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2014 DIGILAW 770 (BOM)

Agnelo Filomeno Caetano Jose Menezes v. Francisco Rosario Menezes

2014-03-21

S.B.SHUKRE

body2014
JUDGMENT 1. This petition is directed against the judgment and order of the District Judge-2, South Goa, Margao passed on 8.10.2013 thereby dismissing the appeal filed by the petitioners against the order passed on 6.4.2013 by the Civil Judge Junior Division, Margao in Regular Civil Suit No. 179/2012/F rejecting their application for grant of temporary injunction. 2. The petitioners are the husband and wife and respondents are also husband and wife. The petitioner no.1 is the brother of respondent no.1. It is the case of the petitioners that they filed a suit for eviction, recovery of possession, mense profits and other consequential reliefs against the respondents. They submitted that the suit property known as “Gonbhata” alias “Kincamotilem” situated at Maina Curtolim, bearing Land Registration No. 165 presently surveyed under No. 488/16 was purchased by the petitioner no.1 together with his three brothers including respondent no.1 and Manuel and Francisco Santana Menezes by sale deed dated 27.7.1970. The suit property was having an area of 1200 square metres and was purchased by them from Antonio Milagres Rebello and his wife Yevette Fernandes e Rebello. There were differences as to ownership of the land and therefore, petitioner no.1 requested his other brothers including respondent no.1 to convey to him their shares of land to which they all agreed and accordingly conveyed and transferred their shares totaling to 900 square metres in favour of petitioner no.1 by a sale deed (Deed of Sale Illiquid and Undivided Rights) dated 13.6.2007. 3. The petitioners submitted that out of goodwill they permitted other brothers to occupy the portion of the house on the suit property till they were called upon to vacate and when they were requested to vacate the house, they refused to do so. The petitioners further submitted that they wanted to construct a compound wall to protect their property but were obstructed by respondent no.1 from carrying out construction. 4. Respondents resisted the suit by filing written statement denying the entire case of the petitioners. They submitted that they were co-owners of the suit property which was purchased by Jose Menezes and his wife Maria Piedade Etelvina Luis e Menezes, who are the parents of the petitioner no.1 and respondent no.1. 4. Respondents resisted the suit by filing written statement denying the entire case of the petitioners. They submitted that they were co-owners of the suit property which was purchased by Jose Menezes and his wife Maria Piedade Etelvina Luis e Menezes, who are the parents of the petitioner no.1 and respondent no.1. They submitted that consideration for the purchase of the suit property was paid by Maria Claudina Adelina Menezes e Coelho and Maria Cacilda Menezes e D'Souza, the sisters of petitioner no.1 and respondent no.1. They further submitted that petitioner no.1 taking advantage of his name which contains the words 'Jose Menezes', bearing similarity to the name of their father, played mischief and falsely claimed that petitioner no.1 used his own money for construction of the house in the suit property. They submitted that house was actually constructed by their father. They also submitted that petitioner no.1 was approaching real estate developers and was trying to dispose of the suit property. On these grounds they prayed for dismissal of the suit. 5. Along with the suit the petitioners filed application for grant of temporary injunction which too was resisted by the respondents by filing their specific reply of denial. 6. After hearing both the sides and considering the material available on record, the trial Court dismissed the application on the grounds, one of which was that one co-owner could not restrain the other co-owner from using any property. Petitioners brought the matter in appeal before the District Judge, 2, South Goa where it was numbered as MCA No. 47 of 2013. Learned District Judge, after hearing both the sides and considering the material available on record held that trial Court has correctly exercised its jurisdiction and thus by judgment and order passed on 8.10.2013 dismissed the appeal. 7. I have heard learned counsel for the petitioners Shri C. Fernandes and Shri C. A. Coutinho, learned counsel for the respondents. With their assistance, I have carefully gone through the impugned judgment and orders and also the paper book of the appeal. 8. It is submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioners that there is no dispute about principle of law that injunction cannot be granted at the instance of one co-owner against another co-owner of the property. With their assistance, I have carefully gone through the impugned judgment and orders and also the paper book of the appeal. 8. It is submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioners that there is no dispute about principle of law that injunction cannot be granted at the instance of one co-owner against another co-owner of the property. He submitted that in the instant case, there is material establishing prima facie that the other co-owners had sold and transferred their illiquid undivided rights corresponding to the area of 900 square metres in the suit property admittedly admeasuring 1200 square metres by virtue of sale deed dated 13/06/2007 in favour of petitioner no.1 and therefore, petitioner no.1 has become full owner of the suit property. He further submitted that the petitioners being prima facie full owners of the suit property, in the instant matter, there was no question involved of considering grant of injunction in favour of one co-owner and against other co-owners of the property. He submits that both the Courts below have failed to appreciate this striking feature of the instant case which makes it different from a case where there is a question involved of granting injunction at the behest of one co-owner against other co-owners of the property. In support, he has also taken me through the deed of sale of illiquid and undivided rights dated 13.6.2007. 9. Learned counsel for the respondents has submitted that basically the suit that has been filed by the petitioners is for eviction, recovery of possession, mesne profits and other consequential reliefs. He submits that the respondents are admittedly residing in the suit property. He further submits that claim of the petitioners that dwelling house in the suit property was constructed by the petitioner no.1 out of his own money is in dispute. He further submits that it is the specific case of the respondents that house was constructed by the father of petitioner no.1 and other brothers. Therefore, according to him, in a case of this nature wherein relief of recovery of possession has been sought by the petitioners against the respondents, any temporary injunction as sought for by the petitioners including the injunction for restraining the respondents from interfering with the construction of the compound wall in the suit property is likely to be misused by the petitioners to illegally evict the respondents from the suit property. He has also submitted that the petitioners have not established even prima facie that the house on the suit property was constructed by them and that all the rights to suit property have been transferred to them and physical partition of the suit property is yet to take place and therefore, the trial Court as well as first appellate Court have rightly rejected the application for grant of temporary injunction filed by the petitioners. 10. The trial Court, as seen from its order dated 6.4.2013, has prima facie found that the respondents and other two brothers had transferred to the petitioners 3/4th illiquid undivided rights corresponding to an area of 900 square metres in the property admeasuring 1200 square metres in all by virtue of sale deed of 2007. But, the trial Court has also found that as per the own case of the petitioners, the respondents being in possession of the suit house and suit property for a minimum period of 5 years before filing of the suit, it may not be appropriate to grant temporary injunction in favour of the petitioners and against the respondents. The trial Court found that since the respondents were in possession of the suit house and suit property for a considerable period of time, any injunction restraining the respondents from interfering in any manner in the suit property including restrainment in causing of obstruction to the construction of compound wall would amount to granting the petitioners a warrant of possession against the respondents at the stage of temporary injunction itself, which law would never permit. 11. The first appellate Court, while upholding the said order of the trial Court reasoned that since the respondents still had the right in the suit property, same being not partitioned before execution of deed of sale in the year 2007, it could not be said that the petitioners established existence of prima facie case in their favour. Upon such a reasoning the First Appellate Court dismissed the appeal. 12. The orders of the trial Court and the first Appellate Court have been challenged by the petitioners by filing writ petition invoking jurisdiction of this Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India. Jurisdiction of this Court under these articles, it is well settled, is limited. 12. The orders of the trial Court and the first Appellate Court have been challenged by the petitioners by filing writ petition invoking jurisdiction of this Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India. Jurisdiction of this Court under these articles, it is well settled, is limited. It cannot be exercised in a manner so as to re appreciate the evidence or material available on record as if it is a fact finding Court. The High Court can interfere with the orders of the Courts below only when there is manifest error of law or manifest violation of fundamental rights or statutory provisions or perversity apparent on the face of the impugned orders. The jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India is extraordinary in nature and has to be exercised only in exceptional cases wherein there is grave miscarriage of justice resulting from violation of fundamental rights or breach of statutory provisions or serious error of law or perversity in the action complained of or the order impugned. 13. It can also not be forgotten that while exercising writ jurisdiction, it will not be open for this Court to substitute its view with the view taken by the Courts below upon a reasoning that had it been the Court of fact, it would have come to a different conclusion on the basis of the facts and circumstances of the case. It must be shown, for invoking extra ordinary jurisdiction of this Court, that the view taken by the Courts below is absolutely not supported by any material or evidence on record or is based upon some extraneous facts or is in violation of some right or legal principles or is the result of non consideration of material facts on record. 14. These are the principles which are required to be borne in mind while examining the legality, correctness or otherwise of the discretionary relief of temporary injunction founded upon sound principles of equity, fairness and justice. Such relief cannot be granted only because there is an existence of prima facie case in favour of the parties seeking such discretionary relief. The Court is also required to see whether any balance of convenience exists in favour of the parties and whether any irreparable loss would be caused to the parties upon refusal to grant injunctory relief. 15. Such relief cannot be granted only because there is an existence of prima facie case in favour of the parties seeking such discretionary relief. The Court is also required to see whether any balance of convenience exists in favour of the parties and whether any irreparable loss would be caused to the parties upon refusal to grant injunctory relief. 15. On going through the impugned orders and paper-book of the present case, I find that even though prima facie it is established by the petitioners that respondent no.1 and 2 and other brothers had transferred their 3/4th illiquid undivided rights in the suit property to the extent of 900 square metres out of the suit property admeasuring 1200 square metres in total, petitioners have failed to satisfy two other criteria required for grant of discretionary relief of temporary injunction to them. Admittedly, respondents are also in possession of the suit property for more than 5 years and therefore, they have right to possess and enjoy the suit property till the time they are evicted from there in accordance with law. In such a situation, if any temporary injunction is granted against them, it is likely to cause inconvenience to the rights of the respondents to possess and enjoy the property till the time they are evicted from there by due process. On the other hand, if the relief of temporary injunction is refused to the petitioners it would not cause any inconvenience to them as they are also jointly possessing the suit property. So the factor of balance of convenience does not go in favour of the petitioners. Similarly third factor of irreparable loss also does not appear to be in favour of the petitioners as petitioners have not demonstrated in any manner as to how the suit property would be endangered if compound wall is not constructed. In other words, this is a case wherein the petitioners have failed to establish the existence of other two factors in their favour. In these circumstances, if any injunctory relief as prayed for by the petitioners is to be granted, there is every possibility of misconstruing the reliefs as warrant of possession by the petitioners, as rightly held by the trial Court. Thus, I see neither any perversity nor patent illegality in the impugned orders. In these circumstances, if any injunctory relief as prayed for by the petitioners is to be granted, there is every possibility of misconstruing the reliefs as warrant of possession by the petitioners, as rightly held by the trial Court. Thus, I see neither any perversity nor patent illegality in the impugned orders. Therefore, this is not a case, which passes the test for interference in exercise of writ jurisdiction of this Court. 16. In the circumstances, I find no merit in this petition. No interference with the impugned judgment and orders is warranted. Petition deserves to be dismissed. Petition is accordingly dismissed. 17. Rule is discharged.