ORDER 1. In this Appeal the appellant has prayed for setting aside the order/judgment dated 17.5.2006 passed by the learned Single Judge in C.W.J.C. No. 180 of 1998 (R) whereby the award passed on 7.8.1997 by the Central Industrial Tribunal No. 1, Dhanbad in Reference Case No. 183 of 1989 has been set aside. 2. THE BRIEF FACTS OF THE CASE ARE AS UNDER (i) That, the workmen were engaged for supplying drinking water in the residence of the employees and office of the management on piece rate basis, due to water scarcity in absence of adequate water supply system. (ii) That, the concerned workmen used to bring water from the taps and wells and other reservoirs on Bhar of two tins at a time with the help of bamboo and they were employed by the management to supply water to the workers and staff and also to the officers' quarters, offices, mines and at other places of mining operations. (iii) That, in the Kuju area of the management particularly in Arra and Sarubera Collieries, there was no adequate water supply system and supply of water to the workers/staff, office and mines and carrying mining operations were maintained by engaging mazdoors commonly known as Water Carriers. (iv) That, the workmen have worked continuously and uninterruptedly for a period of more than 8 years as water carriers by the management by water container supplied to them by the management to fetch water from wells and taps and to supply the same in the quarters of the staff and officers and also in the offices of the Mines. Their work was also supervised by the staff of the management and record was maintained and number of Bhars of water supplied to each and every quarter was recorded and payment was made on monthly basis to the individual workmen for the total number of Bhar of water supplied by them after due verification and checking by the management and this payment of wages was made to the workmen without involving any third party. As such, it is said that the concerned workmen were employed by the management and engaged as water carriers that was in the clear knowledge of the management and the rate of payment made to the workmen were 0.37 P. Per Bhar was very low compared to the wages paid to the permanent workmen as under Category-I. (v) The workmen requested the management to regularize their services as they were continuously rendering services for considerable long period. But the management did not pay any attention to their demand. Therefore, the dispute arose between the management and the workmen for the regularization of 125 workmen. Thereafter, the matter was referred to the Industrial Tribunal for adjudication, on the following issues:- "Whether the action of the management of Kuju Area of C.C.L., P.O. Kuju, District – Hazaribagh by not making payment of wages and other benefits (including regularisation) as per NCWA-III to S/Shri Raghunandan Mahto and 124 other workmen as mentioned in annexure is legal and justified? If not, to what relief the concerned workmen are entitled?" 3. Learned counsel Mr. Dilip Kumar Prasad appearing on behalf of the appellant Union of workmen, referring to the award passed by the learned Tribunal, has submitted as under:- (i) That the Tribunal has recorded the findings in favour of the Union after appraisal of the evidence laid by union and management. (ii) That the learned Single Judge has not properly appreciated the evidence adduced before the learned Industrial Tribunal and therefore, the said order passed by the learned Single Judge is liable to be set aside as findings of facts recorded by the Industrial Tribunal on the basis of cogent evidence were not properly considered and appreciated. (iii) That the findings of facts cannot be interfered in exercise of writ jurisdiction unless there are apparent error or perversity or illegality in the award. The learned Single Judge has failed to appreciate these proposition of law. (iv) That the learned Single Judge has not properly considered the findings of the Tribunal with respect of the nature of work and the motive of the management for engaging the workmen. (v) That the learned Single Judge has misconstrued the findings of fact recorded by the industrial court which are based on evidence on record and not appreciated the award while rejecting the same without any reasonable explanation. (v) That the learned Single Judge has misconstrued the findings of fact recorded by the industrial court which are based on evidence on record and not appreciated the award while rejecting the same without any reasonable explanation. (vi) That the learned Single Judge has erred in allowing the petition and setting aside the award on the consideration of the case of Steel Authority of India Ltd. vs. National Union Waterfront Workers, (2001) 7 SCC 1 . 4. The learned counsel for the appellant alternatively submitted that in lieu of reinstatement and back wages compensation can also be fixed and awarded on the basis of length of service rendered by each of the workman and last drawn wages. In this context, the learned counsel for the appellant has referred to and relied upon the decision of the Division Bench of this Court in L.P.A. No.299 of 2004. In this case the Division Bench of this Court has held that reinstatement is not necessary order in all the cases. The compensation can be granted in lieu of the reinstatement, as held in the case of Employers in relation to the Management of Kuju Pundi Project of M/s. CCL vs. Their Workmen, 2012 (2) JCR 156 (Jhr). The decision of the L.P.A. was affirmed with some modifications in regard to the enhancement of the compensation in Civil Appeal No. 1089 of 2013, dated 8.2.2013, by the Hon'ble Supreme Court. 5. Learned counsel for the respondent/ management mainly made the following submissions:- (i) That the concerned workmen were absolutely strangers and at no point of time there was relationship of employer and employee between the management. (ii) That the management had made arrangement for supply of water to the residential area and collonies. (iii) That few suppliers of water came forward to the management to bring water from the wells and to supply the same for drinking purpose for the staff and office and they are basically and essentially suppliers of well water like any other suppliers of materials or goods and for this supply of water rate was fixed and accordingly they were paid depending upon the number of bhars supplied by them. Such suppliers themselves engaged workmen from time to time and the management are not at all concerned for such engagement of workmen and this work did not last for more than 2 hours a day and the water supply system also changed from time to time. (iv) That supplier supplying materials or goods to the company would claim employment under the third pay and not with management and such claims cannot be entertained. 6. It is further submitted that the judgment and the order passed by the learned Single Judge does not require any interference as the same has been delivered after a careful consideration of the facts and the evidences on record as also the prevailing position of law in the light of the judgment delivered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India. It is further submitted that the award passed by the Tribunal was based upon the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court, rendered in case of Air India Staturory Corporation vs. United Labour Union, (1997) 9 SCC 377 , which has been overruled by the Constitution Bench judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Steel Authority of India (SAIL) Ltd. vs. National Union Waterfront workers, (2001) 7 SCC 1 . The learned counsel for the respondent has further submitted that the learned Single Judge while allowing the writ petition has held that the appellants have miserably failed to establish violation of Section 25F of the I.D. Act. Therefore, applying the law laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Range Forest Officer vs. S.T. Hadimani, (2002) 3 SCC 25 , the entire case of the union has been demolished. 7. Now, the above mentioned submissions are required to be considered and analyzed keeping in view certain crucial materials and evidences adduced before the learned Tribunal. The findings of facts recorded by the learned Tribunal are very much vital for the purpose of deciding as to whether the demand of the sponsoring unions and the workmen for their regularization and departmentalization as regular worker is justified or not. FINDINGS OF THE TRIBUNAL ON SCRUTINY OF THE EVIDENCES (i) The ld. Tribunal scrutinized the evidences of M.W.'s 1to 4 and W.W.-1 and 2 (Management witness and workman witnesses as well ) documentary evidence i.e. M.1 to M-1/23, Water supply bills, M.2 series Carbon copy of letter given in the name of contractors; Ext. FINDINGS OF THE TRIBUNAL ON SCRUTINY OF THE EVIDENCES (i) The ld. Tribunal scrutinized the evidences of M.W.'s 1to 4 and W.W.-1 and 2 (Management witness and workman witnesses as well ) documentary evidence i.e. M.1 to M-1/23, Water supply bills, M.2 series Carbon copy of letter given in the name of contractors; Ext. M.3 series, petition filed by the workmen for supply of water; Ext.5 and M-6 series the bills of different period 1984-1990 and Ext.W/1 to W-1/2 Water Supply Register signed by quarter occupants since 1983 to 1990; Ext.W/2 photocopy of Stamp Account Book by which the payment was made by the management. (ii) The learned Tribunal on appraisal of deposition of M.W.-1, Prabhakar Singh, Asstt. Inspector of Works of Arra Colliery working since 1973 and he is on the present post from the year 1982 found that workers were working for supply of water. Ext. M1 bearing the signature of Engineer of Colliery from which it was clear that water was supplied through BHARS to the Office Rest Room, Club Canteen and bills were prepared by Nishi Kant Bhagat for payment. M.W.1 further admitted in cross examination that invitation of tender was not advertised and upto 1986 there was no such tender committee to consider the tender supplied by the suppliers. (iii) The M.W.-2 Nalini Ranjan Chatterjee, Ofice Supdt., Area Office, Kuju, stated that earlier water was supplied to the colony through motor pump but now from deep boring. He had never worked in personnel department at G.M.'s office, therefore, his evidence is not reliable one as he was not having any concern with the duties of the workmen in the office of the company in his official capacity. (iv) The learned Tribunal scrutinised the evidence of M.W.-3, Md. A. Haque, Attendance Clerk of Saruberra Colliery who stated that the contractors were engaged for supply of water. Ext.M-6 series reveals that payment of bills were made through account section but in the name of alleged contractors. (v) The learned Tribunal also found from their evidence that Head Clerk used to look after the water supply. (vi) M.W.-4, A.K. Sharma, senior Overseer of Saruberra Colliery, admit his signature over Ext. W-2 which is Payment Register. M.W.-4 also admitted that no work order was issued to the contractor. He also admitted that water carriers supplied the water for 2 to 4 years. (vi) M.W.-4, A.K. Sharma, senior Overseer of Saruberra Colliery, admit his signature over Ext. W-2 which is Payment Register. M.W.-4 also admitted that no work order was issued to the contractor. He also admitted that water carriers supplied the water for 2 to 4 years. (vii) The learned Tribunal also scrutinised the evidence of W.W. 1 & 2 who deposed that they have worked for more than 240 days. They also deposed that payment of wages was made on the basis of working days and number of Bhars and the rate was Rs.0.37P. Per Bhar. W.W.-1, who is Baleshwar Prasad, working in Saruberra Colliery since March, 1991, admitted his signature over Ext.-M5 and M-6 series which were the receipt of payment of bills as Head workman. (viii) The learned Tribunal while discussing the evidence of W.W.-2, who is Area President of United coal Workers Union of Kuju Area stated that the workmen have worked from 1981 to 1987 as water carrier under Cat.-I of the Wage Board Agreement but were not paid wages of Cat.I. It is also stated that during conciliation proceedings workmen were asked by the management to stop the work. He has also stated that total 125 such workmen who were working are the party to the reference. But in cross examination, he stated that there has been no appointment letter, I.D. Card, Wage Sheet, P.F. Account. However, this witness has specifically denied that the workers were working under the contractor for supply of water. He has further stated that system engaging water carrier is still operative and functional under the different area of the management. In the year 1986, water carrier system was stopped in Sarubera Colliery and in 1991 at Arra Colliery. 8. The learned Tribunal decided the Reference in favour of the workmen in Category-1 with 40% of full backwages and other benefits w.e.f. 1.10.1988 and directed to implement it within two months from the publication of award. Learned Tribunal on considering the oral and documentary evidence found that the concerned workmen have worked for about 10 (ten) years with management and have completed more than 240 days in 12 calendar months for year together and thereafter they have been stopped from work from May, 1991 or in some cases from June, 1986. 9. Learned Tribunal on considering the oral and documentary evidence found that the concerned workmen have worked for about 10 (ten) years with management and have completed more than 240 days in 12 calendar months for year together and thereafter they have been stopped from work from May, 1991 or in some cases from June, 1986. 9. Accordingly, learned Tribunal found that the payment was made individually to the workmen and bills and vouchers were prepared in the name of 4/5 persons describing them as contractors but from Ext.W-1 series and Ext.W-2 filed by the workmen it is clear that these registers were signed by the occupant of the quarters where water was supplied by the workmen and on the bais of the bills and registers and after calculating the number of bhars water supplied by the workmen and accordingly payment was made to them by the management itself. The plea of the management that they were contractors' workers and bills and vouchers were prepared in the name of such contractors vide Ext.W-1 to W-3 series and that it was simply paper arrangement made by the management which is sham and camouflage to deprive the workmen from their genuine demand and regularization. Accordingly, learned Tribunal held that the action of the management in not paying the full wages to the workmen and not regularizing them cannot be said to be valid and justified. 10. Aggrieved by the order of the Industrial Tribunal, the management challenged the award before the learned Single Bench of this High Court in C.W.J.C. No. 180 of 1998 (R). Learned Single Judge set aside the impugned award of Learned Tribunal and allowed the writ petition of the management. Learned Single Judge held, that, there was no employer-employee relationship and the union failed to prove that the concerned workmen worked for 240 days in a year, especially, when the same was denied and disputed by the management. 11. Learned Single Judge also held that there was no notification under Section 10(1) of the Contract Labour Act prohibiting employment of contract labour for supply of water and in absence thereof, the finding of the tribunal that employment of contractors was camouflage is wholly untenable. 12. 11. Learned Single Judge also held that there was no notification under Section 10(1) of the Contract Labour Act prohibiting employment of contract labour for supply of water and in absence thereof, the finding of the tribunal that employment of contractors was camouflage is wholly untenable. 12. From perusal of the above referred oral as well as documentary evidence, which was adduced before the Tribunal on behalf of the workmen as well as management, it appears that the Tribunal after careful examination and scrutiny of the said evidence, adduced on behalf of the management as well as workmen, reached to the conclusion that the payments of bills were made through the Accounts Section of the company. The above refered findings of fact recorded by the Tribunal are based on oral as well as documentary evidence as discussed in Paras 15 to 24 of the Judgment. On perusal of the same, at no stretch of imagination, it can be said that the said findings are perverse. Therefore, the findings of fact recorded by the Tribunal in its award are not required to be disturbed in a writ jurisdiction. It appears that the learned Single Judge has not properly appreciated and considered this aspect. 13. In this context, the decision rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court, rendered in the case of International Airport Authority of India vs. International Air Cargo Workers' Union, (2009) 13 SCC 374 is applicable in the facts and circumstances of the present case. In this regard, for appreciation of the matter, para 47 and 48 of the said decision here quoted herein-below: "47. It is true that in exercising the writ jurisdiction, the High Court cannot sit in appeal over the findings and award of the Industrial Tribunal and therefore, cannot re-appreciate evidence. The findings of fact recorded by a fact-finding authority should ordinarily be considered as final. The findings of the Tribunal should not be interfered with in writ jurisdiction merely on the ground that the material on which the Tribunal had acted was insufficient or not credible. 48. It is also true that as long as the findings of fact are based on some materials which are relevant, findings may not be interfered with merely because another view is also possible. 48. It is also true that as long as the findings of fact are based on some materials which are relevant, findings may not be interfered with merely because another view is also possible. But where the Tribunal records findings on no evidence or irrelevant evidence, it is certainly open to the High Court to interfere with the award of the Industrial Tribunal." 14. The Hon'ble Supreme Court of India, while considering the various provisions of Contract Labour (Regulation & Abolition) Act, 1970, in the case of Steel Authority of India Ltd. vs. National Union Waterfront Workers, gave a landmark decision, which has been reported in (2001) 7 SCC 1 , held, as under:- "The history of exploitation of labour is as old as the history of civilization itself. There has been an ongoing struggle by labourers and their organizations against such exploitation but it continues in one form or the other. The Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 is an important legislation in the direction of attaining fair treatment to labour and industrial peace which are the sine qua non for sustained economic growth of any country." 15. The observations made by the Hon'ble Apex Court, in Para Nos. 8 and 9 of the aforesaid decision, are relevant and requires to be considered in the present case, which is reproduced herein-below: "8. Before taking up these points, it needs to be noticed that the history of exploitation of labour is as old as the history of civilisation itself. There are been an ongoing struggle by labourers and their organisations against such exploitation but it continues in one form or the other. The Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 is an important legislation in the direction of attaining fair treatment to labour and industrial peace which are the sine qua non for sustained economic growth of any country. The best description of that Act is given by Krishna Iyer, J., speaking for a three Judge Bench of this Court in LIC of India vs. D.J. Bahadur thus: (SCC p.334, para 22) "22. The Industrial Disputes Act is a benign measure which seeks to pre-empt industrial tensions, provide the meahanics of dispute resolutions and set up the necessary infrastructure so that the energies of partners in production may not be dissipated in counterproductive battles and assurance of industrial justice may create a climate of goodwill." 9. The Industrial Disputes Act is a benign measure which seeks to pre-empt industrial tensions, provide the meahanics of dispute resolutions and set up the necessary infrastructure so that the energies of partners in production may not be dissipated in counterproductive battles and assurance of industrial justice may create a climate of goodwill." 9. After the advent of the Constitution of India, the State is under an obligation to improve the lot of the workforce. Article 23 prohibits, inter alia, begar and other similar forms of forced labour. The directive principle of State policy incorporated in Article 38 mandates the State to secure a social order for promotion of welfare of the people and to establish an egalitarian society. Article 39 enumerates the principles of policy of the State which include welfare measures for the workers. The Staet policy embodied in Article 43 mandates the State to endeavour to secure, by conditions of work ensureing a decent standard of life and full enjoyment of leisure and social and cultural opportunities. Article 43-A enjoins on the State to take steps by suitable legislation or in any other way to secure the participation of workers in the management of undertakings, establishment, or other organisations engaged in any industry. The fundamental rights enshrined in Articles 14 and 16 guarantee equality before law and equaliy of opportunity in public employment. Of course, the Preamble to the Constitution is the lodestar and guides those who find themselves in a grey area while dealing with its provisions. It is now well settled that in interpreting a beneficial legislation enacted to give effect to the Directive Principles of State Policy which is otherwise constitutionally valid, the consideration of the court cannot be divorced from those objectives. In a case of ambiguity in the language of a beneficial labour legislation, the courts have to resolve the quandary in fovour of conferment of, rather than denial of, a benefit on the labour by he legislature but without rewriting and/or doing violence to the provisions of the enactment. 16. The decision given in case of International Air Port Authority of India vs. International Air Cargo Workers union, reported in (2009) 13 SCC 374 , is relevant and needs to be considered. The relevant Paragraph Nos. 35, 36 and 37 of the said decision is reproduced herein-below: "35. 16. The decision given in case of International Air Port Authority of India vs. International Air Cargo Workers union, reported in (2009) 13 SCC 374 , is relevant and needs to be considered. The relevant Paragraph Nos. 35, 36 and 37 of the said decision is reproduced herein-below: "35. As noticed above, SAIL did not specifically deal with the legal position as to when a dispute is brought before the industrial adjudicator as to whether the contract labour agreement is a sham, nominal and merely a camouflage, when there is no prohibition notification under Section 10(1) of the CLRA Act. 36. But where there is no abolition of contract labour under Section 10 of the CLRA Act, but the contract labour contend that the contract between the principal employer and the contrctor is sham and nominal, the remedy is purely under the ID Act. The principles in Gujarat Electricity Board continue to govern the issue. The remedy of the workmen is to approach the industrial adjudicator for an adjudication of their dispute that they are the direct employees of the principal employer and the agreement is sham, nominal and merely a camouflage, even when there is no order under Section 10(1) of the CLRA Act. 37. The industrial adjudicator can grant the relief sought if it finds that contract between the principal employer and the contractor is sham, nominal and merely a camouflage to deny employment benefits to the employer and that there is in fact a direct employment, by applying tests like who pays the salary; who has the power to remove/dismiss from service or initiate disciplinary action; who can tell the employee the way in which the work should be done, in short, who has direction and control over the employee. But where there is no notification under Section 10 of the CLRA Act and where it is not proved in the industrial adjudication that the contract was a sham/nominal and camouflage, then the question of directing the principal employer to absorb or regularize the services of the contract labour does not arise. (Emphasis Supplied) 17. But where there is no notification under Section 10 of the CLRA Act and where it is not proved in the industrial adjudication that the contract was a sham/nominal and camouflage, then the question of directing the principal employer to absorb or regularize the services of the contract labour does not arise. (Emphasis Supplied) 17. In view of the settle proposition of law it appears that the industrial adjudicator can grant the relief sought if it finds that contract between the principal employer and the contractor is sham, nominal and merely a camouflage to deny employment benefit to the employer and that there is in fact a direct employment, by applying tests like : who pays the salary; who has the power to remove/dismiss from service or initiate disciplinary action; who can tell the employee the way in which the work should be done, in short, who has direction and control over the employee. But where there is no notification under Section 10 of the CLRA Act and where it is not proved in the industrial adjudication that the contract was a sham/nominal and camouflage, then the question of directing the principal employer to absorb or regularize the services of the contract labour does not arise. 18. We have considered the submissions of learned counsel for the appellant and the respondent. As the reference was made on 24.11.1989, since then litigation was going on between the workmen and the employer in different forums i.e. Industrial Tribunal, Single Bench of this High Court and presently before this Division Bench of this High Court. Now almost 28 years have been passed. 19. The learned counsel for the appellant has relied upon a decision given in the case of Employees in relation to Management of Kuju Pundi Project of M/s. Central Coalfields Limited vs. Their Workmen represented by Secretary, Jharkhand Colliery Mazdoor Sangh, Hazaribagh, 2012 (2) JCR 156 (Jhr.), appears to be relevant for the purpose of deciding the present case. For better appreciation and for ready reference, the Paragraph Nos. 10, 11 and 12, are quoted herein-below: "10. We have considered the submissions of the learned counsel for the respondent and perused the facts of the above cases. For better appreciation and for ready reference, the Paragraph Nos. 10, 11 and 12, are quoted herein-below: "10. We have considered the submissions of the learned counsel for the respondent and perused the facts of the above cases. At the outset, we may state that in all the cases, except in 1980 Labour & Industrial Cases, 2004, the Court have granted compensation in lieu of reinstatement and the amount of compensation in lieu of reinstatement may vary from Rs.30,000/-to 2,50,000/-, depending upon the facts of each case. It appears from these judgments that the salary drawn by such workman/employee and remaining period of length of service was also considered. Even in a case where Division Bench of Patna High Court in B. Choudhury’s case (supra) considered the principle on which the reinstatement can be compensated and compensation can be award, in that case, the workmen disengaged in the year 1970 was allowed compensation of Rs. 30,000/- after observing that by the time said order was by the High Court, more than 12 years passed from the date of discharge of the employee, which was made on 4th August, 1970. 11. In view of the above reasons, it is clear from the judgments cited by the learned counsel for the respondent himself that the reinstatement is not necessary order in all cases. The compensation can be granted in lieu of reinstatement. Here, in this case, we have to look into the nature of the work which was taken from the workmen and at the cost of repetition, we may observe that the workmen were engaged for supplying of water by carrying water in the buckets lifted on the wooden stick and carrying it on shoulder by the employees of the appellant’s Colonies and their work was stopped on the ground of having pipe line to supply the water to these colonies. The workmen were getting initially a meager amount of 0.25 paise and it was increased to 0.37 paise per bhar and thereafter, as stated by the learned counsel for the workmen, the workmen were getting Rs.300/-per month. We cannot ignore all these facts and in that situation we are of the considered opinion that asking the employer to re-engage and reinstate the workmen after about twenty two years to twenty four years will not be equitable and just relief. 12. We cannot ignore all these facts and in that situation we are of the considered opinion that asking the employer to re-engage and reinstate the workmen after about twenty two years to twenty four years will not be equitable and just relief. 12. In view of the above reasons, so far as reinstatement is concerned, the same is modified to the extent that the workmen shall be entitled to the compensation in lieu of the reinstatement. So far as quantum is concerned, looking to the wages which they were getting as well as looking to the fact that under Section 17B the workmen are still getting the last drawn wages, the adequate compensation in the facts and circumstances to each of the employees will be Rs. 30,000/- (Thirty thousand) which will be sufficient compensation and the same is in addition to the benefit which the employee got under Section 17-B." 20. The aforesaid decision of the Division Bench of this Court has been affirmed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court vide its order dated 8.2.2013 in Civil Appeal No. 1089 of 2013. It is pertinent to note that while affirming the view taken by this Court, the Hon’ble Supreme Court gave enhancement in the amount of compensation and directed the management to pay the compensation of Rs. 60,000/- instead of Rs. 30,000/- ordered by the High Court. 21. In view of the judgment cited before us, it becomes clear that the reinstatement is not necessary in all cases. The compensation can be granted in lieu of the reinstatement. 22. In view of the judgment delivered in case of Employers in Relation to the Management of Kuju Pundi Project of M/s. B.C.C.L. & others vs. Their Workmen, (2012) 2 JCR 156 (Jhr.), which has been confirmed by the Hon'ble Apex Court in Civil Appeal No. 1089 of 2013 dated 8.2.2013, the workers shall be entitled to compensation in lieu of reinstatement, and so far as quantum is concerned, looking to the wages, which they were getting as well as looking to the facts under Section 17-B of the Industrial Disputes Act, the workmen were paid the last drawn wages during the intervening period. Therefore, the adequate compensation, in the facts and circumstances of the present case, is required to be assessed. Therefore, the adequate compensation, in the facts and circumstances of the present case, is required to be assessed. In the above referred judgment, it is clearly held that the amount of compensation should be in addition to the benefit which the employees got under Section 17-B of the Industrial Disputes Act, and accordingly, the compensation of Rs. 30,000/- was awarded to the workmen in the said decision as the workmen were already getting the last drawn wages during the intervening period under Section 17-B of the Industrial Disputes Act. In the present case, the workmen were paid the last drawn wages under Section 17B of the Industrial Disputes Act, during the intervening period, and therefore, the said period is also required to be considered while deciding the quantum of compensation. 23. After considering the wages and the length of services rendered by them, we are of the opinion that each of the employee are required to be compensated by making a lumpsum compensation of Rs. 60,000/- in lieu of reinstatement, each. 24. With the aforesaid observation, the order passed by the learned Single Judge deserves to be set aside. This Letters Patent Appeal is, hereby, partly allowed, and the management is directed to pay a lumpsum amount of compensation of Rs. 60,000/- (Sixty Thousand), in lieu of reinstatement, to each of the workman, within a period of two months from the date of receipt of the copy of the order of this Court.