JUDGMENT S.H. VORA, J. 1. Challenge in this appeal is the order dated 14.05.2007 passed by the learned Chamber Judge, City Civil Court, Court No. 5, Ahmedabad below Notice of Motion Exh.6 in Civil Suit No. 875 of 2007 whereby, the learned Chamber Judge granted relief in terms of para 19(a) during pendency of the suit whereby, the defendants-appellants herein were restrained from appointing and/or issuing Letter of Intent (for short, L.O.I.) to candidate at Sr. No. 3 in the select list prepared by the Dealer Selection Committee and/or other candidate selected by the other Selection Committee which are below the plaintiff’s rank as Dealer of LPG, Ahmedabad-2 (Urban) Region. 2. The parties to the present proceedings would be referred to as per their original status in the plaint for convenience. 3. Filtering unnecessary details, it is not in dispute that the defendants had invited applications from eligible candidates for appointment of Bharat Gas Distributors under various categories for L.P.G. at specified location by issuing public notice on 08.04.2006. The selection for appointment of L.P.G. Distributors was to be made as per the guidelines issued by the Bharat Petroleum Corporation and approved by the Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Gas, Government of India. The said public notice contains all required details including norms for evaluating the candidates, results of interview, Grievance Redressal System etc. Admittedly, the plaintiff was issued call letter for L.P.G. Distributor for Navrangpura, Ahmedabad along with other eligible candidates for appearing in interview scheduled on 17/18.08.2006 before the Selection Committee of the defendants. Admittedly, the Selection Committee announced result of the interview finding three candidates in order of merits as successful candidates and accordingly, Mr. Pinakin R. Patel was at Sr. No. 1, plaintiff at Sr. No. 2 and one Mrs. Saloni Surawala was at Rs. No. 3. After recommendation of the Selection Committee, the defendants had to conduct Field Investigation Report (for short, the F.I.R.) for the first candidate in the merit list and if found eligible, then, L.O.I. was required to be issued and if the first candidate was not found suitable or failed to fulfill the terms and conditions of the award of distributorship, then, the distributorship would be offered to the second candidate in the merit list. Admittedly, the first candidate, though issued L.O.I. could not complete the required infrastructure as per the defendants’ case and, therefore, L.O.I. was withdrawn. Admittedly, the first candidate, though issued L.O.I. could not complete the required infrastructure as per the defendants’ case and, therefore, L.O.I. was withdrawn. As the plaintiff was candidate at Sr. No. 2, F.I.R. was conducted. According to the plaintiff’s case, the officers of defendants visited the place of plaintiff for F.I.R. in the last week of March, 2007 and the plaintiff had to make necessary arrangement for suitable godown for L.P.G. storage and showroom which he was required to arrange as mentioned in his application form. As the plaintiff did not receive L.O.I. and upon inquiry, it was learnt by the plaintiff that the defendants were contemplating to consider the case of the third candidate bypassing the rights of the plaintiff, the plaintiff filed the present suit. 4. Per contra, it is the case of the defendants before the trial Court that the defendants followed the procedure and guidelines for appointment of L.P.G. Distributors. They have stated in para 8 of the reply at Exh.20 that “the plaintiff has expressed apprehension merely on the basis of alleged hearsay talks and not placed on record anything to show that in all probability, he is disqualified for the subject distributorship.” Thereafter, the decision contained in letter dated 05.04.2007, not finding the plaintiff suitable, was placed on record before the trial Court on 11.05.2007 by the defendants along with the further affidavit at Exh.26 without mentioning any thing therein about the said decision dated 05.04.2007. 5. Before the submissions made at bar are considered, it is necessary to reproduce the observations made by the learned trial Judge in paras 2 and 3 of the impugned order, which read as under:- “2. The Court, by order dated 19.04.2007, had issued the notice making it returnable on 24.04.2007 and had granted ad interim injunction directing the defendants to maintain status quo as regards issuance of letter of intent (hereinafter referred to as LOI) in respect of L.P.G. Distributorship, till the returnable date. Thereafter, the defendants filed affidavit-in-reply at Exh.20 on 02.05.2007 and the plaintiff filed affidavit-in-rejoinder at Exh.23 on 07.05.2007. When the matter was heard on 08.05.2007, the learned advocate Mrs. Minu Shah for Mr. Thereafter, the defendants filed affidavit-in-reply at Exh.20 on 02.05.2007 and the plaintiff filed affidavit-in-rejoinder at Exh.23 on 07.05.2007. When the matter was heard on 08.05.2007, the learned advocate Mrs. Minu Shah for Mr. H.S. Shah for the defendants stated before the Court that the case of the plaintiff was under consideration and that she was not aware whether any final decision in respect of the plaintiff’s case was taken or not by the defendants after the Field Verification Report, and hence, the Court passed the following order:- “Heard Ld. Advocates for the parties. It appears and is not disputed by the defendants that the case of the plaintiff is under consideration before the defendant corporation on the FIR conducted in March, 2007 and that the final decision has yet not been taken. Hence, the matter is kept on 11.5.2007 to ascertain whether any final decision in case of the plaintiff has been taken by the defendants or not.” 3. On 11.05.2007, when the matter was listed for further hearing, Mrs. Shah for the defendants submitted further affidavit on behalf of the defendants at Exh.26 and also produced along with other documents, a letter dated 5th April 2005 of Mr. V.N. Rao, Regional L.P.G. Manager (West) containing the decision taken in respect of the plaintiff’s case. In the said letter dated 5th April 2007, it has been stated, inter alia, that since second empanelled candidate Mr. Pramodrai U. Malkan is not meeting requirement of providing suitable infrastructure for setting up distributorship, kindly conduct an F.I.R. on rd the empanelled candidate i.e. Ms. Saloni T. Surawala. It may be noted that from the affidavit-in-reply filed on 02.05.2007 by one Shri R.V. Deshmukh, Territory Manager, (L.P.G.) of the defendants and from the submissions made by the learned advocate for the defendants on 08.05.2007, the Court had gathered the impression that the case of the plaintiff was under consideration and no final decision was taken, the Court was surprised by the decision contained in the letter dated 05.04.2007, produced on record by the defendants along with the further affidavit filed on 11.05.2007 as to why the said decision taken in the month of April, 2007 was not disclosed in the affidavit in reply filed on 02.05.2007. However, there was no explanation much less satisfactory explanation submitted on behalf of the defendants and hence the Notice of Motion was heard at length on 11.05.2007. 6. However, there was no explanation much less satisfactory explanation submitted on behalf of the defendants and hence the Notice of Motion was heard at length on 11.05.2007. 6. Learned advocate Ms. Minoo Shah appearing for the defendants placed heavy reliance on the following decisions and case laws:- (i) Swapan Kumar Pal vs. Achintya Kumar Nayak and Others, (2008) 1 SCC 379 (ii) Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. vs. Sriman Narayan and Another, 2002 (2) Arb. L.R. 619 (SC) (iii) Dalpat Abasaheb Solunke vs. Dr. B.S. Mahajan, AIR 1990 SC 434 (iv) Mr. Devangbhai M. Bhatt vs. Hindustan Petroleum Corporation, Civil Suit No. 1366 of 2002 (v) Air India Ltd. vs. Cochin International Airport Ltd. and Others, (2000) 2 SCC 617 (vi) Union of India and Another vs. N. Chandrasekharan and Others, (1998) 3 SCC 694 (vii) BALCO Employees Union (Regd.) vs. Union of India and Others, AIR 2002 SC 350 (viii) M. Gurudas and Others vs. Rasaranjan and Others, (2006) 8 SCC 367 (ix) Suneeta Aggarwal vs. State of Haryana and Others, (2000) 2 SCC 615 7. Thus, learned advocate Ms. Shah submitted that the award of contract is essentially a commercial transaction and the State or the public body can choose its own method to arrive at a decision and, therefore, it is not open to the judicial scrutiny. According to her, the defendants have to examine the location viability and take commercial decision and the defendants cannot be compelled to enter into agreement with the party against their wishes or interests. It is vehemently argued by her that as per the F.I.R. conducted, the plaintiff was not holding any land/property/godown nor had made any firm offer and, therefore, the concerned authority, relying upon the F.I.R., took decision on 05.04.2007 that the plaintiff did not meet with the requirements of providing suitable infrastructure for setting up distributorship and, therefore, the third candidate was considered. At the end, learned advocate Ms. Shah urged that the present appeal may be accepted and the impugned order may be quashed and set aside. 8. Per contra, learned advocate Mr. J.F. Mehta for the plaintiff submitted that the decision dated 05.04.2007 smacks of mala fide intention on the part of the defendants to unduly favour the next candidate bypassing the plaintiff’s rights. Shah urged that the present appeal may be accepted and the impugned order may be quashed and set aside. 8. Per contra, learned advocate Mr. J.F. Mehta for the plaintiff submitted that the decision dated 05.04.2007 smacks of mala fide intention on the part of the defendants to unduly favour the next candidate bypassing the plaintiff’s rights. According to him, the defendants, being public body and public sector undertaking, are expected to function in fair and transparent manner and not in arbitrary and unreasonable manner even in their commercial activities as per the observations made by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Air India Limited (supra). Therefore, learned advocate Mr. Mehta submitted to dismiss the present appeal as no perversity or illegality in the findings recorded by the learned trial Judge in the impugned order has been shown or pointed out by learned advocate Ms. Shah for the defendants. 9. It is required to be kept in mind that the present Appeal from Order is filed under the provisions of Order 43 Rule 1(r) of the Code and challenge in this appeal is a discretionary order passed by the learned trial Judge under the provisions of Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 of the Code. In case of Matrix Telecom Pvt. Ltd. vs. Matrix Cellular Services Pvt. Ltd. 2011 (3) GLR 1951 , this Court, in paras 6 and 6.1, observed as under:- “6. Before proceeding further it is required to be noted that the present appeal is against the rejection of interim relief and the main suit is still pending. If this court elaborately deals with the matter on merits it is likely that the same would prejudice the case of either side. Therefore, it is well settled law that this Court is not required to go into the merits of the entire matter at this stage and what is required to be seen is whether the appellant-plaintiff has made out a prima facie case or not for grant of interim injunction. 6.1. Therefore, it is well settled law that this Court is not required to go into the merits of the entire matter at this stage and what is required to be seen is whether the appellant-plaintiff has made out a prima facie case or not for grant of interim injunction. 6.1. It is required to be noted that it is well settled law that the Appellate Court may not interfere with the exercise of discretion of the court of first instance and substitute its own discretion except where the discretion has been shown to have been exercised arbitrarily, or capriciously or perversely or where the court had ignored the settled principles of law regulating grant or refusal of interlocutory injunctions. An appeal against exercise of discretion is said to be an appeal on principle. The Appellate Court will not reassess the material and seek to reach a conclusion different from the one reached by the court below if the one reached by the court was reasonably possible on the material. The appellate court would normally not be justified in interfering with the exercise of discretion under appeal solely on the ground that if it had considered the matter at the trial stage it would have come to a contrary conclusion.” 10. Similarly, in the case of Wonder Ltd. and Another vs. Antox India Pvt. Ltd. 1990 (Supp.) SCC 727, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 9 of the said decision, after considering the scope of Order 43 Rule 1(r) of the Code in an appeal wherein, the discretionary order passed by the learned trial Court is under challenge, observed as under:- “9. Usually, the prayer for grant of an interlocutory injunction is at a stage when the existence of the legal right asserted by the plaintiff and its alleged violation are both contested and uncertain and remain uncertain till they are established at the trial on evidence. The court, at this stage, acts on certain well settled principles of administration of this form of interlocutory remedy which is both temporary and discretionary. The object of the interlocutory injunction, it is stated “Is to protect the plaintiff against injury by violation of his rights for which he could not adequately be compensated in damages recoverable in the action if the uncertainty were resolved in his favour at the trial. The object of the interlocutory injunction, it is stated “Is to protect the plaintiff against injury by violation of his rights for which he could not adequately be compensated in damages recoverable in the action if the uncertainty were resolved in his favour at the trial. The need for such protection must be weighed against the corresponding need of the defendant to be protected against injury resulting from his having been prevented from exercising his own legal rights for which he could not be adequately compensated. The court must weigh one need against another and determine where the "balance of convenience lies.” The interlocutory remedy is intended to preserve in status quo, the rights of parties which may appear on a prima facie. The court also, in restraining a defendant from exercising what he considers his legal right but what the plaintiff would like to be prevented, puts into the scales, as a relevant consideration whether the defendant has yet to commence his enterprise or whether he has already been doing so in which latter case considerations somewhat different from those that apply to a case where the defendant is yet to commence his enterprise, are attracted.” 11. So, in light of the limited powers of this Court, the Appellate Court can interfere with the discretionary order passed by the trial Court only in exceptional circumstances and the Appellate Court cannot interfere with the exercise of discretion of the Court of first instance and substitute its own discretion except, where the discretion has been shown to have been exercised arbitrarily, capriciously or perversely or where the Court had ignored the settled principles of law regulating grant or refusal of interlocutory injunctions. In nutshell, an appeal against exercise of discretion is said to be an appeal on principle. To put it differently, the Appellate Court cannot reassess the entire evidence so as to come to its own conclusion contrary to the conclusion arrived at by the trial Court, if two views are possible. 12. Learned advocate Ms. Shah could not satisfy the Court as to why the defendants suppressed the decision dated 05.04.2007 in their reply filed at Exh.20 on 02.05.2007. 12. Learned advocate Ms. Shah could not satisfy the Court as to why the defendants suppressed the decision dated 05.04.2007 in their reply filed at Exh.20 on 02.05.2007. Not only that, she could not explain the reasons as to why in the further affidavit Exh.26 dated 10.05.2007 filed before the trial Court, there is not a whisper of the said decision and copy of the said decision was merely annexed without making any reference thereof in the further affidavit. The learned trial Judge has rightly found that the plaintiff’s apprehension at the time of filing of the suit that the defendants, without following due process of law and principles of natural justice, were contemplating the case of the third candidate bypassing the rights of the plaintiff was justified by the defendants themselves during the course of hearing of Notice of Motion and the same is eloquent from the conduct of the defendants as observed by the learned trial Judge as reproduced in the form of paras 2 and 3, as aforesaid. 13. Learned advocate Ms. Shah ventilated grievance that the learned trial Judge could not interfere with the said decision dated 05.04.2007 and she emphasized that the plaintiff, if at all, had any grievance against the selection, he could have approached the grievance redressal system as mentioned in Clause 18 of the said public notice given in the newspaper and as per the guidelines issued by the defendants. This submission, though looks attractive, but without any substance because the plaintiff was never conveyed with the decision taken by the defendants of not finding him suitable for the distributorship. As noted hereinabove, the said decision was produced for the first time without any justification along with the further affidavit at Exh.26. In fact, the defendants were playing hide and seek game with the trial Court and, therefore, the plaintiff cannot be expected to approach the grievance redressal forum as the defendants have not acted in fair and transparent manner in implementing the procedure and guidelines in its true letter and spirit. 14. Learned advocate Ms. In fact, the defendants were playing hide and seek game with the trial Court and, therefore, the plaintiff cannot be expected to approach the grievance redressal forum as the defendants have not acted in fair and transparent manner in implementing the procedure and guidelines in its true letter and spirit. 14. Learned advocate Ms. Shah placed reliance on the various case laws cited at bar, as aforesaid, and also in the case of Air India Limited (supra) wherein, the Hon'ble Apex Court held as under:- "But the State, its corporations, instrumentalities and agencies are bound to adhere to the norms, standards and procedures laid down by them and cannot depart from them arbitrarily. Though that decision is not amenable to judicial review, the court can examine the decision making process and interfere if it is found vitiated by mala fides, unreasonableness and arbitrariness. The State, its corporations, instrumentalities and agencies have the public duty to be fair to all concerned.” 15. So, looking to the facts and circumstances of the case, it appears that the plaintiff has no grievance so far as his selection at Sr. No. 2 was concerned or selection of other candidates either at Sr. No. 1 or Sr. No. 3 was concerned. The plaintiff raised grievance only when though he was found suitable as per merit list at Sr. No. 2 but he was not issued L.O.I. after conducting F.I.R. and secondly, the decision dated 05.04.2007 was not conveyed to the plaintiff at all and even if the said decision would have been conveyed to the plaintiff, the grievance redressal forum would have no authority to look into the matter as regards the decision taken after conducting F.I.R. 16. Now coming to the decision dated 05.04.2007, it has been stated therein that the second empanelled candidate Mr. Pramodrai U. Malkan is not meeting our requirements of providing suitable infrastructure for setting up the distributorship. According to the defendants' case, the purpose of F.I.R. is to ensure that the statements made in the application are correct or not. It is not the case of the defendants in the reply that the plaintiff has made any incorrect statement in the application. On the contrary, the plaintiff has categorically stated that he did not have his own godown or showroom and, therefore, he has not given firm offer. It is not the case of the defendants in the reply that the plaintiff has made any incorrect statement in the application. On the contrary, the plaintiff has categorically stated that he did not have his own godown or showroom and, therefore, he has not given firm offer. Needless to say that the terms "own" and "firm offers" are defined in Clause 13 of the public advertisement and the plaintiff has stated that he “can arrange" for the same. It requires to be noted that as per allocation of marks, indicated in Clause 13, those applicants, who owned suitable land or godown for L.P.G. storage, were entitled to 25 marks, the applicants, who had given firm offer, were entitled to 18 marks and the applicants, who had stated that "can arrange for the same" were entitled to 10 marks. Similar is the mark system for showroom and for other various criteria. So, on the basis of marks obtained by the various candidates, the plaintiff was selected as second candidate in the merits list. Under the circumstances, the learned trial Judge has rightly found that there was no discretion left with the defendants but to award distributorship to the plaintiff unless, F.I.R. suggested that the plaintiff has not stated correct facts in the application form or that there was any complaint pending against the plaintiff. The defendants have not come out with any such case and also the said decision dated 05.04.2007 does not contain any reason nor the defendants have given any opportunity of hearing to the plaintiff nor have given opportunity of making arrangement for suitable godown or showroom as per requirements of the defendants. Thus, the learned trial Judge has rightly found that the said decision smacks of mala fide intention on the part of the defendants to give undue favour to the next candidate bypassing the rights of the plaintiff. 17. Under the circumstances, no case is made out to interfere with the findings recorded by the learned trial Judge as the learned trial Judge has rightly appreciated the facts of the case and ultimately, found existence of all required ingredients in favour of the plaintiff. 18. 17. Under the circumstances, no case is made out to interfere with the findings recorded by the learned trial Judge as the learned trial Judge has rightly appreciated the facts of the case and ultimately, found existence of all required ingredients in favour of the plaintiff. 18. While parting with the order, it is clarified that this Court has examined the impugned order passed by the learned trial Judge within the limited scope of provisions of Order 43 Rule 1(r) of the Code, whereas the main controversy involved in the suit is at large before the trial Court to be adjudicated through full-fledge trial. Therefore, the learned trial Judge shall not be influenced by any observations recorded in the impugned order and observations recorded by this Court hereinabove while deciding the suit at the end of trial. The findings recorded either by the trial Court or by this Court at interlocutory stage of the suit are tentative in its nature and the learned trial Judge shall decide the case on its merit and as per evidence that may be led during the course of trial and in accordance with law. 19. In view of the above, the present Appeal from Order is hereby dismissed. Further Order Upon pronouncement of the judgment today, learned advocate Ms. Shah for the defendants requests to continue interim relief granted by this Court for a period of six weeks so as to approach before the High Forum, if advised. Request is rejected.