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2014 DIGILAW 726 (PAT)

Jainandan Paswan v. Sheo Kumari Devi

2014-07-01

MUNGESHWAR SAHOO

body2014
Mungeshwar Sahoo, J. – The First Appeal No.22 of 1983 has been filed by the defendants-appellants against the preliminary decree passed by the learned 1st Sub Judge, Muzaffarpur whereas First Appeal No.1 of 1989 has been filed by the defendants-appellants against the final decree passed by the Sub Judge V, Muzaffarpur in Partition Suit No.33 of 1979. Both the First Appeals were directed to be heard together, therefore, both the appeals are heard together. The learned counsels in both the First Appeals are same. 2. The plaintiff-respondent, Sheo Kumari Devi filed the aforesaid partition suit claiming 1/3rd share in the suit property described in Schedule I and II of the plaint. She claimed the said relief alleging that Arjun Paswan, the common ancestor died leaving behind his son, Chandradeo Paswan who is defendant no.1. The wife of defendant no.1, Dukhia Devi was deaf and dumb who is defendant no.2 under the guardianship of her husband. She died during the pendency of the suit. They have two sons namely, Sukhnandan Paswan and Jainandan Paswan. Plaintiff, Sheo Kumari Devi is the only daughter of Sukhnandan Paswan. Jainandan Paswan is defendant no.3 and his sons are defendant nos.4 and 5. The mother of plaintiff namely, Parwati Devi was married with Sukhnandan Paswan. After the plaintiff was born, she entered into second marriage with Sukhdeo Paswan in the month of May, 1956. Thereafter, she again entered third marriage. 3. The suit properties are the ancestral properties acquired by the ancestor, Arjun Paswan by registered sale deed dated 08.06.1917 measuring 4 kathas and he also acquired 9 kathas 19 dhurs by auction purchase in Title Suit No.269 of 1932. He also purchased 2 kathas 13 dhurs on 21.01.1955 in the name of his wife, Mania Devi. The parties are in joint possession of the suit property. Arjun Paswan died in 1940. Sukhnandan died on 12.08.1957. After the death of Sukhnandan, the plaintiff was brought up and educated by her grandfather and thereafter she was married with Vishundeo Das Kesav. Since the defendant no.3 is persuading the defendant no.1 to create document with a view to deprive plaintiff of her due share and defendant no.1 is thinking to sell 3 kathas land for Rs.70,000, the plaintiff asked for partition but refused. Hence the suit was filed. 4. The defendant nos.1 and 3 filed contesting written statement. Since the defendant no.3 is persuading the defendant no.1 to create document with a view to deprive plaintiff of her due share and defendant no.1 is thinking to sell 3 kathas land for Rs.70,000, the plaintiff asked for partition but refused. Hence the suit was filed. 4. The defendant nos.1 and 3 filed contesting written statement. Their defence in short is that Sukhnandan Paswan died issueless on 14.02.1955. He was married with Parwati Devi when he was aged about 13 years and Parwati was aged about 12 years. Therefore, there was no question of the plaintiff being their daughter. Later on, Parwati Devi married with Sukhdeo Paswan from whom the plaintiff was born as such, plaintiff is the daughter of Sukhdeo Paswan and not of Sukhnandan Paswan. They have already transferred 3 kathas 10 dhurs by registered sale deed dated 25.10.1978. The plaintiff has got no concern with the suit property. Defendant no.1 has purchased the property 1 bigha 5 kathas 8 ½ dhurs land and it is incorrect to say that Sukhnandan has purchased the same in the name of defendant no.1. Defendant no.2 filed written statement in support of the case of defendant nos.1 and 3. 5. On the basis of the aforesaid pleadings of the parties, the trial court framed the following issues: – I. Is the suit, as framed maintainable? II. Has the plaintiff got a valid cause of action for the suit? III. Is the suit barred by the law of limitation? IV. Is the plaintiff the daughter of Sukhnandan Paswan? V. Whether Sukhnandan Paswan died on 12.08.1957 as alleged by the plaintiff or whether he died on 14.2.1955 as alleged by the defendants? VI. Is there any unity of title and unity of possession between the plaintiff and the defendants over the properties described in Schedules I and II of the plaint? VII. Is the plaintiff entitled to a decree for partition, if so, to what extent and with respect to what property? VIII. To what relief or reliefs, if any, is the plaintiff entitled? 6. The learned court below decided issue no.4 in favour of the plaintiff and recorded a finding that the plaintiff, Sheo Kumari Devi is the daughter of late Sukhnandan Paswan vide paragraph 39. The trial court also found issue no.5 in favour of the plaintiff and recorded a finding that Sukhnandan Paswan died on 12.08.1957 vide paragraph 49. 6. The learned court below decided issue no.4 in favour of the plaintiff and recorded a finding that the plaintiff, Sheo Kumari Devi is the daughter of late Sukhnandan Paswan vide paragraph 39. The trial court also found issue no.5 in favour of the plaintiff and recorded a finding that Sukhnandan Paswan died on 12.08.1957 vide paragraph 49. Accordingly, the court below decreed the plaintiff’s suit holding that there is unity of title and possession between the parties. 7. The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants submitted that the learned court below has not properly appreciated the evidences and wrongly recorded the finding that plaintiff is daughter of Sukhnandan Paswan. All the witnesses examined on behalf of the defendants have stated that she is the daughter of Sukhdeo Paswan and likewise, the court below wrongly held that Sukhnandan Paswan died on 12.08.1957 although, the defendants produced the “Hathchitha” showing that Sukhnandan in fact, died on 14.02.1955. Moreover, the plaintiff was never in possession of the property and the defendants treating the suit property as their own have already sold a part of the same to third parties. The learned counsel further submitted that the witnesses examined by the plaintiffs are not competent to prove the fact that plaintiff is the daughter of Sukhnandan Paswan and their evidences are not admissible according to Section 50/60 of the Indian Evidence Act. 8. So far the final decree is concerned, the learned counsel submitted that after death of defendant no.1 another final decree has been prepared by the court below which has not been challenged by him. According to the learned counsel, the final decree which has been challenged in First Appeal No.1 of 1989 has been superseded subsequently by passing another final decree after death of defendant no.1. In such circumstances, when the appellants have not challenged the subsequent final decree, if the appeal from preliminary decree is allowed then automatically the judgment and final decree will go and if the First Appeal arising out of preliminary decree is dismissed then appeal from final decree be also dismissed. In other words, the learned counsel submitted that he will not press the First Appeal arising out of final decree on merit. 9. The learned senior counsel, Mr. In other words, the learned counsel submitted that he will not press the First Appeal arising out of final decree on merit. 9. The learned senior counsel, Mr. P.N.Shahi appearing for the respondents submitted that the learned court below has rightly relied upon the death certificate and the school register which was called for by the defendants themselves and recorded the finding that on 12.08.1957, Sukhnandan died and that the plaintiff is daughter of Sukhnandan Paswan. The evidences adduced by the plaintiffs are admissible under Section 50/60 of the Indian Evidence Act because of the fact that the witnesses are related to the parties and documentary evidences have also been produced. The witnesses have also stated their special means of knowledge about the relationship of the plaintiffs. Moreover, in support of the case pleaded by the defendants, no satisfactory evidence has been adduced to prove that plaintiff is the daughter of Sukhdeo Paswan. The learned court below has, therefore, rightly considering the oral as well as documentary evidences recorded the finding. In such circumstances, the findings of the court below cannot be interfered with. 10. So far the First Appeal arising out of final decree is concerned, the learned counsel submitted that the order dated 16.06.1986 was passed by the court below after the death of defendant no.1 and the share of the parties have been re-determined, therefore, when the order which amounts to preliminary decree was not challenged, the First Appeal No.1 of 1989 is not maintainable in view of Section 97. However, in view of the submission of the learned counsel for the appellants, the learned counsel, Mr. Shahi submitted that since the appellant himself is not pressing First Appeal No.1 of 1989 on merit, only First Appeal No.22 of 1983 be decided on merit and the application i.e. I.A. No.6774 of 2007 filed by the respondents in First Appeal No.1 of 1989 be disposed of accordingly. 11. So far I.A. No.1045 of 2013 filed by the appellants in First Appeal No.22 of 1983 is concerned, the learned counsel submitted that both the appeals being heard and disposed of, therefore, he is not pressing this application for stay. It appears that this stay application has not yet been disposed of. Since both the appeals are being disposed of by this common judgment, it is not necessary to pass any stay order. It appears that this stay application has not yet been disposed of. Since both the appeals are being disposed of by this common judgment, it is not necessary to pass any stay order. Therefore, this stay application is disposed of in view of the above facts and it is directed that the same will be governed by the result of the First Appeal. 12. In view of the above rival contentions of the learned counsel for the appellants and the learned counsel for the respondents, the points arise for consideration in this First Appeal are as follows: – I. Whether the plaintiff-respondent, Smt. Sheo Kumari Devi is daughter of Sukhnandan Paswan or not? II. Whether Sukhnandan Paswan died on 12.08.1957 or 14.02.1955 and whether the judgment and decree passed by the court below is sustainable in the eye of law? 13. According to the plaintiff, she is the daughter of Sukhnandan Paswan. When she was minor, her mother deserted her father and married with Sukhdeo Paswan of another village. She was brought up and educated by grandfather and grandmother and married subsequently. The suit properties are the ancestral properties and she claimed 1/4th share. On the other hand, according to the defendants, she is not the daughter of Sukhnandan Paswan rather Sukhnandan Paswan died on 14.02.1955 issueless and her mother, Parwati Devi remarried with Sukhdeo. The plaintiff is daughter of Sukhdeo from Parwati Devi. Now, therefore, in view of this dispute between the parties, if it is held that plaintiff is not daughter of Sukhnandan then the second point for consideration i.e. when Sukhnandan died will be only academic and will have no relevance for decision because once it is held that plaintiff is not the daughter of Sukhnandan then she will not be entitled for any share in the property. However, if it is held that she is daughter of Sukhnandan then the question will be when Sukhnandan died because if Sukhnandan died prior to coming into force of Hindu Succession Act, the property will not be inherited by the plaintiff since it is not the case of any party that there had been partition between Sukhnandan and defendant no.3. Therefore, prior to passing of the Hindu Succession Act, the daughter has no share in the joint family property. In view of the above position, both the points are taken up together. 14. Therefore, prior to passing of the Hindu Succession Act, the daughter has no share in the joint family property. In view of the above position, both the points are taken up together. 14. The plaintiff has examined witnesses and has also produced documentary evidences in support of the points in controversy between the parties. P.W.4 is the plaintiff herself. She has reiterated the same thing as pleaded in the plaint. According to her evidence, she is the only issue of Sukhnandan and Parwati Devi. Her mother deserted her father when she was aged about two months only and she remarried with Sukhdeo Paswan. Her father died when she was aged about 1 ½ years so she was brought up by her grandfather and grandmother. She was educated by them and then she was married. She was calling Chandradeo Paswan as ‘dada’ and Dukhia Devi as ‘dadi’ and the defendant no.3, Jainandan Paswan as ‘uncle’. P.W.6 is the husband of the plaintiff. He has also stated that Sukhnandan Paswan was his father-in-law and defendant no.1 was his grandfather-in-law. Defendant no.3 is uncle-in-law. She was married on 04.03.1969 in the disputed house. Defendant no.1 had performed the ‘kanyadan’. The most important witness is the ‘nani’ of plaintiff who has been examined as P.W.8. She has also fully supported the case of the plaintiff regarding her parentage. She has stated that she was present at the time of marriage and has stated that defendant no.1 performed ‘kanyadan’. P.W.9 is of same Muhalla Nayatola and his house is at a distance of 30-40 yards from the house of defendant no.1. Therefore, he being the resident of same Muhalla, his evidence is admissible under Section 50 of the Indian Evidence Act. He has also stated that only one daughter was born to Sukhnandan Paswan. After his death, his daughter was brought up by her grandfather, Chandradeo Paswan who performed marriage. P.W.10 is maternal grandfather of the plaintiff i.e. husband of P.W.8. He has also supported the plaintiff’s case about her parentage. His evidence is in the same line as that of his wife, P.W.8. 15. It may be mentioned here that the plaintiff has produced Ext.1, school leaving certificate of Rajkiya Yamuna Madhyamik Vidyalaya, Nayatola. In this Ext.1, plaintiff has been described as the daughter of Sukhnandan Paswan. In this school she was admitted on 17.02.1968 and left the school on 31.07.1969. 16. 15. It may be mentioned here that the plaintiff has produced Ext.1, school leaving certificate of Rajkiya Yamuna Madhyamik Vidyalaya, Nayatola. In this Ext.1, plaintiff has been described as the daughter of Sukhnandan Paswan. In this school she was admitted on 17.02.1968 and left the school on 31.07.1969. 16. Exhibit 3 is copy of birth register maintained in the Muzaffarpur Municipality. Since it is issued according to Section 17 of the Birth and Death Act, 1969, it is admissible in evidence. In this Ext.3, it is mentioned that a daughter was born to Sukhnandan Paswan of Nayatola, Muzaffarpur on 13.03.1956. 17. Exhibit 4 is the admission register of Yamuna Madhyamik Vidyalaya, Nayatola. It appears that the defendants had called for this register from the said school but defendant did not use the same so the plaintiff got three entries exhibited. The entry nos.102, 103 and 104 show that Sumitra Kumari, daughter of Chandradeo Paswan, Sheo Kumari, the plaintiff and Renu Kumari, three girls were admitted on 17.02.1968. Plaintiff has been described as daughter of Sukhnandan Paswan of Nayatola. 18. So far the date of death is concerned, according to the plaintiff, Sukhnandan died on 12.08.1957 whereas according to the defendants, he died on 14.02.1955. The plaintiff has produced Exhibit 2, the extract of death register of Sukhnandan Paswan which shows that Sukhdeo Paswan, son of Chandradeo Paswan of Muhalla Nayatola died on 12.08.1957. It may be mentioned here that this Exhibit 2 is a public document as such, there is presumption of correctness. The witnesses examined on behalf of the plaintiff, P.W.4 has stated that Sukhnandan Paswan died on 12.08.1957. P.W.10 has also stated that Sukhnandan died in the year 1957. Therefore, the oral evidence produced by the plaintiffs on this question i.e. regarding the year of death of Sukhnandan is corroborated by Exhibit 2. 19. On the other hand, the defendants have examined many witnesses. According to evidence of D.W.6, Sukhnandan was married with Parwati and no issue was born. After six months of marriage, he died in the year 1955. The evidence of D.W.7 is in the same line as that of D.W.6. D.W.9 has stated that plaintiff was born to Parwati through Sukhdeo Paswan of village Nazirpur. Same is the evidence of D.W.10. D.W.13 has said that no daughter was born to Sukhnandan Paswan. D.W.15 is Sarpanch of village Harpur. The evidence of D.W.7 is in the same line as that of D.W.6. D.W.9 has stated that plaintiff was born to Parwati through Sukhdeo Paswan of village Nazirpur. Same is the evidence of D.W.10. D.W.13 has said that no daughter was born to Sukhnandan Paswan. D.W.15 is Sarpanch of village Harpur. According to him, plaintiff is daughter of Sukhdeo Paswan. The evidence of D.W.16 is in the same line. D.W.17 is the defendant no.1 himself. 20. It appears that Exhibit A has been produced by the defendants to show that plaintiff was reading in Lower Primary School, Abdulnagar, Madhopur. It appears that no such case has been made out by the defendants. It further appears that for the purpose of this case, this document has been produced. Further, in support of the said certificate, the admission register was never produced by the defendants from the said school. The Headmaster was also not examined in support of the said certificate. These are the oral and documentary evidences produced by the defendants. 21. From the discussion of the evidences oral as well as documentary mentioned above, it appears that the oral evidences produced by the plaintiffs on both the points are supported by the documentary evidences. In support of the school leaving certificate, the admission register has been produced wherein the three girls admitted on the same date. The witnesses categorically stated about plaintiff’s parentage. So far the date of death is concerned, the public documents have been produced and the witnesses have also stated in support of the said document. On the contrary, only statements have been given by the defendants that plaintiff is daughter of Sukhdeo Paswan. The certificate, Exhibit A is not reliable document. The witnesses examined on behalf of the defendants regarding the relationship of plaintiff with Sukhdeo are not in accordance with Section 50 of the Evidence Act. Therefore, unless the evidences are in accordance with Section 50 of Evidence Act, the same is inadmissible, as has been held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Dolgobinda Paricha vs. Nimai Charan Misra and others, AIR 1959 Supreme Court 914. The witnesses examined by the defendants have only stated that plaintiff is daughter of Sukhdeo. Therefore, unless the evidences are in accordance with Section 50 of Evidence Act, the same is inadmissible, as has been held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Dolgobinda Paricha vs. Nimai Charan Misra and others, AIR 1959 Supreme Court 914. The witnesses examined by the defendants have only stated that plaintiff is daughter of Sukhdeo. So far the statements of some of the witnesses, discussed above, to the effect that Sukhnandan had no daughter is concerned, it may be mentioned here that these are only negative evidences. It is settled principles of law that negative needs no proof. Therefore, the plaintiff has produced positive evidence in support of her case that she is the daughter of Sukhnandan. 22. It appears that Exhibit C is a Hathchitha which has been produced by D.W.19. According to D.W.19, Faguni Paswan has given this Hathchitha to him. In view of the above position, this Hathchitha is not at all admissible in evidence. There is nothing on record in support of this Hathchitha as to on what basis, the entries have been made therein and this Hathchitha is contrary to the entries made in Exhibit 2, the public document. 23. In view of the above discussion of the evidences adduced by the parties, I find that the plaintiffs have been able to prove that she is the daughter of late Sukhnandan Paswan and her father Sukhnandan Paswan died on 12.08.1957. The defendants failed to prove that plaintiff is daughter of Sukhdeo Paswan and Sukhnandan Paswan died on 14.02.1955. The finding of the trial court on this point is, therefore, confirmed. 24. Accordingly, the First Appeal No.22 of 1983 arising out of the preliminary decree is hereby dismissed. 25. Since the learned counsel for the appellants did not press the First Appeal No.1 of 1989 on merit, on the ground that the main question i.e. two points in First Appeal No.22 of 1983 may only be decided on merit, the First Appeal No.1 of 1989 arising out of final decree is hereby also dismissed. The I.A. No.6774 of 2007 is hereby accordingly disposed of, as the same was filed by the appellants praying for dismissal of First Appeal No.1 of 1989 on the ground that it is not maintainable. 26. In the result, both the First Appeals i.e. First Appeal No.22 of 1983 and First Appeal No.1 of 1989 are dismissed. The I.A. No.6774 of 2007 is hereby accordingly disposed of, as the same was filed by the appellants praying for dismissal of First Appeal No.1 of 1989 on the ground that it is not maintainable. 26. In the result, both the First Appeals i.e. First Appeal No.22 of 1983 and First Appeal No.1 of 1989 are dismissed. No order as to costs.