Judgment : 1. Accused 3 and 4 in Crime No.102 of 2012 on the file of Madnoor Police Station, Nizamabad District assailed the order of the Judicial Magistrate of First Class, Bichkunda, Nizamabad District in Crl.M.P.No.1231 of 2013. 2. A case was registered initially against four accused including accused 3 and 4, who are the petitioners herein upon a complaint lodged by the 2nd respondent. The husband of the 2nd respondent allegedly was murdered by accused No.1 at the instigation of accused 3 and 4. After due investigation, Police deleted the names of accused 3 and 4 from the array of the accused and filed charge-sheet against accused 1 and 2 only. The 2nd respondent herein, who is the de facto complainant, questioned the charge-sheet through Crl.M.P.No.1231 of 2013 and prayed to include accused 3 and 4 also as accused. The learned Judicial Magistrate of First Class, Bichkunda allowed Crl.M.P.No.1231 of 2013 through orders dated 20-12-2013 and took cognizance of the case against accused 1 to 4. He ordered issuance of Non-Bailable Warrants (NBWs) against accused 3 and 4. Questioning the taking cognizance of the case against accused 3 and 4 by the Committal Court, the present petition is laid. 3. Sri D.Bhaskar Reddy, learned counsel for the petitioners, has taken me through the complaint, Section 161 Cr.P.C and Section 164 Cr.P.C statements of the 2nd respondent and other witnesses. Sri T.Pradyumna Kumar Reddy, learned counsel for the 2nd respondent, submitted that in a petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C., Court cannot evaluate the evidence. Detailed arguments were advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioners about the contradictions and omissions of the witnesses between their Section 161 Cr.P.C and Section 164 Cr.P.C statements. As submitted by the learned counsel for the 2nd respondent, I consider that the Court cannot go into the question about the merits of the evidence in a quash petition. 4. The learned counsel for the petitioners also submitted that no case is made out against the petitioners in any event. He pointed out that even according to the prosecution, accused 3 and 4 are alleged abettors and that no case of abetment is made out against them. He referred to RANGANAYAKI v. STATE( (2004) 12 SCC 521 ) where the Supreme Court had occasion to explain the ingredients of the abetment. He pointed out that even according to the prosecution, accused 3 and 4 are alleged abettors and that no case of abetment is made out against them. He referred to RANGANAYAKI v. STATE( (2004) 12 SCC 521 ) where the Supreme Court had occasion to explain the ingredients of the abetment. It was held that the intentional adding and active complicity are essential to constitute the offence under Section 109 IPC. It is submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioners that in the statements, the witnesses did not clearly speak about the specific complicity of the petitioners in the abetment of the murder of the deceased by accused No.1.I may venture to repeat that in a quash petition, it is not permissible to assess and evaluate the evidence, more so from Section 161 Cr.P.C and Section 164 Cr.P.C statements. In the complaint, the 2nd respondent stated that accused No.1 murdered her husband having been instigated by the petitioners herein. Whether such instigation is established or not is a matter of evidence which can be decided at the time of trial and not in a petition of this nature. 5. The learned counsel for the petitioners placed reliance upon Nagawwa v. Veeranna( AIR 1976 SC 1947 ), which was passed long before State of Haryana v. Ch.Bhajan Lal ( AIR 1992 SC 604 (1)), where the Supreme Court gave a list of circumstances in which it would be appropriate to quash a complaint or a charge-sheet. 5. The learned counsel for the petitioners placed reliance upon Nagawwa v. Veeranna( AIR 1976 SC 1947 ), which was passed long before State of Haryana v. Ch.Bhajan Lal ( AIR 1992 SC 604 (1)), where the Supreme Court gave a list of circumstances in which it would be appropriate to quash a complaint or a charge-sheet. However, in Nagawwa (2 supra) also, the Supreme Court noticed in para 5 as follows: “… … … Thus it may be safely held that in the following cases an order of the Magistrate issuing process against the accused can be quashed or set aside: (1) where the allegations made in the complaint or the statement of the witnesses recorded in support of the same taken at their face value make out absolutely no case against the accused or the complaint does not disclose the essential ingredients of an offence which is alleged against the accused; (2) where the allegations made in the complaint are potently absurd and inherently improbable so that no prudent person can ever reach a conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused; (3) where the discretion exercised by the Magistrate in issuing process is capricious and arbitrary having been based either on no evidence or on materials which are wholly irrelevant or inadmissible; and (4) where the complaint suffers from fundamental legal defects, such as, want of sanction, or absence of a complaint by legally competent authority and the like. The cases mentioned by us are purely illustrative and provide sufficient guidelines to indicate contingencies where the High Court can quash proceedings.” 6. Ch.Bhajan Lal (3 supra) holds the sway as on today. Nagawwa (2 supra) certainly is in consonance with Ch.Bhajan Lal (3 supra). I therefore may examine whether the present case falls within the ambit of the principles of Ch.Bhajan Lal (3 supra). Before going into this question, I may refer to other contentions of the learned counsel for the petitioners. 7. The learned counsel for the petitioners placed reliance upon Shakson Belthissor v. State of Kerala (2009(2) ALD (Crl.) 497 (SC)). In that case, the Supreme Court observed that FIR and charge-sheet can be quashed to prevent abuse of process of law when complaint or the charge-sheet did not disclose any evidence or when the complaint is found to be frivolous, vexatious or oppressive. In that case, the Supreme Court observed that FIR and charge-sheet can be quashed to prevent abuse of process of law when complaint or the charge-sheet did not disclose any evidence or when the complaint is found to be frivolous, vexatious or oppressive. In the present case, the complaint prima facie discloses the offence under Section 302 read with Section 109 IPC so far as the petitioners are concerned. It certainly cannot be considered to be frivolous or vexatious. 8. In ADALAT PRASAD v. ROOPLAL JINDAL ( (2004) 7 SCC 338 ), the Court held thus: “15. It is true that if a Magistrate takes cognizance of an offence, issues process without there being any allegation against the accused or any material implicating the accused or in contravention of provisions of Sections 200 and 202, the order of the Magistrate may be vitiated, but then the relief an aggrieved accused can obtain at that stage is not by invoking Section 203 of the Code because the Criminal Procedure Code does not contemplate a review of an order. Hence in the absence of any review power or inherent power with the subordinate criminal courts, the remedy lies in invoking Section 482 of the Code.” In the present case, however, where the Court found prima facie case on the complaint of the 2nd respondent and brought the petitioners on record as accused 3 and 4, the question of invoking Section 482 Cr.P.C does not arise. 9. In Ch.Bhajan Lal (3 supra), it was noticed in para 108: “................................................................................... 1. Where the allegations made in the First Information Report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. 2. Where the allegations in the First Information Report and other materials, if any, accompanying the F. I. R. do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code. 3. Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused. 4. 3. Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused. 4. Where, the allegations in the F.I.R. do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code. 5. Where the allegations made in the F.I.R. or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. 6. Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party. 7. Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge.” As rightly submitted by the learned counsel for the 2nd respondent, I do not see how the petitioners fit themselves in any of the circumstances enumerated by the Supreme Court. 10. The learned counsel for the 2nd respondent submitted that Police have no authority to delete the names of any of the accused but has to report the case to the Court for the Court to take a decision whether to delete the names of any of the accused while cognizance of the case is taken. In KOTLA HARI CHAKRAPANI REDDY v. STATE OF A.P. (2013(1) ALT (Crl.) 17 (A.P.)), a learned Single Judge of this Court held that no Police Officer could unilaterally delete or direct deletion of the names of the accused and that it would be for the Court to decide whether to delete or to continue the case against any of the accused. 11. In MOTI LAL SONGARA v. PREM PRAKASH ( (2013) 9 SCC 199 ), the view of UMA SHANKAR SINGH v. STATE OF BIHAR [ (2010) 9 SCC 479 ] was approved by the Court. 11. In MOTI LAL SONGARA v. PREM PRAKASH ( (2013) 9 SCC 199 ), the view of UMA SHANKAR SINGH v. STATE OF BIHAR [ (2010) 9 SCC 479 ] was approved by the Court. In UMA SHANKAR SINGH v. STATE OF BIHAR, the Court held that even if the Investigating Authority was of the view that no case was made out against the accused, the Magistrate could apply his mind independently and could take cognizance thereupon in exercise of his powers under Section 190(1)(b) Cr.P.C. 12. Consequently, the petitioners cannot contend that the learned Committal Magistrate has no powers to include the petitioners herein as accused 3 and 4 while cognizance of the case was taken by him. The order of the learned Magistrate which is assailed is thus justified and does not require any interference. There are no merits in this petition. This criminal petition therefore is dismissed. The miscellaneous petitions, if any, pending in this petition shall stand closed.