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2014 DIGILAW 731 (KER)

Sameena Beevi v. State of Kerala

2014-09-18

BABU MATHEW P.JOSEPH, THOTTATHIL B.RADHAKRISHNAN

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JUDGMENT : Mr. Thottathil B. Radhakrishnan, J. Heard the learned counsel for the petitioner and the learned public prosecutor. 2. Petitioner challenges a preventive detention order issued under the provisions of the Kerala Anti-Social Activities (Prevention) Act, 2007, for short, "KAAPA". Order of detention was issued on 05/05/2014 and it was executed on 30/05/2014. This writ petition, stated to be filed by the wife of the detenu, is instituted on 13/08/2014. 3. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioner raised three issues. He argued that the two counts of conviction taken against the detenu are sentences imposed on him pleading guilty before the competent criminal court and therefore, those sentences cannot be treated as resulting in an order under which he has been "made guilty", for the purpose of sub-clauses (i) and (ii) of clause (p) of Section 2 of KAAPA. The second argument is that proceedings having been taken under Section 110 Cr.P.C. on the ground that the detenu is a habitual offender, there was no room to further proceed under the provisions of KAAPA. Thirdly, he argued that the detenu is a permanent resident of Kottayam and is a temporary resident of Thiruvananthapuram and therefore, the District Magistrate, Kollam, did not have jurisdiction to pass an order under KAAPA having regard to the terms of Section 3(1) of that Act. 4. Per contra, the learned prosecutor argued that the findings of guilt and the resultant sentencing on the pleading of guilt have been rendered in two warrant cases, and it makes no difference whether the sentencing was on pleading guilty or after trial. It is further argued that the action taken under Section 110 Cr.P.C. was wholly insufficient and has essentially fizzled out, as is apparent even on the face of the detention order which shows that even the notification of the order under Section 110 Cr.P.C. could not be duly served. He further argued that the District Magistrate, Kollam had authority within the format of Section 3(1) of KAAPA to pass the order of detention. 5. Section 2(p) of KAAPA defines 'known rowdy'. Sub-clauses (i) and (ii) of that Section deal with cases where a person has been made guilty by a competent court. He further argued that the District Magistrate, Kollam had authority within the format of Section 3(1) of KAAPA to pass the order of detention. 5. Section 2(p) of KAAPA defines 'known rowdy'. Sub-clauses (i) and (ii) of that Section deal with cases where a person has been made guilty by a competent court. Sub-clause (iii) deals with instances where the judicial verdict has not come, but the investigating agency or other authority has come to the conclusion and resultant finding at that level that the person has committed a particular offence. KAAPA is essentially a piece of preventive law. That is put into action by the executive machinery of the Government and the statutory authorities under that Act. Therefore, the use of the words "made guilty" and the other words found in Section 2(p) cannot be understood to be confined to the concept of trial, followed by conviction and sentencing. The provision in Section 241 which falls within Chapter XIX of Cr.P.C, deals with conviction on pleading guilty. That provides that if the accused pleads guilty, the Magistrate shall record the plea and may, in his discretion, convict him thereon. Therefore, the pleading of guilt has to be a voluntary act at the instance of the accused. Once that is done, the Magistrate has to be satisfied of the voluntary nature of the plea and when such satisfaction is arrived at, the discretion could be exercised to convict the person who is arrayed as an accused. Sub-sections 1 and 2 of Section 242 Cr.P.C. will also show that the Magistrate will proceed to fix the date for examination of the witnesses if the accused refuses to plead or does not plead guilty, or claims to be tried; or, the Magistrate does not convict the accused under Section 241 Cr.P.C. It is also trite law, going by the catena of decisions of the Apex Court and different High Courts, that in cases where capital punishment or even life imprisonment is prescribed as penalty, the courts would not enter a conviction on a pleading of guilt. The finding of guilt and the resultant imposition of penalty on the pleading of guilt will be rendered only after ascertaining the different factors on which the Magistrate will have to be satisfied that the discretion has to be exercised to terminate the prosecution by entering a conviction and imposing a sentence that way. The finding of guilt and the resultant imposition of penalty on the pleading of guilt will be rendered only after ascertaining the different factors on which the Magistrate will have to be satisfied that the discretion has to be exercised to terminate the prosecution by entering a conviction and imposing a sentence that way. We may make immediate advertence to Section 375 of Cr.P.C. which excludes appeals where an accused person has pleaded guilty and has been convicted on such plea, except as to the extent and legality of sentence. This means that the process of conviction or entering a conviction of an accused person on a pleading of guilt is a discretionary act by the competent judicial authority and all that could be opened up would be the extent and legality of the sentence. This position under Section 375 of Cr.P.C. is also clear by the wordings laid down under Section 341 of Cr.P.C. In a case where the accused pleaded guilty resulting in an order of conviction and consequential imposition of sentence, there is no question of drawing any distinction between conviction on a plea of guilt and conviction following a full-fledged trial in cases which come under Section 242 Cr.P.C. Therefore, we are unable to appreciate any distinction between those two types of cases. The argument advanced on behalf of the petitioner on that count, therefore, fails and the same is accordingly rejected. 6. Insofar as Section 110 Cr.P.C. is concerned, the provisions therein are essentially intended to protect the social order and tranquillity and to prevent instances at the hands of habitual offenders. But if the habitual offender proceeded against under that provision is not amenable to the process which is initiated, obviously such proceedings fail and cannot be utilised as a shield against an order under KAAPA. That contention of the petitioner also, therefore, fails. 7. But if the habitual offender proceeded against under that provision is not amenable to the process which is initiated, obviously such proceedings fail and cannot be utilised as a shield against an order under KAAPA. That contention of the petitioner also, therefore, fails. 7. Coming to the question whether the District Magistrate, Kollam had jurisdiction to pass the impugned order, it needs to be noted that Section 3 of KAAPA provides for exercise of jurisdiction by the District Magistrate "in respect of such persons residing within his jurisdiction" or "in respect of such persons not so resident who have been indulging in or about to indulge in or abet any anti-social activities within such jurisdiction." Therefore, the proposed detenu's residence whether permanent or temporary, within the limits of the District Magistrate concerned is not sine qua non for effectuating the jurisdiction under Section 3 of KAAPA. The argument to the contrary, raised on behalf of the petitioner also, therefore, fails. For the aforesaid reasons, this writ petition fails and, in the result, it is dismissed.