ORDER Dr. B. Siva Sankara Rao, J. 1. The prosecution agency represented by the Intelligence Officer, Narcotics Control Bureau, Hyderabad Sub-Zone, who is the petitioner herein, filed this application under Section 437(5) instead under Section 439(2) read with 37 of The Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (for short "NDPS Act") to cancel the order in Crl.P. No. 2204/2014 dated 03.03.2014 granting bail in favour of the 5th accused shown as the sole respondent to the present application. 2. Heard the petitioner-prosecution agency and the respondent-accused No. 5 at length and perused the material on record. 3. Now the points for consideration are: 1. Whether there are any Just grounds to recall or cancel the bail order granted to the respondents-5th accused and if so, on what grounds and under which provision? 2. To what result? POINT Nos. 1 & 2: 4. Before coming to the facts on the scope of the application, the only contention for cancellation of bail is that the learned Judge did not properly advert to the scope of Section 37 of NDPS Act, which prohibits the grant of bail. Thereby it is required to reproduce what the Section 37 speaks herein: "[37. Offences to be cognizable and non-bailable.-(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974) (a) every offence punishable under this Act shall be cognizable; (b) no person accused of an offence punishable for offences under section 19 or section 24 or section 27Aand also for offences involving commercial quantity shall be released on bail or on his own bond unless (i) the Public Prosecutor has been given an opportunity to oppose the application for such release, and (ii) where the Public Prosecutor opposes the application, the court is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing that he is not guilty of such offence and that he is not likely to commit any offence while on bail. (2) The limitations on granting of bail specified in clause (b) of sub-section (1) are in addition to the limitations under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974) or any other law for the time being in force, on granting of bail.]" 5. (2) The limitations on granting of bail specified in clause (b) of sub-section (1) are in addition to the limitations under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974) or any other law for the time being in force, on granting of bail.]" 5. As per Section 37(1)(b), if it is the commercial quantity of the Narcotic drug or psychotropic substance, whatever be the penal provision, leave about irrespective of commercial quantity similar rider is there for those offences punishable under Sections 19, 24 and 27(a). Section 37(1)(b)(ii)speaks where the Public Prosecutor opposes the application, the Court is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing that he is not guilty of such offence and that he is not likely to commit any offence while on bail. 6. The counsel for prosecution placed reliance upon (i) Babua Vs State of Orissa 2001(2) SCC 566 , wherein it has held that, Court should examine whether prosecution statements, if believed would result in conviction if it could not given an answer in negative, bail could not be granted; (ii) Intelligence officer, Narcotics Control Bureau Vs Shambhu Shankar 2002(2) SCC 562 that bail cannot be granted unless the public prosecutor has been heard and Court is satisfied that the accused is not guilty and not likely to commit any offence while on bail; (iii) State of M.P. Vs Kajad 2001(7) SCC 672 held that Court's satisfaction under Section 37(1)(b)(ii) about accused being not guilty must be arrived based on the record; (iv) D. Sarojini Vs State of A.P. 2001 (7) SCC 677 , held the same and also in; (v) Customs, New Delhi Vs Ahmadalieva Nodira. 7. The counsel for the accused, who is the respondent to this application, raised the contention that there are no grounds to cancel the bail and that the bail granted is valid within the scope of Section 37 of the Act supra and placed reliance on the expression of the Apex Court in Union of India v. Rattan Mallik @ Habul 2009 Crl. Law Journal 3043 (SC, wherein it was observed in paras 13 to 16 as follows: 13. Law Journal 3043 (SC, wherein it was observed in paras 13 to 16 as follows: 13. It is plain from a bare reading of the non-obstante clause in the Section and Sub-Section (2) thereof that the power to grant bail to a person accused of having committed offence under the NDPS Act is not only subject to the limitations imposed under Section 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, it is also subject to the restrictions placed by sub-clause (b) of sub-section (1) of Section 37 of the NDPS Act. Apart from giving an opportunity to the Public Prosecutor to oppose the application for such release, the other twin conditions viz; (i) the satisfaction of the Court that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accused is not guilty of the alleged offence; and (ii) that he is not likely to commit any offence while on bail, have to be satisfied. It is manifest that the conditions are cumulative and not alternative. The satisfaction contemplated regarding the accused being not guilty, has to be based on "reasonable grounds". The expression 'reasonable grounds' has not been defined in the said Act but means something more than prima facie grounds. It connotes substantial probable causes for believing that the accused is not guilty of the offence he is charged with. The reasonable belief contemplated in turn points to existence of such facts and circumstances as are sufficient in themselves to justify satisfaction that the accused is not guilty of the alleged offence. [Vide Union of India Vs. Shiv Shanker Kesari] Thus, recording of satisfaction on both the aspects, noted above, is sine qua non for granting of bail under the NDPS Act. 14. We may, however, hasten to add that while considering an application for bail with reference to Section 37 of the NDPS Act, the Court is not called upon to record a finding of "not guilty'. At this stage, it is neither necessary nor desirable, to weigh the evidence meticulously to arrive at a positive finding as to whether or not the accused has committed offence under the NDPS Act. What is to be seen is whether there is reasonable ground for believing that the accused is not guilty of the offence(s) he is charged with and further that he is not likely to commit an offence under the said Act while on bail. What is to be seen is whether there is reasonable ground for believing that the accused is not guilty of the offence(s) he is charged with and further that he is not likely to commit an offence under the said Act while on bail. The satisfaction of the Court about the existence of the said twin conditions is for a limited purpose and is confined to the question of releasing the accused on bail. 15. Bearing in mind the above broad principles, we may now consider the merits of the present appeal.' It is evident from the afore-extracted paragraph that the circumstances which have weighed with the learned Judge to conclude that it was a fit case for grant of bail are: (i) that nothing has been found from the possession of the respondent; (ii) he is in jail for the last three years and (iii) that there is no chance of his appeal being heard within a period of seven years. In our opinion, the stated circumstances may be relevant for grant of bail in matters arising out of conviction under the Indian Penal Code, 1860 etc. but are not sufficient to satisfy the mandatory requirements as stipulated in sub-clause (b) of sub-section (1) of Section 37 of the NDPS Act. Merely because, according to the Ld. Judge, nothing was found from the possession of the respondent, it could not be said at this stage that the respondent was not guilty of the offences for which he had been charged and convicted. We find no substance in the argument of learned counsel for the respondent that the observation of the learned Judge to the effect that "nothing has been found from his possession" by itself shows application of mind by the Ld. Judge tantamounting to "satisfaction" within the meaning of the said provision. It seems that the provisions of the NDPS Act and more particularly Section 37 were not brought to the notice of the learned Judge. 16. Thus, in our opinion, the impugned order having been passed ignoring the mandatory requirements of Section 37 of the NDPS Act, it cannot be sustained......" 8. It seems that the provisions of the NDPS Act and more particularly Section 37 were not brought to the notice of the learned Judge. 16. Thus, in our opinion, the impugned order having been passed ignoring the mandatory requirements of Section 37 of the NDPS Act, it cannot be sustained......" 8. The expression clearly indicates, that there must be some thing more than prima facie grounds, within the meaning of reasonable grounds as a substantial probable cause for believing that accused is not guilty of such offence, and another requirement of satisfaction of the Court is that he is not likely to commit any offence while on bail; and in the absence of showing the material the accused is not entitled to the concession of bail by virtue of rider under Section 37 of the Act; irrespective of the Qualified (not absolute) fundamental right of personal liberty as part of the fundamental rights of the individual enshrined under Article 21 of the Constitution of India; by virtue of the legal bar to say a person who waived the constitutional privilege of liberty by involved in the grave crime, in the larger interest of society cannot be given concession of individual liberty. There is nothing more to answer, but in the limited purpose of the contention raised as not a writ petition questioning the constitutional validity of the Section, 37 of the Act; leave about similar bar by another provision of this chapter in Section 32-A against suspension of sentence and grant of bail of a convict pending appeal, which as constitutionally valid including in Dadu Vs. State 2000 Cr. L.J. 4619 (SC). 9. The counsel for A.5 to the application, regarding the requirements for cancellation of bail, placed reliance upon a case in State (Delhi Administration) v. Sanjay Gandhi (1978) 2 SCC 411 , paras 13 and 24, which speaks that: "13. Rejection of bail when bail is applied for is one thing; cancellation of bail already granted is quite another. It is easier, to reject a bail application in a non-bailable case than to cancel a bail granted in such a case. Cancellation of bail necessarily involves the review of a decision already made and can by and large be permitted only, if, by reason of supervening circumstances, it would be no longer conducive to a fair trial to allow the accused to retain his freedom during the trial. Cancellation of bail necessarily involves the review of a decision already made and can by and large be permitted only, if, by reason of supervening circumstances, it would be no longer conducive to a fair trial to allow the accused to retain his freedom during the trial. 24. Section 439(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure confers jurisdiction on the High Court or Court of Session to direct that any person who has been released on bail under Chapter XXXIII be arrested and committed to custody......." 10. Here, practically, Section 37 of NDPS Act is a special provision and it starts with the non-obstante clause in showing irrespective of what is contained in Chapter XXXIII of Criminal Procedure Code, Section 37 of the Act prevails in case of conflict to override and in case of no conflict and reconcilability, to consider as additional consideration (vide section 51 of the Act). Here the cancellation of bail sought for is not by raising any subsequent or supervening circumstance or violation of conditions, to say said principle of law has no application to the facts, when the contention is the bail granted without proper consideration of Section 37 of the Act, hence to recall or cancel for Section 37 of the Act does not able the accused to the concession. 11. Having regard to the above, when cancellation of bail sought for is not for any violation of conditions, but non entitled to grant under Section 37of the Act, that was ignored; the general norms under Section 439(2) or Section 437(5) of Cr.P.C. laid down, but for additionally, cannot be applied substantially to the cancellation of the bail sought for under Section 37 of the NDPS Act in complaining that in granting the bail the rider was not properly adverted to. 12. It is needless to say virtually the scope for cancellation sought is for recalling of the order passed by the Court based on the cardial principle governed by the Latin maxim "Actus Curiae Neminem Gravabit", i.e. "An act of the Court not sanctioned by law shall prejudice no one". 12. It is needless to say virtually the scope for cancellation sought is for recalling of the order passed by the Court based on the cardial principle governed by the Latin maxim "Actus Curiae Neminem Gravabit", i.e. "An act of the Court not sanctioned by law shall prejudice no one". It is needless to say for such recall, the inherent power of the Court which inheres in every Court from its very constitution, subject to the saving and unless denied "by way of statutory interdiction with all breadth and length is to the necessity, to apply to meet the ends of justice, including to undo a wrong or irregular thing as no Court can perpetrate an illegality or even an irregularity generally, when necessary facts brought to its notice. It is so to exercise apart from the inherent powers that are preserved by Section 151 of Civil Procedure Code, 1908 to all the Civil Courts; equally to the High Courts by Section 482 of Cr.P.C. to sub-serve the ends of justice, to render complete justice or to prevent abuse of injustice vide Jaipur MDS v. Commissioner of Income Tax AIR 1977 SC 1348 and Surya Kaksh Singh v. State of U.P. Crl. A. No. 1680 of 2013 of the Apex Court to recall an order passed when not correct. It is practically the petition that has to be considered within the above scope of Section 482read with 439(2) of Cr.P.C. read with Section 37 of NDPS Act. 13. From this, it is important to note the fact that the contraband, involved in this case is a commercial quantity, which is undisputedly a psychotropic substance either in one category or the other very nearer to it. The provisions that to be kept in mind are Section 35- mens rea a reverse onus clause putting burden on accused to rebut the presumption the Court shall draw till rebutted of the culpable mental state; similarly under Section 54 regarding possession, which needless to say includes a conscious possession - whether physical or constructive as suffice of awareness about a particular fact from State of mind is criteria -vide- Madanlal v. State of Himachal Pradesh 2003 SCC Crl. 1664 and Avtar Singh and Ors. 1664 and Avtar Singh and Ors. vs State Of Uttar Pradesh 2002 SCC (Crl.) 1 769 (A&E); Section 25 - same punishment of substantive against those allowed the premises in use; Section 28 - an attempt is also a punishable offence providing same punishment of accomplished act, if some act done under the attempt; Section 30 - even preparation is an offence punishable, (like in Sections 399 I.P.C.); Sections 29 - vicarious liability (like in Sections 107 to 120-B & Sections 34 to 37 I.P.C.); Section 50 - Mandatory compliance where personal search is involved with or without any property search or the like; Sections 41 & 42 (like sections 400 & 165 Cr.P.C.) where the officer is empowered officer and where authorised officer ( to say because of empowerment by delegation otherwise by statutory empowerment to intimate to the superior within the prescribed time of search proceedings, Otherwise compliance of Section 42 is not required if not a delegated exercise and Section 43 (like Section 102 Cr.P.C.) where only seizure involved with no search there also compliance of Section 42 not required Section 57 compliance if any which is even directing Narayana Swamy v. Assistant Director of D.R.I. 2002 (SCC) Crl. 1865 (A). 14. From this, it is important to know before discussing the facts, provisions of Evidence Act under Chapter II among Sections 5 to 55 on the scope of relevancy of facts, particularly, admissions and confessions which are part of it in particular the bar laid down for admissibility of a confession to police officer in saying it cannot be admitted. The wording is to police officer. Here the intelligence officers of the Narcotic Control Bureau, whether come within the purview of the Police Officer, for any statement made by accused is (by self-incrimination, from Article 20 of the Constitution of India, protects the testimonial compulsion; needless to say if it is voluntary by waiver of the constitutional privilege is saved from the rider of Article 20 a bar under Section 25 of the Evidence Act or not:- In this regard, the Apex Court in Kanhaiyalal v. Union of India AIR 2008 SC 1044 , held that confession of offence other than to a police officer, of an officer governed by the provision of Narcotics Act is not hit by Section 25 of the Indian Evidence Act. It is to say if it is voluntarily, it is as good as a confession under Section 24 of the Evidence Act. Needless to say in this juncture, the other provisions covered by Section 28 of Evidence Act as to confession made after removal of impression caused by inducement, threat or promise being relevant and admissible; also as per Section 29 confession otherwise relevant, not to become irrelevant because of promise of secrecy, or in consequence of a deception practised on the accused person for the purpose of obtaining it, or when he was drunk, or because it was made in answer to questions which he need not have answered, whatever may have been the form of those questions, or because he was not warned that he was not bound to make such confession, and that evidence of it might be given against him. 15. Here from this perspective, there is a disclosure statement made by the respondent to this application-A.5, which is prima facie (for purpose of the bail application scope) to hold as relevant for consideration in considering the said disclosure since what is discussed supra admissible, prohibits for the entitlement to the concession of bail under Section 37 of the Act. This confession or disclosure statement what ever it may of the accused at his pre arrest stage, running in 8 pages with all minute details and the same is corroborated by the statement of the owner of the premises of the Balaji Lab, Quthbullapur Mandal, where from the contra band seized covered by panchanama - in the presence of one of witnesses of the area and the other of some distance to there (to say resident above 7 k.m. away to the police). As per the prosecution case covered by seizure panchanama, lessee of the premises was A.4 and the real lessee/occupant who bargained even was A.5, who is the respondent herein and the seizure is in the presence of them. As per the prosecution case covered by seizure panchanama, lessee of the premises was A.4 and the real lessee/occupant who bargained even was A.5, who is the respondent herein and the seizure is in the presence of them. The detailed statement of A.5 clearly indicates all minute details about his academic qualifications, avocation, acquaintance with A.4, another deceased - Suresh Reddy, other accused and other facts including his family members details, ages everything what not, it not been voluntarily; as required by Section 3 of the Evidence Act to infer as the conduct of a prudent person, how can all these details, the so called intelligence officer of the Narcotic Control Bureau (a total stranger) could know on its face. Apart from the presumption under Section 114 of the Evidence Act, of all official acts are duly performed, the presumption that every statement is voluntary may equally apply to the disclosure statement of A.5 under the Act which clearly indicates complicity of A.5 of the conscious possession of the psychotropic substance, with culpable state of mind which is revealed from his mouth of 5.225 kgs of Methaphetamine, at page 7 disclosure, dated 27.11.2013. It is but for voluntary or with no force or even after case of such force or threat or influence, these facts could not be the out come from his mouth. 16. From this background, it is just to refer back to the application for bail sought by the respondent (A.5) herein. His bail application running with 9 paras in 5 pages taking all sorts of defence including conducting the seizure panchanama of the contraband, undisputedly he is a signatory to every page. No doubt there is lot of gap to the signatures and the ending to each page writing for his saying as the outcome of signature of him in the blank unfilled page and the later filling the contents and the other contention of him that the so called voluntary confession or disclosure obtained by him under threat or force. From what is discussed above on the scope of Sections 24, 28 & 29 of the Evidence Act, such confession for even admittedly not retracted till date if not immediately to say if not voluntarily made, for the purpose of bail application to consider as voluntary. From what is discussed above on the scope of Sections 24, 28 & 29 of the Evidence Act, such confession for even admittedly not retracted till date if not immediately to say if not voluntarily made, for the purpose of bail application to consider as voluntary. The other contention is that even the panchanama of seizure discloses service of notice under Section 50 of the NDPS Act, not complied with. Admittedly no search of person conducted and it is required only when there is search of person involved for mandatory compliance. Section 50 of the Act here not applied when admittedly there is no search of person, much less involved even in anticipation of need of search, any notice given when not conducted, the question of compliance does not arise, but for in conducting. Having regard to the above, such contention no way survives. Then, coming to the other contention, the complicity of A. 5 cannot be made out as the very seizure panchanama shows from the prosecution, of A.4 was the lessee and not the A.5. In fact what is discussed supra, one is real lessee and the other ostensible so far as A.4 and A.5 concerned. Having regard to the above, that contention may not survive. 17. It is from these propositions, averments and contentions, now coming to the point for consideration of order passed by this court (another Bench) in granting bail is it within the parameters of Section 37 NDPS Act, if not for holding with great respect any slip in drawing of proper attention in granting the bail; how far the principle that "an act of the Court not sanctioned shall prejudice no one" can be intervened at the instance of the prosecution agency, which is the pivotal question to answer now concerned: The order passed by this court in Crl.P. No. 2204 of 2014 dated 03.03.2014 reads particularly page 2 from second para and third para in considering whether answered to overcome the bar under Section 37 of the Act or not, it speaks that there is a contention raised by the accused on the ambiguity regarding the psychotropic substance is Methaphetamine or Amphetemine, (which is a seized contraband). In fact, when both are the prohibited psychotropic substances that too both involve commercial quantity but for, if at all to raise the same in defence during trial if shown to draw attention for a little credence; that two in the absence of non framing of alternative charge contemplated by criminal procedure code; Sections 220-222 and if already framed subject to non exercise of power under Section 216 Cr.P.C. pending trial even to raise in the arguments after the trial and cannot now for the purpose of bail application, the contention is untenable for the impugned bail order not so answered. So far as the other contention noted of occupation of premises of A. 5 is doubtful concerned, the above discussion supra clarifies the presence of A.5 and also real lessee of the premises is A. 5 and his signatures are there and that too with a version of him obtained by force in writing, the disclosure statement of him which cannot be believed as discussed supra. The court did not consider muchless discussed the matter. Coming to the other contention of non compliance Section 50, there is no ground to sustain, that was also not answered. Even for the court for the observation of there is case against the A.4 for the allegedly taken premises of lessee, but not A.5, the Court did not consider the material. It is inevitable to say that court did not draw its attention to the above disclosure statement of A.5, leave about panchanama contents that speak his presence was there. Suffice to say the court did not advert to the said aspect in considering for granting bail the rider under Section 37 of the Act. 18. The purpose of penal law according to Wechsler - an American author is to express a formal social condemnation of a forbidden conduct, buttressed by sanctions calculated to prevent it. According to Robert Jackson - liberty to be achieved is only within and through the rule of law. 19. Having regard to the above, it is the duty of the court to recall its own order granting bail, within the parameters of law more particularly by invoking Section 482 Cr.P.C. Accordingly the point is answered. 20. According to Robert Jackson - liberty to be achieved is only within and through the rule of law. 19. Having regard to the above, it is the duty of the court to recall its own order granting bail, within the parameters of law more particularly by invoking Section 482 Cr.P.C. Accordingly the point is answered. 20. In the result, the application is allowed under Section 482 R/W. 439(2) Cr.P.C. R/W. 37 NDPS Act by recalling the bail order and for all purposes by cancelling the bail forthwith by directing the respondent No. 5 - accused to surrender before the authorities within 5 days, failing which it is left open to the officials concerned to apprehend him and submit to judicial custody. 21. As the observations made in the bail application are only to the extent of considering the scope of Section 37 of NDPS Act and non existence of reasonable grounds for believing that he is not guilty of such offence and is not likely to commit any offence while on bail to say otherwise in holding of no prima facie case for entitlement to bail; these observations shall no way influence much less prejudice the mind of either trial judge or for any other forum for any remedy to invoke by the petitioner, if otherwise entitled. Application allowed