Research › Search › Judgment

Gujarat High Court · body

2014 DIGILAW 723 (GUJ)

Varshaben Batukbhai Makwana v. State of Gujarat

2014-07-07

G.B.SHAH

body2014
JUDGMENT G.B. Shah, J. 1. In view of the facts of both the captioned petitions are similar, the same are heard and decided together by this common judgment. 2. The petitions have been moved praying for following common prayers: 12 A) Your Lordships may be pleased to admit this Special Civil Application; B) Your Lordships may further be pleased to issue a writ of mandamus or any other appropriate writ, order or direction in the nature of mandamus quashing and setting aside the impugned communication dated 04/03/2014 issued by the Taluka Development Officer, Gariyadhar Taluka Panchayat being ex-facie illegal, arbitrary, improper, politically motivated and de hors the provisions of the law in facts and circumstances of the case and in the interest of justice; C) Your Lordships may further be pleased to issue a writ of mandamus or any other appropriate writ, order or direction in the nature of mandamus directing the respondent No. 1 to hear and decide the disqualification proceedings viz. Application Nos. 8, 9, 10 and 21, 22 and 23 of 2013 expeditiously and within a period of four weeks from the date of the receipt of the writ of this Hon'ble Court to meet with the ends of justice; D) Pending admission, hearing and final disposal of the petition Your Lordship may be pleased to direct the respondent nos. 2 & 3 herein not to convene the meeting dated 18/03/2014 to consider the No Confidence Motion proposed on 12/02/2014 to meet with the ends of justice; in the alternate; Your Lordships may be pleased to direct that in the event of convening of meeting of Gariyadhar Taluka Panchayat for consideration of Motion of No Confidence against the petitioner, the vote that may be cast by respondent nos. 4 to 6 shall be kept in a sealed cover separately and the same shall not be opened until further orders are recorded by this Hon'ble Court; E) Any other and further relief/s as deem fit in the facts and the circumstances may kindly be granted. 3. Heard Mr. P.J. Kanabar, learned advocate for the petitioners, Mr. B.M. Mangukiya, learned advocate for the respondent Nos. 4 to 6, Mr. H.S. Munshaw, learned advocate for the respondent Nos. 2 and 3 and Mr. K.L. Pandya, learned Assistant Government Pleader for the respondent No. 1. 4. 3. Heard Mr. P.J. Kanabar, learned advocate for the petitioners, Mr. B.M. Mangukiya, learned advocate for the respondent Nos. 4 to 6, Mr. H.S. Munshaw, learned advocate for the respondent Nos. 2 and 3 and Mr. K.L. Pandya, learned Assistant Government Pleader for the respondent No. 1. 4. Facts leading to the controversy involved in the matters are such that on 29/07/2013, Agenda for holding the 10th General Board Meeting of Gariyadhar Taluka Panchayat (for short 'the panchayat'), to be held on 13/08/2013 at 14:00 hours, came to be issued. Mr. R.C. Faldu, President of Gujarat State Bhartiya Janta Party (for short 'the BJP President') issued Mandate. On 13/08/2013 i.e. the day on which, the aforesaid meeting was scheduled, the respondent Nos. 4 to 6 abstained from the meeting though the mandate was served by respondent No. 3. On 19/08/2013, Agenda for 11th General Board Meeting of Gariyadhar Taluka Panchayat, to be held on 07/09/2013 at 14:00 hours to consider the No Confidence Motion against the President and the Vice President, came to be issued and the BJP President, on 02/09/2013, issued Mandate asking all the eight members of the panchayat to compulsorily remain present in the said meeting and to vote against the Motion of No Confidence. One Kirtigiri Valamgiri Gosai, a member of the panchayat, preferred application Nos. 21, 22 and 22 of 2013 separately against the respondent Nos. 4 to 6 respectively, before the competent authority under the provisions of the Gujarat Provision for Disqualification of Members of Local Authorities for Defection Act, 1986 (for short 'the Defection Act'). In the meeting held on 07/09/2013, Whip was read out. The respondent Nos. 4 to 6, though the Whip was served, flouted the same and voted in favour of No Confidence Motion. However, the said Motion for No Confidence failed for want of 2/3rd majority. Again Kirtigiri Valamgiri Gosai preferred application Nos. 8, 9 and 10 against the respondent Nos. 4 to 6 respectively before the respondent No. 1 herein for holding them disqualified. Pending disqualification proceedings, the respondent Nos. 4 to 6 and seven other members again moved a common No Confidence Motion against the petitioners herein. The petitioners declined to call the meeting of the panchayat as the proposal dated 28/01/2014 at the instance of the respondent Nos. 4 to 6 respectively before the respondent No. 1 herein for holding them disqualified. Pending disqualification proceedings, the respondent Nos. 4 to 6 and seven other members again moved a common No Confidence Motion against the petitioners herein. The petitioners declined to call the meeting of the panchayat as the proposal dated 28/01/2014 at the instance of the respondent Nos. 4 to 6 herein was pending and also that the said proposal was contrary to the provisions of Rule 20 of the Gujarat Panchayats (Procedure) Rules, 1997 (for short 1997 Rules'). Again on 12/02/2014, the respondent Nos. 4 to 6 and others, pending disqualification proceedings, proposed No Confidence Motion against the President and the Vice President of the panchayat i.e. the present petitioners. On 26/02/2014, the petitioners declined to call for the meeting of the panchayat and informed the respondent No. 3 accordingly, to which, on 04/03/2014, the petitioners were informed by respondent No. 3 that a meeting is scheduled on 18/03/2014 to consider the No Confidence Motion. Being aggrieved with the decision of accepting the said proposal dated 12/02/2014 by respondent No. 2 and subsequent issuance of the impugned communication dated 04/03/2014, the petitioners have filed the present petitions. 5. At the outset it is pertinent to note that by order dated 14/03/2014, this Court was pleased to admit the present petitions and as an interim order, observed that, 'in the meantime, let the meeting, which is fixed on 18/03/2014 may go on and votes of respondent Nos. 4, 5 and 6 shall be kept in sealed cover and shall not be opened until further orders, passed by this Court'. 6. Mr. P.J. Kanabar, learned advocate for the petitioners has submitted that one Kirtigiri Valamgiri Gosai, a member of the panchayat, has preferred application Nos. 21, 22 and 23 of 2013 against the respondent Nos. 4 to 6 respectively before the competent authority under the provisions of the Defection Act as well as application Nos. 8, 9 and 10 of 2013 against the said respondent Nos. 4 to 6 respectively before the respondent No. 1 for holding them to be disqualified to which, the respondent Nos. 4 to 6 respectively before the competent authority under the provisions of the Defection Act as well as application Nos. 8, 9 and 10 of 2013 against the said respondent Nos. 4 to 6 respectively before the respondent No. 1 for holding them to be disqualified to which, the respondent Nos. 4 to 6 have not filed any reply to the said applications and with a view to prolong the proceedings, they have submitted the preliminary objections in the matter, which otherwise, have no substance and got the said matters adjourned at the instance of respondent Nos. 4 to 6 on one count or the other. The learned advocate for the petitioners then submitted that pending disqualification proceedings against respondent Nos. 4 to 6, they once again proposed No Confidence Motion dated 12/02/2014 to overreach the disqualification proceedings, against the petitioners and under the circumstances, the petitioners declined to call the meeting of the panchayat and therefore, vide communication dated 26/02/2014, the petitioners accordingly informed to the Taluka Development Officer, Gariyadhar. The respondent Nos. 4 to 6 then approached the District Development Officer, Bhavnagar District Panchayat vide communication dated 04/03/2014 and the petitioners have been informed about the meeting in question dated 18/03/2014 for considering the proposal for No Confidence Motion. The learned advocate for the petitioners has submitted that the acceptance of the said proposal dated 12/02/2014 at the hands of the District Development Officer and subsequent issuance of communication dated 04/03/2014 are ex facie illegal, arbitrary and improper, politically motivated and de hors the provisions of the Defection Act and the Rule so also the ratio laid down in the decision of the Hon'ble the Apex Court in Rajendra Singh Rana and Others Vs. Swami Prasad Maurya and Others, reported in, (2007) 4 SCC 270 . The learned advocate for the petitioners further submitted that the proceedings under the Defection Act have been initiated against the respondent Nos. 4 to 6 as back as on 07/09/2013, which are required to be decided at the earliest and as the respondent No. 1, in the aforesaid circumstances, was sitting tight over the matter, the directions for expeditious hearing of the matter in consonance with Rule 8 of the Rule of 1987 are required to be issued against the respondent No. 1. Lastly, the learned advocate for the petitioners has submitted that if the petitioners are removed from the office on the strength of votes of respondent Nos. 4 to 6 and after removal from the office, if respondent Nos. 4 to 6 are also removed under the disqualification proceedings, then their object and motive of removing the petitioners from the office would get fulfilled defeating the very purpose and objectives of the Defection Act and hence, he requested to allow the present petitions. 7. On the other hand, Mr. B.M. Mangukiya, learned advocate for the respondent Nos. 4 to 6, drawing attention of the Court to the affidavit-in-reply filed by the respondent Nos. 4 to 6 dated 13/03/2014 has submitted that, as averred therein, since the petitioners have not filed any petition for disqualification, the present petitions are not maintainable at their behest and therefore, the petitioners have no right to prefer these petitions. He has also submitted that there is split within the political party to which the present respondents belonged and more than 1/3rd members of the taluka panchayat political party have formed a separate group. The taluka panchayat is consisting of 15 members out of which, 08 members were elected as official candidates of the Bhartiya Janta Party, whereas, 07 candidates got elected officially of the Indian National Congress. Out of 08 members, 03 respondents herein have formed a group and were compelled to leave the party and therefore, there is a split which protects the present respondents from disqualification and therefore, the ratio laid down in the case of Rajendra Singh Rana (supra) cannot be pressed into service. The learned advocate for the respondent Nos. 4 to 6 has also submitted that Notice issued by the District Development Officer to call the meeting on 18/03/2013 is not illegal and accordingly, the petitions deserve to be dismissed. In support of his submissions, the learned advocate for the respondent Nos. 4 to 6 has relied upon a decision rendered by the Hon'ble the Apex Court in Speaker, Haryana Vidhan Sabha Vs. Kuldeep Bishnoi and Others, reported in, AIR 2013 SC 120 and also decision of this Court in Chamanbhai Maganbhai Vinzula and Another Vs. D.H. Brahmbhatt, IAS Designated Authority and Secretary and Others, reported in 2013 (3) GLH 221 . 8. Mr. H.S. Munshaw, learned advocate for the respondent Nos. Kuldeep Bishnoi and Others, reported in, AIR 2013 SC 120 and also decision of this Court in Chamanbhai Maganbhai Vinzula and Another Vs. D.H. Brahmbhatt, IAS Designated Authority and Secretary and Others, reported in 2013 (3) GLH 221 . 8. Mr. H.S. Munshaw, learned advocate for the respondent Nos. 2 and 3 has drawn attention of the Court on affidavit-in-reply dated 13/06/2014 filed on behalf of the respondent No. 3 i.e. of Taluka Development Officer, Gariyadhar Taluka Panchayat, and submitted that in light of the averments made on oath by the said official, the present petitions deserve to be rejected in limine. 9. I have considered the above-referred rival submissions made by the learned advocates for the parties. 9.1 As aforesaid, after issuance of Notice vide order dated 10/03/2014, this Court passed the order dated 14/03/2014 admitting the present petitions. Simultaneously, the Court has, vide said order, directed to take the affidavit-in-reply filed by the respondent Nos. 4 to 6 on record and further ordered, as aforesaid, that in the meantime, let the meeting which is fixed on 18/03/2014 may go on and votes of respondent Nos. 4 to 6 shall be kept in sealed cover and shall not be opened until further orders passed by this Court. 9.2 Before dealing with the submissions made by the learned advocates for the parties, it is desirable to go through the order dated 28/03/2014, passed by this Court in Special Civil Application No. 4119 of 2014, which has been filed by said Kirtigiri Valamgiri Gosai, a member of the said panchayat. The same reads as under: 1. Copy of the petition has been served to Mr. B.M. Mangukiya, learned advocate for respondent Nos. 2 to 4. With consent of the learned advocates for the respective parties, the matter is taken up for final hearing. 2. Rule. Mr. Rakesh Patel, learned Assistant Government Pleader waives service of notice of Rule on behalf of respondent No. 1 and Mr. B.M. Mangukiya, learned advocate waives service of notice of Rule on behalf of respondent Nos. 2 to 4. 3. With consent of the learned advocates for the respective parties, the matter is taken up for final hearing. 2. Rule. Mr. Rakesh Patel, learned Assistant Government Pleader waives service of notice of Rule on behalf of respondent No. 1 and Mr. B.M. Mangukiya, learned advocate waives service of notice of Rule on behalf of respondent Nos. 2 to 4. 3. By way of the present petition, the petitioner has prayed as under: [A] Your Lordships may be pleased to admit this Special Civil Application; [B] Your Lordships may further be pleased to issue a writ of mandamus or any other appropriate writ, order or direction in the nature of mandamus directing the respondent No. 1 to hear and decide the disqualification proceedings viz. Application Nos. 8, 9 and 10 and 21, 22 and 23 of 2013 as expeditiously and within a period of four weeks from the date of the receipt of the writ of this Hon'ble Court to meet with the ends of justice; [C] Any other and further relief/s as deem fit in the facts and circumstances of the case may be granted. 4. Mr. P.J. Kanabar, learned advocate for the petitioner would submit that under the Gujarat Provision for Disqualification of Members of Local Authorities for Defection Act, 1986 & Rules of 1987. the authority has to decide the disqualification proceedings viz. Application Nos. 8, 9 and 10 and 21, 22 and 23 of 2013 as expeditiously as possible. Since, the proceedings are pending before the authority since September, 2013 and therefore, the authority be directed to decide the proceedings as expeditiously as possible. 5. Considering the above aspects, the following order would meet the end of justice: [a] Respondent No. 1 is hereby directed to decide all the proceedings with regard to Gariyadhar Taluka Panchayat as expeditiously as possible not later than three months from the date of receipt of this order. 6. Since election of Parliament is going to be held on 30.04.2014 and result is likely to be declared on 16.05.2014, little more time is granted to the authority. 7. In view of the above direction, the present petition is disposed of accordingly. Rule is made absolute. Direct service is permitted. 9.3 It is not in dispute that disqualification proceedings viz. Application Nos. 7. In view of the above direction, the present petition is disposed of accordingly. Rule is made absolute. Direct service is permitted. 9.3 It is not in dispute that disqualification proceedings viz. Application Nos. 8, 9 and 10 and 21, 22 and 23 of 2013 are pending before the designated officer/competent authority i.e. respondent No. 1. Under the circumstances, main questions, which are required to be decided in the present petitions are: i) can this Court, in its writ jurisdiction, interfere with the disqualification proceedings pending before the designated officer/competent authority and pass the interim order, as prayed for in Para 12(C) of the petitions? and ii) can this Court restrain the respondent Nos. 4 to 6 from proposing the No Confidence Motion, as has been proposed vide letter dated 12/02/2014 against the petitioners herein during the pendency of disqualification proceedings? 9.4 Before dealing with the aforesaid issues, the case law, on which the learned advocates for the parties have placed reliance, is required to be looked into. The learned advocate for the petitioners has placed reliance on a decision in the case of Rajendra Singh Rana (supra), more particularly, Para 34 of the same, which reads as under: 34. As we see it, the act of disqualification occurs on a member voluntarily giving up his membership of a political party or at the point of defiance of the whip issued to him. Therefore, the act that constitutes disqualification in terms of paragraph 2 of the Tenth Schedule is the act of giving up or defiance of the whip. The fact that a decision in that regard may be taken in the case of voluntary giving up by the Speaker at a subsequent point of time cannot and does not postpone the incurring of disqualification by the act of the Legislator. Similarly, the fact that the party could condone the defiance of a whip within 15 days or that the Speaker takes the decision only thereafter in those cases, cannot also pitch the time of disqualification as anything other than the point at which the whip is defied. Similarly, the fact that the party could condone the defiance of a whip within 15 days or that the Speaker takes the decision only thereafter in those cases, cannot also pitch the time of disqualification as anything other than the point at which the whip is defied. Therefore in the background of the object sought to be achieved by the Fifty Second Amendment of the Constitution and on a true understanding of paragraph 2 of the Tenth Schedule, with reference to the other paragraphs of the Tenth Schedule, the position that emerges is that the Speaker has to decide the question of disqualification with reference to the date on which the member voluntarily gives up his membership or defies the whip. It is really a decision ex post facto. The fact that in terms of paragraph 6 a decision on the question has to be taken by the Speaker or the Chairman, cannot lead to a conclusion that the question has to be determined only with reference to the date of the decision of the Speaker. An interpretation of that nature would leave the disqualification to an indeterminate point of time and to the whims of the decision making authority. The same would defeat the very object of enacting the law. Such an interpretation should be avoided to the extent possible. We are, therefore, of the view that the contention that (sic it is) only on a decision of the Speaker that the disqualification is incurred, cannot be accepted. This would mean that what the learned Chief Justice has called the snowballing effect, will also have to be ignored and the question will have to be decided with reference to the date on which the membership of the Legislature party is alleged to have been voluntarily given up. 9.5 The learned advocate for the petitioners has further relied upon a decision rendered by the Hon'ble the Apex Court in Shri Kihota Hollohon Vs. Zachilhu and Others, reported in, AIR 1993 SC 412 , more particularly, Para 42 of the same, which reads as under: 42. In the result, we hold on contentions E and F: That the Tenth Schedule does not, in providing for an additional grant for disqualification and for adjudication of disputed disqualifications, seek to create a non-justiciable constitutional area. The power to resolve such disputes vested in the Speaker or chairman is a judicial power. In the result, we hold on contentions E and F: That the Tenth Schedule does not, in providing for an additional grant for disqualification and for adjudication of disputed disqualifications, seek to create a non-justiciable constitutional area. The power to resolve such disputes vested in the Speaker or chairman is a judicial power. That Paragraph 6(1) of the Tenth Schedule, to the extent it seeks to impart finality to the decision of the Speakers/Chairmen is valid. But the concept of statutory finality embodied in Paragraph 6(1) does not detract from or abrogate judicial review under Articles 136, 226and 227 of the Constitution in so far as infirmities based on violations of constitutional mandates, mala fides, non-compliance with Rules of Natural Justice and perversity, are concerned. That the deeming provision in Paragraph 6(2) of the Tenth Schedule attracts an immunity analogous to that in Articles 122(1) and 212(1) of the Constitution as understood and explained in Keshav Singh's Case Spl. Ref. No. 1, [1965] 1 SCR 413, to protect the validity of proceedings from mere irregularities of procedure. The deeming provision, having regard to the words "be deemed to be proceedings in Parliament" or "proceedings in the Legislature of a State" confines the scope of the fiction accordingly. The Speaker/Chairmen while exercising powers and discharging functions under the Tenth Schedule act as Tribunal adjudicating rights and obligations under the Tenth Schedule and their decisions in that capacity are amenable to judicial review. However, having regard to the Constitutional Schedule in the Tenth Schedule, judicial review should not cover any stage prior to the making of a decision by the Speakers/Chairman. Having regard to the constitutional intendment and the status of the repository of the adjudicatory power, no quia timet actions are permissible, the only exception for any interlocutory interference being cases of interlocutory disqualifications or suspensions which may have grave, immediate and irreversible repercussions and consequence. 9.6 The learned advocate for the petitioners has then placed reliance on the decision in Chamanbhai Maganbhai Vinzula (supra), more particularly Para 23 of the same. It is pertinent to note that the learned advocate for the respondent Nos. 4 to 6 has also relied upon the same decision, more particularly, Paras 21 and 22. The said paragraphs viz. Paras 21, 22 and 23 read as under: 21. It is pertinent to note that the learned advocate for the respondent Nos. 4 to 6 has also relied upon the same decision, more particularly, Paras 21 and 22. The said paragraphs viz. Paras 21, 22 and 23 read as under: 21. From the principles enunciated in the above decision it is evident that the decision of the designated officer on the question of disqualification is a decision ex post facto and the disqualification would relate to the date when such disqualification was incurred viz. From the date they voluntarily gave up their membership of the Congress party and/or from the date when they voted or abstained from voting in any meeting of the Corporation contrary to any direction issued by the Congress party or by any person or authority authorised by it in this behalf. 22. To conclude, the designated officer while exercising powers under section 6 of the Gujarat Provision for Disqualification of Members of Local Authorities for Defection Act, 1986 does not have any power to grant any interim relief restraining any person against whom proceedings under the provisions of the said Act are pending before him, from acting in the capacity of councillor of a municipal corporation, member of a panchayat or councillor of a municipality, as the case may be. However, the decision of the designated officer on the question of disqualification is a decision ex post facto and the disqualification would relate to the date when such disqualification was incurred viz. From the date such person voluntarily gives up his membership of the political party to which he belongs and/or from the date when he voted or abstained from voting in any meeting of the municipal corporation, panchayat or as the case may be municipality, contrary to any direction issued by the political party to which he belongs or by any person or authority authorised by it in this behalf. 23. In the result, the petitions fail and are accordingly dismissed. For the reasons stated hereinabove, this court is of the view that the designated officer has no inherent power to grant interim injunction during the pendency of a petition under section 6 of the Act. 23. In the result, the petitions fail and are accordingly dismissed. For the reasons stated hereinabove, this court is of the view that the designated officer has no inherent power to grant interim injunction during the pendency of a petition under section 6 of the Act. However, the petitioners having approached this court at a stage prior to the election of the members of the Standing Committee, in the light of the law laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of Rajendra Singh Rana v. Swami Prasad Maurya, (2007) 4 SCC 270 , if at the conclusion of the proceedings, the designated officer comes to the conclusion that the second respondents are disqualified under the provisions of the Act, the disqualification would relate to the date when the act of disqualification occurred namely, on the date when the second respondents voluntarily gave up their memberships of the Indian National Congress or at the point of defiance of whip issued to them. Accordingly, the result of the elections for the six members of the Standing Committee held on 17th April, 2013 shall be subject to the final outcome of the proceedings under section 6 of the Act before the designated authority. Rule 8 of the Rules mandates that the designated officer shall determine the question as expeditiously as possible and an endeavour shall be made to determine the subject of disqualification within two months from the date on which the petition is made under rule 6. In the facts of the present case, it appears that the petition under section 6 of the Act has been made on 12th March, 2013 hence, as on date, the period of two months had not yet expired. However, having regard to the averments made in the memorandum of the petitions and the facts which were brought to the notice of the court, it appears that the designated officer is proceeding in a tardy manner and the matter is being adjourned from time to time on request made on behalf of the second respondents. Under the circumstances, with a view to balance the equities, the designated officer shall decide the petition under rule 6 of the rules as expeditiously as possible without wasting any more time. It appears that till date the second respondents have not filed their replies to the petitions under rule 6 of the Rules. Under the circumstances, with a view to balance the equities, the designated officer shall decide the petition under rule 6 of the rules as expeditiously as possible without wasting any more time. It appears that till date the second respondents have not filed their replies to the petitions under rule 6 of the Rules. If at all the second respondents desire to file their replies, they shall do so within a period of seven days from today failing which they would lose their right to file reply. The designated officer shall thereafter proceed to decide the question referred to it in terms of the procedure laid down under rule 7 of the Rules as expeditiously as possible and not later than a period of three weeks from the date of receipt of the operative part of this judgment. 9.7 The learned advocate for the respondent Nos. 4 to 6 has placed reliance on a decision in Speaker, Haryana Vidhan Sabha (supra), more particularly Head Note 'B' of the same, which reads as under: (B) Constitution of India, Arts. 191, 226, 227, Sch 10, Paras 4, 6-Disqualification of MLA on ground of defection-Petition for, pending decision before speaker-High Court as such stage cannot pass interim order in exercise of power of judicial review-Interim order passed preventing concerned MLAs from effectively functioning as members of State legislature pending decision of Speaker on petition for disqualification-Liable to be set aside-Such order cannot also be passed in exercise of powers under O. 41 R. 33, Civil P. C. 10. I have carefully gone through the above-referred decisions on which the learned advocates for the parties have placed reliance. It is pertinent to note here that the Hon'ble Apex Court, in the decision in the case of Speaker, Haryana Vidhan Sabha (supra) has also considered the decisions in Shri Kihota Hollohon (supra) so also in Rajendra Singh Rana (supra) and has decided the issue involved in it. It is pertinent to note here that the Hon'ble Apex Court, in the decision in the case of Speaker, Haryana Vidhan Sabha (supra) has also considered the decisions in Shri Kihota Hollohon (supra) so also in Rajendra Singh Rana (supra) and has decided the issue involved in it. So far as the case of Speaker, Haryana Vidhan Sabha (supra) is concerned, the facts are such that the Speaker of Haryana Vidhan Sabha as well as five other MLAs had challenged the decision rendered by the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Letters Patent Appeal No. 366 of 2011 by which the Division Bench prevented the said MLAs from discharging their functions as members of the Haryana Vidhan Sabha before the disqualification petitions filed against them were decided by the Speaker. Drawing attention of the Court on Para 5, the learned advocate for the respondent Nos. 4 to 6 herein has submitted that the Hon'ble Apex Court has raised the substantial questions of law by Paras 5(a) to 5(e). He has placed reliance on Paras 5(a) to 5(c) of the same, which are extracted hereunder: (a) Whether the High Court in exercise of its powers under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution, has the jurisdiction to issue directions of an interim nature to a Member of the House while a disqualification petition of such Member is pending before the Speaker of a State Legislative Assembly under Article 191 read with the Tenth Schedule to the Constitution of India? (b) Whether even in exercise of its powers of judicial review, the High Court, as a constitutional authority, can issue mandatory directions to the Speaker of a State Assembly, who is himself a constitutional authority, to dispose of a disqualification petition within a specified time? (c) Can the High Court, in its writ jurisdiction, interfere with the disqualification proceedings pending before the Speaker and pass an order temporarily disqualifying a Member of the State Legislative Assembly, despite the law laid down by this Court in Raja Soap Factory vs. V. Shantharaj & Ors. [ 1965(2) SCR 800 : ( AIR 1965 SC 1449 )] and in L. Chandra Kumar vs. Union of India [ (1997) 3 SCC 261 : ( AIR 1997 SC 1125 : 1997 AIR SCW 1345)], to the contrary? [ 1965(2) SCR 800 : ( AIR 1965 SC 1449 )] and in L. Chandra Kumar vs. Union of India [ (1997) 3 SCC 261 : ( AIR 1997 SC 1125 : 1997 AIR SCW 1345)], to the contrary? (d) xxx (e) xxx 10.1 Referring to the operative portion of the said decision, the Hon'ble Apex Court has clearly held in Para 48 that the High Court had no jurisdiction to pass such an order, which was in the domain of the Speaker. The High Court assumed jurisdiction which it never had in making the interim order which had the effect of preventing five MLAs in question from effectively functioning as Members of the Haryana Vidhan Sabha and accordingly, the directions given by the learned Single Judge to the Speaker, as endorsed by the Division Bench, were therefore, upheld to the extent that it directed the Speaker to decide the petitions for disqualification of five MLAs within a period of four months. Moreover, remaining portion of the order disqualifying five MLAs from effectively functioning as members of the Haryana Vidhan Sabha was set aside. The said five MLAs were therefore, held to be entitled to be fully functioned as Members of the Haryana Vidhan Sabha without any restrictions, subject to the final decision that may be rendered by the Speaker in the disqualification petitions filed under paragraph 6 of the Tenth Schedule to the Constitution. Moreover, it appears that the direction has also been given to the Speaker to dispose of the pending applications for disqualification of five MLAs within a period of three months from the date of communication of the said order. 11. So far as the case on hand is concerned, it is the fact that while admitting the present petitions, the respondent Nos. 4 to 6, as such, have not been prevented by passing the interim order against them but, as aforesaid, this Court has directed and allowed to hold the meeting dated 18/03/2014 with further direction that the votes of respondent Nos. 4 to 6 shall be kept in sealed cover and shall not be opened until further orders passed by this Court. Thus, the respondent Nos. 4 to 6 have, as such, exercised their rights but the fact remains that the order dated 28/03/2014, which has been passed by this Court though in separate proceeding viz. 4 to 6 shall be kept in sealed cover and shall not be opened until further orders passed by this Court. Thus, the respondent Nos. 4 to 6 have, as such, exercised their rights but the fact remains that the order dated 28/03/2014, which has been passed by this Court though in separate proceeding viz. Special Civil Application No. 4119 of 2014 filed by Kirtigiri Valamgiri Gosai, has been passed qua the same applications viz. Application Nos. 8, 9, 10, and 21, 22 and 23 of 2013 and it appears that the same has not been implemented in letter and spirit. 12. In the aforesaid view of the matter, while the Court is of the opinion that the ratio laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in Speaker, Haryana Vidhan Sabha (supra), on which the learned advocate for the respondents has placed reliance, is applicable to the present case, present petitions deserve to be partly allowed and accordingly, they are partly allowed with the following directions and observations: i) The designated officer/competent authority shall decide the applications being Nos. 8, 9 and 10, and 21, 22 and 23 of 2013 under Rule 6 of the Rules, as expeditiously as possible, without wasting any more time. The designated officer/competent authority, therefore, shall proceed to decide the question referred to them in terms of the procedure laid down under Rule 7, as expeditiously as possible but not later than three weeks from the date of receipt of copy of this judgment. ii) Prima facie, it appears that the respondent Nos. 4 to 6 have not filed their replies to the said proceedings. Hence, if the respondent Nos. 4 to 6, if at all, desire to file the same, they can do so within a period of seven days from today, failing which, they will lose their right to file reply. iii) It is clarified that the designated officer/competent authority is at liberty to seek extension of time in the circumstance so necessitated, by way of filing appropriate application before this Court. iv) It is further clarified that subject to the final decision to be rendered by the designated officer/competent authority in the disqualification proceedings, the sealed cover kept reserved in the meeting dated 18/03/2014 be opened and the result of the disqualification proceedings would govern the rest of the proceedings of the said meeting dated 18/03/2014. iv) It is further clarified that subject to the final decision to be rendered by the designated officer/competent authority in the disqualification proceedings, the sealed cover kept reserved in the meeting dated 18/03/2014 be opened and the result of the disqualification proceedings would govern the rest of the proceedings of the said meeting dated 18/03/2014. 12.1 Rule is made absolute to the aforesaid extent with no order as to costs. [G.B. Shah, J. ] Further order: 1. After pronouncement, Mr. Kanabar, learned advocate for the petitioners requested to stay the operation of the present judgment for a period of four weeks to which, Mr. B.M. Mangukiya, objected, drawing attention of the Court upon the decision in Speaker, Haryana Vidhan Sabha (supra). 2. In the facts and circumstances and considering the aforesaid judgment, the request made by the learned advocate for the petitioners is rejected. 3. Mr. Mangukiya, request for direct service. The same is granted.