JUDGMENT B.R. Sarangi, J. 1. The petitioner, who was working as a Constable under the Central Industrial Security Force (C.I.S.F.) has filed this application assailing the order passed by the Disciplinary Authority imposing on him major penalty of removal from service, vide order dated 10.01.2001, Annexure-4 and confirmation thereof in appeal by the appellate authority, vide order dated 29.09.2001, Annexure-5 and the revisional order dismissing the cause of the petitioner on the ground of limitation vide order dated 06.01.2006, Annexure-6. 2. The factual matrix of the case in hand is that the petitioner was appointed as a Constable which post he joined on 27.06.1990 at the CISF Training Centre, Sidhabari of West Bengal. After being transferred from place to place while he was posted at NALCO, Angul in July, 2000 and was discharging his service, he was placed under suspension on 28.09.2000 by opposite party no.3 Commandant, CISF, NALCO Unit, in exercise of power under sub-rule (1) of Rule-30 of CISF Rules, 1969 (hereinafter referred to 1969 Rules) vide Annexure-1, in contemplation of a disciplinary proceeding against him. Charge-sheet was then submitted on 2.10.2000, vide Annexure-2, which reads as follows: “Gross misconduct, carelessness and dereliction of duty in that No. 904650569 Const. P.N. Samal of CISF Unit Nalco, Angul while detailed for B shift duty on 26.09.2000 from 1300 hrs to 2100 hrs at Watch Tower No.1 when checked by S.I./Ext. P.R. Sharma, the patrolling officer at about 1345 hrs. He was latter found sleeping on the 1st floor of a quarter under construction at IAPL by SI/Exe R.P. Shrama, patrolling officer. ANNEXURE - II Gross misconduct, insubordinate behaviour and assault on senior in that No. 904650569 Constable P.N. Samal of B Coy. CISF Unit Nalco Angul misbehaved with SI/Exe R.P. Sharma, the patrolling officer, when found sleeping at a quarter under construction at IAPL on 26.09.2000 at about 1350 hrs and later assaulted SI/Exe R.P. Sharma for which SI/Exe R.P. Sharma sustained injury below to his left eye lid.” 3. On being served charge-sheet the petitioner submitted his written submission to the charges on 5.10.2000 denying all the allegations. As per sub-rule (4) of Rule-34 of the 1969 Rules, the Inspector/Exe. Sri Arun Kumar was appointed as the inquiry officer, who conducted the inquiry and submitted his report, vide Annexure-3 dated 30.12.2000, to the disciplinary authority. On being served charge-sheet the petitioner submitted his written submission to the charges on 5.10.2000 denying all the allegations. As per sub-rule (4) of Rule-34 of the 1969 Rules, the Inspector/Exe. Sri Arun Kumar was appointed as the inquiry officer, who conducted the inquiry and submitted his report, vide Annexure-3 dated 30.12.2000, to the disciplinary authority. Copy of the inquiry report was supplied to the petitioner who submitted his submission on 03.01.2001. The disciplinary authority on 05.01.2001 after going through the written submission of the petitioner, in exercise of power confers under Rule-29 of schedule-11 read with Rule-31 (b) of the 1969 Rules, imposed major penalty of petitioners removal from service, vide order dated 10.01.2001, Annexure-4. Assailing the said order of punishment of removal from service vide Annexure-4, the petitioner preferred an appeal before the appellate authority but the appellate authority confirmed the order of punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority on 29.9.2001. Thereafter assailing the order of punishment passed by the disciplinary as well as the appellate authority, the petitioner filed the present writ application. During pendency of the writ application, the petitioner approached the revisional authority and his revision petition was rejected on the ground of limitation, vide order dated 6.1.2006, Annexure-6. 4. Mr. B.B. Mohapatra, learned counsel for the petitioner, strenuously urged that the inquiry officer conducted a preliminary inquiry during which the petitioner disputed the charge against him having manhandled one S.I./Exe, R.P. Singh by giving him blow and causing injury to him. He has submitted that the inquiry was conducted in a most perfunctory manner with malice and bias against him. Therefore, he alleges that the action taken by the disciplinary authority as well as the appellate authority basing on a perfunctory inquiry report cannot be sustained in the eye of law and therefore seeks interference of this Court. It is further urged that the punishment imposed is shockingly disproportionate to the allegation made against the petitioner. Therefore by judicial review, this Court should reduce the quantum of punishment and allow the petitioner to join the service. To substantiate his contention, Mr. Mohapatra, learned counsel, relied upon the judgments in Sudarsan Giri vs. Union of India and Others, 2010 (I) OLR 742 , Sri Akshaya Kumar Satpathy vs. Union of India and four Others, 2013 (I) OLR 410 and Jai Bhagwan vs. Commr. of Police and Others, AIR 2013 SC 2908 . 5. Mr. To substantiate his contention, Mr. Mohapatra, learned counsel, relied upon the judgments in Sudarsan Giri vs. Union of India and Others, 2010 (I) OLR 742 , Sri Akshaya Kumar Satpathy vs. Union of India and four Others, 2013 (I) OLR 410 and Jai Bhagwan vs. Commr. of Police and Others, AIR 2013 SC 2908 . 5. Mr. S.K. Das, learned Standing Counsel for the Central Government, vehemently opposed the contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner and stated that CISF is a discipline organization and as such the petitioner having adhered to such service ought to have maintained the discipline. He further submitted that when the petitioner was discharging his duty at a particular place in duty hour, he could not have slept and more so when his lapses were pointed out by the patrolling officer, instead of admitting his guilt, the petitioner assaulted the officer concerned causing injury on his person and that itself indicates the misconduct on his part and at the same time his insubordination. Therefore, after conducting the inquiry in conformity with the 1969 Rules and compliance with due procedure if the disciplinary authority imposed punishment which was affirmed by the appellate authority, this Court should not interfere with the same as both the fact finding authority and appellate authorities came to a definite concurrent finding. It is further stated that the revisional authority has dismissed the revision on the ground of limitation. To substantiate his contention, Mr. Das, learned counsel relied upon the judgments in U.P. State Road Transport Corporation and Others vs. A.K. Parul, AIR 1999 SC 1552 , U.P. State Road Transport Corporation vs. Subhash Chandra Sharma and Others, AIR 2000 SC 1163 and unreported judgment of this Court in Srikanta Das vs. Inspector General of Police, CRPF, O.J.C. No. 2655 of 1997, disposed of on 24.04.2006. 6. The Parliament has enacted an Act to provide for the constitution and regulation of an Armed Forces for the better protection and security of industrial undertakings owned by the Central Government, certain industrial undertakings, employees of all such undertakings and to provide technical consultancy services to industrial establishments in the private sector and for matters connected therewith called Central Industrial Security Force Act, 1969. To give effect to the provisions of the Act, in exercise of power conferred on CISF Act, 1968, the Central Government framed rules, called the CISF Rules, 1969 and the 1969 Rules have been replaced by an another set of Rules called CISF Rule, 2001 which have been given effect to from 5.11.2001. Since the cause of action so far as the petitioner is concerned was prior to commencement of the aforesaid 2001 Rules, the proceeding was initiated and conducted as per the provisions contained in 1969 Rules. Under Chapter-10 of the 1969 Rules, procedure for penalty has been prescribed. Rule-34 deals with the nature of penalties where the penalty has been classified in two categories, namely, major and minor penalties. Removal from service has been classified as major penalty under sub-rule (2) of Rule-34. To impose major penalty, procedure has been envisaged under Rule-36 of 1969 Rules. 7. In course of hearing, to the query by this Court confronting Mr. Mohapatra, learned counsel for the petitioner, whether he was assailing imposition of the major penalty alleging any infraction of procedural irregularities committed by the authorities by not complying with the provisions contemplated under Rule-36 or not, fairly he submitted that he does not assail the procedure as envisaged under Rule-36 while imposing punishment of removal of the petitioner from service and rather, he confines his contention with regard to imposition of such major penalty the same being disproportionate to offence alleged against the petitioner. He further argued with vehemence that only on a single occasion if any lapse was notified against the petitioner as he was taking rest in a nearby place during his duty hours, this trivial mistake, he should not have been removed from service. By removing the petitioner from service, he has sustained mental, physical, physiological and financial hardship, which cannot be compensated in any manner whatsoever and for a petty offence major penalty of removal from service could not have been inflicted by the authorities. 8. Mr. S.K. Das, learned counsel for the opposite party, in reply to the contention raised by learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that not only the petitioner remained absent from duty, but he had shifted to some other place during his duty hours. 8. Mr. S.K. Das, learned counsel for the opposite party, in reply to the contention raised by learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that not only the petitioner remained absent from duty, but he had shifted to some other place during his duty hours. The CISF is a discipline organization and such lapses will have deep root into the matter leaving bad impact in the event no punishment would be inflicted on the delinquent employee. At the same time, it is urged that the petitioner misconducted himself by assaulting the patrolling officer, who found him sleeping and that itself amounted to serious misconduct. Therefore, considering the matter from any angle, if the disciplinary authority imposed punishment of removal from service, that cannot be said to be disproportionate to the charge levelled against the petitioner and the Court should refrain from interfering with the concurrent findings of the inquiry officer, concluded the same by the disciplinary authority and the appellate authority. 9. There is no dispute that the petitioner was never earlier punished for any misconduct prior to the alleged incident and it is the admitted case of both the parties that the petitioner lacked in duty during duty hours by sleeping at a place other than the place allotted to him for duty. So far as assaulting the higher authority is concerned, there is dispute and this Court expresses no opinion with regard to that. But on the basis of the inquiry caused by the inquiry officer, oral evidence was considered and the finding of the inquiry officer was upheld by the disciplinary authority as well as the appellate authority. Mr. Sharma, the patrolling officer had sustained minor injury and therefore the allegation made against the petitioner basing upon which inquiry was conducted and finding was recorded was triffle in nature. Rather being a model employer, the opposite party ought to have imposed such a penalty so that the petitioner would have rectified himself, but without giving such opportunity for his rectification, imposing harsh punishment of removal from service will grossly dislocate the entire family set up of the petitioner causing great prejudice to him. 10. In U.P. State Road Transport Corporation and Others vs. A.K. Parul, AIR 1999 SC 1552 , the apex Court in paragraph-3 held as follows:- “3. 10. In U.P. State Road Transport Corporation and Others vs. A.K. Parul, AIR 1999 SC 1552 , the apex Court in paragraph-3 held as follows:- “3. This Court consistently has taken the view that while exercising judicial review the Courts shall not normally interfere with the punishment imposed by the authorities and this will be more so when the Court finds the charges were proved. The interference with the punishment on the facts of this case cannot be sustained. In State Bank of India vs. Samarendra Kishore Endow, (1994) 2 SCC 537 : 1994 AIR SCW 1465, this Court held that imposition of proper punishment is within the discretion and judgment of the disciplinary authority. It may be open to the appellate authority to interfere with it, but not to the High Court or to the Administrative Tribunal for the reasons that the jurisdiction of the Tribunal is similar to the powers of the High Court under Article 226.” 11. Reference was made to an unreported judgment of this Court in Srikanta Das vs. Inspector General of Police, CRPF, OJC No. 2655 of 1997 disposed of on 24.04.2006. That case related to a more heinous offence while here is a case where it cannot be construed that the allegation made against the petitioner was within the purview of more heinous. This decision is therefore not applicable to the present case. 12. The reference made to U.P. State Road Transport Corporation vs. Subash Chandra Sharma and Others, AIR 2000 SC 1163 by learned counsel for the opposite party is yet disputed as the principle settled therein related to punishment awarded in a way shockingly disproportionate to the nature of the charge found proved against the delinquent in which event the High Court should not exercise its power under article 226 of the Constitution of India. 13. In view of the decision referred above, there is no iota of doubt that while exercising power of judicial review under Article 226 and judicial review, this Court shall not normally interfere with the punishment imposed by the authority nor shall interfere with the quantum of punishment imposed by the authority. It is within the domain of the authority to interfere with such quantum of punishment in a court or tribunal. 14. The scope of judicial review in the matter of imposition of penalty as a result of disciplinary proceeding is very limited. It is within the domain of the authority to interfere with such quantum of punishment in a court or tribunal. 14. The scope of judicial review in the matter of imposition of penalty as a result of disciplinary proceeding is very limited. This Court can interfere with the punishment only if it finds the same to be shockingly disproportionate to the charges proved. In such a case, the Court is to remit the matter back to the disciplinary authority for reconsideration of punishment. Of course in appropriate cases, in order to avoid delay the Court can itself impose lesser punishment. (See – You One Maharia-JV through You One Engineering and Construction Company Ltd. and Another vs. National Highways Authority of India, AIR 2007 SC 2954 . 15. The question of interference with the quantum of punishment has been considered by the Supreme Court in catena of judgments, and it was held that if the punishment awarded is disproportionate to the charge of misconduct, it would be arbitrary and thus, would violate the mandate of Article 14 of the Constitution (See – Bhagat Ram vs. State of Himachal Pradesh & Others, AIR 1983 SC 454 , Ranjit Thakur vs. Union of India and Others, AIR 1987 SC 2386 , Union of India and Others vs. Giriraj Sharma, AIR 1994 SC 215 , B.C. Chaturvedi vs. Union of India and Others, AIR 1996 SC 484 . 16. In the case of Ranjit Thakur (supra), the Apex Court observed as under:- “But the sentence has to suit the offence and the offender. It should not be vindictive or unduly harsh. It should not be disproportionate to the offence as to shock the conscience and amount in itself to conclusive evidence of bias. The doctrine of proportionality, as part of the concept of judicial review, would ensure that even on an aspect, which is otherwise, within the exclusive province of the Court Martial, if the decision of the Court even as to sentence is an out ranges defiance of logic, then the sentence would not be immune from correction. Irrationality and perversity are recognized grounds of judicial review.” 17. In the case of B.C. Chaturvedi (supra), after examining earlier decisions, the Supreme Court observed that in exercise of the powers of judicial review, the Court cannot normally substitute its own conclusion or penalty. Irrationality and perversity are recognized grounds of judicial review.” 17. In the case of B.C. Chaturvedi (supra), after examining earlier decisions, the Supreme Court observed that in exercise of the powers of judicial review, the Court cannot normally substitute its own conclusion or penalty. However, if the penalty imposed by an authority shocks the conscience of the Court, it would appropriately mould the relief either directing the authority to reconsider the penalty imposed and in exceptional and rare cases, in order to shorten the litigation, itself impose appropriate punishment with cogent reasons in support thereof. 18. In the case of Union of India and Others vs. G. Ganayutham, AIR 1997 SC 3387 , the Supreme Court considered the entire law on the subject and observed: “In such association, unless the Court/Tribunal opines in its secondary role, that the administrator was, on the material before him, irrational according to Wednesbury or CCSU then, the matter has to be remitted back to the appropriate authority for reconsideration. It is only in very rare cases as pointed out in B.C. Chaturvedis case that the Court might, to shorten litigation think of substituting its own view as to the quantum of punishment in the place of the punishment awarded by the competent authority. 19. What is the appropriate quantum of punishment to be awarded to a delinquent is a matter that primarily rests at the discretion of the disciplinary authority. An authority sitting in appeal over any such order of punishment is by all means entitled to examine the issue regarding the quantum of punishment inasmuch as it is entitled to examine whether the charges have been satisfactorily proved. But when any such order is challenged before a Service Tribunal or the High Court the exercise of discretion by the competent authority in determining and awarding punishment is generally respected except where the same is found to be so outrageously disproportionate to the charge of misconduct and the Court considers it to be arbitrary and wholly unreasonable. The superior Courts and the Tribunal invoke the doctrine of proportionality which has been gradually accepted as one of the facets of judicial review. Where punishment is excessive or disproportionate to the offence so as to shock the conscience of the Court and is unacceptable even then Courts should be slow and generally reluctant to interfere with the quantum of punishment. Where punishment is excessive or disproportionate to the offence so as to shock the conscience of the Court and is unacceptable even then Courts should be slow and generally reluctant to interfere with the quantum of punishment. The law on the subject is well settled by a series of decisions rendered by this Court. We remain content with reference to only some of them. 20. In Ranjit Thakur vs. Union of India, (1987) 4 SCC 611 : AIR 1987 SC 2386 , the apex Court held that the doctrine of proportionality, as part of the concept of judicial review, would ensure that even on an aspect which is, otherwise, within the exclusive province of the Court-Martial, if the decision even as to the sentence is in defiance of logic, then the quantum of sentence would not be immune from correction. Irrationality and perversity, observed this Court, are recognized grounds of judicial review. The following passage is apposite in this regard. The doctrine of proportionality, as part of the concept of judicial review, would ensure that even on an aspect which is, otherwise, within the exclusive province of the Court-Martial, if the decision even as to sentence is an in defiance of logic, then the quantum of sentence would not be immune from correction. Irrationality and perversity are recognized grounds of judicial review. 21. Similarly, in Dev Singh vs. Punjab Tourism Development Corporation Limited, (2003) 8 SCC 9 : AIR 2003 SC 3712 : 2003 AIR SCW 4222, the Supreme Court, following Ranjit Thakur's case (supra) held: “A court sitting in an appeal against a punishment imposed in the disciplinary proceedings will not normally substitute its own conclusion on penalty. However, if the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority or the appellate authority shocks the conscience of the court then the court would appropriately mould the relief either by directing the disciplinary/appropriate authority to reconsider the penalty imposed or to shorten the litigation it may make an exception in rare cases and impose appropriate punishment with cogent reasons in support thereof. It is also clear from the above noted judgments of this court, if the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority is totally disproportionate to the misconduct proved against the delinquent officer, then the court would interfere in such a case." 22. It is also clear from the above noted judgments of this court, if the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority is totally disproportionate to the misconduct proved against the delinquent officer, then the court would interfere in such a case." 22. Reference may also be made to the decisions of the Supreme Court in Union of India vs. Ganayutham, (1997) 7 SCC 463 : AIR 1997 SC 3387 : 1997 AIR SCW 3464, Ex-Naik Sardar Singh vs. Union of India, (1991) 3 SCC 213 : AIR 1992 SC 417 : 1992 AIR SCW 4 and Om Kumar vs. Union of India, (2001) 2 SCC 386 : AIR 2000 SC 3689 : 2000 AIR SCW 4361, which reiterate the same proposition. 23. The above view of the apex Court was referred to by this Court in Sudarsan Giri case (supra) and by the apex Court in Jai Bhagwan case mentioned (supra). 24. Coming to the case in hand, this Court is of the view that punishment of removal from service for the kind of misconduct proved against the petitioner appears to be grossly disproportionate. There is no dispute that during duty hours the petitioner had slept and having been caught, he manhandled the patrolling officer. For this sole occasion, he could not have been imposed major penalty from removal from service and the disciplinary authority as well as appellate authority ought to have given opportunity to the petitioner to amend his conduct and behaviour. If any further incident would have been there then the delinquent would have been liable for harshest punishment like removal from service but for a single triffle incident, this Court finds the punishment to be disproportionate to the nature of misconduct of the petitioner. 25. Therefore, taking the totality of the circumstances into account, this Court is of the view that punishment of removal of the petitioner from service is a harsh punishment and the said punishment could be substituted by an order of reduction in rank or any other suitable punishment as contemplated under Rule-34 of the 1969 Rules. Therefore, the matter is remitted back to the revisional authority with direction to him to consider and dispose of the same within a period of four months from the date of communication of this order by complying with the principles of natural justice. 26. With the above observation and direction, the writ petition stands disposed of.