JUDGMENT R.D. Kothari, J. 1. The petitioner formerly known as Mrs. Kamla Dinesh Solanki after getting divorced from respondent No. 2 known as Makwana Kamlaben Devjibhai. This change in name has landed the petitioner in trouble. The petitioner is facing prosecution for the offences under Secs. 467, 468, 420, 471, 192 read with Sec. 114 of the Indian Penal Code. The complaint is filed by her husband. The relevant facts are as under: "2.1. The marriage between the parties has taken place at Bhavnagar. They had one boy named Jay through this marriage. On account of difference of opinion between them, they got separated by executing writing on 14-8-2005. There is no dispute between the parties that customary divorce is permissible in their caste. At the relevant time, petitioner-wife was serving in Food Corporation of India (for short "F.C.I."). In record of the F.C.I., it appears that her matrimonial name i.e. Mrs. Kamla Dinesh Solanki was recorded. Petitioner wanted to change her name, replacing the matrimonial identity of her by name Makwana Kamlaben Devshibhai i.e. name before her marriage. In this regard, she had duly applied for correction of her name before the Government authority. Accordingly, the changed name appeared in Government Gazette on 16-2-2006 at Page 112 at Sr. No. 45. Though, it appears that the change in name was duly published in Government Gazette, F.C.I. had asked the petitioner to file an affidavit. It was submitted that F.C.I. had asked petitioner to file her affidavit and also affidavit of her husband. Affidavit of husband, alleged to be forged, it was prepared and perhaps, filed before F.C.I. It is dated 28-1-2006. This has led the respondent No. 2-husband to file present complaint against the petitioner for forgery and cheating. The complaint was filed on 31-1-2008." 2. Heard learned Advocates for the parties. 3. Mr. A.D. Shah, learned Advocate for the petitioners has submitted that in the facts and circumstances of the present case, the essential ingredients of none of the offences are attracted. Shri Shah has relied upon the following authorities: "1. Dr. Vimla v. Delhi Administration, AIR 1963 SC 1572 2. Jibrial Diwan v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1997 SC 3424 3. Parminder Kaur v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2010 (1) SCC (Cri.) 782" 4. Shri Shah has relied upon the following authorities: "1. Dr. Vimla v. Delhi Administration, AIR 1963 SC 1572 2. Jibrial Diwan v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1997 SC 3424 3. Parminder Kaur v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2010 (1) SCC (Cri.) 782" 4. Relying on these authorities, it was submitted that in the facts of the present case, the complaint lodged by the respondent No. 2 deserves to be quashed. 5. In Dr. Vimla's case (supra), the appellant had purchased one Austin 10 Horse Power car in the name of her minor daughter Nalini aged about six months at that time. The car was insured against a policy issued by the Bharat Fire and General Insurance Co. Limited. The appellant had visited the Insurance Company and signed the proposal form as Nalini. Subsequently, she also filed two claims on the ground that the car met with accident. In connection with these claims arising from accident, the appellant had signed the claim forms on behalf of Nalini. Payment was received by the appellant. In receipts also the appellant has signed as Nalini. As it came to the notice of the Insurance Company, it filed a criminal complaint against the appellant and her husband. They were tried by the Sessions Court for the offences under Secs. 120B, 419, 467 and 468 of the Indian Penal Code. The Sessions Court acquitted both of them. The State preferred an appeal to the High Court of Punjab and had substantially upheld the judgment of the Sessions Court. However, the appellant came to be convicted for the offences under Sec. 419 of the Indian Penal Code. She was awarded punishment of imprisonment till the rising of the Court and to fine of Rs. 100/-. The said judgment was challenged by the appellant before the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal. It was held that: "14. To summarize : the expression '"defraud" involves two elements, namely, deceit and injury to the person deceived. Injury is something other than economic loss, that is, deprivation of property, whether movable or immovable, or of money, and it will include any harm whatever caused to any person in body, mind, reputation or such others. In short, it is a non-economic or non-pecuniary loss. A benefit or advantage to the deceiver will almost always cause loss or detriment to the deceived. In short, it is a non-economic or non-pecuniary loss. A benefit or advantage to the deceiver will almost always cause loss or detriment to the deceived. Even in those rare cases where there is a benefit or advantage to the deceiver, but no corresponding loss to the deceived, the second condition is satisfied. 15. Now let us apply the said principles to the facts of the present case. Certainly, Dr. Vimla was guilty of deceit, for though her name was Vimla, she signed in all the relevant papers as Nalini and made the Insurance Company believe that her name was Nalini, but the said, deceit did not either secure to her advantage or cause any non-economic loss or injury to the Insurance Company. The charge does not disclose any such advantage or injury, nor is there any evidence to prove the same. The fact that Dr. Vimla said that the owner of the car who sold it to her suggested that the taking of the sale of the car in the name of Nalini would be useful for income-tax purposes is not of any relevance in the present case, for one reason, the said owner did not say so in his evidence and for the other, it was not indicated in the charge or in the evidence. In the charge framed, she was alleged to have defrauded the Insurance Company and the only evidence given was that if it was disclosed that Nalini was a minor, the Insurance Company might not have paid the money. But as we have pointed out earlier, the entire transaction was that of Dr. Vimla and it was only put through in the name of her made minor daughter for reasons best known to herself. On the evidence as disclosed, neither was she benefited nor the Insurance Company incurred loss in any sense of the term." 6. In Jibrial Diwan case (supra), the forgery and cheating was alleged. In appeal, Supreme Court has allowed the appeal by short judgment. The Head Notes-A and B which reads as under: "(A) Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860) - Secs. In Jibrial Diwan case (supra), the forgery and cheating was alleged. In appeal, Supreme Court has allowed the appeal by short judgment. The Head Notes-A and B which reads as under: "(A) Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860) - Secs. 471, 465 - Forgery - Proof - Letters prepared on Letter - Head of Minister by accused whereupon invitations were written to invite actors for cultural show - Letters did not bear signature of Minister - Neither any wrongful gain to anyone nor any wrongful loss to another is caused by delivery of forged letters. Act of accused could not be termed to have been done dishonestly - His conviction under Secs. 471 and 465 - Not proper. (B) Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860) - Section 417 - Cheating -Letters prepared on Letter - Head of Minister by accused whereupon invitations were written to invite actors for cultural show - Letters did not bear signature of Minister - Act of accused did not cause or was likely to cause harm to any person in body, mind - His conviction under Sec. 417 - Not proper." 7. In Parminder Kaur's case (supra), it appears that the complaint was filed by brother of the appellant's husband. She had filed two civil suits i.e. Civil Suit Nos. 266 and 267 of 2002 praying for cancellation of sale-deed. She had filed Civil Suit No. 267 of 2002 in the capacity of power of attorney on behalf of "Amrinder Hargobind Singh". The complainant was holding power of attorney in respect of property in question. It was say of the complainant that while instituting these two civil suits, the appellant has filed false affidavit and has also made interpolation in certified copy of the revenue record; the complaint was filed for the offences under Secs. 420, 467, 468 and 471 of Indian Penal Code. The Supreme Court was pleased to allow this appeal and set aside the impugned judgment and quash the Prosecution Case No. 3045 of 2004 against the appellant holding that this prosecution is nothing but an abuse of process of law. 8. On the other hand, Mr. 420, 467, 468 and 471 of Indian Penal Code. The Supreme Court was pleased to allow this appeal and set aside the impugned judgment and quash the Prosecution Case No. 3045 of 2004 against the appellant holding that this prosecution is nothing but an abuse of process of law. 8. On the other hand, Mr. F.B. Brahmbhatt, vehemently opposing the present application, has pointed out that prima facie forgery is committed by the petitioner whether the petitioner had an intention or not, whether there was any mens rea on the part of the petitioner or not, are not to be considered at this stage and emphasis was placed on proceeding going on between the parties under the Guardian and Wards Act for custody of child. It was asserted that the petitioner was brain washing their minor child and did not even allow to meet her minor son to his father. In the facts and circumstances of me present case, it was submitted that the offences does require investigation. This Court ought not to interfere at this stage. Learned Advocate for respondent No. 2 has relied upon the following authorities: "1. State of Andhra Pradesh v. Goloconda Linga Swamy, AIR 2004 SC 3967 2. Gian Singh v. State of Punjab, 2012 AIR SCW 5333 3. Union of India v. Prakash P. Hinduja, AIR 2003 SC 2612 " 9. In State of Andhra Pradesh's case (supra), the allegations was of transporting and storing black jaggery/molasses for manufacturing illicit liquor. The question was raised about the evidentiary value of the statements of witnesses and of seizure of illicit distilled liquor. It was held that the same cannot be said to be irrelevant. Whether the material is sufficient for holding accused guilty or not, may be considered at the trial. It was held that the F.I.R. cannot be quashed at threshold. 10. In Gian Singh's case (supra), the Supreme Court held that the power under Sec. 482 are not restricted by any provision in Code. However, inherent power not to be exercised when there is express provisions for redressal of grievance. However, it was held that against express bar of law engrafted in Code, the powers under Sec. 482 should not be exercised. 11. However, inherent power not to be exercised when there is express provisions for redressal of grievance. However, it was held that against express bar of law engrafted in Code, the powers under Sec. 482 should not be exercised. 11. The Union of India (supra), referring well known principles for exercising of powers under Sec. 482 of Cr.P.C. It was held that the powers are to be exercised to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice or where there is an express legal bar against the proceedings. 12. In the present case, dissolution of the marriage between the parties by executing writing is not in dispute. Both the parties relied on the same. It is dated 14-8-2005. At that time, their boy - Jay was aged about 6 years. In the writing, it was agreed that upon petitioner getting remarried, the petitioner was to hand over the custody of the child to respondent No. 2. It is not in dispute that the petitioner did not remarry. The custody of the child continued with the petitioner. As it appears from the submissions made at the time of hearing, proceeding for custody of child is vigorously litigated between the parties. 13. As referred above, the present complaint came to be lodged by respondent No. 2 as petitioner has filed "forged affidavit". The same is reproduced hereunder: 14. The above affidavit was prepared either because petitioner's employer i.e. F.C.I. was of the view that the affidavit of respondent No. 2 is necessary for effecting change in the name of the petitioner or the petitioner was labouring under the belief that such affidavit is required for altering her name. Petitioner's husband coming to know of preparing such affidavit by the petitioner after about 2 and 1/2 years has filed the present complaint against his wife and five others accused including stamp vendor. 15. The offence alleged against the petitioner is of forgery and cheating. For both these offences, intention is essential ingredient. In absence of intention, there would be no offence either of forgery or of cheating. All dishonest acts do not amount to cheating. Then, similarly Sec. 482 of I.P.C. requires intention to defraud. 16. Learned Advocate Mr. F.B. Brahmbhatt appearing for respondent No. 2 on this point has vehemently submitted that the intention cannot be appreciated in this proceeding. In absence of intention, there would be no offence either of forgery or of cheating. All dishonest acts do not amount to cheating. Then, similarly Sec. 482 of I.P.C. requires intention to defraud. 16. Learned Advocate Mr. F.B. Brahmbhatt appearing for respondent No. 2 on this point has vehemently submitted that the intention cannot be appreciated in this proceeding. It was submitted by analogy that if this Court is persuaded to look into intention then in murder case also, the accused may come forward with plea of absence of intention and with prayer to consider case under Sec. 304, Part-II or for lesser offence. It was submitted that it is not proper, safe and advisable to consider 'intention' aspect at this stage, in this proceeding. It was submitted that prima facie in the present case, offence is committed by the petitioner and the investigation should be proceeded in accordance with the law. It was also submitted that if police found that there is no case against the petitioner, the police may file summary report or if police file charge-sheet, the petitioner would have an option to apply for the discharge. 17. No general proposition can be laid down that the intention can or cannot be considered while considering the case under Sec. 482 of Cr.P.C. Learned Advocate for respondent No. 2 has also conceded that it depends upon the facts and circumstances of the each case. What is clear from the perusal of provision is that the intention is essential ingredients to bring home the case. Let us consider the facts and circumstances of the case on hand. The sole purpose of affidavit in question was to get her name changed in the record maintained by an employer i.e. Food Corporation of India. Prior to preparing this affidavit, the petitioner has already undergone the necessary legal procedures to change her name i.e. due publication in Government Gazette. It is not the case of respondent No. 2 that for the said purpose i.e. for publication in Government Gazette, petitioner has used any forged documents nor affidavit in question is used by the petitioner for any other purpose or before any other authority. It is not the case of respondent No. 2 that for the said purpose i.e. for publication in Government Gazette, petitioner has used any forged documents nor affidavit in question is used by the petitioner for any other purpose or before any other authority. It may be stated that learned Advocate for respondent No. 2 has strongly opposed the present application urging that in the said affidavit, incorrect statement as to the custody of the child is made and secondly, closely litigated litigation between the parties for custody of child was also pressed into service. These facts and circumstances of the case are not relevant for considering the merits of the present petition. What appears from the submissions of learned Advocate for respondent No. 2 is that if there had been no dispute between the parties about the custody of child perhaps the present complaint may not have been lodged. That apart the present case is covered up by the ratio laid down by Hon'ble Supreme Court in Dr. Vimla's case (supra), wherein as per say of the complainant that the appellant has forged the signature of her daughter and has signed the proposal form and had received the money in the name of her daughter. 18. In Parminder Kaur's case (supra), wherein fact that the complainant was brother of the appellant's husband had weighed with the Court in considering case of forgery. Learned Advocate for the petitioner has rightly drawn attention to Paragraph 36 which reads thus: "36. The State has also relied upon Bharat Parikh v. C.B.I., 2008 (10) SCC 109 , and has justified that all this can be considered at the time of framing of charges. We are surprised at the attitude of the State when it is apparent on the record that the whole prosecution is mala fide, malicious and vengeancefull only to settle the scores of respondent No. 2 against the appellant." 19. The Court in that case has concluded that me change in the deed as alleged did not give rise to any offence (Paragraph 40). So far as the facts of the present case are concerned, the odds are in favour of the petitioners. It is not in dispute in the present case that petitioner-wife has prepared or get prepared Annexure-B affidavit. Affidavit is sworn in before the Notary. So far as the facts of the present case are concerned, the odds are in favour of the petitioners. It is not in dispute in the present case that petitioner-wife has prepared or get prepared Annexure-B affidavit. Affidavit is sworn in before the Notary. Affidavit is in the name of respondent No. 2 means person referred as deponent in the affidavit is respondent No. 2. Respondent No. 2 claims that he is unaware of this affidavit. This affidavit said to have been placed before the employer of the petitioner-wife i.e. before F.C.I., to change the name of the petitioner-wife in record of F.C.I. The petitioner is a wife and respondent No. 2 is a husband. It is not the say of the complainant that affidavit in question was produced before any other authority or was used for any other purpose. No such case. No one would ever endorse the act of petitioner. It is wrong, rather, it is a blunder. The petitioner ought not to have done so. Having said so, let it be said that following the principle and the ratio laid down in Dr. Vimla's case (supra), the case of the complainant herein falls short of taking the view that issues raised herein are worth place on trial. Neither it is in the interest of justice nor for upholding the law, it is required. Ends of justice do not require to ask the parties to undergo the trial. There is no 'injury' as defined under I.P.C., to the person deceived. The Court was pleased to allow the appeal in Dr. Vimla's case (supra). On that principle, present petition succeeds. In view of above discussion, the present petition is allowed. The F.I.R. being M. Case No. 2 of 2008 registered with Bhavnagar 'C' Division Police Station is hereby quashed and set-aside. Rule is made absolute to the aforesaid extent.