JUDGMENT Tarlok Singh Chauhan, Judge. The present Letters Patent Appeal has been preferred by the appellants against the judgment dated 21.06.2010 passed by the learned Single Judge in CWP (T) No.760 of 2008 and the order thereafter passed in COPC No.284 of 2011 on 26.08.2011 whereby the original orders passed on 21.06.2010 were modified. 2. The facts, in brief, may be noticed. The respondent was working as Ward Sister in the department of Health and Family Welfare. She filed a writ petition wherein she claimed that the department did not hold the Departmental Promotion Committee (for short ‘DPC’) for the post of Matron in time despite the fact that the eligible candidates were available and as such she was deprived of her right to be considered for promotion to the post of Matron. 3. This petition was contested by the appellants by filing reply wherein it was contended that retrospective promotions are not sanctioned under the law and if the petition is allowed, the same would invite multiplicity of litigation. It was also stated that since the ACRs and Integrity Certificate of the petitioner and similarly situated persons were not available, the case of the petitioner could not be considered for promotion by holding the DPC. 4. This petition was allowed by the learned Single Judge vide order dated 21.06.2010 by directing the appellants to consider the case of the petitioner for the post of Matron from the date her juniors were promoted with all consequential benefits within a period of ten weeks. 5. The appellants in terms of the judgment passed by this Court on 21.06.2010 considered the case of the respondent and rejected her claim vide order dated 07.05.2011. Thereafter, the respondent filed contempt petition No. 284 of 2011, wherein a detailed reply was filed by Shri P.C.Dhiman, the then Principal Secretary (Health) to the Government of Himachal Pradesh. The said contempt petition was disposed of on 26.08.2011 whereby the learned Single Judge modified the original judgment dated 21.06.2010 passed in CWP(T) No.760 of 2008 and directed the appellants to consider the case of the respondent for promotion to the higher post with effect from February, 2008, on adhoc basis. It was further directed that the said order shall not be treated as precedent for future. 6. It was further directed that the said order shall not be treated as precedent for future. 6. It is against these orders that the present appeal has been filed on the grounds that the orders dated 21.06.2010 and subsequent order dated 26.08.2011 are not in consonance with law and are therefore required to be set aside. It is contended that the juniors of the respondent were infact promoted on 27.08.2008 on adhoc basis on which date admittedly the respondent had superannuated. The orders were contrary to the settled principle of law that promotion could not be claimed as a matter of right and same was subject to administrative discretion based on numerous considerations like availability of posts, sanction of the competent authority, availability of ser vice records etc. It was claimed that respondent could not be given retrospective promotion merely on the ground that the DPC could not be held in time. It was further contended that the promotion was not an absolute right and the cause of action in such cases would only arise in case process for promotion through DPC is vitiated through extraneous or unjustifiable reasons. Lastly, it was claimed that the DPC had been conducted in accordance with law and moreover these proceedings have not been challenged by the respondent. 7. We have heard Shri Shrawan Dogra, learned Advocate General, assisted by Shri Romesh Verma and Shri M.A.Khan, learned Additional Advocate Generals, for the appellants and Shri G.R.Palsra, Advocate, for the respondent and gone through the records of the case. 8. The appellants have not denied that there were vacancies at the time when the respondent had become eligible and she had been denied promotion only on account of non-convening of DPC within the time schedule for certain reasons as set out by the appellants in their reply to the writ petition as also in the grounds of appeal herein. Therefore, in this backdrop, the only question required to be determined is whether merely on account of non-holding of DPC within the time schedule would automatically give the respondent a right to claim promotion with retrospective effect. The question is no longer res integra and has been decided by this Court vide judgment dated 17.05.2014 in CWP No.9271 of 2013, titled Prakash Chand versus State of Himachal Pradesh and another and connected matter, wherein this Court held as under:- “7. The question is no longer res integra and has been decided by this Court vide judgment dated 17.05.2014 in CWP No.9271 of 2013, titled Prakash Chand versus State of Himachal Pradesh and another and connected matter, wherein this Court held as under:- “7. In the given facts and circumstances of the case, it cannot be disputed that the petitioners despite they being eligible have been denied promotion, but the question yet remains as to whether in the given facts and circumstances, the petitioners can be given retrospective promotion i.e. promotion from the back date. This proposition of law has been settled by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in plethora of judgments:- (i) 1987 (4) SCC 566 K. Madhavan & Anr vs. UOI & Ors. (ii) 1989 Supp (2) SCC 625 Union of India & Ors v K.K. Vadera & Ors (iii) 1995 (4) SCC 246 Vinod Kumar Sangal vs. UOI & Ors. (iv) 1998 (7) SCC 44 Baij Nath Sharma vs. Hon'ble High Court & Jodhpur & Ors (v) AIR 2004 SC 255 P.N. Premachandran vs. The State of Kerela & Ors (vi) AIR 2004 SC 3460 Sanjay K. Sinha & Ors v State of Bihar & Ors (vii) 2006 (13) SCALE 246 State of Uttaranchal & Ors vs. Dinesh Kr. Sharma (viii) 2008 (14) SCC 29 Nirmal Chandra Sinha vs. UOI & Ors. (ix) 2010 (4) SCC 290 UOI & Anr. vs. Hemraj Singh Chauhan 8. In K.Madhavan & Anr vs. Union of India & Ors. (1987) 4 SCC 566 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that nobody can claim a right for appointment to a post as a matter of right. It was held that as a rule retrospective appointment or promotion to a post should not be resorted to unless on a sound reasoning and foundation it becomes necessary to sparingly do so. Insofar as the scheduled D.P.C. is concerned, it observed that only if they were cancelled because of malafide, arbitrarily or without any reasonable justification to the prejudice of an employee, could the Government in such a case be directed to undo the injustice caused and grant promotion from a retrospective date. 9. Normally, the promotion to the post should be from the date the promotion is granted and not from the date on which such post falls vacant. This was so held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Union of India & Ors. 9. Normally, the promotion to the post should be from the date the promotion is granted and not from the date on which such post falls vacant. This was so held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Union of India & Ors. vs. K.K.Vadera & Ors. 1989 Supp (2) SCC 625 which reads thus:- “5……We do not know of any law or any rule under which a promotion is to be effective from the date of creation of the promotional post. After a post falls vacant for any reason whatsoever, a promotion to that post should be from the date the promotion is granted and not from the date on which such post falls vacant. In the same way when additional posts are created, promotions to those posts can be granted only after the Assessment Board has met and made its recommendations for promotions being granted. If on the contrary, promotions are directed to become effective from the date of the creation of additional posts, then it would have the effect of giving promotions even before the Assessment Board has met and assessed the suitability of the candidates for promotion….” 10. In Baij Nath Sharma vs. Hon’ble Rajasthan High Court at Jodhpur & Anr. 1998 (7) SCC 44 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court relying upon the law declared in K.K.Vadera’s case (supra) held that a member of the Rajasthan Judicial Service could not be promoted from the date when the vacancy accrued in the Rajasthan Higher Judicial Service against which vacancy he was ultimately promoted. 11. This view was reiterated in the decisions reported in Sanjay K.Sinha & Ors. vs. State of Bihar & Ors. AIR 2004 SC 3460 , State of Uttaranchal & Ors. vs. Dinesh Kumar Sharma 2006(13) Scale 246 , Nirmal Chandra Sinha vs. Union of India & Ors. 2008 (14) SCC 29 . In State of Uttaranchal & Anr. vs. Dinesh Kumar Sharma (2007) 1 SCC 683 , it was held that a person appointed on promotion would not get seniority of any earlier year but would get seniority of year in which his/her appointment is made. 12. From the aforesaid discussion, the following legal position can be culled out:- i) The normal rule of law is that nobody can be promoted from a retrospective effect except when there exist facts which necessitate so or there is a rule which permits so. 12. From the aforesaid discussion, the following legal position can be culled out:- i) The normal rule of law is that nobody can be promoted from a retrospective effect except when there exist facts which necessitate so or there is a rule which permits so. ii) If due to administrative reasons D.P.C. cannot be held in a year, then the person cannot claim retrospective promotion in the absence of malafides since malafides taints every act requiring a person wronged to be placed in the position but for the malafide or tainted exercise of power.” 9. Now adverting to the facts of the present case, it would be seen from the memorandum of appeal that there is not even a whisper much less a ground taken by the respondent attributing malafides against the appellants. Therefore, in the given facts and circumstances in absence of malafides attributed to the appellants, no illegality can be said to have been committed by the appellants in convening the DPC on 27.08.2008. 10. The matter does not rest here. It is not understood as to on what basis the respondent filed the contempt petition after the appellants had already taken a decision on 07.05.2011 in compliance to the judgment dated 21.06.2010. The question of legality or correctness of the order could only have been challenged by way of a substantive petition or through any other remedy as available, but in no case the order could be held to be contemptuous thereby giving cause of action to the respondent to prefer the contempt petition. 11. It is settled law that the Court exercising contempt jurisdiction cannot pass supplemental order to the main order passed in the writ petition. The Courts are not permitted to travel beyond the four-corners of the order which is alleged to have been flouted or enter into the questions that have not been dealt with or decided in the judgment or the order violation of which is alleged. Only such directions which are explicit in a judgment or order or are plainly self-evident ought to be taken into account for the purpose of consideration as to whether there has been any disobedience or wilful violation of the same, but in no case decided issue can be reopened. Only such directions which are explicit in a judgment or order or are plainly self-evident ought to be taken into account for the purpose of consideration as to whether there has been any disobedience or wilful violation of the same, but in no case decided issue can be reopened. The position of law has been reiterated in a three Hon’ble Judges Bench decision in Sudhir Vasudeva, Chairman and Managing Director, Oil and Natural Gas Corporation Limited and others versus M. George Ravishekaran and others (2014) 3 SCC 373 which reads thus:- “19. The power vested in the High Courts as well as this Court to punish for contempt is a special and rare power available both under the Constitution as well as the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. It is a drastic power which, if misdirected, could even curb the liberty of the individual charged with commission of contempt. The very nature of the power casts a sacred duty in the Courts to exercise the same with the greatest of care and caution. This is also necessary as, more often than not, adjudication of a contempt plea involves a process of self-determination of the sweep, meaning and effect of the order in respect of which disobedience is alleged. The Courts must not, therefore, travel beyond the four corners of the order which is alleged to have been flouted or enter into questions that have not been dealt with or decided in the judgment or the order violation of which is alleged. Only such directions which are explicit in a judgment or order or are plainly self-evident ought to be taken into account for the purpose of consideration as to whether there has been any disobedience or wilful violation of the same. Decided issues cannot be reopened; nor can the plea of equities be considered. The Courts must also ensure that while considering a contempt plea the power available to the Court in other corrective jurisdictions like review or appeal is not trenched upon. No order or direction supplemental to what has been already expressed should be issued by the Court while exercising jurisdiction in the domain of the contempt law; such an exercise is more appropriate in other jurisdictions vested in the Court, as noticed above. No order or direction supplemental to what has been already expressed should be issued by the Court while exercising jurisdiction in the domain of the contempt law; such an exercise is more appropriate in other jurisdictions vested in the Court, as noticed above. The above principles would appear to be the cumulative outcome of the precedents cited at the Bar, namely, Jhareswar Prasad Paul v. Tarak Nath Ganguly (2002) 5 SCC 352 , V.M. Manohar Prasad v. N.Ratnam Raju (2004) 13 SCC 610 , Bihar Finance Service House Construction Coop. Society Ltd. v. Gautam Goswami (2008) 5 SCC 339 and Union of India v. Subedar Devassy PV (2006) 1 SCC 613 .” 12. Thus, in view of the aforesaid discussion and taking into consideration the settled position of law, we find merit in this appeal and accordingly for all reasons stated above, the order passed by the learned Single Judge dated 21.06.2010 in CWP (T) No.760 of 2008 and order dated 26.08.2011 in COPC No. 284 of 2011 whereby the order dated 21.06.2010 was modified, are set aside and resultantly the writ petition filed by the writ petitioner (respondent herein) is dismissed, leaving the parties to bear their own costs.