JUDGMENT 1. The present appeal has been filed by the workmen being aggrieved by the judgment and order dt. 20.4.2006 passed by the learned Single Judge in C.W.J.C. No. 290 of 1998(R) whereby the learned Single Judge has allowed the writ petition filed by the management and set aside the award passed by the Industrial Tribunal whereby the Management was directed to reinstate and regularize the concerned workmen. 2. The brief facts of the case are as under : That, the appellant-workmen were employed by the management for various permanent and perennial nature of jobs since 1986, such as, black-smithy, welding, fabrication, erection and tyndal jobs. Dispute arose between the employer and workmen regarding regularization of workmen which gave the cause of action for raising industrial reference. The Central Govt. under Section 10(1)(d)(2A) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 made reference to the Industrial Tribunal for adjudication. The following dispute was referred for adjudication to the Tribunal: “Whether the demand of Janta Mazdoor Sangh that the management of Moonidih Project of M/s BCCL, P.O. Moonidih, Dist. Dhanbad should departmentalise and treat as regular workmen on the rolls of the colliery, 18 Tyndal Mazdoors etc, whose names appear in the Annexure, is justified ? If not, to what reliefs are these Tyndal Mazdoor etc entitled?” On appreciation of various documentary as well as considering oral evidences, the Tribunal gave an award dated 17.8.1997, in Reference Case No.45 of 1993, holding that the demand of the workmen is justified and directed the management to reinstate and regularize the concerned workmen as permanent tyndals of the management w.e.f. 1.7.90 with 30 % backwages. That, the management being aggrieved by the award had filed the writ application being C.W.J.C. No.290 of 1998(R). It was admitted on 17th March, 1999 and the operation of the award was stayed. Though, there was an order for payment of benefits under Section 17(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act, but, the management has not paid those benefits, except one workman. That, ultimately, the writ application was heard and it was finally allowed by an order dated 20.4.2006, whereby the impugned award passed by the Industrial Tribunal was set aside and the demand of the Union is held unjustified. 3. The case of the Union, in short, is that the workmen were employed by the management in various permanent and perennial nature of jobs since 1986. 3. The case of the Union, in short, is that the workmen were employed by the management in various permanent and perennial nature of jobs since 1986. They claimed regularization, but the management stopped them from work after the dispute was raised by the Union. The engagement of the contractor M/s New Jhang Transport was a camouflage. Under the N.C.W.A.-III & IV, it was agreed that the industry shall not engage contract labour on jobs of permanent and perennial nature and such jobs will continue to be done by the regular labour. In support of its claim, the Union examined the contractor Mewa Singh as WW-1, who inter alia deposed that he established the firm M/s New Jhang Transport as the management had asked him that it will facilitate easy payment. The case of the management inter alia was that no notification was issued under Section 10 of the Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, prohibiting the engagement of the contractors for the work in question done by the said contractor. The jobs were of short duration of about 8 to 10 days in a month. In support of its case, MW1 was examined on behalf of the management, who stated, inter alia, that the workers were employed by the contractors. The work of one Cycle Stand, 2-3 Cow Catchers and dismantalling of one building was only done within three years. The workmen did not work regularly. 4. Learned counsel Mr. Sudarshan Srivastava appearing on behalf of the appellant –Union of workmen, has submitted that the Tribunal has recorded the findings in favour of the Union by referring the judgment rendered in the case of Madusantakam Co-operative Sugar Mills Vrs. S. Vishwanathan, reported in (2005) 3 SCC p.193. It is submitted that the Learned Single Judge has failed to appreciate the ratio laid down in the above judgment that the Court in its writ jurisdiction, is not required to interfere with the findings of the facts recorded by Tribunal as the same was neither perverse nor illegal. 5. Learned counsel for the appellant has submitted that the learned Single Judge has not properly appreciated the evidence adduced before the learned Industrial Tribunal and therefore, the said order is liable to be set aside as findings of facts recorded by the Industrial Tribunal based on cogent evidence were not properly considered and appreciated. 5. Learned counsel for the appellant has submitted that the learned Single Judge has not properly appreciated the evidence adduced before the learned Industrial Tribunal and therefore, the said order is liable to be set aside as findings of facts recorded by the Industrial Tribunal based on cogent evidence were not properly considered and appreciated. It is further submitted that the findings of facts cannot be interfered in exercise of writ jurisdiction unless there are apparent error or perversity or illegality in the award. The learned Single Judge has failed to appreciate these proposition of law. It is further submitted that the learned Single Judge has not properly considered the findings of the Tribunal with respect to the nature of work and the motive of the management for engaging the workmen through contractor which amounts to sham and camouflage, and therefore, directed the management to reinstate the workmen concerned. It is further submitted that the learned Single Judge has also failed to consider and appreciate the documentary evidence Ext. W1-series and Ext.M series i.e. Attendance Register from January 1988 till December, 1989 where the attendance of the workmen have been marked and the payment on revenue stamp has been shown under the signature of Sr. Personnel Officer of Moonidih Project with his official seal. The learned counsel for the appellant has further submitted that the learned Single Judge has not appreciated that the Tribunal has also considered the oral evidence of one and only witness examined on behalf of the management. It is also submitted that the learned Single Judge has misconstrued the findings of fact recorded by the industrial court which are based on evidence on record and not appreciated the award while rejecting the same without any reasonable explanation. It is lastly submitted that the learned Single Judge has erred in allowing the petition and setting aside the award on the consideration of the case of Steel Authority of India Ltd. Versus National Union Waterfront Workers, reported in, (2001) 7 SCC 1 . 6. The learned counsel for the appellant alternatively submitted that in lieu of reinstatement and back wages compensation can also be fixed and awarded on the basis of length of service rendered by each of the workman and last drawn wages. 6. The learned counsel for the appellant alternatively submitted that in lieu of reinstatement and back wages compensation can also be fixed and awarded on the basis of length of service rendered by each of the workman and last drawn wages. In this context, the learned counsel for the appellant has referred to and relied upon the decision of the Division Bench of this Court in L.P.A. No.299 of 2004. Wherein the Division Bench of this Court has held that reinstatement is not necessary order in all the cases. The compensation can be granted in lieu of the reinstatement, as held in the case of Employers in relation to the Management of Kuju Pundi Project of M/s CCL Versus Their Workmen, reported in 2012 (2) JCR 156 (Jhr). The decision of the L.P.A was affirmed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court vide its order dt. 8.2.2013 in Civil Appeal No.1089 of 2013, by providing enhancement in the amount of compensation. 7. Learned counsel for the respondent -management has submitted that the judgment and the order passed by the learned Single Judge does not require any interference as the same has been delivered after a careful consideration of the facts and the evidences on record as also the prevailing position of law in the light of the judgment delivered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India. It is further submitted that the award passed by the Tribunal was based upon the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court, rendered in case of Air India Staturory Corporation (Supra), which has been overruled by the Constitution Bench judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Steel Authority of India (SAIL) Ltd. Versus National Union Waterfront workers, reported in (2001) 7 SCC 1 . The learned counsel for the respondent further submitted that the learned Single Judge while allowing the writ petition has held that the appellants have miserably failed to establish violation of Section 25F of the I.D. Act. Therefore, applying the law laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Range Forest Officer Versus S.T. Hadimani, reported in, (2002) 3 SCC 25 , the entire case of the union has been demolished. It is further submitted that the learned Single Judge while examining the award has taken into consideration that during the three years, the only one cow shed and 2-3 cow catchers were made while the building was demolished. It is further submitted that the learned Single Judge while examining the award has taken into consideration that during the three years, the only one cow shed and 2-3 cow catchers were made while the building was demolished. These go to show that the case assigned to the contractor were of short duration. The learned counsel for the respondent has further submitted that nowhere any finding has been recorded that the contract awarded to the contractors was prohibited by issuance of the notification under Section 10 (1) of the Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970. In absence of any prohibitory notification, the respondent-employer was fully justified in engaging the contractor. It is further submitted that in any view of the matter without there being any abolition notification, there cannot be any employer/ employee relationship. In this context, the learned counsel for the respondents has referred to and relied upon the case of Steel Authority of India (SAIL) Vr. Union Waterfront Workers, reported in (2001) 7 SCC 1 . Para No.125(3) of the said judgment reads as under : “(3) Neither Section 10 of the CLRA Act nor any other provision in the Act, whether expressly or by necessary implication, provides for automatic absorption of contract labour on issuing a notification by the appropriate Government under sub-section (1) of Section 10, prohibiting employment of contract labour, in any process, operation or other work in any establishment. Consequently the principal employer cannot be required to order absorption of the contract labour working in the establishment concerned.” 8. It is further submitted that as held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India, without prohibitory notification of the contract labour, no direction for absorption of the contract labour can be passed. It is also submitted that there cannot be regularization/absorption in public employment where the entry into the service is through the mode which does not need a constitutional scheme of equality under Article 14. It is further stated that the respondent is the State under Article 12 of the Constitution of India and as such the employment if any made by the contractor without observing the Article 14 cannot claim the regularization/ absorption. 9. On the point of compensation, learned counsel for the respondent has referred to Para 28 of the judgment in case of Gangadhar Pillai Vs. 9. On the point of compensation, learned counsel for the respondent has referred to Para 28 of the judgment in case of Gangadhar Pillai Vs. Siemens Ltd., reported in (2007) 1 SCC 533 , wherein it is mentioned that – “it is not the law that on completion of 240 days of continuous service in a year, the employee concerned becomes entitled to for regularization of his services and /or permanent status. The concept of 240 days in a year was introduced in the industrial law for a definite purpose. Under the Industrial Disputes Act, the concept of 240 days was introduced so as to fasten statutory liabilities upon the employer to pay the compensation to be computed in the manner specified in Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 before he is retrenched from service and not for any other purpose. In the event a violation of the said provision takes place, termination of services of the employee may be found to be illegal, but only on that account, his services cannot be directed to be regularized. Direction to reinstate the workman would mean that he gets back the same status.” 10. Now, the above mentioned submissions are required to be considered and analyzed keeping in view certain crucial materials and evidences adduced before the learned Tribunal. The findings of facts recorded by the learned Tribunal are very much vital for the purpose of deciding as to whether the demand of the sponsoring unions and the workmen for their regularization and departmentalization as regular worker is justified or not. Findings of Facts Recorded by the Industrial Court Paragraph 11, 12, 13 and 14 of the award delivered by the Tribunal deals with some crucial evidence which was adduced before the Tribunal for determination of the issue involved in the matter and the said evidence is also necessary to be looked into and consider by this Court and therefore, the same is reproduced hereinbelow : “11. On re-call he has further said in his examination in chief that the work order Ext.M-1 consists of the jobs of welding, cutting, blacksmith and of tyndal. Similar nature of jobs were also carried vide ext.M-1/1 series or Ext.M-1/3 series and in rest of the work order similar nature of job has been entrusted. On re-call he has further said in his examination in chief that the work order Ext.M-1 consists of the jobs of welding, cutting, blacksmith and of tyndal. Similar nature of jobs were also carried vide ext.M-1/1 series or Ext.M-1/3 series and in rest of the work order similar nature of job has been entrusted. He has further said that fabrication work entrusted through the work orders were performed in the surface and this fabrication works were done for support in the underground. He did not know that similar support work is also done with the help of timber and sleepers. Some other persons were also doing the work of fabrication, but he has denied that he and other worker working under the contractor. He has also denied that the management used to get aforesaid fabrication work done through contractor. 12. Some documents have been filed on behalf of the management Ext.M-1 series photocopy of such work orders from the year 1987 till 31st March, 1989 and Ext. M-2 series are pre receipted bills submitted by the said contractor company M/s New Jhang Transport company along with bills and payment order made through these bills which are Ext.M-2 to M-2/11. 13. The workmen have also filed documents marked Exts. W-1 and W-2 /1 for the years 1988-89and Ext. W-2 Attendance Register of the workmen which also bear signature of Dy. Personnel Manager on almost all the pages at intervail below the attendance of the concerned workmen which has been shown marked below from January, 1989 to December, 1989. Ext. M-1 series are photocopy of Attendance Register from January 1988 till December, 1989 where attendance of the workmen has been marked and payment on revenue stamp has been shown also under the signature of Sr. Personnel Officer of Moonidih Project of the management with his official seal. So thee documents Ext. W-1 series and Ext. W-2 cannot be said to be manufactured documents for the purpose of the case. 14. While arguing the case it has been submitted on behalf of the workmen and the sponsoring union that the job of welding, blacksmithy, fabrication, erection and tyndals jobs were of permanent and perennial nature which the workmen were continuously performing from the year 1986 to 1989 and they were stopped from work after service notice to the management. 14. While arguing the case it has been submitted on behalf of the workmen and the sponsoring union that the job of welding, blacksmithy, fabrication, erection and tyndals jobs were of permanent and perennial nature which the workmen were continuously performing from the year 1986 to 1989 and they were stopped from work after service notice to the management. It is also submitted that from Ext.M-1 series filed by the management the nature of work has been noted in these work orders and these are from the years 1987 to 1990 and goes to substantiate the contention of the workmen that they has worked for long and completed so many 240 days in 12 calendar months working with the management and doing the job of permanent and perennial nature. This fact is also substantiates from Ext.W-1 series and Ext.W-2 the attendance register filed by the workmen and the union which bear the signature of the Personnel Officer of the management with his official seal. It is also submitted that the intermediary M/s New jhang Transport was only a vail to shield the management’s legal liabilities and it was simply sham and colouflage to deny the claim of the workmen for their regularization and moreover the said contractor had neither licence for contract work nor the management produced to show that it has registration for engaging such contractor for performing permanent and perennial nature of job by contractor workmen. It is also pointed out that MW-1 the only witness examined by the management has clearly admitted that he had no direct personal knowledge of the work performed by the workmen and he was simply concerned with passing of the bills submitted by the Contractor company of the workmen. In view of the matter the contention of the management that the sponsoring union and the workmen are demanding for abolishing of contract system in the company is totally beyond the record and simply the workmen and the union are demanding for regularization/ departmentalization of the workmen as they have worked for so many years performing permanent and perennial nature of jobs with the management and such nature of job was restricted under NCWA-III to be done by the permanent workmen and not by contractor workers to which the management has not denied.” 11. The learned Single Judge while setting aside the impugned award in writ petition filed by the management observed that the conclusion of the Tribunal are not based on material on record. The learned Single Judge further observed that the Tribunal has not considered the case of the management that there was no notification under Section 10 of the Act. Moreover, the award has been passed on the basis of the judgment of Air India Statutory Corporation (supra) which is now overruled vide paragraph 125 of the decision rendered in case of Steel Authority of India Limited (supra). Moreover, the learned Single Judge has also observed that there is no finding about the facts attracting violation of Section 25 F of the Industrial Disputes Act which was to be proved by the Union in view of the judgment of Range Forest Officer (supra) The learned Single Judge has proceeded on the basis that in absence of any notification under Section 10 of the Act, it cannot be said that the management was not entitled to engage the contract labour for the works in question and that the contractor was engaged as a camouflage. 12. In view of the above observation, the learned Single Judge has reached to the conclusion that the award cannot be sustained and accordingly passed the order to set aside the impugned award by holding that the demand of the Union is unjustified. Now, these observations of learned Single Judge needs to be considered in the light of the observation and findings recorded by the learned Industrial Tribunal. 13. Now, on perusal of the award passed by the Tribunal, it appears that the management has examined only one witness i.e. MW-1 Janki Prasad, who was working as superintendent engineer in the Moonidih Area Project since 1975. He has supported the management’s case, has given in written statement that there was a contractor firm namely New Jhang Transport Co., who was given the contract in the year 1987 to 1989 for building Cow Shed, Cow Catcher, Cycle Stand and for demolition of building, etc. It is also stated that some transport work was also given to the contractor and the work order was issued to the contractor for such work. It is also stated that some transport work was also given to the contractor and the work order was issued to the contractor for such work. He has further stated that the workmen engaged by the contractor were selected by the contractor himself and they used to work in his supervision and the management has no control over them. He has further stated that on completion of the work, bills were submitted by the firm and the payment was made through cheque. It is also stated by him that these works were temporary in nature and the concerned workmen did not work regularly, and therefore, their claim for regularization was not justified. But, in cross examination of the said witness, he has stated that the work order issued to the transport contractor under the signature of the agent and not under his signature and he was only responsible for passing of the bills of the contractor and no payment was made by him. The said Janki Prasad MW-1 examined on behalf of the management has further denied in the cross examination that the payment was made to the workmen under the supervision of the officer of the company and he could not say whether the said contractor company is having any valid licence or not. 14. Similarly, before the Industrial court, the workmen have examined WW-1 Mewa Singh. According to this witness, the workers were engaged for the work of black-smithy, welding, fabrication, erection and tyndal jobs under the management and he used to supervise the work of other workmen. It is also stated that the fabrication work was done by the concerned workmen in their different capacity as per the drawings prepared by the engineers of the company and they used to work in the premises of the project and they were engaged in the permanent nature of job. It is also stated that the fabrication work was done by the concerned workmen in their different capacity as per the drawings prepared by the engineers of the company and they used to work in the premises of the project and they were engaged in the permanent nature of job. He has further stated that the amount calculated in the work orders were calculated on the basis of the labour rates and these work orders were issued in the name of M/s New Jhang Transport as the management asked them to establish the company to facilitate the easy payment of the amount due to the workmen for the work done by them and thereafter they created such a company and the management used to pay by issue of cheques in the name of the said firm, but, this was simply a firm neither licenced nor registered. He has further stated that the management used to give letters to file calculations for the work done at labour rates and the concerned workmen used to sign on every page after the payment. In support thereof, a register was produced before the Tribunal which was marked as ‘Ext.-W1’ It is also stated that after filing of their dispute, the management stopped their work. This witness was cross examined by the management and in the cross examination he has stated that the company used to issue cheques on the bills submitted by the said firm and sometimes payment was made in cash. The account was in the name of the firm and it was operated by him and he used to draw the money from the account and pay the same to the concerned workmen at the rate of Rs.25/-a day and he used to take for himself at the rate of Rs.30-32/-per day. 15. From perusal of the above referred oral as well as documentary evidence, which was adduced before the Tribunal on behalf of the workmen as well as management, it appears that the Tribunal after careful examination and scrutiny of the said evidence, adduced on behalf of the management as well as workmen, reached to the conclusion that the payments of bills were made through the Accounts Section of the company, but in the name of the alleged contractor. The evidence which has been discussed by the Tribunal in paragraph 11 to 14 above are based on oral as well as documentary evidence. On perusal of the same, at no stretch of imagination, it can be said that the said findings are perverse. Therefore, the findings of fact recorded by the Tribunal in its award are not required to be disturbed in a writ jurisdiction. It appears that the learned Single Judge has not properly appreciated and considered this aspect. 16. In this context, the decision rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court, rendered in the case of International Airport Authority of India Versus International Air Cargo Workers' Union, reported in, (2009) 13 SCC 374 is applicable in the facts and circumstances of the present case. In this regard, for appreciation of the matter, para 47 and 48 of the said decision here quoted hereinbelow : “47. It is true that in exercising the writ jurisdiction, the High Court cannot sit in appeal over the findings and award of the Industrial Tribunal and therefore, cannot reappreciate evidence. The findings of fact recorded by a fact-finding authority should ordinarily be considered as final. The findings of the Tribunal should not be interfered with in writ jurisdiction merely on the ground that the material on which the Tribunal had acted was insufficient or not credible. 48. It is also true that as long as the findings of fact are based on some materials which are relevant, findings may not be interfered with merely because another view is also possible. But where the Tribunal records findings on no evidence or irrelevant evidence, it is certainly open to the High Court to interfere with the award of the Industrial Tribunal.” 17. The Hon'ble Supreme Court of India, while considering the various provisions of Contract Labour (Regulation & Abolition) Act, 1970, in the case of Steel Authority of India Ltd. Versus National Union Waterfront Workers, gave a landmark decision, which has been reported in (2001) 7 SCC 1 , held, as under : “The history of exploitation of labour is as old as the history of civilization itself. There has been an ongoing struggle by labourers and their organizations against such exploitation but it continues in one form or the other. There has been an ongoing struggle by labourers and their organizations against such exploitation but it continues in one form or the other. The Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 is an important legislation in the direction of attaining fair treatment to labour and industrial peace which are the sine qua non for sustained economic growth of any country.” The observations made by the Hon'ble Apex Court, in Para Nos. 8 and 9 of the aforesaid decision, are relevant and requires to be considered in the present case, which is reproduced hereinbelow: “8. Before taking up these points, it needs to be noticed that the history of exploitation of labour is as old as the history of civilisation itself. There are been an ongoing struggle by labourers and their organisations against such exploitation but it continues in one form or the other. The Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 is an important legislation in the direction of attaining fair treatment to labour and industrial peace which are the sine qua non for sustained economic growth of any country. The best description of that Act is given by Krishna Iyer, J., speaking for a three -Judge Bench of this Court in LIC of India v. D.J. Bahadur thus: (SCC p.334, para 22) “22. the Industrial Disputes Act is a benign measure which seeks to pre-empt industrial tensions, provide the meahanics of dispute resolutions and set up the necessary infrastructure so that the energies of partners in production may not be dissipated in counterproductive battles and assurance of industrial justice may create a climate of goodwill.” 9. After the advent of the Constitution of India, the State is under an obligation to improve the lot of the workforce. Article 23 prohibits, inter alia, begar and other similar forms of forced labour. The directive principle of State policy incorporated in Article 38 mandates the State to secure a social order for promotion of welfare of the people and to establish an egalitarian society. Article 39 enumerates the principles of policy of the State which include welfare measures for the workers. The State policy embodied in Article 43 mandates the State to endeavour to secure, by conditions of work ensureing a decent standard of life and full enjoyment of leisure and social and cultural opportunities. Article 39 enumerates the principles of policy of the State which include welfare measures for the workers. The State policy embodied in Article 43 mandates the State to endeavour to secure, by conditions of work ensureing a decent standard of life and full enjoyment of leisure and social and cultural opportunities. Article 43-A enjoins on the State to take steps by suitable legislation or in any other way to secure the participation of workers in the management of undertakings, establishment, or other organisations engaged in any industry. The fundamental rights enshrined in Articles 14 and 16 guarantee equality before law and equality of opportunity in public employment. Of course, the Preamble to the Constitution is the lodestar and guides those who find themselves in a grey area while dealing with its provisions. It is now well settled that in interpreting a beneficial legislation enacted to give effect to the Directive Principles of State Policy which is otherwise constitutionally valid, the consideration of the court cannot be divorced from those objectives. In a case of ambiguity in the language of a beneficial labour legislation, the courts have to resolve the quandary in fovour of conferment of, rather than denial of, a benefit on the labour by he legislature but without rewriting and/or doing violence to the provisions of the enactment. 18. The decision given in case of International Air Port Authority of India Vrs. International Air Cargo Workers union, reported in (2009) 13 SCC 374 , is relevant and needs to be considered. The relevant Paragraph Nos. 35, 36 and 37 of the said decision is reproduced hereinbelow : “35. As noticed above, SAIL did not specifically deal with the legal position as to when a dispute is brought before the industrial adjudicator as to whether the contract labour agreement is a sham, nominal and merely a camouflage, when there is no prohibition notification under section 10(1) of the CLRA Act. 36. But where there is no abolition of contract labour under Section 10 of the CLRA Act, but the contract labour contend that the contract between the principal employer and the contractor is sham and nominal, the remedy is purely under the ID Act. The principles in Gujarat Electricity Board continue to govern the issue. 36. But where there is no abolition of contract labour under Section 10 of the CLRA Act, but the contract labour contend that the contract between the principal employer and the contractor is sham and nominal, the remedy is purely under the ID Act. The principles in Gujarat Electricity Board continue to govern the issue. The remedy of the workmen is to approach the industrial adjudicator for an adjudication of their dispute that they are the direct employees of the principal employer and the agreement is sham, nominal and merely a camouflage, even when there is no order under Section 10(1 of the CLRA Act. 37. The industrial adjudicator can grant the relief sought if it finds that contract between the principal employer and the contractor is sham, nominal and merely a camouflage to deny employment benefits to the employer and that there is in fact a direct employment, by applying tests like: who pays the salary; who has the power to remove/dismiss from service or initiate disciplinary action; who can tell the employee the way in which the work should be done, in short, who has direction and control over the employee. But where there is no notification under Section 10 of the CLRA Act and where it is not proved in the industrial adjudication that the contract was a sham/nominal and camouflage, then the question of directing the principal employer to absorb or regularize the services of the contract labour does not arise. (Emphasis Supplied) 19. In view of the settle proposition of law it appears that the industrial adjudicator can grant the relief sought if it finds that contract between the principal employer and the contractor is sham, nominal and merely a camouflage to deny employment benefit to the employer and that there is in fact a direct employment, by applying tests like : who pays the salary; who has the power to remove/dismiss from service or initiate disciplinary action; who can tell the employee the way in which the work should be done, in short, who has direction and control over the employee. But where there is no notification under Section 10 of the CLRA Act and where it is not proved in the industrial adjudication that the contract was a sham/ nominal and camouflage, then the question of directing the principal employer to absorb or regularize the services of the contract labour does not arise. But where there is no notification under Section 10 of the CLRA Act and where it is not proved in the industrial adjudication that the contract was a sham/ nominal and camouflage, then the question of directing the principal employer to absorb or regularize the services of the contract labour does not arise. 20. As the reference was made on 5.1.1993, since then litigation was going on between the workmen and the employer in different forums i.e. Industrial Tribunal, Single Bench of this High Court and presently before this Division Bench of this High Court. Now almost 24 years have been passed. 21. The learned counsel for the appellant has alternative submission that if the Court is not inclined to affirm the view taken by industrial Court then in that case alternatively adequate compensation may be amended in lieu of reinstatement keeping in mind nature and length of service rendered by the workmen as also the wages received by the workmen. In this context, the learned counsel for the appellant has relied upon a decision given in the case of Employees in relation to Management of Kuju Pundi Project of M/s Central Coalfields Limited Vrs. Their Workmen represented by Secretary, Jharkhand Colliery Mazdoor Sangh, Hazaribagh, reported in 2012 (2) JCR 156 (Jhr.), appears to be relevant for the purpose of deciding the present case. For better appreciation and for ready reference, the Paragraph Nos. 10, 11 and 12, are quoted hereinbelow : “10. We have considered the submissions of the learned counsel for the respondent and perused the facts of the above cases. At the outset, we may state that in all the cases, except in 1980 Labour & Industrial Cases, 2004, the Court have granted compensation in lieu of reinstatement and the amount of compensation in lieu of reinstatement may vary from Rs.30,000/-to 2,50,000/-, depending upon the facts of each case. It appears from these judgments that the salary drawn by such workman/employee and remaining period of length of service was also considered. It appears from these judgments that the salary drawn by such workman/employee and remaining period of length of service was also considered. Even in a case where Division Bench of Patna High Court in B.Choudhury’s case (supra) considered the principle on which the reinstatement can be compensated and compensation can be award, in that case, the workmen disengaged in the year 1970 was allowed compensation of Rs.30,000/-after observing that by the time said order was by the High Court, more than 12 years passed from the date of discharge of the employee, which was made on 4th August, 1970. 11. In view of the above reasons, It is clear from the judgments cited by the learned counsel for the respondent himself that the reinstatement is not necessary order in all cases. The compensation can be granted in lieu of reinstatement. Here, in this case, we have to look into the nature of the work which was taken from the workmen and at the cost of repetition, we may observe that the workmen were engaged for supplying of water by carrying water in the buckets lifted on the wooden stick and carrying it on shoulder by the employees of the appellant’s Colonies and their work was stopped on the ground of having pipe line to supply the water to these colonies. The workmen were getting initially a meager amount of 0.25 paise and it was increased to 0.37 paise per bhar and thereafter, as stated by the learned counsel for the workmen, the workmen were getting Rs.300/-per month. We cannot ignore all these facts and in that situation we are of the considered opinion that asking the employer to re-engage and reinstate the workmen after about twenty two years to twenty four years will not be equitable and just relief. 12. In view of the above reasons, so far as reinstatement is concerned, the same is modified to the extent that the workmen shall be entitled to the compensation in lieu of the reinstatement. 12. In view of the above reasons, so far as reinstatement is concerned, the same is modified to the extent that the workmen shall be entitled to the compensation in lieu of the reinstatement. So far as quantum is concerned, looking to the wages which they were getting as well as looking to the fact that under Section 17B the workmen are still getting the last drawn wages, the adequate compensation in the facts and circumstances to each of the employees will be Rs.30,000/-(Thirty thousand) which will be sufficient compensation and the same is in addition to the benefit which the employee got under Section 17-B.” The aforesaid decision of the Division Bench of this Court rendered in L.P.A. No.299 of 2004 has been affirmed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court vide its order dated 8.2.2013 in Civil Appeal No.1089 of 2013. It is pertinent to note that while affirming the view taken by this Court, the Hon’ble Supreme Court gave enhancement in the amount of compensation and directed the management to pay the compensation of Rs.60,000/-instead of Rs.30,000/-ordered by the High Court. 22. In the said decision, the various precedents cited by the learned counsel for the parties, have been considered wherein the Courts have granted the compensation in lieu of reinstatement and the amount of compensation which have been awarded in lieu of the reinstatement are varying from Rs.30,000/-to Rs.2,50,000/-, depending upon the facts of each case. It appears from these judgments, that the salary drawn by such workmen /employee and the remaining period of the length of service was also considered. In the present case also more than two decades have been passed from the date of discharge of the employees, and therefore, it would be just and proper to compensate them in lieu of reinstatement. 23. In view of the judgment cited before us, it becomes clear that the reinstatement is not necessary in all cases. The compensation can be granted in lieu of the reinstatement. Here, in this case, we have to consider the nature of work performed by the workmen as also the length of service rendered by them. In the present case, the workmen were engaged for the black-smithy, welding, fabrication, erection and tyndal jobs and they have worked for more than four years and the said workmen were getting initially a meager amount of Rs.25/ day. 24. In the present case, the workmen were engaged for the black-smithy, welding, fabrication, erection and tyndal jobs and they have worked for more than four years and the said workmen were getting initially a meager amount of Rs.25/ day. 24. In view of the judgment delivered in case of Employers in Relation to the Management of Kuju Pundi Project of M/s B.C.C.L. & Others Versus Their Workmen, reported in, (2012) 2 JCR 156 (Jhr.), which has been confirmed by the Hon'ble Apex Court in Civil Appeal No.1089 of 2013 dated 8.2.2013, the workers shall be entitled to compensation in lieu of reinstatement, and so far as quantum is concerned, looking to the wages, which they were getting as well as looking to the facts under Section 17-B of the Industrial Disputes Act, the workmen were not paid the last drawn wages during the intervening period of about 24 years, therefore, the adequate compensation, in the facts and circumstances of the present case, is required to be assessed. In the above referred judgment, it is clearly held that the amount of compensation should be in addition to the benefit which the employees got under Section 17-B of the Industrial Disputes Act, and accordingly, the compensation of Rs.30,000/-was awarded to the workmen in the said decision as the workmen were already getting the last drawn wages during the intervening period under Section 17B of the Industrial Disputes Act, whereas, in the present case, the workmen are not paid the last drawn wages under Section 17-B of the Industrial Disputes Act, during the intervening period, and therefore, the said period is also required to be considered while deciding the quantum of compensation. 25. In the evidence of learned Tribunal it has came that workmen were getting Rs.25 per day. So workers were getting wages Rs.750/-per month (Rs.25x 30 days). Hence, yearly wages of the workmen was Rs.9,000/-(Rupees Nine Thousand only). From perusal of the record, we find that the dispute was raised before the Assistant Labour Commissioner (C) Dhanbad on July, 1990 for regularisation of the workmen. So, from July 1990 to July 2014, almost twenty four years have been passed. So, multiplying 24 years with Rs.9,000/-per annum, the amount comes to Rs.2,16,000/-. From perusal of the record, we find that the dispute was raised before the Assistant Labour Commissioner (C) Dhanbad on July, 1990 for regularisation of the workmen. So, from July 1990 to July 2014, almost twenty four years have been passed. So, multiplying 24 years with Rs.9,000/-per annum, the amount comes to Rs.2,16,000/-. By the order dated 17.3.1999 in C.W.J.C. No.290/ 1998(R), learned Single Judge directed to pay the concerned workmen full wages last drawn by the workmen during the pendency of the application under Section 17-B of the I.D.Act. Aggrieved by this order dated 17.3.1999, the management had filed the S.L.P. before the Apex Court being S.L.P. (C) No. 8436 of 1999. By order dated 16.7.1999, the said SLP was dismissed. Hence, the management was bound to pay the concerned workmen full wages last drawn as per Section 17-B of the I.D.Act. Here it is pertinent to note that though there was order for payment under Section 17-B of the I.D.Act, but the management has not paid those benefits except the one workman. This point has been stated in para 3 of the memo of appeal. But, the management gave information by filing application dated 12.1.2000 before the Single Bench of this Court and stated that the management was ready to give wages to the concerned workmen in terms of the Section 17-B of the Industrial Disputes Act, but there was dispute regarding the identity of the concerned workmen. In their application, management also stated that there is difference with regards to the particulars of workmen furnished at the time of dispute dated 9.7.1990 and affidavit submitted by them before this Hon'ble Court. In this regard, the management is directed to pay compensation to the concerned workmen whose name appeared in the Award dated 17.8.1997 passed by the Industrial Tribunal. 26. Now, at the time of deciding this Letters Patent Appeal, this Court is also required to consider as to whether the workmen are required to pay the amount as per the above referred calculation or not. It appears that no material is placed before us on behalf of the workmen to show that they were not gainfully employed during the intervening period. It appears that no material is placed before us on behalf of the workmen to show that they were not gainfully employed during the intervening period. Likewise, the management has also not produced any material to show that the workmen were gainfully employed during the intervening period, and therefore, we are of the view that since a gap of more than 20 years has been passed after the relievement of the workmen, in absence of any material with regard to gainful employment of the workmen, it would be just and proper to give a lumpsum compensation of Rs.1,08,000/-, in lieu of reinstatement, to each of the workman, which comes to 50 % of the above referred amount of compensation. 27. With the aforesaid observation, the order passed by the learned Single Judge deserves to be set aside and this Letters Patent Appeal is, hereby, partly allowed. The management is directed to pay a lumpsum amount of compensation of Rs.1,08,000/-(One Lakh Eight Thousand), in lieu of reinstatement, to each of the workman, within a period of two months from the date of receipt of the copy of the order of this Court.