ORAL ORDER Heard Mr. Swaraj Kumar Ghosh, learned Senior counsel for the petitioner, Mr. Anshuman Singh, learned counsel for the Bihar State Housing Board(hereinafter referred to as “the Board”) and its functionaries while the State is represented by Mr. Santosh Kumar Mishra, A.C. to G.P.30. 2. The petitioner is aggrieved by the order dated 26.10.2012 as contained in Annexure-13 whereby the Revenue Officer, Bihar State Housing Board, Patna has directed the petitioner and his brother to deposit a sum of Rs. 41,41,235/- by way of “Labhansh” in lieu of the permission sought by them for transfer of the allotted land in favour of the third party. 3. Facts of the case briefly stated is that a plot of land bearing Plot No. L-33 situated in Krishna Nagar in the town and district Patna was allotted to the father of the petitioner late Paras Nath Sinha by the Bihar State Housing Board on 23.9.1969 and an agreement was entered into between the parties which was duly registered on 29.10.1969. The father of the petitioner intended to transfer the said plot in favour of one Prem Kali Devi and he requested the respondent Board to grant him permission for such transfer vide letter dated 16.3.2009 which was accompanied with an affidavit in terms of the agreement containing an undertaking to pay the “Labhansh” (unearned income) as would be calculated by the Housing Board. Since no response was received by the father of the petitioner, a reminder was issued on 24.3.2009 placed at Annexure-2 and this time the respondent Board responded to the request when a letter dated 26.5.2009 was issued by the Revenue Officer requiring the father of the petitioner to deposit “Labhansh” of Rs. 5,17,545/- so that necessary permission could be granted by them for transfer of the land in favour of the said Prem Kali Devi. Within two days of the issuance of the letter by the Revenue Officer, the father of the petitioner deceased on 28.5.2009. The petitioner made the deposit of Rs. 5,17,545/- on 10.6.2009 in terms of the demand raised by the Board as contained in Annexure-3 and the receipt whereof is placed at Annexure-5. Since the original allottee had deceased in the meantime the petitioner applied for transfer of the allotment in his name on 12.6.2009 and which application is placed at Annexure-6. The petitioner made the deposit of Rs. 5,17,545/- on 10.6.2009 in terms of the demand raised by the Board as contained in Annexure-3 and the receipt whereof is placed at Annexure-5. Since the original allottee had deceased in the meantime the petitioner applied for transfer of the allotment in his name on 12.6.2009 and which application is placed at Annexure-6. While applying to the respondent Board for transfer of the allotment in the name of the petitioner and his brother, a permission was also sought for effecting the transfer. The respondent Board having received the application filed on behalf of the petitioner for transfer of the settlement, found the application lacking in some respects and after series of correspondences in between the Board and the petitioner, it finally culminated in an order dated 26.7.2011 placed at Annexure 11 whereunder the settlement of the plot in question was transferred in the name of the petitioner and his brother Sanjay Kumar who has since deceased. It is thereafter that the demand in question was raised by the Board assessing the “Labhansh” at Rs. 41,41,1235/- vide letter bearing memo No. 9480 dated 26.10.2012 and which has been impugned in the present writ application. 4. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and I have perused the records. 5. It is the contention of Mr. Ghosh standing in support of the petitioner that the “Labhansh” having been assessed by the respondent Board on 26.5.2009 and having been deposited by the petitioner on 10.6.2009, there could not have been a reassessment of the “Labhansh” merely because the original settlee had died in the meanwhile and the respondent Board itself had taken no less than two years to transfer the settlement in their name. It is thus the contention of Mr. Ghosh that the delay having been caused at the level of the Board it could not have acted prejudicial to his interest nor could have vested jurisdiction in the Board to re-assess the “Labhansh”. It is the contention of Mr. Ghosh that consequent upon the death of the original settlee, the legal heirs have stepped into his shoes and thus a mere correction in the records of the Board as to the name of the settlee cannot vest jurisdiction in the Board to alter the “Labhansh” assessed. 6. The arguments of Mr. Ghosh has been contested by Mr. Ghosh that consequent upon the death of the original settlee, the legal heirs have stepped into his shoes and thus a mere correction in the records of the Board as to the name of the settlee cannot vest jurisdiction in the Board to alter the “Labhansh” assessed. 6. The arguments of Mr. Ghosh has been contested by Mr. Anshuman Singh standing for the Board who submits that the “Labhansh” was assessed by the board on the application made by the original settlee and it was rather unjustified for the petitioner to have suppressed the event of death of the original settlee on 28.5.2009 before making the deposit on 10.6.2009 in response to the demand raised on 26.5.2009 as contained in Annexure-3. He submits that an application for transfer of name of the settlee is not an automatic event rather there are certain conditions to be satisfied before the said transfer can take place and the delay of two years is wholly attributable to the petitioner who has taken such time to rectify the errors in the application. He thus submits that once this exercise of transfer of name was completed that the Board acting on the request made by the present settlee assessed the “Labhansh” and which on the basis of the rate of land as existing on that date was calculated at Rs. 41,41, 725/-. He thus submits that there is absolutely no illegality in the demand raised by the Board and if the petitioners intend to transfer the land they would have to pay the said amount before they can effect the transfer. 7. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and I have perused the records. 8. Considering the arguments advanced by the learned counsel, the only issue which crops up for consideration is whether the petitioner would be required to pay the re-assessed amount of Rs. 41,41, 235/- and whether there was any occasion for the Board to raise such demand. 9. The certified copy of the agreement as well as a typed copy was placed by learned counsel during the course of hearing and the opening paragraph and paragraph 10 of the agreement reads as follows: - “This agreement is made the …. 41,41, 235/- and whether there was any occasion for the Board to raise such demand. 9. The certified copy of the agreement as well as a typed copy was placed by learned counsel during the course of hearing and the opening paragraph and paragraph 10 of the agreement reads as follows: - “This agreement is made the …. of …..19 between Shri Paras Nath Sinha son of Late Shri Radha Mohan Prasad Srivastava resident of village/P.O. Naya Mohammadpur P.S. Kotwali District Shahabad at present residing at Jakkanpur(New Area)(hereinafter referred to as the Settlee, which expression shall, unless the context does not so admit, include his heirs, executors, administrators and permitted assigns) of the one part and the Governor of Bihar (hereinafter referred to as the Government, which expression shall unless the context does not so admit, include his successors and assigns) of the other part.” “10. The settlee shall have no right to transfer his interest to a third party in the land without the previous sanction in writing of government” 10. It is manifest from the aforementioned paragraphs of the agreement that the term “settlee” would include his “legal heirs”. Paragraph 10 of the agreement restrains the settlee from effecting any transfer to a third party without previous sanction of the Board to be obtained in writing. 11. It is not in dispute that a permission indeed was taken by the original settlee in terms of Clause 10 of the agreement. In fact acting on the request, the permission was granted to the original settlee who is the father of the petitioner and who was required to make payment of “Labhansh” of Rs. 5,17,545/-. It is an unfortunate circumstance that within two days of issuance of such letter on 26.5.2009 the original settlee died on 28.5.2009 and the petitioner acting pursuant to the demand dated 26.5.2009 deposited the said amount on 10.6.2009 which is reflected from Annexure-5 and within two days thereafter, the petitioner also made a request for transfer of his name in the relevant records and also sought permission to proceed with the transfer for which a request had already been placed by his father the original settlee. It is a matter of record that in the completion of formalities, a period of two years lapsed and finally the name of the legal heir stood transferred on 26.7.2011. 12. It is a matter of record that in the completion of formalities, a period of two years lapsed and finally the name of the legal heir stood transferred on 26.7.2011. 12. The issue is whether this passage of time would vest any right in the Board to reassess the “Labhansh”. In the opinion of this Court the Board could not raise a second demand and my reasons for holding as such is as follows: (a) The definition of the term “settlee” as found in the original agreement includes his “legal heirs”. Thus by operation of law and following the death of the original settlee his “legal heirs” i.e. the petitioner and other children stepped into the shoes of the original settlee and were within their jurisdiction to deposit the “Labhansh” as required under the demand dated 26.5.2009 which indeed was deposited on 10.6.2009. (b) The term “settlee” as defined in the agreement is inclusive of “legal heirs” and thus the distinction sought to be created by the Board for raising a fresh demand of “Labhansh”, is on complete misconception of the legal position. (c) Considering the matter from another angle, the demand for “Labhansh” was raised on 26.5.2009. The original settlee expired on 28.5.2009. The amount in terms of the demand was deposited on 10.6.2009 and an application for transfer of name and for permission to effect the transfer in terms of the request made by the original settlee, was placed before the Board on 12.6.2009 meaning thereby there was no delay on the part of the petitioner in seeking transfer of the name of the heirs. A passage of two years in completion of formalities would not vest jurisdiction in the Board to enhance the “Labhansh” which already stood assessed by the Board in terms of the permission sought. There being no delay on the part of the petitioner in seeking transfer of the name of legal heirs which is more in the nature of ministerial act, the delay which has occasioned for whatever reason, certainly did not give a reason to the Board to reassess the “Labhansh”. 13. As I have already held that by operation of law and the conditions of the agreement, the legal heirs have stepped into the shoes of the settlee hence there was no infirmity on the part of the petitioner to have made the deposit pursuant to the demand dated 26.5.2009. 13. As I have already held that by operation of law and the conditions of the agreement, the legal heirs have stepped into the shoes of the settlee hence there was no infirmity on the part of the petitioner to have made the deposit pursuant to the demand dated 26.5.2009. The formalities thus having been completed by the petitioner who admittedly is one of the legal heirs of the deceased original settlee, the ministerial act of transfer of the name in the records of the Board, did not vest them with any jurisdiction to raise a fresh demand. 14. For the conclusions drawn by me hereinabove, it is but obvious that the demand dated 26.10.2012 as contained in Annexure-13 cannot be upheld and is accordingly set aside. 15. Since the amount of “Labhansh” as assessed by the Board has already been deposited by the petitioner, the consequential permission should be passed by the Board within 6 weeks of production/receipt of a copy of this order. 16. The writ application is allowed.