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2014 DIGILAW 72 (JHR)

Havildar Bal Mukund Shukla @ Bal Mukund Shukla v. State of Jharkhand

2014-01-13

SHREE CHANDRASHEKHAR

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Order : Challenging order dated 19.05.2012 and 18.09.2012, the petitioner has approached this Court. 2. Heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the documents on record. 3. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioner has submitted that, the evidence brought on record during the departmental enquiry does not establish the charge framed against the petitioner. The case against the petitioner is based on no evidence and therefore, the penalty order dated 19.05.2012 and the appellate order dated 18.09.2012 are liable to be interfered with by this Court. The learned counsel has further submitted that, only on the self-serving statement given by the Deputy Superintendent of Police, Smt. Emelda Ekka, the Enquiry Officer erroneously recorded the finding that the charge framed against the petitioner stood proved. 4. The learned counsel appearing for the respondent-State has submitted that, it is not denied by the petitioner that he gave two missed calls on the mobile number of the Deputy Superintendent of Police and therefore, there is no reason to disbelieve the statement given by the said Deputy Superintendent of Police, Smt. Emelda Ekka, during the departmental proceeding. 5. From the record of the case, I find that a charge-memo was served upon the petitioner on 24.01.2012 on the allegation that on 20.11.2011 when the Deputy Superintendent of Police, Smt. Emelda Ekka, called the petitioner and disclosed her identity still the petitioner misbehaved with the said Officer. It is further alleged that the petitioner intentionally made calls on the mobile of the said Officer. During the departmental proceeding, one Dev Kumar Rai has been examined by the Department in support of the charge framed against the petitioner. The said witness has stated before the Enquiry Office that when he was sitting with Deputy Superintendent of Police, Smt. Emelda Ekka, the petitioner came there and apologized to the Officer. Another witness namely, Amrita Sinha has been examined by the Department, who has stated before the Enquiry Officer that, at about 11.00 a.m, Smt. Emelda Ekka asked her to make call on mobile number 9304444874. Relying on the statements made by these witnesses during the departmental proceeding, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner has submitted that the charge framed against the petitioner vide charge memo dated 24.01.2012, is not only vague, the charge is contradicted by evidence on record. 6. Relying on the statements made by these witnesses during the departmental proceeding, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner has submitted that the charge framed against the petitioner vide charge memo dated 24.01.2012, is not only vague, the charge is contradicted by evidence on record. 6. I find that the specific charge against the petitioner is that, when Smt. Emelda Ekka, Deputy Superintendent of Police, made a call to the petitioner, the petitioner misbehaved. From the record of the case, I find that in view of the statement made by the witness namely, Amrita Sinha, the charge framed on 24.01.2012 against the petitioner is factually incorrect. I further find that the evidence which has been brought on record in support of the charge framed against the petitioner, would only establish that the petitioner called on mobile phone of Smt. Emelda Ekka. No other witness has supported the charge framed against the petitioner. Only on the basis of the statement made by Smt. Emelda Ekka, Deputy Superintendent of Police, which is contradicted by statement of the witness Amrita Sinha, it cannot be concluded that the charge framed against the petitioner stands proved. Smt. Emelda Ekka is the complainant and she only supported the charge. I find that the petitioner has categorically stated that he called his wife on 20.11.2011 and when he received the call from Smt. Emelda Ekka, Deputy Superintendent of Police, he thought his wife had called. I further find that the charge itself is vague. The allegations imputed to the petitioner do not make sense. 7. In “Union of India and Others v. Gyan Chand Chattar”, reported in (2009) 12 SCC 78 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under, 32. In Surath Chandra Chakrabarty v. State of W.B. this Court held that it is not permissible to hold an enquiry on a vague charge as the same does not give a clear picture to the delinquent to make an effective defence because he may not be aware as what is the allegation against him and what kind of defence he can put in rebuttal thereof. This Court observed as under: (SCC p. 553, para 5) “5. This Court observed as under: (SCC p. 553, para 5) “5. … The grounds on which it is proposed to take action have to be reduced to the form of a definite charge or charges which have to be communicated to the person charged together with a statement of the allegations on which each charge is based and any other circumstance which it is proposed to be taken into consideration in passing orders has also to be stated. This rule embodies a principle which is one of the basic contents of a reasonable or adequate opportunity for defending oneself. If a person is not told clearly and definitely what the allegations are on which the charges preferred against him are founded he cannot possibly, by projecting his own imagination, discover all the facts and circumstances that may be in the contemplation of the authorities to be established against him.” …………………………………………………………… …………………………………………………………… …………………………………………………………… 34. In Sawai Singh v. State of Rajasthan this Court held that even in a domestic enquiry, the charge must be clear, definite and specific as it would be difficult for any delinquent to meet the vague charges. Evidence adduced should not be perfunctory even if the delinquent does not take the defence or make a protest against that the charges are vague, that does not save the enquiry from being vitiated for the reason that there must be fair play in action, particularly, in respect of an order involving adverse or penal consequences.” 8. In view of the aforesaid discussion, the impugned orders dated 19.05.2012 and 18.09.2012 are hereby quashed. Ordered accordingly.