JUDGMENT Subrata Talukdar, J.: By order dated 9th of June, 2014 this Court was pleased to allow CO 1885 of 2003 on the ground that in view of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy (Amendment) Act, 2005 (for short the 2005 Amendment Act) amending the provisions of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1997 (for short the 1997 Act), the word “Controller” appearing in Section 6 of the 1997 Act has been substituted by the words “Civil Judge having Jurisdiction”. This Court was therefore of the view that the case made out by Ms. Sarada Parmar on behalf of the petitioners that pursuant to the amendment the Civil Court had acquired jurisdiction to hear suits filed under the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act and the order impugned dated 31st March, 2003 passed by the Ld. 1st Civil Court (Junior Division) at Malda in OC 243 of 2010 holding that the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to try any suit as per provisions of Section 8 of the 1997 Act deserves to be set aside. Accordingly the order impugned dated 31st March, 2003 were set aside and the connected CAN application to CO 1885 of 2003 viz CAN 6581 of 2006 stood disposed of. Sri Aniruddha Chatterjee, Ld. Counsel appearing for the Opposite Parties, submits that his client has taken out CAN 5803 of 2014, copy whereof has been served on Ms. Parmar. Sri Chatterjee had argued that the contents of CAN 5803 of 2014 could not be canvassed before this Court on the 9th of June, 2014 as none was present on behalf of the opposite parties. His basic argument is that the order impugned dated 31st March, 2003, which is under challenge in CO 1885 of 2003 is an appealable order and therefore a revisional application does not lie. He urges this Court to recall the order dated 9th June, 2014 on the ground of maintainability of the revisional application failing which the opposite parties shall be caused utter prejudice. Taking this Court to the contents of the order impugned dated 31st March, 2003 Sri Chatterjee points out that the order is essentially an order of return of plaint. The ordering portion of the said impugned order reads as follows:- “Let the plaint be returned as the Court has no jurisdiction and accordingly the petition u/s 17(1) and 17(2) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act is disposed. The ordering portion of the said impugned order reads as follows:- “Let the plaint be returned as the Court has no jurisdiction and accordingly the petition u/s 17(1) and 17(2) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act is disposed. Accordingly the suit is disposed.” Sri Chatterjee has further pointed out that the return of plaint is provided under Order 7 Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure (for short the CPC). Taking this Court to Order 43 Rule 1 of the CPC Sri Chatterjee points out that the said provision provides for appeals from orders and the language of Order 43 Rule 1(a) is as follows:- “1. Appeals from orders – An appeal shall lie from the following orders under the provisions of Section 104, namely :- a. An order under Rule 10 of order VII returning the plaint to be presented to a proper Court except where the procedures specified in Rule 10-A of Order VII has been followed….” Sri Chatterjee therefore submits that the language of Order 43 Rule 1 is self-explanatory. The issue being one of return of plaint is clearly recorded by the order impugned dated 31st March, 2003. Hence, the present revisional application is not maintainable. Only an appeal will lie under Order 43 Rule 1 (a) (supra) and there can be no other procedure. With characteristic brevity and clarity, Sri Chatterjee relies upon a decision of this Hon’ble Court reported in AIR 1995 Calcutta 370 in Ajay Kumar Rit Vs. Iswar Dharma Thakur & Ors. Sri Chatterjee submits that in exercise of power u/s 151 of the CPC this Court can recall an ex-parte order passed in a revisional application. He relies on paras – 11, 12, 13 and 14 of the said decision:- “11. Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure is an enabling section. It was not possible for the Legislature to cover each and every case which may come up before a Court for consideration and it is for that purpose to enable the Court to cover such cases that this enabling provision was put in the Code. There may be cases where the ex parte disposal of an application may result in substantial injustice to a party. There may be cases where the ex parte disposal of an application may result in substantial injustice to a party. The Court in such circumstances should not fail to exercise its power to restore such case to their original position and then dispose the same according to merits upon hearing both sides. 12. It is true that while disposing the revisional application the Court took into consideration the submission made by the learned counsel for the opposite parties/plaintiffs but in doing so the Court had not the advantage of hearing the submission of the other side. 13. In the instant case it has been alleged by the petitioner that it has been alleged by the petitioner that his counsel was engaged in another Court and accordingly it was not possible to attend the Court at the time of hearing of the application. It will appear from the affidavit filed by the opposite parties that on 9-6-94 after the ex parte order was passed the learned Advocate for the petitioner came to the Court and affirmed an application for recalling the said order on the ground that the learned counsel was engaged in another Court. Since no party can suffer for misdemeanour or laches of his counsel, as laid down in the decision reported in AIR 1981 SC 1400 , I think the substantial injustice would be caused to the petitioner/defendant if they are not allowed to make their submissions in the revisional application. 14. In the aforesaid view of the matter I am of the opinion the recalling application should be allowed.” Per contra Ms. Parmar, Ld. Counsel argues that the Ld. 1st Civil Court (Junior Division) had arrived at a finding that the applications u/s 17(1) and 17(2) were coram non-judice. Ms. Parmar reiterates and, such fact is already recorded in the order dated 9th June, 2014, that in view of the statutory amendment in 2005 of the 1997 Act, the Ld. Civil Court had committed an error of jurisdiction which, now stands corrected by an order of this Court. In such circumstances Ms. Parmar points out that there cannot be any applicability of order 43 Rule 1(a) of the CPC. She makes the point that this Court, acting in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution has only corrected the perversity and/or patent illegality in the order of the Ld. In such circumstances Ms. Parmar points out that there cannot be any applicability of order 43 Rule 1(a) of the CPC. She makes the point that this Court, acting in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution has only corrected the perversity and/or patent illegality in the order of the Ld. 1st Civil Court (Junior Division) by reminding the Learned Court of the present statutory position. Ms. Parmar relies on a decision of this Court reported in 2014 CHN (2) 619 in the matter of Sarmistha Guha Vs. Gouri Guha. Ms. Parmar submits that there is no encumbrance on this Court to treat the present civil revisional application as a deemed appeal under Order 43 Rule 1(a) of the CPC. Relying upon para 16 of the Sarmistha’s judgment (supra) Ms. Parmar points out that the Court should take a liberal approach and technicality should not be a bar in allowing the reliefs sought for. In the facts of the said case (supra) the conversion of the suit from probate proceedings to one of granting letter of administration was allowed and upheld by this Hon’ble Court. Heard the parties and considered the materials on record. This Court notices that in the decision reported in 1996 CWN 978 in the matter of Drawings and Metals & Ors. Vs. State Bank of India, the jurisdiction of the Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India has been clearly spelt out. At paragraphs 4 and 5 the Hon’ble Division Bench has been pleased to hold as follows:- “4. Although an order under Order 40 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure is ordinarily appealable under Order 43 Rule 1(s) of said Code, the present revisional application under Article 227 of the Constitution of India had been preferred, inter-alia, alleging that the procedural illegalities and irregularities mentioned above initiated the impugned appealable order of appointment of Receiver and Article 227 alone could provide a comprehensive relief but not the appeal. 5. We have heard Mr. Saha in detail in support of the revisional application. We have also heard Mr. Mitra on behalf of the bank/opposite party. 5. We have heard Mr. Saha in detail in support of the revisional application. We have also heard Mr. Mitra on behalf of the bank/opposite party. No doubt there is no absolute bar in entertaining an application under Article 227 of the Constitution of India even in a case where an appeal lies but it is well settled by authorities that such interference should be made only in very very exceptional cases and that too only where there has been manifest injustice, resulting from patent and flagrant error of procedure, perversity of finding arbitrary or capricious exercise of jurisdiction. In the present case in view of the specific findings made by the Learned Trial Judge and the reason given by him on which such findings are based, it cannot be said that it is one of the exceptional cases calling for an interference by invocation of extra ordinary revisional powers of the Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. Mere errors of law or procedure, without more, does not attract the said Article. For an authority reference may be made to the case of Miss Maneck Custodji Surajit vs. Sarafazali Nawabali Mirza, reported in A.I.R. 1976 Supreme Court page 2446 where Bhagawati, J. inter-alia observed – “the respondent had clearly a legal remedy available to him by way of an appeal against the decree of City Court and this remedy was not only adequate but more comprehensive than the one under Article 227 of the Constitution ………It is true that this principle is not rigid and inflexible and there could be extra ordinary circumstances where despite the existence of alternative legal remedy, the High Court may interfere in favour of an applicant, but this was certainly not one of such extra ordinary case…………It must be realised that the jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution is an extra ordinary jurisdiction which is to be exercised sparingly and in appropriate cases and it is not to be exercised as if it was an appellate jurisdiction or as if it gave unfettered and unrestricted power to the High Court to do whatever it liked”. In the judgment reported in 2004 (5) SCC 377 in the matter of Perumal Vs. In the judgment reported in 2004 (5) SCC 377 in the matter of Perumal Vs. Janaki the Hon’ble Apex Court was pleased to, inter alia hold that the jurisdiction under Article 227 is a power of superintendence of High Court’s over all Courts and Tribunals functioning within the territories in relation to which a High Court exercises jurisdiction. The High Courts not only have the authority to exercise such jurisdiction but also an obligation to exercise such power in appropriate cases. (emphasis applied). The exercise of such powers may be either on an application made to the High Court or even suo motu when the interest of justice demands. While passing its judgment in Perumal Vs. Janaki (supra) the Hon’ble Apex Court was pleased to notice with approval the observations of the Constitution Bench of the Hon’ble Apex Court in Iqbal Singh Marwa Vs. Meenakshi Marwa reported in 2005 (4) SCC 370 to the effect that any interpretation which leads to a situation where a victim of crime (read an aggrieved party) is rendered remediless, has to be discarded. Applying the above principles of law to the facts of the present case this Court is of the opinion that the Learned 1st Civil Court (Junior Division) at Malda by the order impugned dated 31st March, 2003 committed a patent error of jurisdiction by holding that it had no authority to decide the petitions under Sections 17(1) and 17(2) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act. Such erroneous exercise of jurisdiction automatically stood corrected by the 2005 Amendment Act where the word ‘Controller’ appearing in Section 6 of the 1997 Act was substituted by the words “Civil Judge having jurisdiction.” To the mind of this Court by entertaining the present CO 1885 of 2003 filed under Article 227 of the Constitution this Court is required to simply correct the erroneous exercise of jurisdiction by the Learned 1st Civil Court (Junior Division) and bring the same within the statutory mould. The mere fact that in Order 43 Rule 1(a) speaks of an appeal in cases where the Learned Trial Court orders return of a plaint cannot be stretched to mean that in all cases a wrong exercise of jurisdiction cannot be corrected in exercise of powers under Article 227 of the Constitution of India and instead relegate parties to the long remedy of an appeal. Additionally, this Court is inclined to notice that the petitions under Section 17(1) and 17(2) of the WBPT Act which have not been entertained by the Learned 1st Civil Court (Junior Division) have been filed under a special statute in respect of which there exists a specific amendment. The question of jurisdiction under the special statute having been settled by the amendment which now holds the field, this Court opines that by placing misplaced emphasis on the expression “let the plaint be returned” does not detract from the true colour of the proceedings under the special statute and the failure of the Learned 1st Civil Court (Junior Division) to recognise its own jurisdiction under the amendment. Therefore, taking inspiration from the judgment reported in 1996 CWN 978 (supra) and in 2014 (5) SCC 377 (supra) this Court is not inclined to accept the submission of Sri Chatterjee that in the plain facts of this case the mere technicality of an appeal shall restrain this Court from taking notice of the amended statute and granting relief in terms thereof. CO 1885 of 2003 stands allowed and the order passed by this Court dated 9th June, 2014 stands. CAN 5803 is accordingly disposed of. There will be, however, no order as to costs.