Judgment : Challa Kodanda Ram, J. 1. This writ appeal has been filed against the order dated 04.03.2004 passed by a single Judge of this Court in W.P.No.1379 of 1995 dismissing the writ petition filed by the appellant company herein refusing to interfere with the order dated 24.08.1994 of the Industrial Tribunal, Hyderabad (for shirt, “the Tribunal”) in M.P.No.16 of 1993 in I.D. No.10 of 1989. 2. The brief facts of the case are that the respondent-workman was employed as a Tripman at Prakasam Khani Open Caste-II during the relevant period and a charge sheet was issued alleging violation of standing Order No.16(1), 16(2) and 16(6). The charge against the respondent is that on 31.7.1992 when he was on duty in 2nd shift, the loading operator allowed the lorry with full load, to leave the premises without chalana and that he failed in his duty to collect challan, verify and allow the lorry for load. It was alleged that the lapse on the part of the respondent constitutes misconduct under the standing Order No.16(1), 16(2) and 16(6). After enquiry, the respondent was found guilty of the charges leveled against him and was dismissed from the service with effect from 22.9.1993. Aggrieved the dismissal of service, the workman filed the I.D.No.10 of 1989 before the Tribunal. 3. At the relevant period of time Industrial Dispute No.10 of 1989 in relation to a larger issue was pending before the Tribunal. Therefore, the appellant filed an application in M.P.No.16 of 1993 in I.D.No.10 of 1989 before the Tribunal under Section 33(2)(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (for short, “the Act”), with a prayer to approve the action taken by them in dismissing the respondent from service w.e.f.22.9.1993. While considering the said application, the Tribunal, after taking evidence and examining the material available on record come to the conclusion that the material on record does not justify imposition of any penalty on the workman and refused to accord approval and dismissed the said application. The appellant challenged the order of the Tribunal, by filing, W.P.No.1379 of 1995 and the same was also dismissed. Aggrieved thereby the present appeal came to be filed. 4. Heard Ms. Uma, Advocate representing Sri K. Srinivasa Murty, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner and Sri G. Vidyasagar, learned senior counsel for the respondent. 5. The appellant challenged the order of the Tribunal, by filing, W.P.No.1379 of 1995 and the same was also dismissed. Aggrieved thereby the present appeal came to be filed. 4. Heard Ms. Uma, Advocate representing Sri K. Srinivasa Murty, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner and Sri G. Vidyasagar, learned senior counsel for the respondent. 5. After the inquiry, the Tribunal came to the conclusion that the driver of the lorry had loaded the vehicle with coal un-authorisedly and in connivance with the loading operator at a time when the respondent had gone to attend the nature of calls. The record discloses that the respondent ran after the vehicle and attended to stop it, but the same did not fructify. Immediately thereafter he complained to the higher officials about unauthorized act of loading done by the loading operator. Without taking any action against the loading operator, who was really at fault for unauthorized loading, the respondent was made a scapegoat. The Tribunal also found that the actual reason for initiation of domestic enquiry against the respondent was that he was organizing Secretary of Singareni Collieries Employees’ Union (CITU) and the objection was to keep him under check and control. 6. The learned single Judge did not find any reason to interfere with the finding of the Tribunal. There is no contra material produced before us, to take a view, different from the one, taken by the learned single Judge, so far as the aspect of any culpability of the respondent, is concerned. This leaves us with the other aspect urged by the learned counsel for the appellant, viz., the scope and power of the Tribunal while exercising the powers under Section 33(2)(b) of the Act. 7. The argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner is to the effect that while exercising powers under Section 33(2)(b) of the Act, the Tribunal is required to confine itself, to the aspect of whether on the facts before it permission can be accorded based on the enquiry report in domestic enquiry. He submits that in the instant case, the Industrial Tribunal exceeded its jurisdiction by reassessing the merits of the matter, as if an enquiry is being conducted under Section 11 of the Act and as such the order of the Tribunal is erroneous and unsustainable. He submits that in the instant case, the Industrial Tribunal exceeded its jurisdiction by reassessing the merits of the matter, as if an enquiry is being conducted under Section 11 of the Act and as such the order of the Tribunal is erroneous and unsustainable. We have given our consideration to the submissions made by the learned counsel and we are unable to accept the same. Though at a first blush the scope under Section 33(2)(b) of the Act may appear to be some what limited, it becomes necessary for the Tribunal to scrutinize the proceedings conducted in the domestic enquiry, for the purpose of deciding the application made by the employer to come to a prima facie conclusion that there is no victimization and that there exists substantial material, that justifies the further action. In the present case what all the Tribunal had done, the same, for the purpose of coming to a conclusion whether the employer appellant had initiated domestic enquiry only to victimize the respondent. In the face the categorical finding recorded by the Tribunal, does not suffer from any infirmity. It is well settled that the appellate court would not interfere with the order of the lower Court merely because a different conclusion is possible. Even that possibility does not exist in this case. 8. For the reasons stated above, the writ appeal is liable to be dismissed and it is accordingly dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs. Miscellaneous Petitions, if any pending in this writ appeal shall stand closed.