Judgment Ujjal Bhuyan, J. 1. This writ appeal has been filed against the judgment and order dated 28.06.2013, passed by the learned Single Judge in WP(C) No. 154/2013, allowing the writ petition filed by respondent No. 1 as the writ petitioner by quashing the decision of the Corporate Business Committee of the appellant taken in its 430th meeting held on 27.12.2012 not to award the contract to the respondent No. 1 and remanding the matter back to the appellant to take a fresh decision by taking into consideration all relevant materials and in conformity with the findings recorded in the judgment. Matter relates to award of a contract for two numbers of 2000 HP VFD rig packages following E-Tender by the appellant, Oil India Ltd. (OIL). Respondent No. 1 as the writ petitioner had filed the writ petition, out of which, this appeal arises and the appellant was the respondent No. 1 in the writ petition. 2. Facts of the case may be briefly noted. 3. OIL, a Govt. of India undertaking, floated open global E-Tender No. SDG 9008P11/07, inviting bids under single stage two bids system for awarding contract for two numbers of 2000 HP rig packages. 27 parties purchased tender papers. Pre-Bid Conference was held on 21.09.2010 and 22.09.2010. Ultimately, five parties submitted tender, including respondent No. 1 (Drillmec SPA, Italy) and respondent No. 2 (China Petroleum Technology and Development Corporation). Tender was also submitted by Bharat Heavy Electricals Ltd. (BHEL), not a party in the appellate proceeding. 4. Technical bids of all the five bidders were opened on 15.06.2011. The bids of respondent Nos. 1 & 2 and BHEL were found to be technically responsive. However, the bid of BHEL was rejected because of non-extension of bid validity period. 5. Following the approval of Corporate Business Committee (CBC), price bids of respondent Nos. 1 & 2 were opened on 07.03.2012. On the ground that there were certain discrepancies in the price bids of the two parties, CBC decided to refer the matter to the Independent External Monitors, which recommended that because of the discrepancies noticed, fresh price bids be invited from the bidders who were found technically responsive. Accordingly, fresh price bids were invited not only from respondent Nos. 1 & 2, but also from BHEL. Accordingly, fresh price bids were invited not only from respondent Nos. 1 & 2, but also from BHEL. In the fresh price bids submitted, OIL noticed insertion of a new condition by respondent No. 1, which would be adverted to in detail in the succeeding paragraphs of this judgment. Suffice it to say at this stage that as per the new condition, respondent No. 1 indicated that it reserved the right to manufacture and test the rigs or part of them in any of its facilities as per availability. It was further noticed that respondent No. 1 had indicated the prices of only 19 major rig components as against the tender requirement of 63 major rig components as prescribed in the price bid annexure-A4 format attached with the tender documents. 6. Respondent No. 2 submitted complaints, against the fresh price bid submitted by respondent No. 1, which was taken note of by the appellant OIL. Legal opinion of the Attorney General of India was taken by OIL as to whether insertion of a new clause in the price bid and non-mentioning of the prices of all the major rig components in the price bid would render the price bid of respondent No. 1 non-responsive. 7. On 27.12.2012 CBC of OIL held its 430th meeting, in which it was decided to exclude the respondent No. 1 from the tender process and to hold price negotiation with respondent No. 2. 8. At this stage, respondent No. 1 as the writ petitioner filed the related writ petition. 9. Respondent No. 1 contended in the writ petition that on both the occasions when the price bids were opened, it emerged as the lowest bidder (L1). Being L1, it was expecting award of contract in its favour. It stated that respondent No. 2 made unsolicited correspondences with the appellant and based on such correspondence, decision was taken in the 430th meeting of the CBC held on 27.12.2012 to disqualify it from the tender process, though copy of such decision was not furnished. Respondent No. 1 contended that such decision of the appellant was arbitrary and based on extraneous considerations, which was opposed to public interest. Respondent No. 1 contended that such decision of the appellant was arbitrary and based on extraneous considerations, which was opposed to public interest. By filing the writ petit ion, respondent No. 1 sought for a mandamus to the appellant to finalise the tender process in strict compliance to the mandatory provisions of law and to restrain the appellant from awarding the contract to respondent No. 2. Respondent No. 1 also sought quashing of the decision of CBC adopted in its 430th meeting held on 27.12.2012. 10. The writ petition was resisted by the appellant, which was arrayed as respondent No. 1 in the writ petition as well as by the respondent No. 2, which was arrayed as respondent No. 4 in the writ petition. 11. OIL filed two affidavits. Stand taken by OIL was that in its 430th meeting, it decided to disqualify respondent No. 1 from the tender process and also decided to hold price negotiation with respondent No. 2 for award of contract. It was an internal decision taken by OIL, which was yet to be communicated to the respondent No. 1. It was stated that in its fresh price bid dated 02.10.2012, respondent No. 1 had inserted a new condition which was to the following effect:- "Drillmec reserved the right to manufacture and test the rigs, or part of them, in any of its facilities which belong to us, as per their availability at the time of contract awarding." 12. As per para 1.0 of the Bid Rejection Criteria (BRC), the price bid should contain the price schedule and the bidder's commercial conditions. It provides that a bidder who does not comply with the aforementioned condition, its bid would be rejected. It was further stated that respondent No. 1 had indicated the prices of only 19 major rig components against tender requirement of 63 major rig components as prescribed in the price bid format annexure-A4 attached with the tender documents, which was in contravention of tender condition that the bidder should indicate the prices of major rig components. Further contention of OIL was that respondent No. 1 had submitted alongwith the tender American Petroleum Institute (API) certificate of prescribed duration, which was issued to Drillmec SPA, Italy for its facility at Italy. Further contention of OIL was that respondent No. 1 had submitted alongwith the tender American Petroleum Institute (API) certificate of prescribed duration, which was issued to Drillmec SPA, Italy for its facility at Italy. Therefore, according to OIL, it was not clear whether the API certificate submitted with the tender would cover the other facilities of respondent No. 1 as mentioned in the new clause. The other facilities to be chosen by respondent No. 1 at a later date, may not meet API requirements and may not have API certification. It is in such circumstances that OIL had internally taken the decision not to award the contract to respondent No. 1. Prior to taking such a decision, opinion of the Attorney General of India was taken, who opined that respondent No. 1 had violated the terms of the tender. Offer of respondent No. 1 became conditional and as per opinion of Attorney General it was not to be considered. He also opined that it was not necessary for OIL to seek clarification from respondent No. 1. OIL had also raised the question of maintainability of the writ petition, as it was contended that affidavit filed in support of the writ petition was sworn by one Shri Vamaraju Sree Satye Murthy, who declared himself as Director of Drillmec India Pvt. Ltd. Thus locus standi of the respondent No. 1 to file the writ petition was questioned. 13. Respondent No. 2 in its affidavit, raised preliminary objection as to the maintainability of the writ petition. It was contended that the affidavit filed in support of the writ petition was affirmed by one Shri Vamaraju Sree Satye Murthy, who is not a part of Drillmec SPA, Italy, the writ petitioner, but claimed to be a Director of another company called 'Drillmec India Pvt. Ltd'. He did not have any authorisation to represent Drillmec SPA, Italy. It was also contended that respondent No. 1 being a foreign company does not enjoy fundamental rights under Articles 14 and 19 of the Constitution of India. Respondent No. 1 being a foreign corporate entity, cannot seek enforcement of Article 19(1)(g) read with Article 14 of the Constitution of India. It was also contended that respondent No. 1 being a foreign company does not enjoy fundamental rights under Articles 14 and 19 of the Constitution of India. Respondent No. 1 being a foreign corporate entity, cannot seek enforcement of Article 19(1)(g) read with Article 14 of the Constitution of India. It was next contended that respondent No. 1 did not disclose in the writ petition that it had inserted a new condition in its fresh price bid, which was not there in its technical bid, which was held to be responsive. Had respondent No. 1 inserted this new condition in the technical bid, in terms of the tender conditions, it would have been disqualified. This factum was not disclosed to the Court in the writ petition. Respondent No. 2 further contended that there was no irrationality, arbitrariness or mala fides in the decision taken by OIL. Respondent No. 1's tender was found to be technically responsive with regard to initial declaration made by it about its manufacturing facility at Piacenza, Italy, which had API certification. But the same stood nullified by insertion of a new condition in the price bid to the effect that respondent No. 1 reserved the right to manufacture and test the rigs or any part of them in any of its facilities as per availability at the time of contract awarding. The API certificate furnished by respondent No. 1 pertains to the manufacturing facility at Piacenza, Italy and it was not known whether the other facilities of respondent No. 1 had API certification, as no such certificate was furnished by respondent No. 1. Respondent No. 1 also did not fulfill mandatory condition of tender by not mentioning the prices of all the 63 items. Thus, the price bid of respondent No. 1 was incomplete and could not have been treated as a valid bid. In such circumstances, the decision taken by OIL to exclude respondent No. 1 from the tender process cannot be faulted. Referring the matter to Independent External Monitors cannot be said to be arbitrary. 14. Respondent No. 1 in its separate rejoinder affidavits stated that appellant did not seek any clarification from the respondent No. 1 after opening of the fresh price bid, though it was the lowest bidder. The decision making process in disqualifying respondent No. 1 from the tender process was vitiated by violation of the principles of natural justice. 14. Respondent No. 1 in its separate rejoinder affidavits stated that appellant did not seek any clarification from the respondent No. 1 after opening of the fresh price bid, though it was the lowest bidder. The decision making process in disqualifying respondent No. 1 from the tender process was vitiated by violation of the principles of natural justice. Bid of respondent No. 1, both from the technical and commercial points of view, is more viable and feasible than that of respondent No. 2. 15. It was denied that respondent No. 1 had projected any new terms or allied conditions in the tender. Shri Vamaraju Sree Satye Murthy is fully conversant with the facts and being authorized to deal with the matter, he was competent to swear the affidavit. Appellant departed from the notified norms in accepting unsolicited communication from respondent No. 2. It was stated that what was contended by the appellant/respondent No. 2 to be insertion of anew condition, was actually a footnote, which was in tune with the clarification given by respondent No. 1 before the Independent External Monitors. It could not have been construed as a new condition. It was contended that the prices indicated in the price list of the price bid covered all the 63 items. It was stated that breakup of prices of major rig components were not given as a matter of its own policy, which was mentioned in the technical bid, which was accepted by OIL. Therefore, it was not correct to say that respondent No. 1 had breached the terms of tender while submitting the price bid. The product quoted by respondent No. 1 had API certificate, which was clearly mentioned in the tender. Thus, decision of OIL to disqualify respondent No. 1 from the tender process was illegal, arbitrary and opposed to public interest. Allegation of suppression of material facts was denied. Opinion of the Attorney General was obtained in order to justify the arbitrary action, it was contended. Such opinions may not have any bearing on adjudication in a court of law. Respondent No. 1 though a foreign company, is entitled to a fair and non-arbitrary treatment at the hands of OIL, which is an authority under Article 12 of the Constitution. Such opinions may not have any bearing on adjudication in a court of law. Respondent No. 1 though a foreign company, is entitled to a fair and non-arbitrary treatment at the hands of OIL, which is an authority under Article 12 of the Constitution. Therefore, an action in public law against such an authority would be maintainable at the instance of a foreign company on the touchstone of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. OIL is constitutionally mandated to act in a manner which is non-arbitrary, nondiscriminatory, fair and reasonable. 16. Learned Single Judge by the judgment and order dated 28.06.2013 allowed the writ petition by quashing the decision of the CBC taken in its 430th meeting held on 27.12.2012 and remanding the matter back to OIL to take a fresh decision after taking into consideration all relevant materials having regard to the findings recorded in the judgment. Learned Single Judge in his elaborate judgment first dealt with the issue of maintainability of the writ petition which was particularly contested by respondent No. 2. Maintainability of the writ petition was questioned on three grounds:- i) competence of Shri Vamaraju Sree Satye Murthy to swear the affidavit in support of the writ petition, ii) whether respondent No. 1 (writ petitioner) being a foreign corporate entity incorporated in Italy was entitled to invoke the fundamental rights guaranteed under Articles 14 and 19 of the Constitution of India and, therefore, whether it could maintain the writ petition, iii) whether the writ petition suffered from gross suppression of material facts. After due consideration, learned Single Judge rejected the first objection as to competence of Shri Vamaraju to swear the affidavit in support of the writ petition and to maintain the same. It was held that Shri Vamaraju had the competence to swear the affidavit in support of the writ petition. 17. Coming to the second objection regarding maintainability of the writ petition filed by foreign corporate entity by invoking fundamental rights guaranteed under Articles 14 & 19 of the Constitution of India, learned Single Judge held that such an objection could not be sustained. In so far the objection as to suppression of material facts is concerned, learned Single Judge held that considering the stage at which the writ petition was filed, it could not be said that writ petitioner suppressed material facts. 18. In so far the objection as to suppression of material facts is concerned, learned Single Judge held that considering the stage at which the writ petition was filed, it could not be said that writ petitioner suppressed material facts. 18. Having held that the writ petition is maintainable, learned Single Judge examined the decision on merit. Learned Single Judge on the basis of the materials on record, noted that the bid of the respondent No. 1 was rejected on three grounds - i) insertion of a new clause in the fresh price bid, ii) disclosure of prices of only 19 major rig components as against 63 major rig components in the format annexure-A4 as per tender requirements, and iii) inability of the appellant to determine as to whether the API certification submitted by the respondent No. 1 along with the tender documents would cover the other manufacturing facilities of respondent No. 1 as per the new clause inserted in the fresh price bid whereby it reserved the right to manufacture and test the rigs in any of its facilities. 19. Learned Single Judge first took up the second ground of rejection and held that the condition which required disclosure of the prices of 63 major rig components in the price bid cannot be termed as an essential condition of tender entailing rejection of the bid for any deviation therefrom. It was a non-essential condition, deviation from which had the approval of the appellant earlier. This ground of rejection was accordingly held to be arbitrary and being influenced by the unsolicited communication of respondent No. 2. The first and the third grounds of rejection were taken up together. After considering the matter extensively, learned Single Judge held that while rejecting the bid of the respondent No. 1 on these two grounds, the appellant acted in an arbitrary and unreasonable manner by not taking into consideration the relevant factors. It was held that since appellant is vested with the right coupled with duty to exercise its sound discretion, it failed to do so by not taking into account all the matters which it was bound to consider by excluding from consideration those matters which are relevant to what they had to consider which vitiated the decision making process being violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. On the basis of such reasonings, learned Single Judge granted relief to the respondent No. 1. On the basis of such reasonings, learned Single Judge granted relief to the respondent No. 1. 20. Aggrieved, the appellant, who was the respondent No. 1 in the writ petition, has filed the present appeal questioning the legality and correctness of the findings recorded by the learned Single Judge. 21. Heard Mr. K.N. Choudhury, learned Senior Counsel assisted by Mr. A. Sarma, learned counsel for the appellant and Mr. TV Ratnam, learned counsel for respondent No. 2. We have also heard Mr. D.K. Mishra, learned Senior Counsel assisted by Mr. B Prasad, learned counsel for the respondent No. 1. 22. Opening the arguments, Mr. Choudhury, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellant OIL, submitted that learned Single Judge fell in serious error in interfering with a purely commercial decision of OIL by acting like an appellate authority. He submitted that parameters of judicial review in matters relating to tender and award of contract is limited and clearly demarcated. Appellant was fully justified in excluding respondent No. 1 from the tender process and to hold price negotiation with the respondent No. 2 on account of the three grounds mentioned above. To eliminate any scope of arbitrariness or unreasonableness, appellant ensured that the decision making process was multi-layered. Opinion of the Attorney General was sought for and obtained. Only thereafter the appellant decided to exclude respondent No. 1 from the tender process and to hold negotiation with respondent No. 2. In the decision making process involving several stages, there is bound to be exchange of views which in turn may lead to expression of divergent views. Just because the final or ultimate decision taken is not in conformity with the views of the lower authorities, it cannot be said that the final decision taken to reject the tender of respondent No. 1 is arbitrary and unreasonable. Learned Senior Counsel greatly laid emphasis on the insertion of a footnote in the fresh price bid submitted by the respondent No. 1, which stated that it reserved the right to manufacture and test the rigs or any part of them in any of its facilities as per availability at the time of award of contract. This clause, he submits, had changed the technical bid of respondent No. 1 which was earlier found to be responsive. It made the bid of respondent No. 1 conditional. According to Mr. This clause, he submits, had changed the technical bid of respondent No. 1 which was earlier found to be responsive. It made the bid of respondent No. 1 conditional. According to Mr. Choudhury, as per Clause 1.0 of the Bid Rejection Criteria under the caption 'commercial', the price bid of a bidder should only contain the price schedule and the bidder's commercial terms and conditions. It provides that no price details should be furnished in the technical bid, non-compliance of which would result in rejection of the bid. He submitted that by insertion of the footnote, the otherwise responsive technical bid of the respondent No. 1 was rendered non-responsive. Therefore, the decision taken by the CBC in its 430th meeting to exclude respondent No. 1 from the tender process and to invite respondent No. 2 for negotiation cannot be faulted with. Further contention of Mr. Choudhury, learned Senior Counsel for the appellant is that learned Single Judge committed a manifest error in holding that the condition requiring disclosure of the prices of 63 major rig components as per format mentioned in annexure-A4 was non-essential, which the appellant had taken a conscious decision earlier to waive. Mr. Choudhury submitted that action of respondent No. 1 in disclosing the prices of only 19 rig components out of 63, cannot be justified under any circumstances. Learned Senior Counsel has referred to various clauses of the tender documents to contend that the course of action adopted by the appellant was in conformity with the tender requirements and the same could not have been termed as arbitrary or unreasonable or acting without taking into consideration relevant factors. He submitted that insertion of the new condition by way of a footnote in the fresh price bid by respondent No. 1 created doubts in the mind of OIL as to whether the API certification furnished by respondent No. 1 along with the tender documents would also cover the other manufacturing sites. He submitted that the appellant had absolute right to reject a non-conforming bid without seeking clarification. Appellant was under no legal obligation to seek clarification from respondent No. 1. As per tender, vague and indefinite expressions would not be considered. Condition inserted by respondent No. 1 to manufacture and test the rigs at any other facilities as per availability is quite vague and misleading. Referring to various decisions of the Apex Court, Mr. Appellant was under no legal obligation to seek clarification from respondent No. 1. As per tender, vague and indefinite expressions would not be considered. Condition inserted by respondent No. 1 to manufacture and test the rigs at any other facilities as per availability is quite vague and misleading. Referring to various decisions of the Apex Court, Mr. Choudhury submitted that interference with the decision of the appellant to exclude respondent No. 1 from the tender process and to hold negotiation with respondent No. 2 is not at all justified and warranted in the facts and circumstances of the case. Such interference is also contrary to the law laid down by the Apex Court. He, therefore, submits that the judgment of the learned Single Judge should be set aside and the writ petition filed by respondent No. 1 should be dismissed. 23. Respondent No. 2 has not filed any independent appeal to assail the findings of the learned Single Judge. However, learned counsel appearing for respondent No. 2 made submissions supporting the stand taken by the appellant OIL. Additionally, he has made further submissions, particularly on the point of maintainability of the writ petition. Mr. Ratnam appearing for respondent No. 2 argued that writ petition filed by respondent No. 1 was supported by an affidavit which was affirmed by Shri Vamaraju Sree Satye Murthy, who claimed to be a Director of an Indian company, Drillmec India Pvt. Ltd. working in collaboration with respondent No. 1. Making his elaborate submissions, Mr. Ratnam contended that learned Single Judge had erred in coming to the conclusion that Shri Vamaraju had the competence to swear the affidavit as he is in no way connected with respondent No. 1. There is no averment in the writ petition that respondent No. 1 had authorized him to file the writ petition on its behalf or to swear any affidavit in support of the writ petition. Referring to Order 29 Rule 1 of the Civil Procedure Code which mandates that in suits by or against a corporation any pleading may be signed and verified on behalf of the corporation by the Secretary or by any Director or by the Principal Officer of the corporation who is able to depose to the facts of the case, Mr. Ratnam submitted that Shri Vamaraju is admittedly, neither a Secretary nor a Director nor a Principal Officer of respondent No. 1. Ratnam submitted that Shri Vamaraju is admittedly, neither a Secretary nor a Director nor a Principal Officer of respondent No. 1. He submitted that going by the shifting stand of respondent No. 1, more particularly of Shri Vamaraju in the course of the litigation, it appears that he is an agent of respondent No. 1, which fact was not disclosed to the appellant OIL by respondent No. 1. Such non-disclosure would amount to violation of the integrity pact which entails serious consequences, such as, cancellation of the tender. Mr. Ratnam also argued about suppression of material facts by the respondent No. 1 in the writ petition. He submitted that in the writ petition, respondent No. 1 did not mention about insertion of a new clause by way of a footnote in the fresh price bid. Respondent No. 1 also did not mention that it did not disclose the prices of all 63 rig components. As a matter of fact, respondent No. 1 feigned ignorance of the grounds of rejection of its bid by contending that those were not communicated to it, though it was fully aware of such rejection and the grounds of such rejection. Contention of respondent No. 1 before the writ court that it could come to know about the grounds of rejection of its bid for the first time from the affidavit-in-opposition of the appellant was not at all correct. Mr. Ratnam would, therefore, contend that respondent No. 1 failed to make a full disclosure of all the essential facts relating to the writ petition and, thus, was guilty of suppression of material facts. Therefore, it was not entitled to any discretionary relief from the Court. Another point argued at length by Mr. Ratnam was that respondent No. 1 being a foreign corporate entity was not entitled to invoke fundamental rights guaranteed under Articles 14 and 19 of the Constitution of India. Referring to the decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Indo China Steam Navigation Company Ltd. Vs. Jasjit Singh, reported in (1964) 6 SCC 594 and British India Steam Navigation Company Ltd. Vs. Referring to the decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Indo China Steam Navigation Company Ltd. Vs. Jasjit Singh, reported in (1964) 6 SCC 594 and British India Steam Navigation Company Ltd. Vs. Jasjit Singh, reported in AIR 1964 SC 1451 , learned counsel submits that a foreign entity does not have the right to enforce the fundamental rights guaranteed under Article 19 and so also Article 14 of the Constitution, if the alleged violation of such right flows from the guarantees under Article 19 of the Constitution. It is contended that respondent No. 1 does not have any fundamental right to do business with appellant OIL The allegation of discrimination under Article 14 is founded on the fundamental right to do business under Article 19(1)(g). Thus, respondent No. 1 was not entitled to seek relief on the plank of Article 14 read with Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution. Coming to the third ground of rejection of the bid of the respondent No. 1 and the challenge made to the same which have been upheld by the learned Single Judge, Mr. Ratnam would submit that respondent No. 1 had deliberately inserted the new condition in the fresh price bid to gain unfair advantage. It was further argued that non-disclosure of the prices of 63 major rig components by respondent No. 1 amounted to violation of the tender requirement. He submitted that view taken by the learned Single Judge that the requirement to disclose the prices of all 63 items was not a mandatory requirement is wholly erroneous as the tender in question was a global tender and was required to be strictly followed in conformity with the terms and conditions laid down by the appellant. In such circumstances, decision of appellant OIL to exclude respondent No. 1 from the tender process and to hold negotiation with respondent No. 2 is fully justified. No case for interference was made out and learned Single Judge committed a manifest error in interfering with the decision of OIL. Referring to various Apex Court judgments, Mr. Ratnam has argued that learned Single Judge had clearly exceeded the limitations of judicial review by granting relief to the respondent No. 1. He concluded by supporting Mr. Choudhury in his submission that it is a case where the writ petition ought to have been dismissed. 24. Mr. Referring to various Apex Court judgments, Mr. Ratnam has argued that learned Single Judge had clearly exceeded the limitations of judicial review by granting relief to the respondent No. 1. He concluded by supporting Mr. Choudhury in his submission that it is a case where the writ petition ought to have been dismissed. 24. Mr. D.K. Mishra, learned Senior Counsel appearing for respondent No. 1 (writ petitioner) in his elaborate, painstaking and extensive argument has strongly supported the judgment of the learned Single Judge. He submitted that learned Single Judge had examined all aspects of the matter in great detail and after due consideration had allowed the writ petition filed by the respondent No. 1 by quashing the decision of CBC and directing reconsideration of the bid of respondent No. 1. He submits that decision taken by CBC to exclude respondent No. 1 from the tender process and to begin negotiation with respondent No. 2 for award of contract was based on three grounds, namely, insertion of a new clause in the price bid, disclosure of prices of only 19 major rig components as against tender requirement of 63 major rig components and inability of appellant OIL to determine whether or not the API certification submitted by respondent No. 1 along with the tender papers covered the other manufacturing facilities of respondent No. 1 since, as per the new clause inserted in the fresh price bid, respondent No. 1 reserved the right to manufacture and test the rigs in any of its facilities. 25. Regarding non-disclosure of breakup price of all 63 major rig components in the format A-4, Mr. Mishra, learned Senior Counsel submitted that after opening of the technical bids on 15.06.2011, the same was sent to the User Department of OIL to examine the technical bids in detail. In the course of examination by the User Department, it was found that respondent No. 1 and BHEL did not give the breakup price of 63 major rig components in the format A-4. These two parties mentioned that they would disclose the breakup price of the 63 major rig components after award of contract as per policy decision of company. The User Department also found that respondent No. 2 also did not furnish the unit price. Thus, none of the three tenderers (at that point of time) gave complete breakup price. These two parties mentioned that they would disclose the breakup price of the 63 major rig components after award of contract as per policy decision of company. The User Department also found that respondent No. 2 also did not furnish the unit price. Thus, none of the three tenderers (at that point of time) gave complete breakup price. However, in spite of such deviation/non-compliance, the User Department communicated that the tender should be accepted. Based on the note prepared by the User Department, the Tender Committee which was also the approving authority, approved the technical bids of the three bidders. This was also approved by the next higher authority i.e., Local Management Committee. Ultimately, the CBC in its 425th meeting held on 02.03.2012 approved the recommendation made by the User Department, which had the approval of the Tender Committee and the Local Management Committee. The technical bids of all the three bidders were accepted and approved for opening of the price bids. On opening of the price bid on 03.07.2012, respondent No. 1 was found to be the lowest bidder (L1). At that stage, respondent No. 2 made unsolicited correspondence with OIL stating that there was a typing mistake in the figure quoted by it and, therefore, appellant OIL should not finalise the tender. Thereafter, appellant OIL decided to invite fresh price bids on 01.09.2012. Learned Senior Counsel, therefore, submitted that learned Single Judge examined the action of appellant OIL and came to the conclusion that it having taken a conscious decision to accept nondisclosure of the prices of all the 63 major rig components, it cannot subsequently turn around and reject the bid of respondent No. 1 on the alleged ground of non-disclosure of the prices of all 63 major rig components in the prescribed format. Learned Senior Counsel submitted that inter-se evaluation amongst the bidders was required to be made on the total value of 63 major rig components and not on the basis of breakup price of each component. Learned Senior Counsel further submitted that there is nothing like 19 rig components, but 63 major rigs have been put under 19 heads. Learned Senior Counsel submitted that inter-se evaluation amongst the bidders was required to be made on the total value of 63 major rig components and not on the basis of breakup price of each component. Learned Senior Counsel further submitted that there is nothing like 19 rig components, but 63 major rigs have been put under 19 heads. In the above circumstances, he would submit that learned Single Judge was justified in holding such condition to be a non-essential condition and was further justified in taking the view that the said ground to exclude respondent No. 1 from the tender process is wholly unacceptable and untenable in law. 26. Coming to the other two grounds of rejection of the tender of respondent No. 1, Mr. Mishra submitted that the footnote that was inserted in the fresh price bid of respondent No. 1 stating that respondent No. 1 reserved the right to manufacture and test the rigs or any part of them in any of its facility as per availability, had to be made as a clarification was sought for from respondent No. 1 during technical evaluation as to whether it can manufacture the 'mud system' in Italy and would bear single point responsibility in the event of award of contract. Referring to Clause 1.0 of the Bid Rejection Criteria under the caption 'commercial', learned Senior Counsel submitted that the said condition prohibited mentioning of price details in the technical bid, but there is no such prohibition in so far price bid is concerned. Price bid of respondent No. 1 did contain the price schedule and commercial terms and conditions. Therefore, appellant OIL could not have read the said criteria in a manner as if insertion or furnishing of any technical condition in the price bid would result in automatic rejection of the bid. Learned Single Judge had gone into this aspect of the matter and rightly did not approve the course of action adopted by appellant OIL. Mr. Mishra asserted that the terms of the tender document provide for consequences of furnishing price details in the technical bid, but does not provide for consequences of inserting a note in the price bid which can be relatable to the technical bid. Referring to the submissions of Mr. Mr. Mishra asserted that the terms of the tender document provide for consequences of furnishing price details in the technical bid, but does not provide for consequences of inserting a note in the price bid which can be relatable to the technical bid. Referring to the submissions of Mr. Choudhury, learned Senior Counsel appearing for appellant OIL that by inserting such a clause in the fresh price bid, the technical bid of respondent No. 1 became non-responsive and, therefore, appellant OIL was well within its right to reject the bid of respondent No. 1, Mr. Mishra submitted that the technical bids were accepted with all the deviations. Once the technical bids were accepted, those stood finalised and frozen and cannot be changed or modified unilaterally by anyone, including by the appellant OIL. Thus, once the technical bid was found to be responsive, question of such technical bid becoming non-responsive again because of insertion of a footnote in the fresh price bid does not arise. Mr. Mishra fully supported the view of the learned Single Judge that the CBC acted arbitrarily in not seeking clarification from respondent No. 1 with regard to the footnote inserted in the fresh price bid though the Tender Committee as well as the Local Management Committee were of the view that such clarification should be sought for. If insertion of the footnote in the fresh price bid created doubt in the minds of the officials of appellant OIL, as is being canvassed, then it was incumbent upon them to have sought for clarification from respondent No. 1. However, appellant OIL with a pre-determined mind did not seek any clarification from respondent No. 1 with the sole purpose of rejecting its bid so that it can negotiate with the respondent No. 2 to whom it intended to award the contract. Mr. Mishra ultimately argued that decision of appellant OIL to exclude respondent No. 1 from the tender process despite its tender being found to be responsive and being L1 in so far price bid is concerned, was wholly influenced by the unsolicited correspondences made by respondent No. 2, for which in fact, its tender ought to have been rejected. 27. Coming to the objections raised as to locus standi of Shri Vamaraju to swear the affidavit in support of the writ petition, Mr. 27. Coming to the objections raised as to locus standi of Shri Vamaraju to swear the affidavit in support of the writ petition, Mr. Mishra submitted that the writ petitioner had authorised M/s. Drillmec India Pvt. Ltd. to represent it in matters relating to the tender in question. Subsequently, in the meeting of the Board of Directors of M/s. Drillmec India Pvt. Ltd., Shri Vamaraju was authorised to deal with the matter relating to the tender in question. Relevant documents in this regard were placed before the Court and the learned Single Judge rightly held that Shri Vamaraju had the competence to swear the affidavit. 28. On the issue of maintainability of the writ petition on the ground that the writ petitioner being a foreign corporate entity is not entitled to invoke the fundamental rights guaranteed under Article 19 of the Constitution of India and consequently, it cannot also invoke Article 14 of the Constitution because in order to invoke Article 14, it has necessarily to fall back on Article 19, Mr. Mishra, learned Senior Counsel appearing for respondent No. 1 submitted that as a proposition, it is not disputed that a company, whether foreign or Indian, being a juristic person cannot invoke Article 19 of the Constitution of India since such right is available only to a citizen. But a corporate entity, whether Indian or foreign, cannot be subjected to discrimination and have ample protection under the Constitution. He submitted and asserted that Article 14 of the Constitution would be available not only to an Indian company, but also to a foreign company. He submitted that reliance placed by learned counsel for the respondent No. 2 on Indo China Navigation (Supra) and other judgments, is wholly misplaced inasmuch as, no such proposition of law has been laid down in the said decisions which says that a corporation or a company cannot challenge the decision making process being arbitrary, unreasonable and violative of Article 14 without falling back on Article 19(1) of the Constitution. Mr. Mishra vehemently argued that it is no longer open for anybody to contend or argue that action of the State or any of its instrumentalities cannot be assailed and struck down at the instance of a company, whether Indian or foreign, on the ground of arbitrariness and unreasonableness, thus being violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. Mr. Mishra vehemently argued that it is no longer open for anybody to contend or argue that action of the State or any of its instrumentalities cannot be assailed and struck down at the instance of a company, whether Indian or foreign, on the ground of arbitrariness and unreasonableness, thus being violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. In this regard, he submitted that the view taken by the learned Single Judge is the correct view consistent with the views taken by the Apex Court and, therefore, no interference is called for. 29. In this connection, Mr. Mishra has raised a point that though OIL as the appellant has filed the appeal against the judgment of the learned Single Judge, it has not raised this issue in the appeal. This point has been urged only by respondent No. 2. Respondent No. 2 having chosen not to file any appeal against the judgment of the learned Single Judge, cannot be permitted to raise this issue in the appeal filed by OIL. In support of his argument, Mr. Mishra has cited and referred to a large number of decisions. Summing up his argument, Mr. Mishra submitted that in the facts and circumstances of the case, the decision of the learned Single Judge is perfectly justified and, therefore, the decision of the learned Single Judge should be upheld. 30. Submissions made by the learned counsel for the parties have received the due consideration of the Court. We have also perused the relevant materials on record and the judgments cited at the bar. 31. Before proceeding further, we consider it apposite to clarify at the outset that though respondent No. 2 has not filed any independent appeal challenging the judgment of the learned Single Judge, we have permitted the said respondent to argue various grounds assailing the correctness of the judgment while supporting the appeal filed by the appellant OIL. Without entering into the technicalities vis-a-vis provisions of Order 41 Rule 33 of the Civil Procedure Code, we have permitted learned counsel appearing for the respondent No. 2 to make his submissions on the various points as noticed (supra) since respondent No. 2 is a party to the appeal. 32. Without entering into the technicalities vis-a-vis provisions of Order 41 Rule 33 of the Civil Procedure Code, we have permitted learned counsel appearing for the respondent No. 2 to make his submissions on the various points as noticed (supra) since respondent No. 2 is a party to the appeal. 32. To better appreciate the various facets of the lis, which have surfaced in the course of the hearing of the appeal, we deem it proper to frame issues and to decide the matter issue wise. 33. The following are the issues which arise for consideration in the appeal:- i) Whether the writ petition filed by respondent No. 1, Drillmec SPA, Italy, which is supported by an affidavit affirmed by Shri Vamaraju Sree Satye Murthy, would be maintainable? Or, in other words, whether Shri Vamaraju Sree Satye Murthy had the competence to swear the affidavit in support of the writ petition filed by Drillmec SPA, Italy? ii) Whether respondent No. 1 (writ petitioner) suppressed material facts while filing the writ petition? iii) Whether respondent No. 1 being a foreign corporate entity can file a writ petition seeking enforcement of the fundamental rights guaranteed under Articles 14 & 19 of the Constitution of India? iv) Whether appellant OIL was justified in taking the decision to exclude respondent No. 1 (writ petitioner) from the tender process on the ground of insertion of a new clause by the respondent No. 1 by way of a footnote in the fresh price bid? v) Whether the requirement of disclosure of the prices of all the 63 major rig components as prescribed in the format annexure-A4 to the bid documents is an essential condition of tender or nonessential condition of tender? Or, whether appellant OIL was justified in excluding respondent No. 1 (writ petitioner) from the tender process on the ground of noncompliance of the aforesaid condition by disclosing the prices of only 19 major rig components as against the requirement of 63 major rig components? vi) Whether learned Single Judge was justified in interfering with the decision of appellant OIL in rejecting the bid of respondent No. 1 (writ petitioner) and issuing a direction in the nature of mandamus to the appellant to reconsider the matter relating to award of contract in the light of the conclusions reached by the learned Single Judge? 34. vi) Whether learned Single Judge was justified in interfering with the decision of appellant OIL in rejecting the bid of respondent No. 1 (writ petitioner) and issuing a direction in the nature of mandamus to the appellant to reconsider the matter relating to award of contract in the light of the conclusions reached by the learned Single Judge? 34. We now proceed to deal with the appeal issue wise as formulated above. 35. Issue No. 1: The first issue that we have framed is, whether the writ petition filed by respondent No. 1, which is supported by an affidavit affirmed by Shri Vamaraju Sree Satye Murthy would be maintainable? In other words, the question for consideration is whether Shri Vamaraju Sree Satye Murthy had the competence to swear the affidavit in support of the writ petition filed by respondent No. 1? 36. Learned Single Judge examined this issue, and by giving detail reasonings arrived at the conclusion that Sri Vamaraju Sree Satye Murthy, who is conversant with the facts and circumstances relating to the tender in question, had the competence to swear the affidavit supporting the pleadings in the writ petition. Learned Single Judge referred to the provisions contained in Chapter V-A of the Gauhati High Court Rules, and held that an application under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is required to be presented in the format prescribed and must be accompanied by an affidavit verifying the pleaded facts. Such affidavit may be affirmed by any person having cognizance of the facts stated in the application. Referring to the dictionary meaning of the word 'cognizance', which means knowledge, notice or perception; it means acknowledgment or admission of a fact, learned Single Judge held that a person who has knowledge, notice or perception of facts narrated in the writ petition would have competence to swear the affidavit in support of the writ petition. Referring to the dictionary meaning of the word 'cognizance', which means knowledge, notice or perception; it means acknowledgment or admission of a fact, learned Single Judge held that a person who has knowledge, notice or perception of facts narrated in the writ petition would have competence to swear the affidavit in support of the writ petition. Reverting to the facts of the present case, we find that the writ petition is filed by Drillmec SPA, Italy, a foreign corporate entity, but the affidavit supporting the writ petition was sworn by Shri Vamaraju Sree Satye Murthy, who declared himself to be the Director of an Indian company called, Drillmec India Pvt. Ltd. In the affidavit, he stated that Drillmec India Pvt. Ltd., a company incorporated under the Companies Act, 1956, works in collaboration with respondent No. 1 (writ petitioner) and that he was duly authorised to represent respondent No. 1 in the case and to swear affidavit in support of the writ petition. He further stated that he was conversant with the facts and circumstances of the case and being duly authorised by the respondent No. 1, he was competent to swear the affidavit. 37. In the course of hearing before the learned Single Judge, learned counsel appearing for respondent No. 2 produced a document issued by the Ministry of Corporate Affairs, Govt. of India, as well as, a certificate issued by a Company Secretary containing names of the shareholders of Drillmec India Pvt. Ltd. in support of the contention that respondent No. 1 has no equity participation in Drillmec India Pvt. Ltd. and that there is no collaboration between the two. When the above documents were filed in Court, which were accepted, respondent No. 1 in response thereto, produced two documents, one, a certificate issued by respondent No. 1 authorizing Drillmec India Pvt. Ltd. to represent them in all matters relating to the tender in question, and second, a copy of resolution adopted by the Board of Directors of Drillmec India Pvt. Ltd. in its meeting held on 07.01.2013 authorizing Shri Vamaraju Sree Satye Murthy to deal with the matters relating to the tender in question as per authority given by respondent No. 1 which were also accepted. Learned Single Judge, therefore, concluded that respondent No. 1 had authorised Drillmec India Pvt. Ltd. to represent them in all matters pertaining to the tender in question and Drillmec India Pvt. Ltd. in turn, authorised Shri Vamaraju Sree Satye Murthy to deal with the matter. On the strength of the said authorisation, Shri Vamaraju Sree Satye Murthy had affirmed the affidavit in support of the writ petition, stating that he was acquainted with the facts and circumstances of the case. In the above background, learned Single Judge held that Shri Vamaraju Sree Satye Murthy had the competence to swear the affidavit supporting the pleadings in the writ petition. 38. We agree with the view taken by the learned Single Judge. 39. Respondent No. 1 had authorized Drillmec India Pvt. Ltd. to represent it on its behalf on all matters relating to the tender in question. Drillmec India Pvt. Ltd. is a corporate entity and not a natural person. It has to function through its Directors and other officers. Accordingly, Board of Directors of Drillmec India Pvt. Ltd. adopted resolution on 07.01.2013 authorising Shri Vamaraju Sree Satye Murthy to deal with matters regarding the tender in question on behalf of respondent No. 1 as per authority given by respondent No. 1 to Drillmec India Pvt. Ltd. As per Rule 7 of Chapter V-A of the Gauhati High Court Rules, particularly the note appended thereto, the affidavit in support of the writ petition should be by a person having cognizance of the facts stated in the writ petition. We may also refer to the provisions of Order 6 Rule 14 of the Civil Procedure Code. Thus, the legal requirement would be fulfilled if a person who has cognizance of the facts stated in the writ petition affirms the affidavit. Once the Court is satisfied that the person swearing the affidavit has the authority and has cognizance of the facts pleaded in the writ petition, the affidavit filed in support of the writ petition would be construed to be in order. 40. In United Bank of India Vs. Once the Court is satisfied that the person swearing the affidavit has the authority and has cognizance of the facts pleaded in the writ petition, the affidavit filed in support of the writ petition would be construed to be in order. 40. In United Bank of India Vs. Naresh Kumar & Ors., reported in (1996) 6 SCC 660 , where the Apex Court was considering the issue as to whether the suit for recovery of money filed by the appellant Bank was properly instituted, it was observed that there is sufficient power in the Courts under the Code of Civil Procedure to ensure that injustice is not done to any party who has a just cause. As far as possible a substantive right should not be allowed to be defeated on account of a procedural irregularity, which is curable. Referring to Order 6 Rule 14 of the Civil Procedure Code, the Apex Court observed that as a company is a juristic entity, it can duly authorize any person to sign the plaint or the written statement on its behalf and this should be regarded as sufficient compliance with the provisions of Order 6 Rule 14 of the Civil Procedure Code. It was further held that a person may be expressly authorised to sign the pleadings on behalf of the company, for example by the Board of Directors passing a resolution to that effect or by a power of attorney being executed in favour of any individual. 41. There is another aspect. There is a subtle yet significant difference between the locus standi of a person to file an application under Article226 of the Constitution of India and the locus standi of a person authorised by the writ petitioner to swear the affidavit in support of the writ petition. 42. Thus having regard to the above, we are of the view that Shri Vamaraju Sree Satye Murthy had the necessary competence to swear the affidavit in support of the writ petition. Writ petition is maintainable on this count. This issue is accordingly decided in favour of respondent No. 1 (writ petitioner). 43. Issue No. 2: During the hearing, it was also argued mostly by respondent No. 2 that respondent No. 1 had suppressed material facts in the writ petition. Writ petition is maintainable on this count. This issue is accordingly decided in favour of respondent No. 1 (writ petitioner). 43. Issue No. 2: During the hearing, it was also argued mostly by respondent No. 2 that respondent No. 1 had suppressed material facts in the writ petition. It was argued that respondent No. 1 did not mention in the writ petition that it had inserted a new clause by way of a footnote in the fresh price bid and that it had also not disclosed the prices of all the 63 major rig components. Such suppression disentitled respondent No. 1 from any discretionary relief. 44. This aspect was gone into by the learned Single Judge. After due consideration, learned Single Judge came to the conclusion that respondent No. 1 did not suppress any material facts. Learned Single Judge rightly pointed out that material facts are those primary facts necessary for the party filing the application under 226 of the Constitution of India to plead in the application in order to establish the existence of a cause of action. Writ petition was filed at a stage when appellant OIL had not disclosed to the respondent No. 1 the reasons for rejection of its bid. The writ petition was filed seeking a direction to the appellant OIL to finalise the tender process strictly in accordance with law. Learned Single Judge noted that appellant OIL in its counter-affidavit had disclosed for the first time the factum of rejection of the bid of respondent No. 1, as well as, the grounds for such rejection. In the counter-affidavit filed by appellant OIL, it was its pleaded case that OIL had internally decided to disqualify the respondent No. 1 as it had willfully breached key terms of the tender document and other allied conditions and the same was not communicated either to the respondent No. 1 or to any other party. Since the formal decision to disqualify respondent No. 1 from the tender process was not communicated to the respondent No. 1, therefore, respondent No. 1 had no occasion to know that it's tender was being rejected on the grounds of insertion of a new clause in the fresh price bid and nondisclosure of the prices of all the 63 major rig components. Had such a decision been communicated to the respondent No. 1 and had respondent No. 1 thereafter withheld such material facts from the Court, surely it would have been a case of suppression of material facts, as rightly held by the learned Single Judge. In the absence thereof, it cannot be said that respondent No. 1 had suppressed any material facts. 45. In view of above, we are in agreement with the view expressed by the learned Single Judge and decide this issue in favour of respondent No. 1. 46. Issue No. 3: The question whether respondent No. 1 being a foreign corporate entity would be entitled to maintain the writ petition by invoking the fundamental rights guaranteed under Articles 14 and 19 of the Constitution of India, was argued with great deal of seriousness, particularly by learned counsel for respondent No. 2. The argument is that respondent No. 1 being a foreign corporate entity cannot invoke Article 14 of the Constitution of India alone, as because in order to invoke Article 14 and to get the relief, it has necessarily to fall back upon Article 19 of the Constitution of India to which it is not entitled. 47. This aspect of the matter was gone into by the learned Single Judge and he held as under:- "54. The petitioner is a foreign corporate entity, who has filed the petition challenging the decision making process of awarding the contract, and at a stage when they were not informed about the outcome of the tender submitted by them alongwith the respondent Nos. 4 and 5 and also about the grounds of rejection of their tender. The petitioner has claimed that the decision making process has been vitiated because of non adherence to the terms and conditions of the bid, and not claiming fundamental right as guaranteed to a citizen under Article 19 of the Constitution of India. 55. Article 14 of the Constitution, which confers the right of equality before law, unlike Article 19 of the Constitution, secures a right to 'any person' of equality before law and equal protection of law within the territory of India, which right cannot be denied by the State. While under Article 14, such right is protected to any person, in Article 19, the rights mentioned therein is protected to the citizens of the country only and not to any person. 56. While under Article 14, such right is protected to any person, in Article 19, the rights mentioned therein is protected to the citizens of the country only and not to any person. 56. In State Trading Corporation of India Ltd. (supra), the question, which arose for consideration by the Apex Court was whether the said Corporation can maintain a writ petition under Article 32 of the Constitution of India for enforcement of the fundamental right under Article 19 of the Constitution. A 9(nine) Judges Bench of the Apex Court in the said case has, upon consideration of the provisions of Part-III of the Constitution, held that the makers of the Constitution deliberately and advisedly made a clear distinction between the fundamental rights available to 'any person' and those guaranteed to 'all citizens' and since the right under Article 19 of the Constitution is available to the citizens only, the same cannot be enforced by a corporation, it is being not a natural person but a juristic person. The Apex Court in the said case has not held that the right under Article 14 of the Constitution cannot be invoked by a corporation, as submitted by the learned senior counsel for the respondent No. 4. On the other hand, having regard to use of the expression 'citizen' and 'any person' in different provisions of Part-III of the Constitution, it has been held that the most reasonable view to take of the provisions of the Constitution is to say that whenever any particular right was to be enjoyed by a citizen of India, the Constitution takes care to use the expression 'any citizen' or 'all citizens' in clear contradiction to those rights, which were to be enjoyed by all, irrespective of whether they are citizens or aliens, or whether they were natural persons or juristic persons. 57. A constitutional Bench of the Apex Court in Barium Chemicals Ltd. (supra) placing reliance on the State Trading Corporation of India Ltd. (supra) reiterated the said proposition of law that the Company or the Corporation being not a citizen has no fundamental right under Article 19 of the Constitution. The same view has also been taken by the Apex Court in Biswanath Tea Company Ltd. (supra). In Indo-China Steam Navigation Co. The same view has also been taken by the Apex Court in Biswanath Tea Company Ltd. (supra). In Indo-China Steam Navigation Co. Ltd. (supra), a constitutional Bench of the Apex Court, while considering the penal action taken against the appellant before it, under the provisions of the Sea Customs Act, 1878, has held that a foreign company, being not a citizen within the meaning of Article 19 of the Constitution is not entitled to claim the benefit of the said provision, as such right is guaranteed only to the citizens of India. In the said case, the Apex Court has also held that, the plea that mens rea being not regarded as an essential element of Section 52-A of the Sea Customs Act the said provision would be ultra vires Article 14, 19and 31(1) of the Constitution and as such unconstitutional and invalid, cannot be sustained for the simple reason that in supporting the said pleas, inevitably the appellant has to fall back upon the fundamental right guaranteed by Article 19(1)(f) of the Constitution. The Apex Court has further held that certain rights guaranteed to the citizens of India under Article 19 are not available to the foreigners and pleas which may successfully be raised by the citizens on the strength of the said rights guaranteed under Article 19 would be not available to the non-citizens. In British India Steam Navigation Co. Ltd. (supra), another constitutional Bench of the Apex Court, referring to the decision in the State Trading Corporation of India Ltd. (supra), has also held that a foreign company being not a citizen of India is not entitled to claim the right under Article 19(1) of the Constitution of India. 58. In British India Steam Navigation Co. Ltd. (supra), another constitutional Bench of the Apex Court, referring to the decision in the State Trading Corporation of India Ltd. (supra), has also held that a foreign company being not a citizen of India is not entitled to claim the right under Article 19(1) of the Constitution of India. 58. From the aforesaid decisions, on which the learned senior counsel for the respondent No. 4 has placed reliance in support of the contention that the petitioner being a foreign entity cannot maintain a writ petition for violation of the right under Articles 14, 19 and 21 of the Constitution of India, it, therefore, transpires that the foreign company being not a natural person, but a juristic person, cannot maintain a writ petition for enforcement of certain rights guaranteed to a citizen under Part-III of the Constitution of India, like the right under Article 19(1) of the Constitution, which specifically provides that those rights are available to the 'citizen', unlike the rights under Article 14, which is available to 'any person'. The Corporation including the foreign entity, however, also cannot maintain a writ petition alleging violation of the right under Article 14 of the Constitution of India if, to be successful in such plea, such Corporation including the foreign entity has to fall back upon the fundamental right guaranteed under Article 19(1) of the Constitution. 59. The petitioner, which is a foreign company, as noticed above, has filed the present petition challenging the decision making process on the ground of violation of the terms and conditions of the bids as well as non maintenance of the transparent, fair and open procedure resulting in arbitrariness and unreasonableness in action, within the meaning of Article 14 of the Constitution, therefore, can maintain the writ petition. Hence, the second ground of challenge to the maintainability of the writ petition also cannot be sustained." 48. We are in agreement with the views expressed by the learned Single Judge. 49. Article 14 of the Constitution of India provides that the State shall not deny to any person equality before the law or the equal protection of the laws within the territory of India, whereas under Article 19, all citizens of India have been guaranteed certain rights as mentioned in Clauses (a) to (g) of sub-Article (1). 49. Article 14 of the Constitution of India provides that the State shall not deny to any person equality before the law or the equal protection of the laws within the territory of India, whereas under Article 19, all citizens of India have been guaranteed certain rights as mentioned in Clauses (a) to (g) of sub-Article (1). Thus, while the protection under Article 14 is available to any person, the protection under Article 19 is available only to a citizen of India. 50. Section 3(42) of the General Clauses Act, 1897, defines "person" to include any company or organisation or body of individuals, whether incorporated or not. 51. It is a settled proposition that a company being a juristic person, cannot invoke Article 19 of the Constitution - it may be a company incorporated in India or a company incorporated in a foreign country (kindly see the decision in State Trading Corporation of India Vs. CTO, AIR 1963 SC 1811 ). A shareholder of a company also cannot invoke Article 19 on the ground that the shareholder would be ultimately affected by the decision of the executive which had affected the rights of the company. A shareholder can challenge such a decision, if he can show that such action had not only impaired the rights of the company, but had also affected the rights of the shareholder. But the proposition canvassed by learned counsel for respondent No. 2 that even Article 14 would not be available to a foreign corporate entity because in order to enforce its right under Article 14, it has necessarily to fall back upon Article 19, does not appeal to us. Though, learned counsel for the respondent No. 2 had relied upon indo china Navigation (Supra) in support of his argument, we find that no such proposition of law has been laid down therein that a corporate entity, whether foreign or Indian, cannot challenge an executive decision being arbitrary and unreasonable, thus violative of Article 14 without falling back upon Article 19(1) of the Constitution. 52. The proposition that a decision making process relating to award of a contract can be successfully challenged before the superior Courts on the ground of being violative of Article 14 of the Constitution, is by now well settled and in our view, requires no restatement. 52. The proposition that a decision making process relating to award of a contract can be successfully challenged before the superior Courts on the ground of being violative of Article 14 of the Constitution, is by now well settled and in our view, requires no restatement. The State or its instrumentalities including public sector undertakings such as appellant OIL are required to act fairly, reasonably and without any discrimination. Its action must be in conformity with Article 14 of the Constitution of India. Starting from Ramana Dayaram Shetty Vs. International Airport Authority of India & Ors., reported in (1979) 3 SCC 489 , it has been the consistent and unwavering view of the Constitutional courts in India that an instrumentality of the State, like the State itself, would be bound by the same constitutional and public law limitations. In our view it would be perfectly legitimate for a person to approach the Court under Articles 32 or 226 of the Constitution and raise a grievance that it has been subjected to unfair, arbitrary, unreasonable, irrational and discriminatory treatment. To maintain a legal action under Article 14, it is not necessary for the person to fall back upon any other fundamental right or other rights. As already noticed, a person includes a company, a juristic person. A company may be an Indian or a foreign company. 53. Neither law nor its application is static. It is dynamic. In today's context when Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in various sectors of our economy is a reality and is being pursued by the executive arm of the State, it will be wholly untenable and opposed to the constitutional mandate to tell the foreign companies that they can do business in India, but they will not be entitled to the guarantee of fair play and equality as enshrined in Article 14 of the Constitution of India. We are all the more surprised because this argument has been advanced by a foreign company. 54. Thus, while agreeing with the views expressed by the learned Single Judge, we hold that a company, a juristic person, whether Indian or foreign, can maintain a legal action based on Article 14 of the Constitution of India alone. This issue is accordingly answered in favour of respondent No. 1. 55. 54. Thus, while agreeing with the views expressed by the learned Single Judge, we hold that a company, a juristic person, whether Indian or foreign, can maintain a legal action based on Article 14 of the Constitution of India alone. This issue is accordingly answered in favour of respondent No. 1. 55. Issue No. 4 Having agreed with the views expressed by the learned Single Judge on the maintainability of the writ petition, we may now proceed to deal with the substantive issues on merit. We have already noticed that the price bid of respondent No. 1 was rejected by appellant No. 1 on three grounds i.e. insertion of a new clause in the fresh price bid by respondent No. 1, disclosure of the prices of only 19 major rig components as against the tender requirement of 63 and inability of appellant OIL to determine whether or not the API certification submitted by respondent No. 1 alongwith the tender documents would cover the other facilities of respondent No. 1 since as per the new clause inserted, it reserved the right to manufacture and test the rigs in any of its facilities. The first and the third ground of rejection are interrelated and are taken up at the first instance. So the question which arises for consideration is whether the appellant OIL was justified in taking the decision to exclude respondent No. 1 (writ petitioner) from the tender process on the ground of insertion of a new clause by respondent No. 1 by way of a foot note in the fresh price bid? 56. To examine the above issue, it would be necessary to revert back to the facts of the case which may be recapitulated briefly. In this connection, we may note that learned Single Judge had painstakingly culled out the relevant undisputed facts from the record from which we now make the brief factual reference. 57. As already noticed, appellant OIL had floated open global E-Tender in the month of August, 2010 inviting bids under single stage two bid system for supply and commissioning of two 2000 HP-VFD rig packages, one with top drive and another with provision for top drive. Though initially 27 parties had purchased tender documents and participated in the pre-bid conference, only 5 submitted their technical and commercial bids, including respondent No. 1, respondent No. 2 and BHEL. Technical bids were opened on 15.06.2011. Though initially 27 parties had purchased tender documents and participated in the pre-bid conference, only 5 submitted their technical and commercial bids, including respondent No. 1, respondent No. 2 and BHEL. Technical bids were opened on 15.06.2011. Respondent No. 1, respondent No. 2 and BHEL were found to be technically responsive. The Tender Committee noticed certain deviations in the bids submitted by the three bidders but approved the proposal for opening of the price bids of the three technically responsive bidders. This was also approved by the Local Management Committee. Finally, the matter was placed before the CBC, which took a decision on 02.03.2012 to open the price bids of respondent No. 1 and respondent No. 2. Because of non-extension of bid validity, it was decided not to open the price bid of BHEL. Accordingly, price bid of both respondent No. 1 and respondent No. 2 were opened on 07.03.2012. Both Tender Committee and Local Management Committee found certain discrepancies in the price bids. When the matter was placed before the CBC, it decided to refer the matter to the Independent External Monitors, on whose recommendation, CBC decided to re-invite fresh price bids from all the three bidders whose technical bids were found to be responsive i.e. respondent No. 1, respondent No. 2 and BHEL. Though it was a continuation of the same tender process, a slight modification was made in the two rig packages. This time it was mentioned that both the rig packages should be with top drive instead of one with top drive and the other without top drive. All the aforesaid three bidders submitted their fresh bids. However, the respondent No. 1 in the fresh price bid inserted the following clause which was not there in the earlier price bid submitted by it:- "Drillmec reserved the right to manufacture and test the rigs, or part of them, in any of its facilities, which belong to us as per their availability at the time of contract awarding." Respondent No. 1 in the fresh price bid submitted the prices of 19 major rig components instead of 63. 58. The fresh price bids of the bidders were opened on 03.10.2012. The Local Management Committee on 09.10.2012 scrutinized the offers made by the three bidders and found that respondent No. 1 had put the aforesaid clause in the price bid. 58. The fresh price bids of the bidders were opened on 03.10.2012. The Local Management Committee on 09.10.2012 scrutinized the offers made by the three bidders and found that respondent No. 1 had put the aforesaid clause in the price bid. Local Management Committee was of the view that a clarification should be sought from respondent No. 1. The decision of the Local Management Committee had the approval of the Tender Committee. Accordingly, matter was placed before the CBC on 03.12.2012. In the meanwhile, communications dated 12.10.2012, 16.10.2012 and 19.10.2012 were received by appellant OIL from respondent No. 2 complaining that the fresh price bid submitted by respondent No. 1 should be rejected because of incorporation of the said clause in the price bid as well as for not furnishing the prices of all 63 major rig components. 59. CBC in its 429th meeting held on 03.12.2012 considered the proposal of Local Management Committee as well as the communications received from respondent No. 2. Decision was taken in the said meeting to obtain the opinion of Solicitor General of India. Ultimately, an opinion was obtained from the Attorney General of India on 14.12.2012. Thereafter, the CBC in its 430th meeting held on 27.12.2012 decided to hold negotiation with respondent No. 2 on the price bid. 60. Before proceeding further, we have referred to some of the relevant provisions of the tender which have a bearing on the issue under consideration. These conditions are:- "BID REJECTION CRITERIA: The bids shall conform generally to the specifications and terms as well as conditions laid out in the tender. Bids will be rejected in case the items offered do not conform to the required parameters stipulated in the technical specifications and to the respective international/national standers wherever stipulated. Notwithstanding the general conformity of the bids to the stipulated specifications and terms and conditions, the following requirements will have to be met by the bids, without which, the same shall be considered as non-responsive and stand rejected. TECHNICAL 15. Manufacturer must be a valid licensee of API Spec. 4F for a period not less than 10 years continuously without any break preceding the bid (technical) opening date. Bids from bidders having API Spec. TECHNICAL 15. Manufacturer must be a valid licensee of API Spec. 4F for a period not less than 10 years continuously without any break preceding the bid (technical) opening date. Bids from bidders having API Spec. 4F license (of Manufacturer) less than 10 years or having a break in between, preceding the bid opening date will not be considered (copies of API certificate for all the 10 years must be forwarded with technical bid). COMMERCIAL 1.0 Bids are invited under Single Stage Two Bid System. Bidders shall quote accordingly under Single Stage Two Bid System. Please note that no price details should be furnished in the Technical (i.e. Unpriced) bid. The "Unpriced Bid" shall contain all techno-commercial details except the prices which shall be kept blank. The "Priced Bid" must contain the price schedule and the bidder's commercial terms and conditions. Bidder not complying with above submission procedure will be rejected." 61. The scope of judicial review in matters relating to tenders and award of contracts has by now crystallized following a consistent line of decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court over a period of time. Though it would be unnecessary to refer to all the judgments, it is considered apposite to refer to some of those judgments so that the case in hand can be examined in the correct perspective. 62. In Tata Cellular Vs. Union of India, reported in (1994) 6 SCC 651 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court considered various decisions on the scope of judicial review of administrative action and summarized the position as under:- "(1) The modern trend points to judicial restraint in administrative action. (2) The court does not sit as a court of appeal but merely reviews the manner in which the decision was made. (3) The court does not have the expertise to correct the administrative decision. If a review of the administrative decision is permitted it will be substituting its own decision, without the necessary expertise which itself may be fallible. (4) The terms of the invitation to tender cannot be open to judicial scrutiny because the invitation to tender is in the realm of contract. Normally speaking, the decision to accept the tender or aware the contract is reached by process of negotiations through several tiers. More often than not, such decisions are made qualitatively by experts. (5) The Government must have freedom of contract. Normally speaking, the decision to accept the tender or aware the contract is reached by process of negotiations through several tiers. More often than not, such decisions are made qualitatively by experts. (5) The Government must have freedom of contract. In other words, a fair play in the joints is a necessary concomitant for an administrative body functioning in an administrative sphere or quasi-administrative sphere. However, the decision must not only be tested by the application of Wednesbury principle of reasonableness (including its other facts pointed out above) but must be free from arbitrariness not affected by bias or actuated by mala fides. (6) Quashing decisions may impose heavy administrative burden on the administration and lead to increased and unbudgeted expenditure." 63. Tata Cellular (Supra) was approvingly referred to by the Apex Court in West Bengal State Electricity Board Vs. Patel Engineering Co. Ltd. and Ors., reported in (2001) 2 SCC 451 and interfered with the direction of the High Court permitting correction of errors by the bidders in their bid documents, holding the same to be beyond the scope of judicial review. It was observed therein that in an international competitive bidding which postulates keen competition, adherence to the terms and conditions of the tender should be strictly complied with which is the best principle to be followed and which is also in the public interest. 64. In Jagdish Mandal Vs. State of Orissa & Ors., reported in (2007) 14 SCC 517, the Hon'ble Supreme Court after referring to various decisions on the scope of judicial review in award of contracts, held as follows:- "22. Judicial review of administrative action is intended to prevent arbitrariness, irrationality, unreasonableness, bias and mala fides. Its purpose is to check whether choice or decision is made "lawfully" and not to check whether choice or decision is "sound". When the power of judicial review is invoked in matters relating to tenders or award of contracts, certain special features should be borne in mind. A contract is a commercial transaction. Evaluating tenders and awarding contracts are essentially commercial functions. Principles of equity and natural justice stay at a distance. If the decision relating to award of contract is bona fide and is in public interest, courts will not, in exercise of power of judicial review, interfere even if a procedural aberration or error in assessment or prejudice to a tenderer, is made out. Principles of equity and natural justice stay at a distance. If the decision relating to award of contract is bona fide and is in public interest, courts will not, in exercise of power of judicial review, interfere even if a procedural aberration or error in assessment or prejudice to a tenderer, is made out. The power of judicial review will not be permitted to be invoked to protect private interest at the cost of public interest, or to decide contractual disputes. The tenderer or contractor with a grievance can always seek damages in a civil court. Attempts by unsuccessful tenderers with imaginary grievances, wounded pride and business rivalry, to make mountains out of molehills of some technical/procedural violation or some prejudice to self, and persuade courts to interfere by exercising power of judicial review, should be resisted. Such interferences, either interim or final, may hold up public works for years, or delay relief and succour to thousands and millions and may increase the project cost manifold. Therefore, a court before interfering in tender or contractual matters in exercise of power of judicial review, should pose to itself the following questions: (i) Whether the process adopted or decision made by the authority is mala fide or intended to favour someone; OR Whether the process adopted or decision made is so arbitrary and irrational that the court can say: "the decision is such that no responsible authority acting reasonably and in accordance with relevant law could have reached"; (ii) Whether public interest is affected. If the answers are in the negative, there should be no interference under Article 226." 65. Siemens Public Communication Networks Private Limited & Anr. Vs. Union of India & Ors., reported in (2008) 16 SCC 215 was a case where the Apex Court was examining the decision of the High Court dismissing the writ petition filed by the appellant for a direction to Bharat Electronics Limited to award the particular contract in its favour on the ground that it was the lowest bidder. The Apex Court in the said judgment took note of various decisions regarding scope of judicial review in matters of tender and held that if two views are possible and no mala fides or arbitrariness is alleged or shown, there is no scope for interference with the view taken by the authorities in inviting tenders. The Apex Court in the said judgment took note of various decisions regarding scope of judicial review in matters of tender and held that if two views are possible and no mala fides or arbitrariness is alleged or shown, there is no scope for interference with the view taken by the authorities in inviting tenders. The Apex Court further held that a contract is a commercial transaction and evaluating tenders and awarding contracts are essentially commercial functions where principles of equity and natural justice stay at a distance. Relevant portion of the said judgment reads as under:- "40. On examining the facts and circumstances of the present case, we are of the view that none of the criteria has been satisfied justifying Court's interference in the grant of contract in favour of the appellants. When the power of judicial review is invoked in the matters relating to tenders or award of contracts, certain special features have to be considered. A contract is a commercial transaction and evaluating tenders and awarding contracts are essentially commercial functions. In such cases principles of equity and natural justice stay at a distance. If the decision relating to award of contracts is bona fide and is in public interest, courts will not exercise the power of judicial review and interfere even if it is accepted for the sake of argument that there is a procedural lacuna." 66. In Michigan Rubber (India) Limited Vs. State of Karnataka & Ors., reported in (2012) 8 SCC 216 , the Apex Court after referring to various decisions summed up the law relating to the scope and approach to be adopted in matters of tender and contract as under:- "23. From the above decisions, the following principles emerge: (a) The basic requirement of Article 14 is fairness in action by the State, and non-arbitrariness in essence and substance is the heartbeat of fair play. These actions are amenable to the judicial review only to the extent that the State must act validly for a discernible reason and not whimsically for any ulterior purpose. These actions are amenable to the judicial review only to the extent that the State must act validly for a discernible reason and not whimsically for any ulterior purpose. If the State acts within the bounds of reasonableness, it would be legitimate to take into consideration the national priorities; (b) Fixation of a value of the tender is entirely within the purview of the executive and the courts hardly have any role to play in this process except for striking down such action of the executive as is proved to be arbitrary or unreasonable. If the Government acts in conformity with certain healthy standards and norms such as awarding of contracts by inviting tenders, in those circumstances, the interference by courts is very limited; (c) In the matter of formulating conditions of a tender document and awarding a contract, greater latitude is required to be conceded to the State authorities unless the action of the tendering authority is found to be malicious and a misuse of its statutory powers, interference by courts is not warranted; (d) Certain preconditions or qualifications or tenders have to be laid down to ensure that the contractor has the capacity and the resources to successfully execute the work; and (e) If the State or its instrumentalities act reasonably, fairly and in public interest in awarding contract, here again, interference by court is very restrictive since no person can claim a fundamental right to carry on business with the Government. 24. Therefore, a court before interfering in tender or contractual matters, in exercise of power of judicial review, should pose to itself the following questions: (i) Whether the process adopted or decision made by the authority is mala fide or intended to favour someone; or whether the process adopted or decision made is so arbitrary and irrational that the court can say: "the decision is such that no responsible authority acting reasonably and in accordance with relevant law could have reached"? and (ii) Whether the public interest is affected? If the answers to the above questions are in the negative, then there should be no interference under Article 226." 67. and (ii) Whether the public interest is affected? If the answers to the above questions are in the negative, then there should be no interference under Article 226." 67. Keeping in mind the legal position, we may now consider the decision making process adopted by appellant OIL to exclude respondent No. 1 from the tender process on the ground of insertion of a new clause in the fresh price bid, which we have already noticed above. Learned Single Judge after referring to Clause 1.0 of the Bid Rejection Criteria under the caption 'commercial' has held that the said clause does not contain any provision that the bid of a bidder would be rejected if any technical condition is put in the price bid. It has been held that the price bid of a bidder cannot be rejected on the ground that a clause has been inserted in the price bid, which, had the bidder mentioned in the technical bid would have rendered him technically non-responsive. Learned Single Judge, therefore, concluded that the bid of respondent No. 1 could not have been rejected by taking recourse to Clause 1.0 of the Bid Rejection Criteria (Commercial) on the ground that price bid of the respondent No. 1 contains a clause concerning technical qualification more so, when respondent No. 1 was found to be technically responsive. 68. Stand of appellant OIL in so far insertion of the said condition is concerned is that respondent No. 1 in its technical bid had mentioned Italy as the place of manufacture and testing of rigs and had submitted API certificate for last 10 years of its Italy plant, on the basis of which, it was found to be technically qualified. By inserting the new condition in the fresh price bid, the responsive technical bid of respondent No. 1 was rendered non-responsive inasmuch as, location of the facilities is not mentioned in the fresh condition. Appellant OIL found fault with the insertion of such clause. As already noticed above, there is a specific stipulation in Clause 15 of the terms and conditions of the Bid Rejection Criteria (Technical) that the manufacturer must have a valid licence of API specification for a continuous period of 10 years, which must be furnished along with the technical bid. Appellant OIL found fault with the insertion of such clause. As already noticed above, there is a specific stipulation in Clause 15 of the terms and conditions of the Bid Rejection Criteria (Technical) that the manufacturer must have a valid licence of API specification for a continuous period of 10 years, which must be furnished along with the technical bid. Learned Single Judge has noted in paragraph 104 of the judgment that manufacturing or testing of rigs must take place in a facility which has API licence for a continuous period of 10 years, which must be furnished along with the technical bid. Non-submission of such licence would entail rejection of the technical bid. In the above context, considering the stand taken by appellant OIL that it had doubts regarding having valid API certification of the other facilities by respondent No. 1 as mentioned in the new clause and therefore, it took the view that insertion of the new clause in the fresh price bid has materially changed/altered the technical bid of respondent No. 1, cannot be said to be an arbitrary, unreasonable or irrational decision. As already noticed, in exercise of the power of judicial review, we are only examining the decision making process and not the correctness or otherwise of the ultimate decision taken. That being the position, we are of the view that appellant OIL was well within its right in arriving at the impugned decision. This is more so, when there is no allegation of mala fide against any functionary of OIL. 69. Coming to the contention of the respondent No. 1 that the said decision of appellant OIL was solely on the basis of the unsolicited communications of respondent No. 2, even the learned Single Judge did not accept such contention by pointing out that the Local Management Committee had decided to seek approval of the CBC to seek clarification from the respondent No. 1 in respect of the clause inserted by it in the fresh price bid, even prior to receipt of the communications from respondent No. 2. 70. 70. On the contention of respondent No. 1 that the CBC did not take relevant factors into consideration and acted unreasonably in refusing to seek clarification from respondent No. 1 regarding insertion of the new clause despite proposal to that effect by the Local Management Committee, it can only be said that as can be seen, there are several stages in the decision making process of appellant OIL. It is a multi-layered decision making process. In such a process, different authorities at different stages of the decision making process, are expected to air their views freely and frankly. In such a scenario, there is bound to be exchange of divergent views. This is also to ensure that arbitrariness, unreasonableness or favouritism are eliminated, but the ultimate decision is that of the final authority. In this case, the final authority is the CBC and its decision is final and conclusive. Just because the CBC did not accede to the proposal of the Local Management Committee to seek clarification from respondent No. 1, it cannot be said that appellant OIL failed to exercise its discretion in a reasonable and rational manner. In the case of Ratnagiri Gas & Power (P) Ltd. Vs. RDS Projects Ltd., reported in (2013) 1 SCC 524 , the Apex Court held that where the decision making process is multi-layered, what is decided at the final level would constitute the final decision of the institution. The Apex Court held thus:- "38. We need hardly point out that in cases where the decision-making process is multi-layered, officers associated with the process are free and indeed expected to take views on various issues according to their individual perceptions. They may in doing so at times strike discordant notes, but that is but natural and indeed welcome for it is only by independent deliberation, that all possible facets of an issue are unfolded and addressed and a decision that is most appropriate under the circumstances shaped. If every step in the decision-making processes viewed with suspicion the integrity of the entire process shall be jeopardised. Officers taking views in the decision-making process will fell handicapped in expressing their opinions freely and frankly for fear of being seen to be doing so for mala fide reasons which would in turn affect public interest......................." 71. If every step in the decision-making processes viewed with suspicion the integrity of the entire process shall be jeopardised. Officers taking views in the decision-making process will fell handicapped in expressing their opinions freely and frankly for fear of being seen to be doing so for mala fide reasons which would in turn affect public interest......................." 71. Having regard to the discussions made above, we are of the considered view that there was no illegality or infirmity in the decision making process taken by appellant OIL leading to the decision to exclude respondent No. 1 from the tender process and hold price negotiation with respondent No. 2. This issue is accordingly answered against the respondent No. 1 and in favour of the OIL. 72. Issue No. 5: In view of the decision taken in respect of issue No. 4, we are of the view that it is not necessary to go into the issue as to whether respondent No. 1 violated any terms and conditions of the tender by disclosing the prices of only 19 major rig components as against 63 or whether disclosure of the prices of 63 major rig components is an essential or non-essential condition of tender. We, therefore, decline to answer this issue. 73. Issue No. 6: Having regard to the discussions made in respect of issue No. 4, we are of the view that learned Single Judge was not justified in interfering with the decision of appellant OIL and issuing a direction in the nature of mandamus to the appellant to reconsider the matter relating to award of contract in the light of the conclusions reached by the learned Single Judge. In the light of the discussions and findings recorded by us, we are of the view that the decision of the learned Single Judge goes well beyond the scope of judicial review and, hence, we are constrained to interfere with the same. 74. Accordingly and in the light of the above, the appellant OIL succeeds in the appeal. Writ appeal is allowed. Judgment and order of the learned Single Judge dated 28.06.2013, passed in WP(C) No. 154/2013 is set aside, and consequently, writ petition is also dismissed. No costs. 75. However, we would like to clarify that dismissal of the writ petition should not be construed to mean that we have evaluated the competing claims of respondent No. 1 and respondent No. 2. No costs. 75. However, we would like to clarify that dismissal of the writ petition should not be construed to mean that we have evaluated the competing claims of respondent No. 1 and respondent No. 2. We have only examined the decision making process. Ultimate decision will be of appellant OIL, which should proceed with the matter in accordance with law and in the public interest. 76. Before we part with the record, we deem it appropriate to place on record our appreciation of the hard work and erudite arguments advanced by learned counsel for the parties, particularly Mr. D.K. Mishra, who argued for respondent No. 1 with a great deal of flair and authority. A.M. Sapre, J. 77. I have perused the draft judgment proposed by my learned brother Justice Ujjal Bhuyan. On its perusal, I concur with him. I have nothing useful to add to the elaborate well considered and scholarly judgment proposed to be pronounced by him except few words of concurrence which I consider proper to write having regard to the nature of controversy and legal issues involved. 78. I need not repeat the facts because they are detailed in the main judgment of my brother. 79. In my considered opinion too, the learned Single Judge rightly held that the writ petition was properly filed with no defects of any nature therein such as the locus of person in filing the writ petition, the authority to file the writ petition and verification made in support thereof. Since my learned brother has given cogent reasons while upholding the finding of the learned Single Judge, I agree with his reasoning and the conclusion on this issue and do not wish to add anything more to the same. 80. Since my learned brother has given cogent reasons while upholding the finding of the learned Single Judge, I agree with his reasoning and the conclusion on this issue and do not wish to add anything more to the same. 80. So far as issue relating to the legal right of writ petitioner in filing the writ petition under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India to challenge the action of appellant (Oil India Limited) in rejecting writ petitioner's tender is concerned, here again I respectfully agree with the reasoning and the conclusion arrived at by the learned Single Judge so also the reasoning and the conclusion arrived at by my learned Brother who has extensively dealt with this issue in the context of the law laid down by the Supreme Court while dealing with the rights of the citizens/persons in challenging the action of State complaining infringement of their rights guaranteed under Article 19(1) read with Article 14 of the Constitution of India. 81. Indeed, it is apt to remember here the words of the eminent Judge - Vivian Bose, J. expressed by the learned judge in his concurring opinion while explaining the ambit and scope of article 14 of the Constitution of India in a locus classic case reported in State of West Bengal Vs. Anwar Ali Sarkar ( AIR 1952 SC 75 ) wherein the learned Judge known for his distinctive style of writing said "any action of the state which is unreasonable, unjust and unfair while dealing with the rights of the citizen would attract the rigour of Article 14". These observations which were made by his lordship in the formative years immediately after enactment of our constitution has stood the test of time in last six decades with more vigor in its application while examining the action of the State qua citizen. The later classic decisions of the Supreme Court rendered in last 6 decades duly taken note of and relied upon by my learned brother on this issue amply support our view. 82. The later classic decisions of the Supreme Court rendered in last 6 decades duly taken note of and relied upon by my learned brother on this issue amply support our view. 82. It would be rather incongruous to hold that a foreign entity though allowed to do and carry on business for their livelihood in India and thereby enter into agreements/contacts with State and its instrumentalities as defined under article 12 are not allowed to raise the plea against the State based on the principal enshrined under Article 14 of the Constitution of India to challenge the action of the State based on the contract/promise as the case may be for want of non availability of enforcement of the fundamental rights guaranteed under Article 19 because they are not the citizens of country. 83. In a present days scenario when there is a consistent move on the part of the State/Union to improve the entire economy for the benefit of citizen by allowing the foreign national to enter into business field, the law cannot be interpreted to deny them a right to raise the plea based independently on the anvil of article 14 which is the most celebrated article available to every citizen of our country against the State while challenging the State action and its instrumentalities in court of law. 84. I therefore respectfully agree with the finding of the learned Single Judge and that of my learned Brother on this issue and accordingly hold that foreign national too will have a right to challenge the action of the State and its instrumentality in a court of law under Article 226 by invoking the principle of Article 14 independent of Article 19 against any State action. In the light of this finding I also hold that writ petitioner was entitled to challenge the action of appellant (Oil India Limited - respondent in the writ petition) by relying on the principles enshrined under Article 14 ibid. 85. I however respectfully disagree with the reasoning and the conclusion of the learned Single judge when he interfered in the decision making process of the appellant (Oil India limited) impugned in the writ petition and feel inclined to agree with the elaborate reasoning and the conclusion arrived at by my learned brother for reversing the view of the learned Single Judge on this issue. Since this issue is extensively dealt with by my brother, I do not wish to add anything to it except what is stated infra. 86. Suffice it to say, if the test laid down by the Supreme Court in the decisions extensively referred to by my brother is applied in its proper perspective to examine the action impugned in the writ petition, then in my opinion, the view taken by the learned Single judge cannot be upheld. In my considered view also, the learned Single Judge virtually exercised the writ jurisdiction like an appellate jurisdiction while examining the decision making process impugned in the writ petition and to some extent entered in the realm of what I may say appreciation of documentary evidence (correspondence) for recording a finding that the action impugned in the writ petition was irrational and arbitrary and was thus violative of Article 14. In so doing, the learned Single judge issued further mandamus against the contracting party (appellant) directing them to proceed in a particular manner while finalizing the tender process. With respect, we cannot agree to exercise of this power in writ jurisdiction relating to mandamus in contractual matters. The writ court may in appropriate contractual matters issue writ of certiorari for quashing the action by invoking Article 14, but when it comes to issuance of writ of mandamus, then question arise as to whether in contractual matter, the writ court can further direct one of the contracting party to execute the contract in a particular manner. On the facts involved in this case, we do not think that it was possible to issue a writ of mandamus of any nature. I also consider appropriate like my brother to place on record that all the senior counsels argued the matter with industry, fairness and with perfect clarity thereby making our task easier. It was indeed a redeemable feature of this case, which deserves to be taken note of while parting with the case. With these few paragraphs, I agree with my brother.