasons and keeping in view the law laid down by the apex Court, this Court holds that the order of punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority vide order dated 31.08.2000 (Annexure-11) and confirmation thereof made by the appellate authority vide order dated 30.12.2000 (Annexure-14) are vitiated. Accordingly, the same are quashed. The opposite parties are directed to reinstate the petitioner in service forthwith and all the consequential financial and service benefits as due and admissible to him be granted within a period of three months from the date of receipt of a copy of this judgment. 10.The writ application is thus allowed. No costs. Application allowed.