JUDGMENT Mansoor Ahmad Mir, C.J. This Letters Patent Appeal is directed against the judgment and order, dated 22nd February, 2010, passed by a learned Single Judge of this Court in CWP(T) No.6696 of 2008, (OA No.1843 of 2000), titled Kashmir Chand versus H.R.T.C. and others, whereby the petition filed by the writ petitioner, (appellant herein), came to be dismissed, (for short, ‘the impugned judgment’). Brief facts: 2. The appellant/writ petitioner invoked the jurisdiction of the Himachal Pradesh State Administrative Tribunal by means of Original Application, (OA No.1843 of 2000), in terms of Section 19 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 for quashing the Memorandum, dated 23.2.1993 (Annexure A 2) on the basis of which departmental proceedings were initiated against the writ petitioner, Memorandum dated 12.8.1996 (Annexure A-4), read with office order dated 17.4.1998 (Annexure A-6), made by respondent No.2 and the order, dated 5.9.1998, (Annexure A-8), made by Sub Divisional Manager, whereby the appeal filed by the appellant/writ petitioner was dismissed. The writ petitioner also sought writ of mandamus commanding the respondents to reinstate him in service, with all consequential benefits, alongwith interest at the rate of 18% per annum. 3. Respondents have resisted the Original Application before the Tribunal by the medium of reply, was lateron transferred to this Court on abolition of the Tribunal and was registered as writ petition, being CWP(T) No.6696 of 2008. The learned Single Judge/Writ Court, after examining the pleadings, dismissed the writ petition, vide the impugned judgment, constraining the appellant to question the same by way of the present appeal. 4. The petitioner was appointed as Conductor in the Himachal Road Transport Corporation (for short, ‘HRTC’), on daily wage basis, and subsequently, his services were regularized w.e.f. 1st August, 1983 by the Regional Manager On 23rd February 1993 respondent No 3 i e the Regional Manager had issued memorandum, (Annexure A2), for drawing departmental inquiry against the writ petitioner in terms of Rule 14 of the CCS(CCA) Rules, 1965, (for short, ‘the Rules’). The Inquiry Officer was appointed, who, after concluding the inquiry, submitted the inquiry report, contained in Annexure A-3. Inquiry Officer had concluded that the charge No.2 was established in view of the past record of the writ petitioner and charges No.1, 3 and 4, were not proved. 5. The Inquiry Officer was appointed, who, after concluding the inquiry, submitted the inquiry report, contained in Annexure A-3. Inquiry Officer had concluded that the charge No.2 was established in view of the past record of the writ petitioner and charges No.1, 3 and 4, were not proved. 5. Thereafter, the inquiry report was submitted to the Divisional Manager, HRTC, Dharamshala (respondent No.2), who, vide Memorandum dated 12th August, 1996, had disagreed with the said inquiry report and recorded finding to the effect that charges are established and proved. Further held that the writ petitioner/appellant deserves imposition of major penalty, as envisaged under Rule 11 of the Rules. It is apt to reproduce relevant portion of the Memorandum dated 12th August, 1996, (Annexure A4), as under: “iii) That the statement exhibited by Sh.Karnail Singh, Inspector bears the address but the one recorded on the Log Book is without any address. Here the number of passengers recorded at the time of checking has little relevance because the Conductor has also admitted the presence of 2 behind Una to Delhi direct. Hence I am of the opinion that the report of Inspector Sh.Karnail Singh that the said Sh.Kashmir Chand, Conductor was carrying 2 passengers with short tickets from Una to Delhi, worth Rs.140.40 paise stand proved against him and accordingly the charge No.3 & 4 also established. I, therefore, disagree with the findings of the Enquiry Officer AND provisionally come to the conclusion that Sh.Kashmir Chand, Conductor warrants imposition of major penalty under Rule-11 of the CCS(CC&A) Rules, 1965. AND, therefore, Sh.Kashmir Chand, Conductor is hereby given an opportunity of making representation on the penalty proposed but only on the basis of evidence adduced during the enquiry. Such representation, if any, should be made in writing and submitted so as to reach the undersigned not later than 15 days from the receipt hereof.” 6. Pursuant to Annexure A-4, the petitioner filed a representation vide Annexure A-5, was rejected and major penalty of compulsory retirement was imposed upon the writ petitioner vide order dated 17th April, 1998 (Annexure A 6). 7. The writ petitioner, against the said order of compulsory retirement, vide Annexure A-7, preferred an appeal before the Managing Director, HRTC, (respondent No.1), through Regional Manager, HRTC, Dharamshala/respondent No.3, was rejected, vide order dated 5.9.1998, (Annexure A-8), which was subject matter of the Original Application before the Tribunal. 8. 7. The writ petitioner, against the said order of compulsory retirement, vide Annexure A-7, preferred an appeal before the Managing Director, HRTC, (respondent No.1), through Regional Manager, HRTC, Dharamshala/respondent No.3, was rejected, vide order dated 5.9.1998, (Annexure A-8), which was subject matter of the Original Application before the Tribunal. 8. The original application was subsequently transferred to this Court and came to be diarized as CWP(T) No. 6696 of 2008. The Writ Court/Single Bench dismissed the said petition vide impugned judgment constraining the petitioner to file the present Letters Patent Appeal. 9. The learned counsel for the appellant, during the course of hearing, argued that the order, dated 12th August, 1996, contained in Annexure A-4, made by the Divisional Manager, whereby penalty of compulsory retirement was proposed to be imposed on the petitioner, is bad in law being not made in accordance with the mandate of the Rules. It was further submitted that while making the impugned order of compulsory retirement, principles of natural justice have also not been followed by the Disciplinary Authority. It was also submitted that the Writ Court has not appreciated the issue raised by the writ petitioner in its right perspective, thus, has committed illegality and the impugned judgment needs to be set aside. 10. The submissions made by the learned counsel for the writ petitioner/appellant are to be appreciated in light of the law expounded by the Apex Court in various pronouncements 11. It is beaten law of the land that when the competent authority/disciplinary authority records disagreement with the report of the Inquiry Officer, the said authority, while recording such findings and reaching to the conclusion which is in variance/contrary to the conclusion arrived at by the Inquiry Officer, has to hear the delinquent official and only thereafter, in case the delinquent official fails to carve out a case that the Inquiry Officer has rightly made the report, the competent authority has to record findings and serve another show cause notice to the said official for showing cause in regard to the punishment proposed to be imposed, which, admittedly, has not been done in the present case. In the present case, respondent No.2, without hearing the petitioner, recorded the finding, held the petitioner guilty and had asked the petitioner to show cause why major penalty be not imposed upon him. 12. In the present case, respondent No.2, without hearing the petitioner, recorded the finding, held the petitioner guilty and had asked the petitioner to show cause why major penalty be not imposed upon him. 12. The Apex Court in case titled as State Bank of India and others vs. K.P. Narayanan Kutty, reported in (2003) 2 SCC 449 , has laid down the same principle. It is apt to reproduce paragraph 6 of the said decision as under: “6. It was also contended on behalf of the appellants that the High Court committed an error in setting aside the order of dismissal when it was not shown that any prejudice was caused to the respondent by not giving an opportunity to him by the disciplinary authority. In this regard the learned counsel cited a decision of this Court in Union Bank of India v. Vishwa Mohan { (1998) 4 SCC 310 }. As already noticed above, before the High Court both the parties concentrated only on one point, namely, the effect of not providing an opportunity by the disciplinary authority when the disciplinary authority disagreed with some findings of the Enquiry Officer. It was also not shown by the appellants before the High Court that no prejudice was caused to the respondent in the absence of providing any opportunity by the disciplinary authority. The aforementioned case of Vishwa Mohan is of no help to the appellants. The learned counsel invited our attention to para 9 of the said judgment. As is evident from the said paragraph, this Court having regard to the facts of that case, taking note of the various acts of serious misconduct, found that no prejudice was caused to the delinquent officer. The learned counsel invited our attention to para 9 of the said judgment. As is evident from the said paragraph, this Court having regard to the facts of that case, taking note of the various acts of serious misconduct, found that no prejudice was caused to the delinquent officer. In para 19 of the judgment in Punjab National Bank case, extracted above, when it is clearly stated that the principles of natural justice have to be read into Regulation 7(2) {Rule 50(3)(ii) of State Bank of India (Supervising Staff) Service Rules, is identical in terms applicable to the present case} and the delinquent officer will have to be given an opportunity to persuade the disciplinary authority to accept the favourable conclusion of the Enquiry Officer, we find it difficult to accept the contention advanced on behalf of the appellants that unless it is shown that some prejudice was caused to the respondent, the order of dismissal could not be set aside by the High Court.” 13. The Apex Court in case titled as Ranjit Singh vs. Union of India and others, (2006) 4 SCC 153 , while relying on the earlier decision, has held that principles of natural justice must be adhered to, in case the Disciplinary Authority intends to disagree with the findings recorded by the Inquiry Officer. It is apt to reproduce paragraph 20, which reads as under: “20. In Punjab National Bank and Others v. Kunj Behari Misra [ (1998) 7 SCC 84 ], this Court has clearly held that the principles of natural justice are required to be complied with by the Disciplinary Authority in the event he intends to differ with the findings of the Enquiry Officer observing: "19. The result of the aforesaid discussion would be that the principles of natural justice have to be read into Regulation 7(2). As a result thereof, whenever the disciplinary authority disagrees with the enquiry authority on any article of charge, then before it records its own findings on such charge, it must record its tentative reasons for such disagreement and give to the delinquent officer an opportunity to represent before it records its findings. The report of the enquiry officer containing its findings will have to be conveyed and the delinquent officer will have an opportunity to persuade the disciplinary authority to accept the favourable conclusion of the enquiry officer. The report of the enquiry officer containing its findings will have to be conveyed and the delinquent officer will have an opportunity to persuade the disciplinary authority to accept the favourable conclusion of the enquiry officer. The principles of natural justice, as we have already observed, require the authority which has to take a final decision and can impose a penalty, to give an opportunity to the officer charged of misconduct to file a representation before the disciplinary authority records its findings on the charges framed against the officer.”” 14. The Apex Court in case titled as Lav Nigam vs. Chairman & MD, ITI Ltd. and another, (2006) 9 SCC 440 , has held that the Disciplinary Authority is under obligation to give notice to the delinquent setting out his tentative conclusions. It is apt to reproduce paragraph 10 of the said decision hereunder: “10. The conclusion of the High Court was contrary to the consistent view taken by this Court that in case the disciplinary authority differs with the view taken by the inquiry officer, he is bound to give a notice setting out his tentative conclusions to the appellant. It is only after hearing the appellant that the disciplinary authority would at all arrive at a final finding of guilt. Thereafter, the employee would again have to be served with a notice relating to the punishment proposed.” 15. The Apex Court in case titled as P.D. Agrawal vs. State Bank of India and others, (2006) 8 SCC 776 , has held that non-observance of principles of natural justice vitiates the order only when some real prejudice is caused to the complainant by such omission and that even a small violation of the said principles would be fatal. 16. The Apex Court in the latest decision rendered in S.P. Malhotra vs. Punjab National Bank and others, (2013) 7 SCC 251 , has discussed the development of law right from 1986 and held that the Disciplinary Authority is bound to record reasons for disagreeing with the findings of the Inquiry Officer and supply a copy thereof to the delinquent and to serve a show cause notice on him seeking his explanation, before making an order of punishment. It is “7. The appellant challenged the said orders of punishment by filing Writ Petition No.1201 of 1988 before the High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh. It is “7. The appellant challenged the said orders of punishment by filing Writ Petition No.1201 of 1988 before the High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh. The said writ petition was contested by the respondent Bank. The learned Single Judge allowed the said writ petition vide judgment and order dated 20-5-2011, holding that in case the disciplinary authority disagrees with the findings recorded by the enquiry officer, he must record reasons for the disagreement and communicate the same to the delinquent seeking his explanation and after considering the same, the punishment could be passed. In the instant case, as such a course had not been resorted to, the punishment order stood vitiated.” 17. Adverting to the facts of the present case, admittedly, the Inquiry Officer, after coming to the conclusion that Charges No.1, 3 and 4 were not proved and that only charge No.2 was proved, submitted the inquiry report to respondent No.2/Divisional Manager, who, vide Memorandum dated 12th August, 1996, (Annexure A 4), disagreed with the inquiry report and recorded the finding that major penalty deserves to be imposed upon the writ petitioner/appellant, which is against the principles laid down by the Apex Court. It was incumbent upon the Disciplinary Authority to record its tentative reasons for such disagreement and give to the delinquent official an opportunity to represent before recording its findings, which has not been done in the case of the writ petitioner. 18. Having said so, the impugned judgment is liable to be set aside and consequently, the Memorandum dated 12th August, 1996, Annexure A-4, vide which the Disciplinary Authority disagreed with the Inquiry report, and the order of compulsory retirement, dated 17th April, 1998 (Annexure A-6), made by respondent No.2, are also liable to be quashed. Ordered accordingly. However, the respondents are at liberty to proceed with the inquiry against the writ petitioner/appellant on the basis of the inquiry report Annexure A-3, already submitted by the Inquiry Officer and if they choose so, the period from the date of compulsory retirement till today shall remain subject to the outcome of the inquiry. It is also made clear that if the respondents choose not to proceed with the inquiry, in that eventuality, the petitioner is held not entitled to back wages from the date of his compulsory retirement till today, but the said period shall be computed only for all other service benefits. 19. It is also made clear that if the respondents choose not to proceed with the inquiry, in that eventuality, the petitioner is held not entitled to back wages from the date of his compulsory retirement till today, but the said period shall be computed only for all other service benefits. 19. The appeal is allowed and stands disposed of, as indicated above.