Judgment : The petitioner was appointed a secretary in 1987 in the fourth respondent Society, and later was placed under suspension in 1992 on the ground of alleged misappropriation of funds. Without any enquiry the petitioner was removed from service through proceedings, dt.10.12.1993. Questioning the said arbitrary action of the fourth respondent Society, the petitioner filed WP No.8547 of 1994. On contest, this Court allowed the writ petition on 30-10-1994 by setting aside the order of removal, with a further direction to conduct an enquiry after providing due opportunity to the petitioner. When the Society filed a review application, this Court clarified that the petitioner should be continued under suspension pending enquiry. Eventually, not satisfied with the explanation submitted by the petitioner, the Managing Committee of the respondent Society, after conducting the enquiry, once again passed orders on 4-1-1995 removing the petitioner from service, despite the fact the Managing Committee alone is not competent to remove a secretary on disciplinary grounds. Realising the invalidity of its own order, the respondent Society again passed a resolution on 22.07.1995 revoking its earlier order, dt.04.01.1995. Thus continuing the petitioner under suspension, eventually the Society reinstated the petitioner into service on 13.05.2002. On the reinstatement of the petitioner, a junior secretary, who was consequently reverted, questioned his reinstatement in W.P.No.13396 of 2002. In course of time, this Court set aside the order of reinstatement by allowing the writ petition on 25.09.2002. On another front, based on the charge of alleged misappropriation of funds, surcharge proceedings were initiated after an enquiry under section 51 of the AP Cooperative Societies Act, 1965 (‘the Act’ for brevity) and orders were passed on 05.04.1994. On appeal, in OA No.47 of 1994, the Cooperative Tribunal, through its orders, dt.30.01.1998, confirmed the orders. When the petitioner assailed the order in OA No.47 of 1994 before this Court in WP No.16399 of 2000, the said writ was ultimately allowed on 18.02.2003, setting aside the surcharge order. As a result, the petitioner was absolved of the charges of misappropriation. Though, initially, the petitioner, when criminal proceedings were initiated, was convicted in C.C.No.228 of 1997, on further challenge in Crl. Appeal No.76 of 2002, the VIII Additional District & Sessions Judge, Visakhapatnam, through its judgement, dt.28.08.2003, honourably acquitted hm. As a result, the petitioner was eventually reinstated into service on 07.01.2003. Be that as it may, the controversy refused to die down. Appeal No.76 of 2002, the VIII Additional District & Sessions Judge, Visakhapatnam, through its judgement, dt.28.08.2003, honourably acquitted hm. As a result, the petitioner was eventually reinstated into service on 07.01.2003. Be that as it may, the controversy refused to die down. On the petitioner’s reinstatement, some members of the respondent Society are said to have filed WP No.7640 of 2003, questioning the said reinstatement. Initially, pending further orders, this Court suspended the proceedings of reinstatement, and later disposed of the writ petition on 04.10.2004 directing the respondent Society to pass appropriate orders taking into account the subsequent developments. Thus, once again, the respondent Society considered the case of the petitioner and reinstated him through proceedings, dt.19.08.2005. As a result, the petitioner duly joined the service back on 24.08.2005. In the meanwhile, the petitioner in W.P. No.7640 of 2003 filed WA No.1864 of 2005 questioning the order, dt.04.10.2004, of the learned single Judge. A learned Division Bench of this Court, however, dismissed the said writ appeal on 07.11.2005. Thus, the petitioner’s reinstatement was considered valid. Though the petitioner, on reinstatement, continued to discharge his duties, he was not paid his salary. When the petitioner submitted a representation, dt.31.12.2005, seeking salary, the newly elected President, the fifth respondent, returned the said representation on 30.01.2006, stating that the order of reinstatement was not on record. From 29.01.2006, the Society did not permit the petitioner to discharge his duties. Aggrieved by the action of the respondent Society, the petitioner made a representation on 06.02.2006 to the first and second respondents. He followed it up with another representation on 18.02.2006. The authorities, however, have not taken any action in response to the petitioner’s representations. Under those Circumstances, the petitioner is said to have approached this Court by filing the present writ petition. In the above factual back drop, the learned counsel for the petitioner has stated that the very initial order of removal from service, dated 10.12.1983 was without any justification. He has further stated that the managing committee alone was not competent to remove a secretary. According to him, such an order of removal as had been passed against the petitioner could be passed only with the consent of the District Level Committee. He has further stated that the managing committee alone was not competent to remove a secretary. According to him, such an order of removal as had been passed against the petitioner could be passed only with the consent of the District Level Committee. The learned Counsel has also taken this Court through various judicial proceedings and has submitted that even a learned Division Bench of this Court has affirmed the reinstatement of the petitioner. The learned Counsel for the petitioner has further strenuously contended that when the petitioner complained of non-payment of salary, the Society simply discharged him from service without further procedure, much less valid orders. During the course of his submissions, the learned counsel has laid much stress on the acquittal he has earned in criminal appeal as well. Accordingly, the learned counsel for the petitioner has urged this Court to direct the respondents 1 & 2 to take appropriate corrective steps to ensure that the petitioner is continued in service and paid salary. Per contra, the learned Government Pleader for Co-operation, Agriculture & Marketing, having substantially admitted the factual submissions of the learned counsel for the petitioner, has, however, stated that, initially, against the order of removal passed by the respondent Society, the petitioner filed an appeal before the District Collector, the competent Appellate Authority. In course of time, the said appeal was dismissed. According to the learned Government Pleader, since the petitioner has not laid any challenge against the said order in appeal, the initial removal of the petitioner has attained finality. He has also further contended that mere acquittal in criminal proceedings would not absolved the petitioner of the civil liability in terms of section 83 (3) of the APCS Act. The learned Government Pleader has also stated that the petitioner was initially reinstated based on his representation that this Court ordered his reinstatement and that he initiated contempt proceedings, but the facts remained otherwise. According to him, it was only the Chairman of the Person-in-Charge Committee that had reinstated the petitioner without the approval of the Managing Committee. The learned Standing Counsel for the respondents 4 and 5 has also substantially submitted on the same lines as has been done by the learned Government Pleader. He has laid heavy stress on the dismissal of the appeal by the District Collector on 19.04.1994. The learned Standing Counsel for the respondents 4 and 5 has also substantially submitted on the same lines as has been done by the learned Government Pleader. He has laid heavy stress on the dismissal of the appeal by the District Collector on 19.04.1994. Referring to the order of reinstatement passed by the Person-in-Charge, the learned Standing Counsel would contend that by the time the order came to be passed, notification for conducting elections to the fourth respondent Society was issued, and as such, the said Person-in-Charge was not at all competent to direct reinstatement of the petitioner. According to the learned Standing Counsel, soon thereafter the Managing Committee came to be formed and the said Managing Committee refused to ratify the action of the Person-in-Charge through its resolution, dated 06.09.1995. The learned Standing Counsel has also drawn the attention of this Court to the fact that an aggrieved employee of the Society filed WP No. 13396 of 2002 questioning the order of reinstatement passed by the respondent Society. This Court through its Order dated 25-09-2002 allowed the writ petition. As per the learned Standing Counsel, the order in the said writ petition remained unchallenged. Frontal thrust in the submissions of the learned Standing Counsel has been placed on the issue of incompetence of the Person-in-Charge in directing the reinstatement of the petitioner, especially in the face of the dismissal of appeal preferred by the petitioner before the District Collector. Heard the learned counsel the petitioner and the learned Government Pleader for the 1st and 2nd respondents, as well as the learned Standing Counsel for the 4th and 5th respondents, apart from perusing the record. Indeed, indisputably, this case has a chequered history, having seen multiple rounds of litigation. Undeniably, the respondents have laid heavy stress on the aspect of the initial order of removal attaining finality in the face of the dismissal of the appeal by the appellate authority, the District Collector. At the same time, it cannot be forgotten that much water has flowed since then. After his initial appointment as a Clerk in 1982, the petitioner was subjected to an enquiry in 1993 under Section 15 (1) of the A.P. Co-operative Societies Act, 1964. On the submission of the report by the Co-operative Sub-Registrar that the petitioner was guilty of misappropriation of funds, through proceedings dated 10.12.1993, the Society removed the petitioner from service. After his initial appointment as a Clerk in 1982, the petitioner was subjected to an enquiry in 1993 under Section 15 (1) of the A.P. Co-operative Societies Act, 1964. On the submission of the report by the Co-operative Sub-Registrar that the petitioner was guilty of misappropriation of funds, through proceedings dated 10.12.1993, the Society removed the petitioner from service. Later, assailing the order of removal, the petitioner filed W.P.No.8547 of 1994. This Court through its order dated 03.10.1994 held that the termination of the petitioner from service on 10.12.1993 was in violation of principles of natural justice and that he should be subjected to a fresh enquiry after following the due procedure. Though reinstatement was ordered by this Court, later a review petition was filed by the fourth respondent in W.P.M.P.No.23557 of 1994. Through an Order dated 07.11.1994, this Court held that the petitioner could be continued under suspension till the enquiry was completed. In the interregnum, the petitioner is said to have filed an appeal before the District Collector questioning the order of removal. The Collector, as an appellate authority, dismissed the said appeal on 19.04.1994. The singular contention of the learned Government Pleader and the learned Standing Counsel for the respondents 1 to 5 is that this order, having never been challenged, attained finality. Be that it may, it is, however, pertinent to observe that in the entire scheme of A.P.Co-operative Societies Act, 1964, or the Rules made there under, I have not seen any provision empowering the District Collector to be an appellate authority against the order of dismissal or removal. It can however be gathered from the counter affidavit of the respondents 4 and 5 that the District Collector exercised the powers under Bye-law 12 (3) (a) of the Special Bye-laws of the Primary Agricultural Cooperative Society. Unfortunately, neither of the parties has placed before this Court a copy of any all those guidelines. At this juncture, as has been observed, it has to be seen that much water has flowed under judicial bridge. Unfortunately, neither of the parties has placed before this Court a copy of any all those guidelines. At this juncture, as has been observed, it has to be seen that much water has flowed under judicial bridge. After a couple more rounds of litigation before this Court, eventually, this Court in W.P.No.7640 of 2003 issued the following direction through its order dated 04.10.2004: "Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case and in view of the interim direction granted by this Court alone, the 7th respondent was removed from service; and I am of the view that it is just and proper for the 6th respondent-society to consider the case of the 7th respondent afresh keeping in view the subsequent events and pass appropriate orders in accordance with law." There is no gainsaying the fact that the petitioner initially suffered conviction in C.C.No.228 of 1997 on the file of the Additional Judicial Magistrate of the First Class, Yelamanchili for the alleged offence under Section 409 of I.P.C. Later, when the petitioner appealed against the conviction, in Crl.Appeal Nos.75 and 76 of 2002, the VIII Additional District and Sessions Judge (Fast Track Court), Visakhapatnam, reversed the findings of the Trial Court and acquitted him through Judgment dated 28.08.2003. Eventually, taking all those events into account, the Sub-Divisional Cooperative Officer, Paderu and Chairman, Person-in-Charge Committee of the fourth respondent Society, through proceedings dated 19.08.2005, reinstated the petitioner into service per the following order: "In view of the court orders and there is no civil, criminal actions against secretary are set aside by the Honourable High Court, A.P., Hyderabad. Orders in different W.P. Nos., as mentioned in the resolution No.1, Dated 18.08.2005, in detail by virtue of powers under special bye-law No.12 of special Bye Laws, retaining to Service conditions of employees of P.A.C.Ss’, the Chairperson, Person-in-charge Committee, Payakaraopeta, resolved to continue the services of Sri D.Babjee, Secretary from the services of Payakaraopeta, P.A.C.S., as direction of Honourable High Court of A.P., Hyderabad and Legal Opinion taken from the Asst. Govt. Govt. Pleader, Sri P.Nagabhushanam Secretary of the Society is directed to hand over the charge of the post of Secretary to Sri D.Babjee, Secretary of the Society as per the orders of Honourable High Court of A.P., Hyderabad in his W.P.No.7640/2003." The record further reveals that while the petitioner was continuing in service consequent upon his reinstatement in the manner stated supra, regular election was held for the fourth respondent Society and new Management came to hold the reins. As a result, the petitioner was refused to be paid any salary, thereby the Management not taking cognizance of the petitioner’s reinstatement effected by the Person-in-Charge Committee. Under those circumstances, the petitioner submitted his representation on 03.02.2006 ventilating his grievance about non-payment of salary. The new Management, however, through its proceedings dated 06.02.2006, rejected the claim of the petitioner for arrears of salary, apart from declining to continue him in service. Going by the averments in the counter affidavits filed by the respondents, it can be gathered that the incumbent Management of the respondent Society has insisted that in the face of the finality of the order dated 31.05.2000 of the District Collector in what is said to be an appeal preferred by the petitioner, the subsequent reinstatement by the Person-in-Charge Committee is unsustainable. At this juncture, it is apt to refer to the judicial dictum of a learned Division Bench of this Court in Government of Andhra Pradesh and others vs. K.Sethuraman and others. Their Lordships, addressing the issue of the competence of the Person-in-charge Committee, have stated thus: "Under S.31, the general body of a society shall constitute a committee in accordance with the bye-laws and entrust the management of the affairs of the society to such committee. The committee constituted by the general body is obviously an elected committee. Under the Second Proviso to S.31 in the case of a Society registered after the commencement of the Act, the persons who have signed the application for registration of the society, are empowered to appoint a committee to conduct the affairs of the society. This committee is referred to by the Full Bench as a nominated committee. Under S.32(7)(a) the Registrar is conferred power to appoint person or persons to manage the affairs of the Society for a particular period. This committee is referred to by the Full Bench as a nominated committee. Under S.32(7)(a) the Registrar is conferred power to appoint person or persons to manage the affairs of the Society for a particular period. Having regard to the provisions referred to above, it is urged by the learned Government Pleader that whatever may be the nature of the appointment of the Committee, either by nomination as contemplated under the Second Proviso to S.31, or bye-laws of the Society or by the Registrar under S.32(7)(a), when such a committee or person or persons are appointed to manage the affairs of the society, they come within the meaning of the word ‘committee’ by whatever name they may be called. The Full Bench has categorically laid down that there is no difference between an elected committee and a nominated committee so far as S.21-C is concerned. (Vide Para-15 of the judgment at page 233 (of 1976-1 APLJ): (at Pp.346-47 of AIR). We find force in the contention of the learned Government Pleader that the person or persons in charge appointed by the Registrar to manage the affairs of the society fall within the definition of ‘Committee’. On the other hand, it is contended by the learned counsel for the respondent that a committee nominated under the second proviso to S.31 functions independently and is not subject to the control of the Registrar, whereas the person or persons in charge appointed under S.32(7)(a) by the Registrar to manage the affairs of the Society have to function subject to the control of the Registrar enc. as such the person or persons so appointed cannot be said to come within the definition of the word ‘committee’." What is to be further appreciated is that the order of reinstatement dated 19.08.2005 passed by the Person-in-Charge Committee has not been set aside by the succeeding Managing Committee; it has simply refused to take cognizance of it after some time. Under these circumstances, as the record reveals, the petitioner went on appealing to the respondents 1 to 3 through his representations, dated 06.02.2006, etc. The grievance of the petitioner is that, despite his repeated representations and oral request by the time of filing of the writ petition, the respondents 1 to 3 did not choose to address his grievance. Under these circumstances, as the record reveals, the petitioner went on appealing to the respondents 1 to 3 through his representations, dated 06.02.2006, etc. The grievance of the petitioner is that, despite his repeated representations and oral request by the time of filing of the writ petition, the respondents 1 to 3 did not choose to address his grievance. The petitioner contends that the action of the fourth respondent Society is grossly in violation of the provisions of the A.P. Cooperative Societies Act and those of the A.P. Shops and Establishments Act, apart from being violative of Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution of India. In the absence of any order which is quasi-judicial nature, the petitioner could not be expected to go before the authority provided under either the A.P. Cooperative Societies Act or under the A.P. Shops and Establishments Act, inasmuch as the order dated 06.02.2006 of the fourth respondent society is a simple negation of the order dated 19.08.2005 passed by the Person-in-Charge Committee. In other words, as has already been stated, the incumbent Management of the fourth respondent Society simply chose to ignore the earlier orders of reinstatement and only this statement of mind of the Management was communicated to the petitioner through its order of rejection dated 06.02.2006. Under those circumstances, this Court is of the considered view that the respondent authorities having been fastened with statutory responsibility ought to have acted on the representations of the petitioner and passed appropriate orders on the representations of the petitioner. It can be seen that there has been persistent inaction on the part of the respondent authorities. Under these circumstances, instead of usurping the administrative power and discretion of the respondents 1 to 3, this Court desires to direct the said authorities to consider the representation of the petitioner dated 06.02.2006, or in the alternative, if the said representation, owing to efflux of time, could not be traced, the respondent authority may direct the petitioner to file a fresh representation and thereafter consider the same on merits to pass appropriate orders on the issue of the fourth respondent Society in not permitting the petitioner to discharge his duties and thereby not paying his salary. In the light of the inordinate delay that has already occurred, it is expected that the respondent authorities may expedite the process and pass appropriate orders within two weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. If fresh representation is required to be submitted by the petitioner, the appropriate orders shall be passed by the authorities within two weeks after the submission of the said representation by the petitioner. It is further made clear that, at the time of passing orders on representation of the petitioner, the respondent authorities are expected to take into consideration the observations of this Court in the present disposition. With the above observations, the writ petition stands allowed. There shall be no order as to costs. As a sequel to it, miscellaneous petitions, if any pending in this writ petition, shall stand closed.