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Andhra High Court · body

2014 DIGILAW 731 (AP)

R. Mahalakshmi v. Nirmala Reddy

2014-06-16

K.G.SHANKAR

body2014
Judgment : 1. The petitioner/accused seeks for the quashment of C.C.No.803 of 2013 on the file of the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Hyderabad. The 1st respondent/de facto complainant claims that she is the Managing Director of Nugget Estates Private Limited and Nugget Realty and Ventures Private Limited. M/s. Nugget Estates Private Limited represented by the de facto complainant as the Managing Director filed W.P.No.3319 of 2013 on the file of this Court questioning the registration of a Society. The petitioner herein as the President of Belvedere Residents’ Welfare Association filed a counter. Alleging that defamatory statements were made in the counter, the 1st respondent filed a complaint before the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Hyderabad. The same was taken on file under Section 499 IPC. Questioning the same, the present petition is laid. 2. The learned counsel for the petitioner placed reliance upon G.JANARDHANA REDDY v. A.NARAYANA REDDY(2010(1) ALT (Crl.) 214 (A.P.)). In that case, a learned Single Judge of this Court held that pleadings such as written statement, counter and appeal grounds and evidence by way of affidavit cannot be considered to be defamatory in nature since they are not tantamount to general publication. I respectfully disagree with this view. I consider that any claim in a written statement, counter or evidence is tantamount to a publication, which is viewed not only by the other side but also by the counsel, perhaps the Pleader’s Clerk, Judge and the staff of the Court and particularly the Bench Clerk. Consequently, the contentions in the counter certainly are liable to be treated as publication within the meaning of Section 499 IPC. 3. In JEFFREY J. DIERMEIER v. STATE OF W.B. ( (2010) 6 SCC 243 ), the question whether the publication was in good faith or for public good was held to be a question of fact which required evidence and that a petition could not be quashed on that ground. However, the learned counsel for the petitioner contended that the petitioner is not claiming any exemption under Section 499 IPC, Tenth Exception and that the alleged imputation falls within the Ninth Exception of Section 499 IPC. 4. However, the learned counsel for the petitioner contended that the petitioner is not claiming any exemption under Section 499 IPC, Tenth Exception and that the alleged imputation falls within the Ninth Exception of Section 499 IPC. 4. Section 499, Ninth Exception reads: “Imputation made in good faith by person for protection of his or other’s interests:--It is not defamation to make an imputation on the character of another provided that the imputation be made in good faith for the protection of the interest of the person making it, or of any other person, or for the public good.” 5. Eighth Exception as well as Ninth Exception of Section 499 IPC deals with the defence of good faith. The Supreme Court considered that the question of good faith is a question of fact which can be assessed after trial only. I therefore consider that the complaint cannot be quashed on the ground that the complaint against the petitioner is not maintainable. 6. The learned counsel for the petitioner referred to the order in W.P.No.3319 of 2013, dated 05-3-2013. There was no specific reference to the imputations made through the counter in the order of this Court. The learned counsel for the petitioner would submit that no damage was caused to the reputation of the 1st respondent as the imputations in the counter, even if they are otherwise tantamount to defamation cannot prima facie constitute an offence since those imputations have not been considered by this Court in W.P.No.3319 of 2013. I do not agree with this contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner. What is relevant is whether the petitioner made an imputation. It is not necessary whether the 1st respondent acted on the basis of imputation or otherwise. I therefore cannot consider that merely because the averments in the counter regarding the defamatory imputation against the 1st respondent have not been referred to in the order by this Court, those imputations do not cease to be defamatory. 7. The learned counsel for the petitioner further submitted that the petitioner is a lady, so much so, she may be exempted from making appearance before the Court. Be it noted that the 1st respondent/de facto complainant who is a lady is 67 years old whereas the petitioner/accused is a lady but is 41 years old. 7. The learned counsel for the petitioner further submitted that the petitioner is a lady, so much so, she may be exempted from making appearance before the Court. Be it noted that the 1st respondent/de facto complainant who is a lady is 67 years old whereas the petitioner/accused is a lady but is 41 years old. When the 1st respondent is capable of appearing before the Court, I am afraid that the petitioner cannot seek for exemption from appearance before the Court. I therefore see no reason to grant exemption to the petitioner herein. 8. For the reasons already set out, this criminal petition is dismissed. The miscellaneous petitions, if any, pending in this petition shall stand closed.