JUDGMENT This appeal is directed against the judgment and decree dated 20/06/2011 passed by the learned Ad-Hoc District Judge – I, FTCI, South Goa, Margao (First Appellate Court, for short) in Regular Civil Appeal No. 333 of 2010 by which the said appeal filed against the judgment and decree dated 14/12/2000 passed by the learned Civil Judge, Senior Division, Margao (Trial Court, for short) in Special Civil Suit No. 136/90/A, came to be dismissed. 2. The appellants were the plaintiffs in the said Civil Suit No. 136/90/A whereas the respondents were the defendants therein. The parties shall hereinafter be referred to in the manner in which they are arrayed in the cause title of said suit. 3. The plaintiff no. 1 and deceased plaintiff no. 2 are husband and wife and plaintiffs no. 2(a), 2(b) and 2(c) are their children whereas the defendants no. 1 and 3 are brothers being children of the original defendant no. 5, since deceased. The defendants no. 5(a) to 5(f) are the legal representatives of the deceased defendant no. 5. The plaintiffs had filed the said Special Civil Suit No. 136 of 1990, inter alia, for declaration that the suit house namely the new portion exclusively constructed by the plaintiff no.1 and as shown in the sketch, bearing house no. 717 belongs exclusively to the plaintiffs and defendants had no right to the same; for mandatory injunction directing the defendants to open the lock put by them on the front door on the right hand side as well as the locks put by them on the two rooms and to remove all their belongings from the room of the suit house and to vacate the suit house; and for permanent injunction. Originally there was an ancestral house in the property belonging to the parents of the plaintiff no. 1, which was constructed by the father Shri Sadashiv Lotlikar, who expired on 28/03/1968. The subject matter of dispute is the new house allegedly constructed by the plaintiff no. 1 in the said property which new house is adjacent to the old ancestral house of the parents. It was the case of the plaintiff that the plaintiff no.1 had, in the year 1968, carried out the construction of the suit house and had started residing in the same and also carried out repairs to the old house. It was alleged by the plaintiffs that the defendants no. It was the case of the plaintiff that the plaintiff no.1 had, in the year 1968, carried out the construction of the suit house and had started residing in the same and also carried out repairs to the old house. It was alleged by the plaintiffs that the defendants no. 1 and 3 forcibly took possession of the part of the suit house and started occupying the same and this deprived the plaintiffs of a room where they used to do pooja and also appropriated the belongings of the plaintiffs and closed some of the rooms of old house and the access to the new house. 4. The defendants filed their Written Statements resisting the suit and inter alia, they claimed that the suit property and the suit house belong to the defendants, plaintiffs, mother of the defendant no. 1 and one brother and two sisters. They alleged that the suit house was constructed by their late father and defendant no. 1 after obtaining the necessary licence from the Margao Municipal Council, in 1967 and that the defendants are in possession of one bed room; plaintiffs are in possession of one bedroom; his brother is occupying one room and the mother is occupying one room. They claimed that it was the late mother of the plaintiff no.1 and of the defendants no. 1 and 3, who had locked the southern side room long back. According to them, the store room was under lock and the key to this lock always used to be with the mother. They further claimed that since Inventory Proceeding were not instituted after the death of Sadashiv Lotlikar, the suit was not maintainable. 5. Following issues were framed by the Trial Court: ISSUES 1. Whether the plaintiffs prove that the suit house bearing no. 717 belongs exclusively to them and the defendants have no right? 2. Whether the plaintiffs prove that they are entitled for mandatory injunction directing the defendants to open the lock put on the front door on the right hand side and also on the two rooms put by the defendants? 3. Whether the plaintiffs prove that they are entitled for a permanent injunction restraining the defendants from interfering with the furniture and other articles of the plaintiffs kept in the suit house? 4. Whether the defendants prove that the plaintiffs have no cause of action to file the present suit against them? 3. Whether the plaintiffs prove that they are entitled for a permanent injunction restraining the defendants from interfering with the furniture and other articles of the plaintiffs kept in the suit house? 4. Whether the defendants prove that the plaintiffs have no cause of action to file the present suit against them? ADDITIONAL ISSUE 4a. Whether the defendants no. 3, 4 and 5 prove that the present suit is not maintainable in law as there have been no inventory proceedings? 5. What relief? What order? 6. During the course of trial before the Trial Court, the plaintiffs examined the plaintiff no.1 as PW1 and three more witnesses. The defendants examined the defendant no.1 as DW 1 one more witness. Both the parties produced various documents before the Trial Court. 7. Upon appreciation of the entire evidence on record and considering the submissions made by the learned Counsel for both the parties, the learned Trial Court held that the plaintiffs could not prove that the suit house bearing no. 717 exclusively belongs to them and that the defendants have no right to the same. It was found that the original house was admittedly constructed by the father of the plaintiff no. 1, defendant no. 1 and defendant no. 3. Even the construction licence and proposed plan of the said extension which the plaintiffs claimed to have been done by the plaintiff no.1 stands in the name of the father. The survey records as well as the Municipal records stood in the name of plaintiff no.1, defendant no.1, defendant no.3 and the deceased defendant no.5. The Trial Court held that the Agreement Exhibit PW1/B-Colly. between the plaintiff no. 1 and the contractor, who according to the plaintiffs, constructed the extended portion is false and fabricated document because Stamp Act came into force in the year 1965, and the said document was not properly stamped as required under the Stamp Act. The Trial Court found that though the plaintiffs alleged that the father of the plaintiff no.1 had granted to him the permission to construct the suit house, however, no such permission was produced on record. The Trial Court found that the plaintiff no.1 (PW1) was working as Insurance Agent in the year 1948 and was earning Rs. The Trial Court found that though the plaintiffs alleged that the father of the plaintiff no.1 had granted to him the permission to construct the suit house, however, no such permission was produced on record. The Trial Court found that the plaintiff no.1 (PW1) was working as Insurance Agent in the year 1948 and was earning Rs. 600/- per month as salary and he had not explained either in the pleadings or in the evidence as to how he could arrange huge amount for purchasing the construction materials and for payments of the bills and receipts produced by him. The Trial Court held that even if the bills and receipts, house tax records, electricity bills, water bills, etc. produced on record were standing in the name of the plaintiff no.1, the said fact alone is not sufficient to prove his exclusive right to the suit house. The Trial Court discussed in detail the evidence of witnesses of both the parties and found that the plaintiffs could not establish their case. The Trial Court also found that no inventory proceedings were initiated upon the death of said Sadashiv Lotlikar and the suit house bearing house no. 717 which includes the extended portion is ancestral house and therefore plaintiffs' suit for seeking declaration and injunction against other co-owners who have right to the suit house and the suit property is not maintainable for failure of the plaintiffs in not previously getting their rights to the suit property duly determined by a judicial decree in the competent Inventory Proceedings. Reliance was placed by the Trial Court on the judgment of this Court in the case of “Shri Cruz Fernandes and his wife V/s Smt. Gregorina Estefania Sofia Fernandes and others” reported in 1991 (2) Goa L. T. 42. Consequently, the suit came to be dismissed. 8. The plaintiffs filed the Regular Civil Appeal No. 333/2010. The learned First Appellate Court formulated the following points for determination. POINTS FOR DETERMINATION 1. Whether the plaintiffs have proved before the trial Court that they are the exclusively owners of the suit house? 2. Whether the learned trial Judge erred in dismissing the suit? 9. The First Appellate Court found that the construction licence produced by the plaintiff no. The learned First Appellate Court formulated the following points for determination. POINTS FOR DETERMINATION 1. Whether the plaintiffs have proved before the trial Court that they are the exclusively owners of the suit house? 2. Whether the learned trial Judge erred in dismissing the suit? 9. The First Appellate Court found that the construction licence produced by the plaintiff no. 1 in respect of the new construction was dated 12/05/1967 and it was clearly mentioned therein that the same was valid for one year beginning from 12/05/1967 which means that it was valid till 11/05/1968 during which period the work had to be completed. It was found that the said construction licence was not renewed. The said licence was issued in the name of Shri Sadanand Lotlikar, the late father of plaintiff no.1. The First Appellate Court further found that the proposed plan prepared by PW2-Shri Bhende was bearing the signature of said Engineer along with the signature of late Sadanand Lotlikar. The First Appellate Court therefore held that it was clear that the licence for construction was not obtained by the plaintiffs but by late father of the plaintiff no.1 and the work of drawing the plans was done by the PW 2 not at the instance of the plaintiffs but at the instance of father of the plaintiff no. 1. The First Appellate Court observed that there is no dispute that the original house in the suit property was constructed by Shri Sadanand Lotlikar, the father of the plaintiff no. 1, defendant no. 1 and defendant no. 3. It therefore held that there is force in the argument advanced by the learned Counsel for the defendants that the construction of the suit house was intended to be carried out by the father of the plaintiff no. 1, the defendant no. 1 and the defendant no. 3 and had thus obtained the construction licence on 12/05/1967. The said father Shri Sadanand Lotlikar expired on 28/03/1968 i.e. after completion of 10 months from the date of obtaining the municipal licence for construction and when only 44 days were left for completion of period of validity of licence. 1, the defendant no. 1 and the defendant no. 3 and had thus obtained the construction licence on 12/05/1967. The said father Shri Sadanand Lotlikar expired on 28/03/1968 i.e. after completion of 10 months from the date of obtaining the municipal licence for construction and when only 44 days were left for completion of period of validity of licence. The First Appellate Court thus concluded that there is substance in the arguments of learned Counsel for the defendants that such a big construction of extension of seven rooms with R.C.C. frame work as shown in the plan and as claimed by PW1 and PW2 could not have been completed in 44 days and therefore it is obvious that the construction was done by late father of the plaintiff no.1 or at least major part was done by the father. The First Appellate Court held that the agreement at Exhibit PW1/B-Colly. between the plaintiff no.1 and the contractor was a private agreement produced by the plaintiff no.1 to show that the plaintiff no. 1 got the construction done in the year 1968. The First Appellate Court observed that the said agreement is dated 13/04/1968 thereby showing that it was executed 28 days before the completion of validity of the construction licence dated 12/05/1967 and except for the first three payments, all payments were shown to have been made after 11/05/1968 and till 07/07/1968, when no construction could have been done on account of expiry of validity of the construction licence. The First Appellate Court further observed that the contractor who is purported party to the said agreement has not been examined. It was further found that the payments were shown to have been made by cash and not by cheques. The First Appellate Court also discussed the evidence of the witnesses examined by the parties and also the documents produced by the parties. The First Appellate Court found that the cash memos, bills, receipts etc. produced by the plaintiffs were of the year 1973, 1974, 1987 and 1988 for which no construction licence was obtained and further the authors of the said documents were not examined. It is further observed by the First appellate Court that mere marking the documents as exhibits does not prove the contents of the said documents. produced by the plaintiffs were of the year 1973, 1974, 1987 and 1988 for which no construction licence was obtained and further the authors of the said documents were not examined. It is further observed by the First appellate Court that mere marking the documents as exhibits does not prove the contents of the said documents. The First Appellate Court also held that the learned Counsel for the defendants had rightly argued that the only remedy available to the plaintiffs was to file Inventory Proceeding and get the improvements listed therein if made by them and the value thereof upon establishment of the fact of carrying out construction and the proof of value. Consequently, the appeal came to be dismissed. 10. Thus, this Second Appeal is preferred by the plaintiffs against the concurrent findings of the two Courts below. 11. Mr. C. Pereira, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the plaintiffs, submitted that the material evidence on record namely the documents like the agreement executed between the plaintiffs and the contractor, the receipts, bills, electricity bills, house tax records, which all stand in the name of the plaintiff no.1 and which pertain to the extended portion i.e. the suit house and which established that the suit structure was constructed by the plaintiff no.1, were not considered by the First Appellate Court. He further submitted that merely because the licence for construction of the extended portion was obtained in the name of late Sadanand Lotlikar, it could not have been held that the suit house belongs to the heirs of late Sadanand Lotlikar. According to him, the Appellate Court failed to render finding on the vital aspect of the matter as to who constructed the suit house. He submitted that even if the property is ancestral, there cannot be anything wrong if the structure constructed thereon belongs to a party who constructs the same. He also pointed out that there is contradictory finding rendered by the First Appellate Court, insofar as the improvements are concerned. The learned Senior Counsel tried to substantiate his submissions by inviting my attention to various portions from the impugned judgments of the Courts below. He urged that the findings of the lower Courts are perverse and therefore the appeal deserves to be allowed. 12. On the other hand, Mr. The learned Senior Counsel tried to substantiate his submissions by inviting my attention to various portions from the impugned judgments of the Courts below. He urged that the findings of the lower Courts are perverse and therefore the appeal deserves to be allowed. 12. On the other hand, Mr. D'Costa, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the defendants submitted that there are concurrent findings of the Courts below and that the said findings are based on the appreciation of the evidence of facts and of the law applicable and there being no perversity in the said findings, the question of interference with the impugned judgments does not arise. He further submitted that no substantial question of law arises in the present appeal and therefore the appeal is liable to be rejected summarily. 13. I have perused the material on record, more particularly the judgments passed by the Trial Court and the First appellate Court and I have also considered the submissions made by the learned Counsel for the parties. 14. The perusal of the judgments rendered by both the Courts below clearly reveals that there are concurrent findings of facts upon the appreciation of the evidence on record. It is an admitted fact that the original house was constructed by the father of the plaintiff no.1, defendant no.1 and defendant no. 5. The survey records as well as the Municipal records stand in the names of plaintiff no.1, defendant no. 1, defendant no. 3 and the deceased defendant no. 5. The construction licence and the proposed plan of the extension stood in the name of deceased father. Though the plaintiffs contended that the father of the plaintiff no.1 had granted him permission to construct the suit house, he did not produce such permission. It is not correct to say that the documents produced by the plaintiffs namely the agreement which is at Exhibit PW1/B-Colly. and the bills, receipts, house tax records, electricity bills, water bills, etc. have not being considered or taken into account by the lower Courts. In fact, almost all the material on record has been considered by the Trial Court as also by the First Appellate Court. 15. As rightly contended by Mr. and the bills, receipts, house tax records, electricity bills, water bills, etc. have not being considered or taken into account by the lower Courts. In fact, almost all the material on record has been considered by the Trial Court as also by the First Appellate Court. 15. As rightly contended by Mr. D'Costa, learned Senior Counsel for the defendants, no substantial question/s of law arise in this second appeal and no perversity has been pointed out by the learned Counsel for the plaintiffs in the findings of the lower Courts. This Court, in Second Appeal, cannot re-appreciate the evidence on which a finding has been given. In such circumstances, the question of interference with the impugned judgments and orders does not arise. 16. The appeal, therefore, deserves to be dismissed and is accordingly dismissed, with no orders as to costs. 17. Proceedings closed.