JUDGMENT Mr. Mahavir S. Chauhan, J.:- Accused in Sessions Case No. 02 of 26.05.2001/12.05.2005, having been acquitted of the offences punishable under Sections 306, 500 and 420 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC, for short), by learned Additional Sessions Judge, Hisar (trial Court, for short), vide judgment dated 06-03-2006, complainant, Ram Partap, to seek upsetting of their acquittal and to pray conviction of the accused (respondents No. 01 to 04), has invoked revisional jurisdiction of this Court by way of this petition under Sections 397 and 401 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (Cr.P.C., for short). 2. Respondents No. 01 to 04 are in arms against the petitioner while the State has been arraigned as a pro-forma respondent. Factual Matrix: 3. Banwari Lal, aged 70 years and his three sons, namely, Rajesh Kumar, Sanjay Kumar, and Suresh Kumar, were arraigned as accused in First Information Report (FIR, for short) No. 192 dated 05.04.2000, under Sections 306,354,500, and 420, IPC, recorded at Police Station, City, Hisar, on the statement of Ram Partap of village Guga Medi (Rajasthan) on the allegations that his daughter Suman (here-in-after referred to as the deceased) was engaged to accused Rajesh Kumar on 02.11.1999 but the accused broke the engagement on the pretext that the lass shown to the accused was not the deceased but some other girl. In a Panchayat, convened on 20.11.1999, the dispute, however, was settled and the complainant was compensated by payment of an amount of money equivalent to the expenditure incurred by him on the engagement ceremony. However, on 03.04.2000, when the complainant was away to his work and his wife Bimla had gone to Bhadra to fetch some medicines, the deceased left home to see her friend at Bhadra. In the evening, complainant received a telephonic message from his nephew Prem Kumar that the deceased had died after consuming some poisonous substance at Aggarwal Colony, Hisar. After enquiring the facts from his near and dear ones, complainant was satisfied that the deceased had consumed the noxious matter at her own due to disturbed mental state, no one was responsible for her death, he did not intend to proceed against any one and letter written by the deceased did not have truth. After enquiring the facts from his near and dear ones, complainant was satisfied that the deceased had consumed the noxious matter at her own due to disturbed mental state, no one was responsible for her death, he did not intend to proceed against any one and letter written by the deceased did not have truth. However, on 05-04-2000, on an application made by Assistant Sub Inspector (ASI) Satpal, Deputy District Attorney, Hisar, on the basis of the letter recovered from the person of the deceased, opined that an offence punishable under Section 306, IPC, was made out against the accused. Accordingly, a First Information Report (FIR) came to be registered under sections 354,500,306 and 420, IPC. Investigation: 4. Investigating Officer, then, recorded statements of witnesses, including those of Ram Partap, father, and Narender, brother, of the deceased. Ram Partap, in his subsequent statement dated 19.04.2000 stated that he had given statement on 04.04.2000 (exculpating the accused) because he was not in his senses at that time. Investigating Officer also collected one more letter written by the deceased and took it in police possession. He also collected two other letters and one envelop from Ram Kumar, Advocate and got compared handwriting on the letter written by the deceased with the writing on aforesaid letters received from Ram Kumar, Advocate and also with application form and photo copy of admission form submitted by the deceased to M.D. Saraswati University, Ajmer and obtained report of handwriting Expert from Forensic Science Laboratory, Madhuban, whereby it was opined that the letters Exhibit P1 and Exhibit P2 were written by the deceased. 5. On completion of investigation, a report in terms of sub-section (2) of Section 173, Cr.P.C., was prepared and was presented before the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Hisar, who, in turn, committed the case to the Court of Session. The case, ultimately, was entrusted to the learned trial Court. Proceedings before the Courts below: 6. 5. On completion of investigation, a report in terms of sub-section (2) of Section 173, Cr.P.C., was prepared and was presented before the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Hisar, who, in turn, committed the case to the Court of Session. The case, ultimately, was entrusted to the learned trial Court. Proceedings before the Courts below: 6. Upon consideration of the record of the case and documents submitted therewith, and after hearing the submissions of the accused and the prosecution, the learned trial Court formed an opinion that there was ground for presuming that the accused had committed an offence punishable under Sections 306, 420, and 500, IPC, and offence of Section 306, IPC, being triable exclusively by it, framed a charge in writing against the accused, to which the accused pleaded not guilty and claimed trial. 7. When called upon to bring evidence in support of the charge, prosecution examined Complainant, Ram Partap as PW1, Head Constable (HC) Samai Singh as PW2, ASI Amar Singh as PW3, Constable © Mehar Singh as PW4, Dr. Himani Kansal as PW5, Draughtsman Subhash Chander as PW6, HC Bhoop Singh as PW7, Advocate Ram Kumar as PW8, Principal (Retired) Ram Kishan Arora as PW9, Narender Kumar as PW10, Inspector Bal Ram as PW11, HC Sita Ram as PW12, Sub Inspector (SI) Satyapal as PW13, C. Naib Singh as PW14, Gopal Sharma, Controller of Examinations (Retired), Maharishi Daya Nand Saraswati University, Ajmer as PW15 and Gulshan Rai, Assistant Director, Forensic Science Laboratory, Haryana as PW16. 8. After the witnesses for the prosecution had been examined and before calling upon the accused to enter on their defence, learned trial Court questioned the accused generally on the case so as to have their explanation qua the inculpating circumstances appearing in the evidence of the prosecution. Accused denied all these circumstances as incorrect and re-asserted plea of their innocence and false implication. 9. When called upon to enter on their defence, the accused did not lead any evidence in defence except for placing on record, Exhibit D1 and Exhibit D2, statements dated 12.05.2000 and 04.04.2000, respectively, of Complainant, Ram Partap; Exhibit D3, statement dated 19.04.2000 of Narender Kumar; Exhibit D4, statement dated 04.04.2000 of Chanan Mal; Exhibit D5, statement dated 04.04.2000 of Arun; Exhibit D6, statement dated 04.04.2000 of Pawan, and Exhibit D7, joint statement of Ishwar, Kundan Lal Surajmal, Vijay, Mange Ram & Amar Singh. 10. 10. After evidence for the defence was complete and the case had been summed up by the learned Public Prosecutor and was replied to by the learned defence counsel, the learned trial Court formulated following points for determination: “a. Whether the accused on 3.4.2000 in the area of Aggarwal Colony, Hisar abetted the commitment of suicide by deceased Suman? B. Whether on 2.11.99 the accused cheated deceased Suman and her father by dishonestly inducing them to deliver cash and ornaments at the time of ring ceremony? C. Whether the accused in the month of November 99 defamed deceased Suman & her family by dissolving the engagement of Suman with Rajesh intending to defame them in the society?” 11. On appreciation of evidence in the light of what was submitted for and against the case of the prosecution, learned trial Court found answers to the formulated questions to be in the negative and the prosecution to have failed to prove guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt and, accordingly, vide judgment dated 06.03.2006, acquitted the accused. The Revision: 12. As stated here-in-before, judgment dated 06.03.2006 is under attack in this appeal. 13. I have heard learned counsel for the parties, besides going through the record of the case. In criticism of the impugned judgment: 14. Learned counsel representing the petitioner have vehemently argued that the deceased committed suicide on 03.04.2000 in front of house of the accused and from her person, amongst other things, letter Exhibit P1 was recovered vide memorandum Exhibit P20. Besides this, another letter Exhibit P2 was recovered vide memorandum Exhibit P3 and a plastic bottle containing some chemical was recovered vide memorandum Exhibit P21. Letter Exhibit P1 also finds mentioned in statement Exhibit P22 made by PW1 Ram Partap on 04.04.2000 while letter Exhibit P2 was recovered on 19.04.2000 when PW1 Ram Partap was not inclined to proceed against the accused. These two letters, therefore, cannot be said to have been fabricated by the prosecution. Letter Exhibit P1 also finds mentioned in statement Exhibit P22 made by PW1 Ram Partap on 04.04.2000 while letter Exhibit P2 was recovered on 19.04.2000 when PW1 Ram Partap was not inclined to proceed against the accused. These two letters, therefore, cannot be said to have been fabricated by the prosecution. Not only PW1 Ram Partap and PW10 Narender Kumar identified handwriting of deceased on letters Exhibit P1 and Exhibit P2 but handwriting on these letters was also compared with the standard/admitted handwriting of the deceased on letters Exhibit P13 and Exhibit P14 and envelop Exhibit P15, which were written by the deceased to PW8, Advocate Ram Kumar, and also with the handwriting on Exhibit P17, an application filed by the deceased in Maharishi Dayanand Sarawati University, Ajmer and Exhibit P31, photocopy of Exhibit P17, and it was opined by PW16 Gulshan Rai, Assistant Director, Forensic Science Laboratory, Haryana, Madhuban, vide his report Exhibit P33, that letters, Exhibit P1 and Exhibit P2, were written by the same person who had written documents Exhibits P13 to Exhibit P15, Exhibit P17 and Exhibit P31. According to the learned counsel, letters, Exhibits P1 and P2, are admissible under Section 32 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (Evidence Act, for short), and what is written therein establishes, beyond any manner of doubt, that the private respondents abetted commission of suicide by the deceased and it is well settled that abetment can be by conduct also. 15. Learned counsel for the petitioner have elaborated that a perusal of Exhibit P1 reveals that family of the deceased and that of the accused were not known to each other and one Munshi Ram had mediated the relationship. Marriage of the deceased with respondent Rajesh Kumar was scheduled to be held on 20.11.1999. On 02.11.1999 accused visited the house of deceased in connection with ring ceremony and with the consent of their respective parents, respondent Rajesh Kumar met the deceased in a separate room and had sexual inter-course with her. But, later on accused refused to marry the deceased and for that reason she remained under immense strain and, ultimately, ended her life. 16. But, later on accused refused to marry the deceased and for that reason she remained under immense strain and, ultimately, ended her life. 16. According to the learned counsel for the petitioner, statement, Exhibit P22, of PW Ram Partap that he did not want to take action against the accused as the deceased had written letter, Exhibit P1, owing to her mental disturbance and no one was responsible for her death, is inconsequential in view of the evidence available on record. In support of the impugned judgment: 17. On the contrary, learned counsel for the private respondents has argued that engagement of the deceased with accused Rajesh was broken 05.11.1999 and the matter was finally settled in the Panchayat held on 20.11.1999. All the gifts received by the accused were returned in view of the settlement. After 20.11.1999 there had been no communication between the accused and the deceased; accused Rajesh Kumar neither met nor telephoned the deceased after that day; and the letters, Exhibits P1 and P2 seem to be outcome of frail disposition of the deceased. Learned counsel has also referred to statement, Exhibit P22, of PW Ram Partap to highlight that PW Ram Partap came to the hospital in the company of Pawan Kumar and Narender Kumar and his brother Chanan Mal and after making enquiries from all his relatives came to know that deceased had consumed some poisonous substance as she was mentally imbalanced and nobody was responsible for her death. According to learned counsel for the private respondents, statement, Exhibit P22 of PW Ram Partap accords with statements of Arun Kumar, Pawan Kumar and Chanan Mal, Exhibits D5, D6, and D4, respectively, and joint statements of respectables recorded at the time of preparation of inquest report Ex.P10 on 04.04.2000 and it is after Deputy District Attorney, gave opinion Exhibit P27, saying that an offence punishable under Section 306, IPC, was made out against the accused, that the Investigating Officer recorded statements of witnesses of the prosecution pointing an accusing finger against the accused persons on 19.04.2000. 18. In view of the above, learned counsel for the petitioner claim upsetting of the impugned judgment but learned counsel for the private respondents defends it, while the State has chosen to assign to itself role of a silent spectator. 19. Nothing more has been argued on either side. 18. In view of the above, learned counsel for the petitioner claim upsetting of the impugned judgment but learned counsel for the private respondents defends it, while the State has chosen to assign to itself role of a silent spectator. 19. Nothing more has been argued on either side. Scope of revisional jurisdiction of High Court in cases of acquittal: 20. Section 401, Cr.P.C., dealing with ambit of revisional jurisdiction of the High Court, runs thus: “401. High Court’s powers of revision- (1) In the case of any proceeding the record of has been called for by itself or which otherwise comes to its knowledge, the High Court may, in its discretion, exercise any of the powers conferred on a Court of Appeal by Sections 386, 389, 390 and 391 or on a Court of Session by Section 307 and, when the Judges composing the Court of revision are equally divided in opinion, the case shall be disposed of in the manner provided by Section 392. (2) No order under this section shall be made to the prejudice of the accused or other person unless he has had an opportunity of being heard either personally or by pleader in his own defence. (3) Nothing in this section shall be deemed to authorise a High Court to convert a finding of acquittal into one of conviction. (4) Where under this Code an appeal lies and no appeal is brought, no proceeding by way of revision shall be entertained at the instance of the party who could have appealed. (5) Where under the Code an appeal lies but an application for revision has been made to the High Court by any person and the High Court is satisfied that such application was made under the erroneous belief that no appeal lies thereto and that it is necessary in the interests of justice so to do, the High Court may treat the application for revision as a petition of appeal and deal with the same accordingly.” 21. Incidentally object of revisional jurisdiction of the High Court as envisaged under Section 401, Cr.P.C., is to confer upon superior criminal courts a kind of paternal or supervisory jurisdiction, aimed at correcting miscarriage of justice arising from misconception of law, irregularity of procedure, neglect of proper precautions of apparent harshness of treatment which result, on the one hand, in some injury to the due maintenance of law and order, or, on the other, in some undeserved hardship to individuals. (See Janata Dal v. H.S. Chowdhary and others, 1992 (4) SCC 305 ). The main question which the High Court has to consider in an application in revision is whether substantial justice has been done. However, in an appeal, the appellant would be entitled to demand adjudication upon all questions of fact or law which he wishes to raise, but in revision the only question is whether the court should interfere in the interest of justice. Where the court concerned does not appear to have committed any illegality or material irregularity or impropriety in passing the impugned judgment and order, the revision cannot succeed. If the impugned order apparently is presentable, without any such infirmity which may render it completely perverse or unacceptable and when there is no failure of justice, interference cannot be had in exercise of revisional jurisdiction. While it is true and well-settled by a long catena of judgments that exercise of power under Section 401, Cr.P.C., cannot but be ascribed to be discretionary - this discretion, however, as is popularly informed, has to be a judicious exercise of discretion and not an arbitrary one. Judicial discretion cannot but be a discretion which stands “informed by tradition, methodised by analogy and disciplined by system” - resultantly only in the event of a glaring defect in the procedural aspect or there being a manifest error on a point of law and thus a flagrant miscarriage of justice, exercise of revisional jurisdiction under this statute ought not to be called for. It is not to be lightly exercised but only in exceptional situations where the justice delivery system requires interference for correction of a manifest illegality or prevention of a gross miscarriage of justice. Revision is not an appellate forum, wherein scrutiny of evidence is possible; neither the revisional jurisdiction is open for being exercised simply by reason of the factum of another view being otherwise possible. Revision is not an appellate forum, wherein scrutiny of evidence is possible; neither the revisional jurisdiction is open for being exercised simply by reason of the factum of another view being otherwise possible. It is restrictive in its application though in the event of there being a failure of justice there can said to be no limitation as regards the applicability of the revisional power. 22. The High Court possesses a general power of superintendence over the actions of courts subordinate to it. On its administrative side, the power is known as the power of superintendence. On the judicial side, it is known as the duty of revision. The High Court can, at any stage, even on its own motion, if it so desires, and certainly when illegalities or irregularities resulting in injustice are brought to its notice, call for the records and examine them. This right of the High Court is as much a part of the administration of justice as its duty to hear appeals and revisions and interlocutory applications - so also its right to exercise its powers of administrative superintendence. Though, however, the jurisdictional sweep of the process of the High Court, under the provisions of Section 401, Cr.P.C., is very much circumscribed. 23. While dealing with the question of maintainability of the revision against the judgment of acquittal filed by the private complainant Hon’ble the Apex Court has held in case of K. Pandurangan v. S.S.R. Velusamy and another, (2003) 8 SCC 625 , that such revision by private party is maintainable. Para 6 of the report runs as follows:- “6. So far as the first question as to the maintainability of the revision at the instance of the complainant is concerned, we think the said argument has only to be noted to be rejected. Under the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, the Court has suo motu power of revision, if that be so, the question of the same being invoked at the instance of an outsider would not make any difference because ultimately it is the power of revision which is already vested with the High Court statutorily that is being exercised by the High Court. Therefore, whether the same is done by itself or at the instance of a third party will not affect such power of the High Court. Therefore, whether the same is done by itself or at the instance of a third party will not affect such power of the High Court. In this regard, we may note the following judgment of this Court in the case of Nadir Khan v. State (Delhi Admn.” 24. The extent of the jurisdiction of the High Court in the matter of interfering in revision against an order of acquittal has been considered by Hon’ble Supreme Court of India on a number of occasions. In D. Stephens v. Nosibolla, 1951 CriLJ 510, Hon’ble Supreme Court observed as follows: “The revisional jurisdiction conferred on the High Court under s. 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is not to be lightly exercised when it is invoked by a private complainant against an order of acquittal, against which the Government has a right of appeal under s. 417. It could be exercised only in exceptional cases where the interests of public justice require interference for the correction of a manifest illegality or the prevention of a gross miscarriage of justice. This jurisdiction is not ordinarily invoked or used merely because the lower Court has taken a wrong view of the law or misappreciated the evidence on the record.” 25. The Hon’ble Apex Court in D. Stephens v. Nosibolla (supra) has also enumerated the situations wherein High Court can interfere in a judgment of acquittal. These are: “(i) Where the trial Court has no jurisdiction to try the case, but has still acquitted the appellant- accused; (ii) Where the Trail Court has wrongly shut out evidence which the prosecution wished to produce; (iii) Where the appellate Court has wrongly held the evidence which was admitted by the Trial Court to be inadmissible; (iv) Where the material evidence has been overlooked only (either) by the Trial Court or by the appellate Court; and (v) Where the acquittal is based on the compounding of the offence which is invalid under the law.” 26. This enunciation of law has been reiterated in K. Ramachandran vs. V.N. Rajan & Anr., 2009(14) SCC 569 . 27. This enunciation of law has been reiterated in K. Ramachandran vs. V.N. Rajan & Anr., 2009(14) SCC 569 . 27. Again, in Logendranath Jha v. Shri Polailal Biswas, [1951]2 SCR 676, Hon’ble Supreme Court observed: “Though sub-s. (1) of s. 439 of the Criminal Procedure Code authorises the High Court to exercise in its discretion any of the powers conferred on a court of appeal by s. 423, yet sub-s. (4) specifically excludes the power to “convert a finding of acquittal into one of conviction”. This does not mean that in dealing with a revision petition by a private party against an order of acquittal, the High Court can in the absence of any error on a point of law reappraise the evidence and reverse the findings of facts on which the acquittal was based, provided only it stops short of finding the accused guilty and passing sentence on him by ordering a re-trial.” 28. Hon’ble Supreme Court of India, after considering the abovecited judgments, held in K. Chinnaswamy Reddy Vs. State of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 1962 SC 1788 :[1963]3 SCR 412, as under: “6. These two cases clearly lay down the limits of the High Court’s jurisdiction to interfere with an order of acquittal in revision; in particular, Logendranath Jha’s case, [1951]2 SCR 676 stresses that it is not open to a High Court to convert a finding of acquittal into one of conviction in view of the provisions of s. 439(4) and that the High Court cannot do this even indirectly by ordering re-trial. What had happened in that case was that the High Court reversed pure findings of facts based on the trial court’s appreciation of evidence but formally complied with sub-s. (4) by directing only a retrial of the appellants without convicting them, and warned that the court retrying the case should not be influenced by any expression of opinion contained in the judgment of the High Court. In that connection this Court observed that there could be little doubt that the dice was loaded against the appellants of that case and it might prove difficult for any subordinate judicial officer dealing with the case to put aside altogether the strong view expressed in the judgment as to the credibility of the prosecution witnesses and the circumstances of the case in general. “7. “7. It is true that it is open to a High Court in revision to set aside an order of acquittal even at the instance of private parties, though the State may not have though fit to appeal; but this jurisdiction should in our opinion be exercised by the High Court only in exceptional cases, when there is some glaring defect in the procedure or there is a manifest error on a point of law and consequently there has been a flagrant miscarriage of justice. Sub-section (4) of s. 439 forbids a High Court from converting a finding of acquittal into one of conviction and that makes it all the more incumbent on the High Court to see that it does not convert the finding of acquittal into one of conviction by the indirect method of ordering retrial, when it cannot itself directly convert a finding of acquittal into a finding of conviction. This places limitations on the power of the High Court to set aside a finding of acquittal in revision and it is only in exceptional cases that this power should be exercised. It is not possible to lay down the criteria for determining such exceptional cases which would cover all contingencies. We may however indicate some cases of this kind, which would in our opinion justify the High Court in interfering with a finding of acquittal in revision. These cases may be : where the trial court has no jurisdiction to try the case but has still acquitted the accused, or where the trial court has wrongly shut out evidence which the prosecution wished of produce, or where the appeal court has wrongly held evidence which was admitted by the trial court to be inadmissible, or where material evidence has been overlooked either by the trial court or by the appeal court, or where the acquittal is based on a compounding of the offence, which is invalid under the law. These and other cases of similar nature can properly be held to be cases of exceptional nature, where the High Court can justifiably interfere with an order of acquittal; and in such a case it is obvious that it cannot be said that the High Court was doing indirectly what it could not do directly in view of the provisions of s. 439(4). We have therefore to see whether the order of the High Court setting aside the order of acquittal in this case can be upheld on these principles.” 29. It was further held in paragraph No. 12 and 13 of the report, as follows: “12. If we may respectfully say so, this case clearly brings out what part of the statement is admissible under s. 27. It is only that part which distinctly relates to the discovery which is admissible; but if any part of the statement distinctly relates to the discovery it will be admissible wholly and the court cannot say that it will excise one part of the statement because it is of a confessional nature. Section 27 makes that part of the statement which is distinctly related to the discovery admissible as a whole, whether it be in the nature of confession or not. Now the statement in this case is said to be that the appellant stated that he would show the place where he had hidden the ornaments. The Sessions Judge has held that part of this statement which is to the effect “where he had hidden them” is not admissible. It is clear that if that part of the statement is excised the remaining statement (namely, that he would show the place) would be completely meaningless. The whole of this statement in our opinion relates distinctly to the discovery of ornaments and is admissible under s. 27 of the Indian Evidence Act. The words “where he had hidden them” are not on a par with the words “with which I stabbed the deceased” in the example given in the judgment of the Judicial Committee. These words (namely, where he had hidden them) have nothing to do with the past history of the crime and are distinctly related to the actual discovery that took place by virtue of that statement. It is however urged that in a case where the offence consists of possession even the words “where he had hidden them” would be inadmissible as they would amount to an admission by the accused that he was in possession. There are in our opinion two answers to this argument. In the first place, s. 27 itself says that where the statement distinctly relates to the discovery it will be admissible whether it amounts to a confession or not. There are in our opinion two answers to this argument. In the first place, s. 27 itself says that where the statement distinctly relates to the discovery it will be admissible whether it amounts to a confession or not. In the second place, these words by themselves though they may show possession of the appellants would not prove the offence, for after the articles have been recovered, the prosecution has still to show that the articles recovered are connected with the crime, i.e. in this case, the prosecution will have to show that they are stolen property. We are therefore of opinion that the entire statement of the appellant (as well as of the other accused who stated that he had given the ornament to Bada Sab and would have it recovered from him) would be admissible in evidence and the Sessions Judge was wrong in ruling out part of it. Therefore, as relevant and admissible evidence was ruled out by the Sessions Judge, this is a fit case where the High Court would be entitled to set aside the finding of acquittal in revision, though it is unfortunate that the High Court did not confine itself only to this point and went on to make rather strong remarks about other parts of the evidence. 13. The next question is what order should be passed in a case like the present. The High Court also considered this aspect of the matter. Two contingencies arise in such a case. In the first place there may be an acquittal by the trial court. In such a case if the High Court is justified, on principles we have enunciated above, to interfere with the order of acquittal in revision, the only course open to it is to set aside the acquittal and send the case back to the trial court for retrial. But there may be another type of case, namely, where the trial court has convicted the accused while the appeal court has acquitted him. In such a case if the conclusion of the High Court is that the order of the appeal court must be set aside, the question is whether the appeal court should be ordered to re-hear the appeal after admitting the statement it had ruled out or whether there should necessarily be a retrial. In such a case if the conclusion of the High Court is that the order of the appeal court must be set aside, the question is whether the appeal court should be ordered to re-hear the appeal after admitting the statement it had ruled out or whether there should necessarily be a retrial. So far as this is concerned, we are of opinion that it is open to the High Court to take either of the two courses. It may order a retrial or it may order the appeal court to re-hear the appeal. It will depend upon the facts of each case whether the High Court would order the appeal court to re-hear the appeal or would order a retrial by the trial court. Where, as in this case, the entire evidence is there and it was the appeal court which ruled out the evidence that had been admitted by the trial court, the proper course in our opinion is to send back the appeal for rehearing to the appeal court. In such a case the order of the trial court would stand subject to the decision of the appeal court on re-hearing. In the present case it is not disputed that the entire evidence has been led and the only defect is that the appeal court wrongly ruled out evidence which was admitted by the trial court. In the circumstances we are of opinion that the proper course is to direct the appeal court to re-hear the appeal and either maintain the conviction after taking into consideration the evidence which was ruled out by it previously or to acquit the accused if that is the just course to take. We should like to add that the appeal court when it re-hears the appeal should not be influenced by any observations of the High Court on the appreciation of the evidence and should bring to bear its own mind on the evidence after taking into consideration that part of the evidence which was considered inadmissible previously by it. We therefore allow the appeal subject to the modification indicated above.” 30. The view enunciated in K. Chinnaswamy Reddy Vs. State of Andhra Pradesh (supra), has been reiterated in Mahendra Pratap Singh v. Sarju Singh, (1968) 2 SCR 287 , Khetrabasi Samal v. State of Orissa, (1970) 1 SCR 880 and Amar Chand Agarwalla v. Shanti Bose, Criminal Appeals Nos. We therefore allow the appeal subject to the modification indicated above.” 30. The view enunciated in K. Chinnaswamy Reddy Vs. State of Andhra Pradesh (supra), has been reiterated in Mahendra Pratap Singh v. Sarju Singh, (1968) 2 SCR 287 , Khetrabasi Samal v. State of Orissa, (1970) 1 SCR 880 and Amar Chand Agarwalla v. Shanti Bose, Criminal Appeals Nos. 101-103 of 1970 decided on 22-12-1972 (reported in AIR 1973 Supreme Court 799). Chaganti Kotaiah and others vs. Gogineni Venkateshwara Rao and another, 1973(2) SCC 249 , and Kishan Swaroop Vs. Govt. of NCT of Delhi, AIR 1998 SC 990 . 31. Expounding the scope of revisional jurisdiction of the High Court, Hon’ble Supreme Court in Jagannath Choudhary Versus Ramayan Singh, 2002(2) R.C.R.(Criminal) 813, held as under: “Incidentally the object of the revisional jurisdiction as envisaged under Section 401 was to confer upon superior criminal courts a kind of paternal or supervisory jurisdiction, in order to correct miscarriage of justice arising from misconception of law, irregularity of procedure, neglect of proper precautions of apparent harshness of treatment which has resulted on the one hand in some injury to the due maintenance of law and order, or on the other hand in some underserved hardship to individuals. (See in this context the decision of this Court in Janata Dal v. H.S. Chowdhary and others, 1992(4) SCC 305 ). The main question which the High Court has to consider in an application in revision is whether substantial justice has been done. If, however, the same has been an appeal, the applicant would be entitled to demand an adjudication upon all questions of fact or law which he wishes to raise, but in revision the only question is whether the court should interfere in the interests of justice. Where the court concerned does not appear to have committed any illegality or material irregularity or impropriety in passing the impugned judgment and order, the revision cannot succeed. If the impugned order apparently is presentable, without any such infirmity which may render it completely perverse or unacceptable and when there is no failure of justice, interference cannot be had in exercise of revisional jurisdiction. 7. If the impugned order apparently is presentable, without any such infirmity which may render it completely perverse or unacceptable and when there is no failure of justice, interference cannot be had in exercise of revisional jurisdiction. 7. While it is true and now well-settled in a long catena of cases that exercise of power under Section 401 cannot but be ascribed to be discretionary - this discretion, however, as is popularly informed has to be a judicious exercise of discretion and not an arbitrary one. Judicial discretion cannot but be a discretion which stands “informed by tradition, methodised by analogy and disciplined by system” - resultantly only in the event of a glaring defect in the procedural aspect or there being a manifest error on a point of law and thus a flagrant miscarriage of justice, exercise of revisional jurisdiction under this statute ought not to be called for. It is not to be lightly exercised but only in exceptional situations where the justice delivery system requires interference for correction of a manifest illegality or prevention of a gross miscarriage of justice. In Nosibolla : Logendranath Tha and Chinnaswamy Reddy (supra) as also in Thakur Das (Thakur Das (Dead) by LRs. V. State of Madhya Pradesh and another, 1978 (1) SCC 27 ) this Court with utmost clarity and in no uncertain terms recorded the same. It is not an appellate forum, wherein scrutiny of evidence is possible; neither the revisional jurisdiction is open for being exercised simply by reason of the factum of another view being otherwise possible. It is restrictive in its application though in the event of there being a failure of justice there can said to be no limitation as regards the applicability of the revisional power. 8. The High Court possesses a general power of superintendence over the actions of courts subordinate to it. On its administrative side, the power is known as the power of superintendence. On the judicial side, it is known as the duty of revision. The High Court can at any stage even on its own motion, if it so desires, and certainly when illegalities or irregularities resulting in injustice are brought to its notice call for the records and examine them. On the judicial side, it is known as the duty of revision. The High Court can at any stage even on its own motion, if it so desires, and certainly when illegalities or irregularities resulting in injustice are brought to its notice call for the records and examine them. This right of the High Court is as much a part of the administration of justice as its duty to hear appeals and revisions and interlocutory applications - so also its right to exercise its powers of administrative superintendence. Though, however, the jurisdictional sweep of the process of the High Court, however, under the provisions of Section 401 is very much circumscribed, as noticed hereinbefore. 9. Having regard to the aforesaid, we do feel it expedient to record that in the contextual facts presently under consideration before this Court, the High Court cannot but be said to have exceeded its revisional jurisdiction in setting aside the order of acquittal.” Question to be answered: 32. Finding of the learned trial Court that deceased committed suicide on 03.04.2000 at about 01.00 P.M. at Aggarwal Colony, Hisar, in front of house of accused, by taking Organophosphorus pesticide and letters Exhibits P1 and P2 were written by her explaining the circumstances driving her to take the extreme step, and admissibility of Exhibits P1 and P2, have remained unchallenged. The question that survives is-was suicide of the deceased abetted by the private respondents? What amounts to abetment and what does not: 33. As the controversy revolves around the applicability of the provisions of Section 306, IPC, to the facts of the present case, the necessary ingredients of Sections 306, 107 and 108 Indian Penal Code have to be noticed. Section 306, IPC, provides that “if any person commits suicide, whoever abets the commission of such suicide, shall be punished.” As this section does not define the expression “abets”, therefore, meaning of the abetment has to be gathered from the provisions of Section 107, IPC, coupled with the definition of the expression “abettor” as laid down in the Section 108, IPC, which read as under :- “107.Abetment of a thing. - A person abets the doing of a thing, who – First. - Instigates any person to do that thing : Secondly. - A person abets the doing of a thing, who – First. - Instigates any person to do that thing : Secondly. - Engages with one or more other person or persons in any conspiracy for the doing of that thing, if an act or illegal omission takes place in pursuance of that conspiracy, and in order to the doing of that thing; or Thirdly. - Intentionally aids, by any act or illegal omission, the doing of that thing. Explanation 1. - A person who, why wilful mispresentation, or by wilful concealment of a material fact which he is bound to disclose, voluntarily causes or procures, or attempts to cause or procure, a thing to be done, it said to instigate the doing of that thing. Explanation 2. - Whoever, either prior to or at the time of the commission of an act, does anything in order to facilitate the commission of that act, and thereby facilitates the commission thereof, is said to aid the doing of that act.” “108. Abettor. - A person abets an offence who abets either the commission of an offence, or the commission of an act which would be an offence, if committed by a person capable by law of committing an offence with the commission of an act which would be an offence, if committed by a person capable by law of committing an offence with the same intention or knowledge as that of the abettor. Explanation 1. - The abetment of the illegal omission of an act may amount to an offence although the abettor may not himself be found to do that act. Explanation 2. - To constitute the offence of abetment it is not necessary that the act abetted should be committed, or that the effect requisite to constitute the offence should be caused. Explanation 3. - It is not necessary that the person abetted should be capable by law of committing an offence, or that he should have the same guilty intention or knowledge as that of the abettor, or any guilty intention or knowledge. Explanation 4. - The abetment of an offence being an offence, the abetment of such an abetment is also an offence. Explanation 5. - It is not necessary to the commission of the offence of abetment by conspiracy that the abettor should concert the offence with the person who commits. Explanation 4. - The abetment of an offence being an offence, the abetment of such an abetment is also an offence. Explanation 5. - It is not necessary to the commission of the offence of abetment by conspiracy that the abettor should concert the offence with the person who commits. It is sufficient if he engages in the conspiracy in pursuance of which the offence is committed.” “306. Abetment of suicide.— If any person commits suicide, whoever abets the commission of such suicide, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine.” 34. In Ramesh Kumar v. State of Chhattisgarh, (2001) 9 SCC 618 : 2001(4) RCR(Criminal) 537, a three-Judge bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court had an occasion to deal with a case of a similar nature. In a dispute between the husband and wife, the appellant husband had said to the wife, “you are free to do whatever you wish and go wherever you like”. Thereafter, the wife of the appellant therein, Ramesh Kumar had committed suicide. The Hon’ble Supreme Court examined different shades of the meaning of “instigation’ and observed that “Instigation” is to goad, urge forward, provoke, incite or encourage to do “an act”. To satisfy the requirement of instigation though it is not necessary that actual words must be used to that effect, but what constitutes instigation must necessarily and specifically be suggestive of the consequence. A reasonable certainty to incite the consequence must be capable of being spelt out. The acts or omission or a continued course of conduct should be such as to create such circumstances that the deceased was left with no other option except to commit suicide in which case instigation may have been inferred. A word uttered in the fit of anger or emotion without intending the consequences to actually follow cannot be said to be instigation. 35. In State of West Bengal v. Orilal Jaiswal and Anr., (1994) 1 SCC 73 , Hon’ble Supreme Court cautioned that the Court should be extremely careful in assessing the facts and circumstances of each case and the evidence adduced in the trial for the purpose of finding whether the cruelty meted out to the victim had in fact induced her to end her life by committing suicide. If it appears to the Court that a victim committing suicide was hypersensitive to ordinary petulance, discord and difference in domestic life quite common to the society to which the victim belonged and such petulance, discord and difference were not expected to induce a similarly circumstanced individual in a given society to commit suicide, the conscience of the Court should not be satisfied for basing a finding that the accused charged of abetting the offence of suicide should be found guilty. 36. Hon’ble Supreme Court in Chitresh Kumar Chopra v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi), 2009 (11) SCALE 24, dealt with the dictionary meaning of the word “instigation” and “goading” and opined that there should be intention to provoke, incite or encourage the doing of an act by the victim. 37. Abetment, thus, involves a mental process of instigating or intentionally aiding a person in doing of a thing. Without a positive act on the part of the accused to instigate or aid in committing suicide, conviction cannot be sustained. 38. It may also be relevent to refer to the observations made in Ranjit Singh v. State of M.P., 1997(3) Crimes 256 , wherein deceased had committed suicide in her quarter by hanging herself to the ceiling fan. In this case 5-6 days prior to the incident, the accused had outraged the modesty of the deceased for which offence under Section 354, IPC, was registered. It was held that said act of the accused could not be construed as an abetment to the deceased to commit suicide and for that reason conviction under Section 306, IPC, was not sustained. 39. In Gurdeep Singh v. State of Haryana, 1998(3) RCR(Crl.) 266, deceased committed theft of money of his master. Accused tried to have carnal intercourse with the deceased and probably on that account he felt ashamed and committed suicide. It was held that offence of abetting was not made out as there was no instigation on the part of the accused for committing the suicide. This was a case where the Additional Sessions Judge, Karnal had decided to frame charges under Sections 323, 506 and 306 read with Section 34, IPC, against the petitioner vide order dated 20.08.1997. This order was challenged, on the ground that the facts did not warrant any charge to be framed under Section 306, IPC. This was a case where the Additional Sessions Judge, Karnal had decided to frame charges under Sections 323, 506 and 306 read with Section 34, IPC, against the petitioner vide order dated 20.08.1997. This order was challenged, on the ground that the facts did not warrant any charge to be framed under Section 306, IPC. While accepting the revision petition, it was observed in paras 6 and 7 as under:- “6. Section 306 Indian Penal Code lays down that if any person commits suicide, whoever abets the commission of such suicide, shall be punished for abetment of suicide. The main point for consideration is whether in the light of the allegations levelled against the petitioners by the prosecution it can be said that there was abetment from the side of the petitioners. The learned counsel for the State relies on para No. 3 of the impugned order and maintains that there were constant threats from the side of the petitioners, as a result of which deceased Amit committed suicide and it tantamounts to abetment. I do not subscribe to the argument raised by the learned counsel for the respondent. As per provisions of Section 107 Indian Penal Code a person abets the doing of a thing, who instigates any person to do that thing; or engages with one or more other person or persons in any conspiracy for the doing of that thing, if an act or illegal omission takes place in pursuance of that conspiracy and in order to the doing of that thing; or intentionally aids, by any act or illegal omission, the doing of that thing. 7. A reading of the above provisions would show that there should be a direct nexus between the act complained of and the ultimate effect. If the deceased had resorted to commit suicide by sprinkling kerosene oil upon himself, it cannot be readily said that petitioners were responsible. As per the allegations of the prosecution one of the petitioners tried to have cardinal intercourse with the deceased. The deceased might have felt ashamed on this. He might have also felt ashamed of the fact that he had committed the theft of the money of the master. As per the allegations of the prosecution one of the petitioners tried to have cardinal intercourse with the deceased. The deceased might have felt ashamed on this. He might have also felt ashamed of the fact that he had committed the theft of the money of the master. There was demand of money which was the material conduct on the part of the petitioners but it cannot be said that there was common abetment or that there was any instigation on the part of the petitioners to the deceased for committing of suicide. I do not dispute with the proposition of law that while framing the charge of the trial Court is supposed to see a prima facie case but if the parameters of prima facie case are totally beyond the circle and scope of Sections 227/228 Criminal Procedure Code certainly this Court has the power to interfere with the said illegal orders while exercising the powers in revision.” In Sudhakar and another v. State of Maharshtra, 2000(3) Crimes 122 (SC) : 2000(3) RCR(Crl.) 383, suicide was committed by the victim after 5-1/2 months of the alleged rape. In that case prosecutrix did not directly state any fact regarding cause of her death. Her statement did not state her mind for committing suicide allegedly on account of humiliation to which she was subjected to on account of rape committed on her by the accused. The Court came to the conclusion that relying upon the statement of the prosecutrix termed as dying declaration was unjustified. 40. In Deepak v. State of M.P (M.P.), 1994 CriLJ 767 : 1993 M.P.L.J. 729, two accused persons, who lived as her tenants in the same house, approached the deceased, a sixteen years old girl, and made overtures for sexual intercourse. When she refused, the accused were said to have threatened her that they would defame her. After about an hour, she committed suicide by setting herself afire. High Court of Madhya Pradesh acquitted the accused of the offence under Section 306, IPC, by holding as under: “9. The first question which falls for decision is whether the two accused persons can be held guilty of offence under Section 306 of the Indian Penal Code abetment has been defined under Section 107 of the Penal Code. High Court of Madhya Pradesh acquitted the accused of the offence under Section 306, IPC, by holding as under: “9. The first question which falls for decision is whether the two accused persons can be held guilty of offence under Section 306 of the Indian Penal Code abetment has been defined under Section 107 of the Penal Code. On the evidence led by the prosecution in the case, can it be said that the two accused persons, in any manner, either ‘instigated’, were ‘engaged’ in conspiracy or intentionally ‘aided’ in commission of suicide by the deceased. As is the statement of the deceased, disclosed from her three dying declarations, the two accused persons, at late hour of the night, entered her room and tried to take advantage of the situation to commit sexual offence against her. This act on the part of the accused might or might not have driven the woman to commit suicide. In the facts as have been brought on record, the two accused persons could not have foreseen that such act on their part, may be that it was a serious offence, would necessarily drive that woman to commit suicide. It is admitted by the deceased in her own dying declarations that not soon after the incident of outraging her modesty, but after about an hour she set herself afire. In my considered opinion therefore, this is not a case where it can be said that the two accused persons were abettors to the act of commission of suicide by the deceased. This is not a case of a married woman, who having been subjected to a continuous treatment of torture, had ended her life. No presumption under Section 113A of the Evidence Act arises in such a case. Here is a case of a woman whose modesty was outraged while she was with her paramour. There was neither any intention nor any positive act on the part of the accused to instigate her or aid her in committing suicide. The two accused persons, therefore, cannot be held guilty of the 306 of the Indian Penal Code and their conviction on that count by the trial Court, is liable to be set aside.” 41. There was neither any intention nor any positive act on the part of the accused to instigate her or aid her in committing suicide. The two accused persons, therefore, cannot be held guilty of the 306 of the Indian Penal Code and their conviction on that count by the trial Court, is liable to be set aside.” 41. In Raj Kumar v. State of Punjab, 1983 CriLJ 706 : 1983(1) R.C.R.(Criminal) 553 : 1983 PLR 268 : 1983 CurLJ 386 , deceased Sita Devi, had married Rajinder Kumar some five years prior to the occurrence. Rajinder Kumar and his wife had stopped seeing eye to eye with each other with the result that for the last 22 days prior to the occurrence he had stopped returning to his house. He was employed at the shop of Raj Kumar appellant. Sita Devi held Raj Kumar to be responsible for discord between her and her husband and for the abnormal conduct of Rajinder Kumar of absenting from home. Her efforts of persuading Rajinder Kumar to come back to her, appear to bear no fruit. At about 8 a.m. on the date of occurrence, Sita Devi deceased came to the shop of Raj Kumar to make a final bid at persuading Rajinder Kumar to resume normal visits to the matrimonial home. He, however, told her back to her house and returned with a bucket of kerosene and again told Rajinder Kumar accused that if he would not accede to her request of returning to her she would burn herself. Both of them told her that she could go ahead with her plan, the same would not affect their health. Sita Devi then and there sprinkled kerosene upon her body and with a matchstick set herself afire right to save her by extinguishing fire or removing her to the hospital for medical aid. It was Sohan Lal P.W. 5, who happened to be present there and had removed her to Civil Hospital, Ludhiana where she died on the same day. A Division Bench of this Court held as under: “The retort made by the accused when the deceased threatened to commit suicide if Rajinder Kumar did not agree to her request, did not amount to instigation by any stretch of imagination. A Division Bench of this Court held as under: “The retort made by the accused when the deceased threatened to commit suicide if Rajinder Kumar did not agree to her request, did not amount to instigation by any stretch of imagination. If such a retort is accepted to be constituting instigation, then to cite only one example, the parents would be guilty of abetment of suicide if even when most unreasonable demand is made by their child, which they are not in a position to comply with, on the threat of committing suicideand they were to retort that the child could do so as they were not in a position to agree to his/her request. The framers of the Code surely could never have intended this to happen.” 42. The intention of the Legislature and the ratio of the above-cited cases is clear that in order to convict a person under Section 306, IPC, there has to be a clear mens rea to commit the offence. It also requires an active act or direct act which leads the deceased to commit suicide seeing no option and this act must have been intended to push the deceased into such a position that he committed suicide. A person abets the doing of a thing only when he instigates a person to do that thing or engages with one or more other persons in any conspiracy for the doing of that thing. If an act or illegal omission takes place in pursuance of that conspiracy; and thirdly, the act of a person would amount to “abetment” if he intentionally aids by any act or illegal omission to do a particular thing. Therefore, for constituting the offence of abetment, there should be a direct or reasonable nexus between the act and the consequence. If there is no direct nexus, the offence of abetment would not be complete. Evidence analyzed: 43. Conduct of the private respondents, when tested on the touchstone of the definition of the term “Abetment” as expounded in the cited judgments, does not come within the purview of the definition. The engagement between the deceased and respondent Rajesh Kumar came to an end on 03.11.1999 and the deceased ended her life five months thereafter, i.e. on 03.04.2000. From 03.11.1999 to 03.04.2000 no meeting or communication, either telephonic or written, took place between the deceased and the accused persons. The engagement between the deceased and respondent Rajesh Kumar came to an end on 03.11.1999 and the deceased ended her life five months thereafter, i.e. on 03.04.2000. From 03.11.1999 to 03.04.2000 no meeting or communication, either telephonic or written, took place between the deceased and the accused persons. Even on 03.04.2000 none from the side of the accused persons met or communicated with the deceased. The gifts etc. given to the accused on the occasion of ring ceremony were returned to the satisfaction of the complainant, of course in the presence of a “Panchayat”. 44. PW1 Ram Partap has maintained that on 02.11.1999, “ring” and “Mang Bharai” ceremonies were performed at his house which were attended by the private respondents and other family members of Banwari Lal. On their no objection, accused Rajesh Kumar and the deceased stayed in a separate room together for about one hour and came out of the said room happily. On 05.11.1999 he received a telephonic message from respondent Banwari Lal that his sons Sanjay and Suresh did not agree to the proposal of marriage of the deceased with respondent Rajesh Kumar. Thereafter, he accompanied by his friends, brother Sheopal Singh, Kundan Lal and Chanan Mal, and Pawan Kumar etc. came to Hisar in the form of Panchayat of brotherhood. Accused told him that he had cheated them by showing another girl in place of the deceased and the deceased had threatened them on telephone that if Rajesh Kumar would not marry her, she would see them. His daughter Suman had accepted Rajesh Kumar as her husband, and they continued to convene Panchayats of brotherhood till March, 2000 to settle the matter. The deceased was a graduate and she felt humiliated as she was not accepted by the accused- Rajesh Kumar but deceased would tell him that she had accepted Rajesh Kumar as her husband and when she came to know that Rajesh Kumar was going to marry another girl she came to Hisar on 03.04.2000 in Aggarwal Colony and committed suicide in front of house of the accused. On 04.04.2000 he came to Hisar in the morning and had signed some papers before the police since he was under shock and mental pressure from the public at Hisar. Police had recorded his statement without his dictation and reading and had obtained his signatures. On 04.04.2000 he came to Hisar in the morning and had signed some papers before the police since he was under shock and mental pressure from the public at Hisar. Police had recorded his statement without his dictation and reading and had obtained his signatures. Police showed to him Exhibit P1, a letter written by the deceased. He also proved letter Exhibit P2 written by the deceased, which was recovered from the almirah of the deceased. 45. PW10 Narender Kumar, brother of the deceased has also corroborated the version of PW1 Ram Partap. 46. Letter, Exhibit P1, according to the prosecution was found from the search of person of the deceased and the entire case revolves around this letter. It reveals that on 02.11.1999 accused visited the house of deceased and with the consent of family members of both of them, accused Rajesh Kumar and the deceased met each other in a separate room where they loved and came close to each other. Though case of the prosecution is that during this meeting accused Rajesh Kumar had sexual inter- course with the deceased but from the language used in the letter, Exhibit P1, it is a bit difficult to reach such a conclusion. Be that as it may, the deceased was a major girl and had closetted herself with accused Rajesh Kumar of her own will and whatever happened inside the room was also consented to by her. It also comes out that engagement of the deceased with accused Rajesh Kumar, was broken on 03.11.1999 and the deceased committed suicide on 03.04.2000, i.e. after five months of 03.11.1999. Neither it is the case of the prosecution nor is there any material available on record from which it could be concluded that during this interregnum spanning five months either of the private respondents met or communicated with the deceased. As per letter, Exhibit P1, deceased did not meet respondent Rajesh Kumar or any other member of his family on 03.04.2000 before she took the extreme step. 47. In the letter, Exhibit P2, also, the deceased said that respondent Rajesh Kumar was accepted by her as her husband and he had overpowered her mind. This letter also does not reveal any abetment on the part of the accused. 48. 47. In the letter, Exhibit P2, also, the deceased said that respondent Rajesh Kumar was accepted by her as her husband and he had overpowered her mind. This letter also does not reveal any abetment on the part of the accused. 48. If these two letters, Exhibits P1 and P2, are read together, it becomes manifestly clear that the deceased was badly obsessed with the idea of having respondent Rajesh Kumar as her husband and had reconciled herself with the situation that arose after the engagement was broken by resolving to stay unmarried for whole of her life but could not bear the news of Rajesh Kumar marrying another girl. The phenomenon fits in the import of term “Fascination” or say “Mania”. Even complainant Ram Partap recognized this syndrome in his statement, Exhibit P22, by saying that the deceased had ingested some poisonous substance of her own, owing to her mental imbalance. His assertion as PW-1 that it was so stated by him because he was under shock and mental pressure, cannot be accepted because statement, Exhibit P22, was made by him in the presence of his sons Pawan Kumar, and Narender Kumar, his brother Chanan Mal and other relatives, that too after satisfying himself after making enquiries from the relatives. He changed his stance only after opinion, Exhibit P27, of the Deputy District Attorney, saying that an offence under Section 306, IPC, is found to be made out, came in. Not only this, when inquest report, Exhibit P10, was prepared by investigating officer, statements under Section 175, Cr.P.C., of various relatives of deceased were recorded. Exhibit D6- statement of Pawan Kumar, brother of the deceased, Exhibit D5- statement of Arjun, cousin of the deceased, Exhibit D4 - statement of Chanan Mal, uncle of the deceased and Exhibit D7-joint statement of all the aforesaid persons, also run on the same lines. 49. The circumstances enumerated here-in-before do not even indicate towards commission of offences punishable under Sections 420 and 500, IPC, proof of commission of these offences by the private respondents, apart. 50. Even if the evidence available on record could be capable of leading to two inferences or conclusions, still, the one favouring the accused persons would have to be preferred over the other. 50. Even if the evidence available on record could be capable of leading to two inferences or conclusions, still, the one favouring the accused persons would have to be preferred over the other. Nevertheless, the evidence, as discussed above, leads to the only conclusion that the prosecution has not been able to fix guilt of the private respondents, muchless beyond reasonable doubt. 51. Dismissed. ---------0.B.S.0------------