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2014 DIGILAW 749 (AP)

Matta @ Palina Bhavani v. Matta Tulasi Rao

2014-06-19

A.V.SESHA SAI

body2014
ORDER: This revision, under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, is filed against the order dated 24.06.2013 passed by the Court of the I Additional District Judge, Srikakulam dismissing I.A.No.31 of 2013 in O.S.No.14 of 2011 filed by the third parties/petitioners herein under the provisions of Order I Rule 10(2) of Code of Civil Procedure (hereinafter called as Code). 2. Heard Sri A.Rama Rao, learned counsel for the petitioners, Sri K.S.Gopalakrishnan, learned counsel for respondent No.1 and Sri K.B.Ramanna Dora, learned counsel for respondent Nos.2 to 4 apart from perusing the material available on record. 3. Respondent No.1 instituted O.S.No.14 of 2011 on the file of the Court of the I Additional District Judge, Srikakulam against respondent Nos.2 to 4 for specific performance of contract of sale dated 09.03.2010 said to have been executed by them in respect of the land admeasuring Ac.2.00 cents situated in Survey Nos.142/16 to 21 and 135/15 to 17 of Balaga Village, Srikakulam Mandal, Srikakulam District. In the said suit, the petitioners herein, who are the daughter and father and who are third parties to the suit proceedings filed I.A.No.31 of 2013 under Order 1 Rule 10(2) of Code, seeking permission of the Court to add themselves as defendants 4 and 5. The plaintiff/respondent No.1 herein and the defendants/respondent Nos.2 to 4 resisted the said petition by filing counters. The learned I Additional District Judge, by virtue of an order dated 24.06.2013 dismissed the said I.A.No.31 of 2013. Calling in question the validity and the legal acceptability of the said order, the present revision has been preferred. 4. It is contended by the learned counsel for the petitioners that the order under revision is erroneous and contrary to law and that the petitioners herein are proper and necessary parties to the suit and that the petitioners are the absolute owners and possessors of the suit property and that the same would be evident from the revenue records such as pattadar passbooks, title deeds and adangals etc. The learned counsel further contends that respondent Nos.2 to 4 herein filed O.S.No.157 of 2009 for permanent injunction wherein they filed I.A.No.306 of 2009 for temporary injunction and that the same was dismissed observing that the petitioners herein are in possession and enjoyment of the subject property. The learned counsel further contends that respondent Nos.2 to 4 herein filed O.S.No.157 of 2009 for permanent injunction wherein they filed I.A.No.306 of 2009 for temporary injunction and that the same was dismissed observing that the petitioners herein are in possession and enjoyment of the subject property. It is further contended by the learned counsel for the petitioners that respondent Nos.2 to 4 herein have colluded with respondent No.1 herein, which resulted in filing of the present suit and that in order to protect their interest in the property, the presence of the petitioners herein in the present suit is very much necessary. In support of his submissions and contentions, the learned counsel for the petitioners places reliance on the judgments in Y.Venkata Reddy and others v. A.P.State Wakf Board, rep. by its Chief Executive Officer, Hyderabad and others , Basant Kumar Soni v. Mukund Das Soni and others and Racharla Thirupathi and others v. Gundala Shobha Rani and others . 5. Per contra, it is contended by the learned counsel for respondent No.1/plaintiff that respondent Nos.2 to 4 herein have set up the petitioners to defeat the right of the plaintiff in the suit schedule property and that the petitioners herein are neither necessary nor proper parties for the suit since they are not parties to the suit agreement of sale and if they have any right in the property, they have to file another independent suit and such rights cannot be adjudicated in the present suit. The learned counsel further contends that the order passed by the Court below is in conformity with the provisions of Order I Rule 10 of the Civil Procedure Code. To bolster his submissions and contentions, learned counsel for respondent No.1 places reliance on the judgment in the case of Kasturi v. Iyyamperumal and others. 6. Learned counsel for respondent Nos.2 to 4, Sri K.B.Ramanna Dora contends that the claim or grievance of the petitioners herein, if any, cannot be the subject matter of the present suit nor the petitioners herein are entitled for any relief in the present suit. 6. Learned counsel for respondent Nos.2 to 4, Sri K.B.Ramanna Dora contends that the claim or grievance of the petitioners herein, if any, cannot be the subject matter of the present suit nor the petitioners herein are entitled for any relief in the present suit. It is further contended by the learned counsel for respondent Nos.2 to 4 that his clients filed O.S.No.157 of 2009 before the Court of the Principal Junior Civil Judge, Srikakulam when the petitioners and certain third parties colluded and tried to grab the subject property and he further contends that there are no merits in the present revision. In support of his contentions, learned counsel for the petitioners relies on Mumbai International Airport Pvt. Ltd v. Regency Convention Centre & Hotels Pvt. Ltd. and others and order in C.R.P.No.4855 of 2011. 7. In the above back ground, now the issues which emanate for consideration of this Court are: Whether the order passed by the Court below is sustainable and tenable and whether the same warrants any interference of this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India? 8. The material available on record reveals that petitioner Nos.1 and 2 are the daughter and father respectively and respondent Nos.2 and 3 are the parents-in-law and respondent No.4 is the husband of petitioner No.1 herein. As per the affidavit filed in support of the present petition, petitioner No.1 is staying with respondent No.2 due to matrimonial disputes with respondent No.4. Petitioner No.1 claims to be the absolute owner of the subject property and it is also the case of the petitioners that all the revenue records such as pattadar passbooks, title deeds and adangals etc., demonstrate the ownership and possession of petitioner No.1. Respondent Nos.2 to 4 instituted O.S.No.157 of 2009 on the file of the Court of the Principal Junior Civil Judge, Srikakulam against the petitioners and others for permanent injunction and respondent Nos.2 to 4 in the said O.S.No.157 of 2009 also sought for temporary injunction under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 of Code in I.A.No.306 of 2009 and the same was dismissed on 13.09.2010. 9. Precisely the case of the petitioners in the present revision is that respondent Nos.2 to 4 colluded with respondent No.1/plaintiff, which resulted in institution of the present suit. It is further alleged that the same is an attempt to grab the subject property. 9. Precisely the case of the petitioners in the present revision is that respondent Nos.2 to 4 colluded with respondent No.1/plaintiff, which resulted in institution of the present suit. It is further alleged that the same is an attempt to grab the subject property. Pleading in the manner indicated so and stating that the petitioners herein are the proper and necessary parties, the petitioners herein filed the present I.A. under Order I Rule 10 of Code. As per the provisions of Order I Rule 10 of Code, Courts are empowered either to strike off the names of the parties improperly joined or to add the parties found to be proper and necessary for effective and complete adjudication of the issues involved in the suit. 10. Coming to the judgment cited on behalf of the learned counsel for the petitioners in Y.Venkata Reddys case (supra 1), this Court at paragraph 6 held as under: Left to the petitioners, they had grievance only against the defendants impleaded in the suits. In a suit for injunction, the plaintiff has the prerogative to choose his opponents and no body can claim right, to get himself impleaded, to the dislike of the plaintiff. It is only when allegations of collusion or fraud are made that the trial Court can consider the feasibility of impleading third parties also, if it is found that their interests are adversely affected on account of their not being made parties. In Basant Kumar Sonis case (supra 2), this Court at paragraph 12 held as under: Therefore, from the above decisions, it is clear that the proposed party must show semblance of right and interest in the subject matter or a direct interest in the subject matter or a direct interest in the subject matter of the suit. The primary object of Order I Rule 10(2) CPC is to bring before the Court at one and the same time all the persons interested in the dispute so that all the controversies in the suit may be finally determined once for all in the presence of all parties without delay, inconvenience and expenses of the several actions, trials and inconclusive adjudication. The petitioner is not a necessary party in O.S.No.58 of 2009 on the file of the Principal District Judge, Medak at Sangareddy, as no relief to be granted, but for the reason that the property covered by contract of sale entered between the 1st respondent herein on one hand and the respondents 2 and 3 on the other hand and the 2nd agreement of sale dated 14.02.2008 entered between parties therein is one and the same. Even though no relief can be granted against the petitioner, who is not a party to the suit, but his presence is necessary for complete and final decision of the question involved in the suit in as much as the petitioner and the 1st respondent are seeking enforcement of their respective agreements of sale said to have been executed by the respondents 2 and 3 herein on two different dates in respect of the same property. Therefore, the presence of the petitioner may be helpful in effectually adjudicating upon all the points in dispute. It is therefore, the duty of the Court to keep in mind a relevant consideration and as far as possible, multiplicity of proceedings should be avoided. Further, if the two suits are tried separately, there is a possibility of conflict of decisions. To be joined as a party to the suit, the person must have a direct or legal interest in the action. In other words, he must show that the litigation may lead to a result, which would affect him legally by interfering or adversely affecting his legal rights or legally protected interest. In view of the fact that subject matter in dispute is one and the same in both the suits and two persons are claiming to enforce two agreements of sale, if the proposed party is not to be impleaded, there would be conflict of decisions. No doubt, the trial Court observed that petitioner may file a petition for trial of both the suits, which would serve the purpose, but at the same time there would be no pleading insofar as the present petitioner is concerned in respect of O.S.No.58 of 2009. There cannot be any dispute that without there being any pleading, any amount of evidence is valueless. If the petitioner is allowed to come on record, he can file written statement so as to safeguard his interest in relation to the property in dispute. There cannot be any dispute that without there being any pleading, any amount of evidence is valueless. If the petitioner is allowed to come on record, he can file written statement so as to safeguard his interest in relation to the property in dispute. Therefore, the presence of the petitioner is very much essential and necessary as his interest in the property relating to the suit would affect adversely in his absence. This aspect of the case has been overlooked by the trial Court. Therefore, the impugned order is liable to be set aside. In Racharla Thirupathis case (supra 3), this Court at paragraphs 5, 6, 8 and 9 held as under: 5. Order I Rule 10(2) CPC confers discretion on the Court, either to strike out or add parties, at any stage of the proceedings either upon or without the application of any party. The main criterion for addition of parties is to enable the Court to effectively and completely adjudicate upon and settle all the questions involved in the suit. Whether a person is a necessary or a proper party depends upon the nature of the dispute raised and the relief claimed by the plaintiff. 6. In Udit Narain Singh Malpaharia v. Additional Member, Board of Revenue, Bihar (1) AIR 1963 SC 786 , the Supreme Court has drawn a subtle distinction between a necessary and a proper party. It is constructive to reproduce the relevant portion of the Judgment, at para-7, hereunder: A necessary party is one without whom no order can be made effectively; a proper party is one in whose absence an effective order can be made but whose presence is necessary for a complete and final decision on the question involved in the proceeding. 8. In Anil Kumar Singh v. Shivnath Mishra (2) (1995) 3 SCC 147 , while dealing with the scope of Order I Rule 10 CPC, the Supreme Court held as under: The object of the rule is to bring on record all the persons who are parties to the dispute relating to the subject matter so that the dispute may be determined in their presence at the same time without any protraction, inconvenience and to avoid multiplicity of proceedings. A person may be added as a party-defendant to the suit though no relief may be claimed against him/her provided his/her presence is necessary for a complete and final decision on the question involved in the suit. Such a person is only a proper party as distinguished from a necessary party. 9. In Ramesh Hirachand Kundanmal v. Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay (3) (1992) 2 SCC 524 , the Apex Court held as under: If the intervener has a cause of action against the plaintiff relating to the subject matter of the existing action, the Court has power to join the intervener so as to give effect to the primary object of the order which is to avoid multiplicity of actions. The person to be joined must be one whose presence is necessary as a party. What makes a person a necessary party is not merely that he has relevant evidence to give on some of the questions involved; that would only make him a necessary witness. 11. Coming to the judgment cited by the learned counsel for respondent No.1 in Kasturis case (supra 4), the Honble Apex Court at Paras 2, 5, 7, 9, 11, 15 and 16 held as under: 2. The only question that needs to be decided in this case is whether in a suit for specific performance of contract for sale of a property instituted by a purchaser against the vendor, a stranger or a third party to the contract, claiming to have an independent title and possession over the contracted property, is entitled to be added as a party-defendant in the said suit. 5. In deciding whether a stranger or a third party to the contract is entitled to be added in a suit for specific performance of contract for sale as a defendant, it is not necessary for us to delve in depth into the scope of Order 1 Rule 10 sub-rule (1) CPC under which only the addition of a plaintiff in the suit may be directed. 7. 7. In our view, a bare reading of this provision, namely, second part of Order 1 Rule 10 sub-rule (2) CPC would clearly show that the necessary parties in a suit for specific performance of a contract for sale are the parties to the contract or if they are dead, their legal representatives as also a person who had purchased the contracted property from the vendor. In equity as well as in law, the contract constitutes rights and also regulates the liabilities of the parties. A purchaser is a necessary party as he would be affected if he had purchased with or without notice of the contract, but a person who claims adversely to the claim of a vendor is, however, not a necessary party. From the above, it is now clear that two tests are to be satisfied for determining the question who is a necessary party. Tests are (1) there must be a right to some relief against such party in respect of the controversies involved in the proceedings; (2) no effective decree can be passed in the absence of such party. 9. We have carefully considered sub-sections (a) to (e) of Section 19 of the Act. From a careful examination of the aforesaid provisions of clauses (a) to (e) of the Specific Relief Act we are of the view that the persons seeking addition in the suit for specific performance of the contract for sale who were not claiming under the vendor but they were claiming adverse to the title of the vendor do not fall in any of the categories enumerated in sub-sections (a) to (e) of Section 19 of the Specific Relief Act. 11. As noted hereinearlier, two tests are required to be satisfied to determine the question who is a necessary party, let us now consider who is a proper party in a suit for specific performance of a contract for sale. For deciding the question who is a proper party in a suit for specific performance the guiding principle is that the presence of such a party is necessary to adjudicate the controversies involved in the suit for specific performance of the contract for sale. Thus, the question is to be decided keeping in mind that scope of the suit. For deciding the question who is a proper party in a suit for specific performance the guiding principle is that the presence of such a party is necessary to adjudicate the controversies involved in the suit for specific performance of the contract for sale. Thus, the question is to be decided keeping in mind that scope of the suit. The question that is to be decided in a suit for specific performance of the contract for sale is to the enforceability of the contract entered into between the parties to the contract. If the person seeking addition is added in such a suit, the scope of the suit for specific performance would be enlarged and it would be practically converted into a suit for title. Therefore, for effective adjudication of the controversies involved in the suit, presence of such parties cannot be said to be necessary at all. Lord Chancellor Cottenham in Tasker v. Small ((1834) 40 ER 848 : 3 My & Cr 63) made the following observations: It is not disputed that, generally, to a bill for a specific performance of a contract of sale, the parties to the contract only are the proper parties; and, when the ground of the jurisdiction of Courts of Equity in suits of that kind is considered it could not properly be otherwise. The Court assumes jurisdiction in such cases, because a court of law, giving damages only for the non-performance of the contract, in may cases does not afford an adequate remedy. But, in equity, as well as at law, the contract constitutes the right, and regulates the liabilities of the parties; and the object of both proceedings is to place the party complaining as nearly as possible in the same situation as the defendant had agreed that he should be placed in. It is obvious that persons, strangers to the contract, and, therefore, neither entitled to the right, nor subject to the liabilities which arise out of it, are as much strangers to a proceeding to enforce the execution of it as they are to a proceeding to recover damages for the breach of it. 15. It is obvious that persons, strangers to the contract, and, therefore, neither entitled to the right, nor subject to the liabilities which arise out of it, are as much strangers to a proceeding to enforce the execution of it as they are to a proceeding to recover damages for the breach of it. 15. As discussed hereinearlier, whether Respondents 1 and 4 to 11 were proper parties or not, the governing principle for deciding the question would be that the presence of Respondents 1 and 4 to 11 before the court would be necessary to enable it effectually and completely to adjudicate upon and settle all the questions involved in the suit. As noted hereinearlier, in a suit for specific performance of a contract for sale, the issue to be decided is the enforceability of the contract entered into between the appellant and Respondents 2 and 3 and whether contract was executed by the appellant and Respondents 2 and 3 for sale of the contracted property, whether the plaintiffs were ready and willing to perform their part of the contract and whether the appellant is entitled to a decree for specific performance of a contract for sale against Respondents 2 and 3. It is an admitted position that Respondents 1 and 4 to 11 did not seek their addition in the suit on the strength of the contract in respect of which the suit for specific performance of the contract for sale has been filed. Admittedly, they abased their claim on independent title and possession of the contracted property. It is, therefore, obvious as noted hereinearlier that in the event, Respondents 1 and 4 to 11 are added or impleaded in the suit, the scope of the suit for specific performance of the contract for sale shall be enlarged from the suit for specific performance to a suit for title and possession which is not permissible in law. In the case of Vijay Pratap v. Sambhu Saran Sinha ( (1996) 10 SCC 53 ) this Court had taken the same view which is being taken by us in this judgment as discussed above. In the case of Vijay Pratap v. Sambhu Saran Sinha ( (1996) 10 SCC 53 ) this Court had taken the same view which is being taken by us in this judgment as discussed above. This Court in that decision clearly held that to decide the right, title and interest in the suit property of the stranger to the contract is beyond the scope of the suit for specific performance of the contract and the same cannot be turned into a regular title suit. Therefore, in our view, a third party or a stranger to the contract cannot be added so as to convert a suit of one character into a suit of different character. As discussed above, in the event any decree is passed against Respondents 2 and 3 and in favour of the appellant for specific performance of the contract for sale in respect of the contracted property, the decree that would be passed in the said suit, obviously, cannot bind Respondents 1 and 4 to 11. It may also be observed that in the event, the appellant obtains a decree for specific performance of the contracted property against Respondents 2 and 3, then, the Court shall direct execution of deed of sale in favour of the appellant in the event Respondents 2 and 3 refusing to execute the deed of sale and to obtain possession of the contracted property he has to put the decree in execution. As noted hereinearlier, since Respondents 1 and 4 to 11 were not parties in the suit for specific performance of a contract for sale of the contracted property, a decree passed in such a suit shall not bind them and in that case, Respondents 1 and 4 to 11 would be at liberty either to obstruct execution in order to protect their possession by taking recourse to the relevant provisions of CPC, if they are available to them, or to file an independent suit for declaration of title and possession against the appellant or Respondent 3. On the other hand, if the decree is passed in favour of the appellant and sale deed is executed, the stranger to the contract being Respondents 1 and 4 to 11 have to be sued for taking possession if they are in possession of the decretal property. 16. On the other hand, if the decree is passed in favour of the appellant and sale deed is executed, the stranger to the contract being Respondents 1 and 4 to 11 have to be sued for taking possession if they are in possession of the decretal property. 16. That apart, from a plain reading of the expression used in sub-rule (2) Order 1 Rule 10 CPC all the questions involved in the suit it is abundantly clear that the legislature clearly meant that the controversies raised as between the parties to the litigation must be gone into only, that is to say, controversies with regard to the right which is set up and the relief claimed on one side and denied on the other and not the controversies which may arise between the plaintiff-appellant and the defendants inter se or questions between the parties to the suit and a third party. In our view, therefore, the court cannot allow adjudication of collateral matters so as to convert a suit for specific performance of contract for sale into a complicated suit for title between the plaintiff-appellant on one hand and Respondents 2 and 3 and Respondents 1 and 4 to 11 on the other. This addition, if allowed, would lead to a complicated litigation by which the trial and decision of serious questions which are totally outside the scope of the suit would have to be gone into. As the decree of a suit for specific performance of the contract for sale, if passed, cannot, at all, affect the right, title and interest of Respondents 1 and 4 to 11 in respect of the contracted property and in view of the detailed discussion made hereinearlier, Respondents 1 and 4 to 11 would not, at all, be necessary to be added in the instant suit for specific performance of the contract for sale. 12. Coming to the judgment cited by the learned counsel for respondent Nos.2 to 4 in Mumbai International Airport Pvt. Ltds case (supra 5) the Honble Apex Court at Para 8 held as under: The general rule in regard to impleadment of parties is that the plaintiff in a suit, being dominus litis, may choose the persons against whom he wishes to litigate and cannot be compelled to sue a person against whom he does not seek any relief. Consequently, a person who is not a party has no right to be impleaded against the wishes of the plaintiff. But this general rule is subject to the provisions of Order I Rule 10(2) of Code of Civil Procedire (Code for short, which provides for impleadment of proper or necessary parties. The said sub-rule is extracted below: Court may strike out or add parties (2) The Court may at any stage of the proceedings, either upon or without the application of either party, and on such terms as may appear to the Court to be just, order that the name of any party improperly joined, whether as plaintiff, or defendant, be struck out, and that the name of any person who ought to have been joined, whether as plaintiff or defendant, or whose presence before the Court may be necessary in order to enable the Court effectually and completely to adjudicate upon and settle all the questions involved in the suit, be added. The said provision makes it clear that a Court may, at any stage of the proceedings (including suits for specific performance), either upon or even without any application, and on such terms as may appear to it to be just, direct that any of the following persons may be added as a party: (a) any person who ought to have been joined as plaintiff or defendant, but not added, or (b) any person whose presence before the Court may be necessary in order to enable the Court to effectively and completely adjudicate upon and settle the question involved in the suit. In short, the Court is given the discretion to add as a party, any person who is found to be a necessary party or proper party. A necessary party is a person who ought to have been joined as a party and in whose absence no effective decree could be passed at all by the Court. If a necessary party is not impleaded, the suit itself is liable to be dismissed. A proper party is a party who, though not a necessary party, is a person whose presence would enable the Court to completely, effectively and adequately adjudicate upon all matters in disputes in the suit, though he need not be a person in favour of or against whom the decree is to be made. A proper party is a party who, though not a necessary party, is a person whose presence would enable the Court to completely, effectively and adequately adjudicate upon all matters in disputes in the suit, though he need not be a person in favour of or against whom the decree is to be made. If a person is not found to be a proper or necessary party, the Court has no jurisdiction to implead him, against the wishes of the plaintiff. The fact that a person is likely to secure a right/interest in a suit property, after the suit is decided against the plaintiff, will not make such person a necessary party or a proper party to the suit for specific performance. 13. In C.R.P.No.4855 of 2011, this Court held as under: The Supreme Court in MIA Pvt Ltd v. Regency Convention Centre & Hotels Pvt. Ltd (supra 5), has examined the scope of Order I Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure and held that if a person is not found to be a proper or necessary party, the Court has no jurisdiction to implead him against the wishes of the plaintiff and that, in a suit for specific performance, only the issues relating to specific performance i.e., whether the defendant executed the agreement/contract and whether such contract should be specifically enforced or not would arise and that the scope of the suit for specific performance cannot be widened at the instance of the third parties, unless the Court feels that their presence is necessary for proper and effective adjudication of the above-mentioned issues arising in the suit. In the instant case, it is not in dispute that the petitioners are claiming right over the suit schedule property on the basis of the registered sale deed executed in their favour during the pendency of the suit. Therefore, their rights over the suit schedule property depend upon the liability of defendant Nos.2 and 3 to execute the sale deed in favour of respondent No.1. For deciding this issue, the presence of the petitioners is not at all necessary. If the petitioners have any independent claim against defendant No.2 and his vendor, they are entitled to agitate such rights independently. 14. For deciding this issue, the presence of the petitioners is not at all necessary. If the petitioners have any independent claim against defendant No.2 and his vendor, they are entitled to agitate such rights independently. 14. The judgments reported in Y.Venkata Reddys case (supra 1) and Racharla Thirupathis case (supra 3) relate to the suits pertaining to injunctions and the judgment reported in Basant Kumar Sonis case (supra 2) dealt with the situation where two suits were instituted for specific performance of contract of sale. In view of the factual and circumstantial variation, the said judgments cited on behalf of the petitioners herein would not render any assistance to the petitioners herein in the present civil revision petition. In the judgment reported in Kasturis case (supra 4), the Honble Apex Court categorically held that a stranger to the contract, making independent claim and adverse to the title of the vendors is neither necessary nor proper party and as such is not entitled to join as party-defendant in the suit for specific performance of contract of sale. The Honble Apex Court further held in the said judgment that a third party or a stranger to the contract cannot be added so as to convert a suit of one character into a suit of different character and the Supreme Court further held that the proposed parties would be at liberty either to obstruct execution in order to protect their possession by taking recourse to the relevant provisions of Code, if they are available to them, or to file an independent suit. The Supreme Court further made it clear that in the event of the suit being decreed, the stranger to the contract will have to be sued for taking possession if he is in possession of the decretal property. In the instant case also petitioner No.1 herein is claiming a right adverse to the plaintiff in the suit and as such in the considered opinion of this Court, the petitioners herein cannot be said to be proper and necessary parties for adjudication of the issue involved in the present suit. 14. For the aforesaid reasons and having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case and having regard to the principles and parameters laid down by the Honble Apex Court and this Court in the above referred judgments, this Civil Revision Petition is dismissed. No order as to costs. 15. 14. For the aforesaid reasons and having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case and having regard to the principles and parameters laid down by the Honble Apex Court and this Court in the above referred judgments, this Civil Revision Petition is dismissed. No order as to costs. 15. Miscellaneous Petitions, if any, pending in this Civil Revision Petition shall stand closed. 1. 2010 (6) ALT 812 2. 2010 (4) ALT 790 3. 2013 (5) ALT 209 4. (2005) 6 SCC 733 5. 2010 (5) ALD 24 (SC)