JUDGMENT RAGHUBIR DASH, J. 1. This Second Appeal is in challenge of the judgment dated 10.01.2007 passed by the learned Additional District Judge, Angul in R.F.A. No. 5 of 2006 dismissing the First Appeal arising out of the judgment passed by the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division), Angul on 21.03.2006 in Civil Suit No. 69 of 2002. 2. Plaintiffs are the Appellants and defendants are the Respondents in this Second Appeal. Plaintiff No.1 Kalinga Institute of Mining Engineering & Technology (KIMET) is an Engineering School established in the year 1989 pursuant to a registered Deed of Trust executed on 22.08.1989. The Institution is affiliated to All India Council of Technical Education (AICTE). Plaintiff Nos. 2 and 3 and defendant Nos. 1 to 5 are the founder trustees constituting the Board of Trustees. Plaintiff No. 2 (since dead) was unanimously elected as Secretary of the Trust Board. The Institute (P-1) was initially represented by the Secretary of the Trust Board (P-2). P-3 and P-4 are two other members of the Trust Board. They filed the suit for declaration that plaintiff No.2 is the Secretary of the Trust Board and as such he is entitled to manage the administration of the institute through members of the Trust Board till formation of a Governing Body in accordance with the guidelines of AICTE, with further declaration that defendant Nos. 1 to 5 have ceased to be members of the Trust Board and as such they be permanently restrained from interfering in the administration of the institute. 3. Shorn of unnecessary details, the plaintiffs’ case may be narrated. D-1 to D-3, as members of the Trust Board, resigned on 30.04.1990, 01.04.1990 and 27.04.1990, respectively, and their resignations were accepted by the Trust Board under resolution dated 26.12.1990. D-4 and D-5 were ousted from the Trust Board due to their continuous absence. After the resignation as well as ouster of the defendants the Trust Board was left with only two trustees, i.e. P-2 and P-3. But, at a later stage, the defendants, who had either resigned or were ousted, formed an unholy combination and in a fictitious meeting held on 10.01.1993 passed a resolution removing P2 from the post of Secretary of the Trust Board and appointed D-1, K.C. Nath, as the Secretary. In the same meeting resolution was passed permitting D-1 to D-3 to withdraw their resignations. In the same meeting resolution was passed permitting D-1 to D-3 to withdraw their resignations. Thereafter, on the strength of such resolution they started creating disturbance in the day-to-day affairs of the institution. Hence, the suit. 4. D-1 to D-5 filed written statement jointly. D-6 did not choose to file any W.S. In their written statement D-1 to D-5 have contended that in April, 1990 when it was noticed that P-2, as the Secretary of the Trust Board, was not discharging his duty properly and was not rendering accounts to the Trust Board, the formers submitted purported resignations to put pressure on P-2 to discharge his duty properly. But, instead of mending his modus operandi, P-2 started misappropriating funds of the institute for which one F.I.R. was lodged against him. On 25.10.1992 as per the request of other members of the Trust Board, D-1 to D-3 withdrew their purported resignations. In the meeting of the Trust Board held on 10.01.1993, which was attended by all the members except P-2, withdrawal of resignations of D-1 to D-3 was accepted, plaintiff No.2 was removed from the post of the Secretary and D-1 was requested to take charge of that post. 5. During pendency of the suit Purna Chandra Pradhan, (P-2) who was representing the institute, died. His son Lambodar Pradhan (P-4) filed a petition under Order 1 Rule 10, C.P.C. to be impleaded as a party claiming that he had been nominated as a permanent trustee/member of the Trust Board. Objection was filed contending that son of deceased plaintiff No.2 being not duly appointed as a trustee by the Trust Board he could not be permitted to represent the trust. The Principal of the institute filed a separate petition to be impleaded as a plaintiff. Other legal representatives of deceased P-2 also filed a separate petition for being substituted and arrayed as plaintiffs. Subsequently, these legal representatives took the stand that they would have no objection if Bansidhar Pradhan’s petition be allowed. Learned trial court vide order dated 30.7.2005 allowed Lambodar Prdahan’s petition and arrayed him as P-4 to carry forward the suit observing, inter alia, that there was no defect with regard to his appointment as a trustee. 6. Having analysed the evidence learned trial court has concluded that D-3 to D-5 are still continuing as members of the Trust Board but D-1 and D-2 have ceased to be members thereof. 6. Having analysed the evidence learned trial court has concluded that D-3 to D-5 are still continuing as members of the Trust Board but D-1 and D-2 have ceased to be members thereof. It has further held that Lambodar Pradhan (P-4) having not been duly inducted as a trustee/member of the Trust Board he has no locus standi to represent the institution. 7. Being aggrieved, P-1 and P-4 preferred R.F.A. No. 5 of 2006 and D-1 to D-5 preferred R.F.A. No. 9 of 2006. Learned lower Appellate Court dismissed both the R.F.As. However, while dismissing R.F.A. No. 5 of 2006 it observed that not only D-1 and D-2, but also D-3 had ceased to be members of the Trust Board. It concurred with trial court’s finding that D-4 and D-5 are still continuing as trustees. So far as the status of P-4 is concerned, learned lower Appellate Court held that his very induction to the Trust Board as a member being not legal, he had no cause of action to proceed with the suit. 8. The Second Appeal has been admitted on the following substantial questions of law: (i) Whether in view of the resolution dated 15.03.1990 (Ext.23) and resolution dated 26.12.1990 (Ext.25) of Trust Board of KIMET ousting Defendant No.4, Bansidhar Pradhan and Defendant No.5, Gobind Ch. Nayak from the Trust Board were legal and valid in view of the facts that the said resolutions have an evidentiary value under Section 35 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 and that no rebuttal evidence was adduced on behalf of the defendants to dislodge the value of the aforesaid resolution? (ii) Whether both the courts below committed gross error of law by coming to a finding that the plaintiff No.4, Lambodar Pradhan is not a trustee of KIMET and has no locus standi to file the suit in view of the order dated 30.07.2005 passed by the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division), Angul in C.S. No. 69 of 2002 wherein it was held that Defendant Nos. 1 to 5 had ceased to be members of Trust Board by virtue of acceptance of their resolutions and ouster and that plaintiff Nos. 4, Lambodar Pradhan was legally accepted as a trustee in place of deceased, Gundicha Behera (Plaintiff No.2). 1 to 5 had ceased to be members of Trust Board by virtue of acceptance of their resolutions and ouster and that plaintiff Nos. 4, Lambodar Pradhan was legally accepted as a trustee in place of deceased, Gundicha Behera (Plaintiff No.2). Could the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division), Angul reverse its own finding given in order dated 30.7.2005 while passing the final judgment even though the order dated 30.7.2005 was not challenged by the defendants in any higher forum and the said order became final and binding between the parties? (iii) Whether the courts below are justified in giving a finding that fraud and interpolation were committed by the plaintiffs while ousting defendant Nos. 3, 4 and 5 from the Trust Board in absence of any particulars of fraud being alleged in the pleading and evidence led to that effect? 9. Lengthy arguments were advanced by both the sides on question No. 2. It is argued by the learned counsel for the Appellants that once the learned trial court, after taking into consideration the rival submissions of the parties, passed order dated 30.7.2005 permitting P-4 to continue the suit observing that he was legally accepted as a trustee, subsequently, while disposing of the suit it could not have reversed its own finding recorded in the order dated 30.7.2005 observing that P-4 was not duly inducted as a trustee and had no locus standi to continue the suit, more so when the order dated 30.7.2005 was not challenged by the defendants in any higher forum and thereby allowed it to attain finality. Learned counsel for the Respondent No.4 has argued justifying the trial court’s stand submitting that the finding recorded in order dated 30.07.2005 is a mere prima facie satisfaction on the induction of plaintiff No.4 as a trustee to allow him to continue the suit which does not operate as res judicata against any finding on merits of the case upon examination of the entire evidence adduced during the trial. 10. In support of his contention learned counsel for the Appellants has cited the judgment in Muthiah Chettiar vs. Krishna Dossvaru, AIR 1921 Madras 599 (FB) and Venkatarama vs. Persurama, AIR 1948 Madras 81 wherein it is observed that an order passed under Order 22 Rule 10 of C.P.C. is appealable. 10. In support of his contention learned counsel for the Appellants has cited the judgment in Muthiah Chettiar vs. Krishna Dossvaru, AIR 1921 Madras 599 (FB) and Venkatarama vs. Persurama, AIR 1948 Madras 81 wherein it is observed that an order passed under Order 22 Rule 10 of C.P.C. is appealable. Relying on this observation, learned counsel submits that the respondents-defendants having not preferred appeal against order dated 30.7.2005, the same had become final and, therefore, the learned trial court could not have reviewed that order while passing the judgment. In support of his further contention that order dated 30.7.2005 of the learned trial court accepting plaintiff No.4 as a trustee is not an interlocutory or interim order but a final order which is conclusive and could not have been reopened by the learned trial court itself or even by the learned lower Appellate Court, reliance has been placed on several decisions including judgment of the apex Court in Chhabil Das vs. Pappu, (2006) 12 SCC 41 . In that case an order under Order 22 Rule 5, C.P.C. allowing the Applicant to be impleaded as legal representative of the deceased Plaintiff was passed observing that the Applicant was adopted by the deceased. It being not challenged in higher forum had attained finality. Therefore, it was held that the Defendant-Appellant could not be permitted to raise question in the Second Appeal that the adoption of the Applicant was per se illegal and he could not represent the estate of the deceased Plaintiff. In Kali Pachi and Others vs. Ramalekshmi Ammal Muthammal and Others, AIR 1953 TRAV-CO. 158 it is observed that on a petition under Order 22 Rule 5, C.P.C. if the question as to who is legal representative has been determined before proceeding with the suit after hearing the parties thereto, the Court’s decision on that question is conclusive as between the parties to such a proceeding so far as the particular case is concerned and the parties to that proceeding cannot be allowed to question that order at any subsequent stage of the suit. In Rabindra N. Das vs. Santosh Kumar Mitra and Others, AIR 1975 Calcutta 381, it is held that an order for substitution passed under Order 22 Rule 5, C.P.C. is not in the nature of an interlocutory order and is conclusive and binding. 11. In Rabindra N. Das vs. Santosh Kumar Mitra and Others, AIR 1975 Calcutta 381, it is held that an order for substitution passed under Order 22 Rule 5, C.P.C. is not in the nature of an interlocutory order and is conclusive and binding. 11. Learned counsel for Respondent No.4, on the other hand, has cited Suresh Kumar Bansal vs. Krishna Bansal & Another, AIR 2010 SC 344 . In this reported case the plaintiff had instituted a suit for eviction and recovery of arrears of rent. During pendency of the suit the plaintiff died. After his death his widow filed an application for substitution and the brother of the deceased plaintiff also filed an application for substitution on the strength of a will allegedly executed by the deceased plaintiff in his favour. The learned Civil Judge allowed the application filed by the widow and rejected the other one observing that the will seemed to be suspicious. The dispute between the widow and the brother of the deceased plaintiff on the question as to who is the legal representative of the deceased went up to the apex Court and the Hon’ble apex Court observed as follows: It is now well settled that determination of the question as to who is the legal representatives of the deceased plaintiff or defendant under Order XXII Rule 5 of the Code of Civil Procedure is only for the purposes of bringing legal representatives on record for the conducting of those legal proceedings only and does not operate as res judicata and the inter se dispute between the rival legal representatives has to be independently tried and decided in probate proceedings. 12. Most of the judgments referred to above are on the provisions contained in Order 22 Rule 5, C.P.C. But the order dated 30.7.2005 permitting the appellant to continue the suit is not under Order 22 Rule 5. 12. Most of the judgments referred to above are on the provisions contained in Order 22 Rule 5, C.P.C. But the order dated 30.7.2005 permitting the appellant to continue the suit is not under Order 22 Rule 5. That order was passed on the appellant’s application nomenclatured as one under Order 22 Rule 10, C.P.C. But, the appropriate provision under which it can be brought is Order 22 Rule 10, C.P.C. In Roshan Lal Kunja Mal vs. Kapur Chand, AIR 1960 Punj 382, referred to in Smt. Pushpa Kumari vs. Dewan Chand Trust, New Delhi, AIR 1983 Delhi 91, a Division Bench has observed that in a representative suit by trustees if some of the trustees die during pendency of a suit and new trustees are appointed they are not representatives of the old trustees within the meaning of Order 22 Rule 3 of the Code. The new trustees are added as parties under Order 22 Rule 10 of the Code. In Rikhu Dev vs. Som Dass, AIR 1975 SC 2159 , the principle on which Order 22 Rule 10 is based is explained in the following words: This rule is based on the principle that trial of a suit cannot be brought to an end merely because the interest of a party in the subject matter of the suit has devolved upon another during the pendency of the suit but that suit may be continued against the person acquiring the interest with the leave of the Court. When a suit is brought by or against a person in a representative capacity and there is a devolution of the interest of the representative, the rule that has to be applied is Order 22, Rule 10 and not Rule 3 or 4, whether the devolution takes place as a consequence of death or for any other reason. Order 22, Rule 10, is not confined to devolution of interest of a party by death; it also applies if the head of the mutt or manager of the temple resigns his office or is removed from office. In such a case the successor to the head of the mutt or to the manager of the temple may be substituted as a party under this rule. In such a case the successor to the head of the mutt or to the manager of the temple may be substituted as a party under this rule. The word interest which is mentioned in this rule means interest in the property i.e. the subject matter of the suit and the interest is the interest of the person who was the party to the suit. In Amit Kumar Shaw vs. Farida Khatoon, AIR 2005 SC 2209 , it is held that under Order 22 Rule 10, no detailed inquiry at the stage of granting leave is contemplated. The Court has only to be prima facie satisfied for exercising its discretion in granting leave for continuing the suit by or against the person on whom the interest has devolved by assignment or devolution. The question about the existence and validity of the assignment or devolution can be considered at the final hearing of the proceedings. The Court has only to be prima facie satisfied for exercising its discretion in granting leave for continuing the suit. 13. The suit at hand was initially filed on behalf of the Institute represented by one of the trustees. The Trustee representing the Trust and another Trustee were also arrayed as plaintiffs in their capacity as Trustees. Both of them died during pendency of the suit. Thereafter, A-4 approached the trial court to be arrayed as a party to continue the suit on behalf of the Institute claiming that he was a duly inducted Trustee. Learned trial court recording its prima facie satisfaction permitted him to represent the Institute and to continue the suit. Consequent upon his introduction as a party the plaint was not sought to be amended. So, the relief for declaration that P-2 is the Secretary of the Trust Board and as such he is entitled to manage the affairs of the Institution through the members of the Trust Board were rendered redundant. Similarly, the defendants did not amend their written statement incorporating pleadings challenging the validity of A-4’s induction as a Trustee. No issue was framed on that count. Under such circumstances, there is little scope to delve into the validity or legality of A-4’s induction as a Trustee. Similarly, the defendants did not amend their written statement incorporating pleadings challenging the validity of A-4’s induction as a Trustee. No issue was framed on that count. Under such circumstances, there is little scope to delve into the validity or legality of A-4’s induction as a Trustee. But, so far the order of permission to continue the suit is concerned, after passing of the order dated 30.7.2005 neither the trial court nor the lower appellate court could have taken a stand which is contrary to the prima facie satisfaction recorded in the said order. Therefore, the observation of the learned courts below that Appellant No. 4 has no locus standi to continue the suit is not sustainable in law. To this extent, question No. (ii) is answered in favour of the Appellant No. 4. 14. Question No. (iii) is on the absence of pleadings giving detailed particulars of fraud allegedly committed by the plaintiffs while ousting defendant Nos. 3 to 5 from the Trust Board. Neither in the written statement there is any challenge to the validity of the ousting of D.3 to 5 from the Trust Board on the ground of fraud nor any finding has been recorded by the learned courts below that there was fraud committed by plaintiff No.2 to oust the defendants from the Trust Board. It is simply pleaded in the W.S. that there were interpolations of some documents. Such a plea is not tantamount to plea of fraud. Therefore, this question does not deserve any consideration. 15. Question No. (i) is on the evidentiary value of resolutions dated 15.3.1990 (Ext.23) and dated 26.12.1990 (Ext.25) of the Trust Board ousting D.4 and D.5 from the Trust Board. Both the learned courts below have exhaustively dealt with the evidence, including Exts.23 and 25, while considering the validity of alleged ouster of D.4 and D.5. Section 35 of the Evidence Act deals with relevancy of entry in any public record or electronic record made by a public servant in performance of his duty. In order to render any document admissible under Section 35 it must be shown that the entry relied on is one in a public or official book, Register or record made by a public servant in discharge of his official duty and the entry relied on states fact in issue or relevant fact. Such entries are presumed to be correct unless rebutted. Such entries are presumed to be correct unless rebutted. Learned counsel for the respondent No.4 has argued that the entry made in the Resolution Book, from which the two resolutions in question have been exhibited, are not made by a public servant and the resolution book itself is not a public or official book, Register or record as contemplated under Section 35 of the Evidence Act. Learned counsel for the Appellants, on the other hand, argues that the Trust Board being a creature of law under the Indian Trust Act, 1882, the Resolution Books maintained by it come within the ambit of Section 35 of the Evidence Act. Admittedly, the plaintiff No.1 Institution is a private Institution run by Trustees constituting a Trust Board. Resolutions passed by the members of the Trust Board are found recorded in a Register. The members of the Trust Board are not public servants. The Resolution Book, therefore, cannot be treated as public or other official book, Register or record maintained by a public servant. Section 35 of the Evidence Act is not applicable to Exts.23 and 25. 16. On behalf of the appellants a petition has been filed for production and acceptance of additional evidence. It is asserted that the documents could not be filed before either of the learned courts below as those were not available for production. It is further claimed that the additional evidence is intended to be adduced only to show that Respondent Nos. 4 and 5, being involved in various crimes including misappropriation of funds of the Institute (P.1), are unfit to continue as Trustees even if they succeed in this Second Appeal. This prayer is opposed to by the respondents contending that the documents intended to be proved as additional evidence have no bearing on examining the correctness and/or legality of the impugned judgment as well as in answering any of the substantial questions in this Second Appeal. The following observation made by the apex Court in Union of India vs. Ibrahim Uddin, (2012) 8 SCC 148 is relevant for the purpose of guidance. An application under Order 41 Rule 27 CPC is to be considered at the time of hearing of appeal on merits so as to find out whether the documents and/or the evidence sought to be adduced have any relevance/bearing on the issues involved. An application under Order 41 Rule 27 CPC is to be considered at the time of hearing of appeal on merits so as to find out whether the documents and/or the evidence sought to be adduced have any relevance/bearing on the issues involved. The admissibility of additional evidence does not depend upon the relevancy to the issue on hand, or on the fact, whether the applicant had an opportunity for adducing such evidence at an earlier stage or not, but it depends upon whether or not the appellate court requires the evidence sought to be adduced to enable it to pronounce judgment or for any other substantial cause. The true test, therefore is, whether the appellate court is able to pronounce judgment on the materials before it without taking into consideration the additional evidence sought to be adduced. Such occasion would arise only if on examining the evidence as it stands the court comes to the conclusion that some inherent lacuna or defect becomes apparent to the court. 17. In view of this observation, it is to be examined as to whether the evidence sought to be adduced are required to enable this Court to pronounce judgment or whether this Court is able to pronounce judgment on materials already on record without taking into consideration the additional evidence sought to be adduced. The documents sought to be produced as additional evidence are intended to show that these are F.I.Rs. as well as allegations and counter-allegations against R.4 and R.5 on their alleged involvement in criminal cases, various scams and misappropriation of funds of the Institute. It is argued by the learned counsel for the appellants that if these documents are taken into consideration then the Court, even if it confirms the findings of the learned courts below that these two respondents are still continuing as members of the Trust Board, would definitely come to a conclusion that R.4 and 5 being involved in serious crimes/scams are unfit to be continued as Trustees. The suit has been filed for declaring that the defendants have ceased to be the members of the Trust Board and therefore, they have no right to interfere in the administration of the institution. The suit is not filed for declaring them disqualified to be members of the Trust Board on grounds including their involvement in serious crimes as well as various scams. The suit is not filed for declaring them disqualified to be members of the Trust Board on grounds including their involvement in serious crimes as well as various scams. Therefore, the documents sought to be adduced as additional evidence are not required for either answering any of the substantial questions of law or enabling the Court to pronounce judgment in this appeal which can be pronounced on the materials already placed before on record. The contentions raised by the learned counsel for the Respondents that the documents sought to be adduced as additional evidence are totally irrelevant and have no bearing on the dispute between the parties is, therefore, accepted. 18. At the closure of argument learned counsel for Respondent No.5 has made a submission supported by the learned counsel for the appellant that even after disposal of the Second Appeal the Collector who vide order dated 3.5.2011 has been directed by this Court to act as Receiver in respect of the appellant institution should be allowed to continue to act as Receiver instead of handing over management of the institution in the hands of any of the Trustees till the Department of Industries, Government of Orissa forms a Governing Body of the institution in accordance with the guidelines framed by AICTE. During pendency of this appeal, finding that there was scramble amongst the Trustees to take over management of the institution, order was passed on 3.5.2011 directing the Collector, Angul to act as Receiver in respect of the institution and take charge of the entire management of the said institution including operation of the institution’s Bank Account as well as exercise of financial power for payment of the salary of the staff members with observation that the interim arrangement should continue till the appeal was taken up for hearing. In support of the contention that the Receiver can be continued even after disposal of the Second Appeal reliance has been placed on the decision in Hiralal Patni vs. Loonkaran Sethiya, AIR 1962 SC 21 wherein it is observed that the Court has ample power to continue the Receiver even after the final decree if the exigencies of the case so require. In the said reported case Hon’ble apex Court have referred to some authoritative Text Books on Receivers such as Halsbury’s Laws of England; Kerr on Receivers; High on the law of Receivers and The Law Relating to Receivers in British India wherefrom the following principles on the duration of appointment of Receiver by the Court emerge. When a Receiver is appointed for a limited time his office determines on the expiration of that time without any further order of the Court and if the appointment is until judgment or further order it is brought to an end by the judgment passed in the case. In the judgment the Court may however provide for the continuance of the Receiver, but such appointment is regarded as a new appointment. The functions of a Receiver usually terminate with the termination of the litigation in which he was appointed. Although as between the parties to the litigation his functions have terminated with the determination of the suit, he is still amenable to the court as its officer until he has complied with its directions as to the disposal of the funds which he has received during the course of his Receivership. The court, however, has ample power to continue the Receiver even after the final decree if the exigencies of the case so demand. In this case the Receiver was appointed till the hearing in the appeal. Considering the nature of dispute between the parties and the way the case is going to be finally disposed of, this Court does not find the existence of any exigency to continue the Receiver after disposal of this Second Appeal. 19. The end result of the lis is that R-4 and R-5 are not found to have ceased to be the members of the Trust Board. As regards the status of Appellant No.4 the plaint having not been amended to incorporate any relief for declaration of his status as a member of the Trust Board, his status cannot be declared in this suit though he has been permitted to continue the suit. As regards the status of Appellant No.4 the plaint having not been amended to incorporate any relief for declaration of his status as a member of the Trust Board, his status cannot be declared in this suit though he has been permitted to continue the suit. Once it is finally concluded that R-4 and R-5 did never cease to be the members of the Trust Board the manner of induction of A-4 as a Trustee, as claimed by him in his application under Order 1 Rule 10, C.P.C. that has been dealt with in the order dated 30.7.2005 of the learned trial court, is glaringly found to be in contravention of Clause 6 of the bye-laws of the Trust. Therefore, learned courts below were compelled to observe that Appellant No.4 is not a validly appointed member of the Board of Trustees. 20. In the result, the Second Appeal is dismissed on contest but, in the facts and circumstances, without cost. Judgment of the learned lower appellate court is confirmed. R-4 and R-5 being found to have never ceased to be the members of the Trust Board are entitled to act as the Board of Trustees under the Deed of Trust as well as the bye-laws of the Trust including the management and functioning of the Trust, i.e. the Institution (A1). The Receivership shall stand terminated on the expiry of two months from the date of this judgment. The Collector, Angul as Receiver shall hand over charge of the entire management of the Institution to the members of the Trust Board existing as on the date of handing over of such charge. On the expiry of the aforesaid period of two months the Receiver shall cease to exercise any function in respect of the management of the Institution including exercise of financial power. The Receiver shall submit account for the entire period of the Receivership before this Court within three months from the date of this judgment and after acceptance of the account, the Receivership shall stand discharged. A copy of this judgment be served on the Receiver, i.e. the Collector, Angul through the Judge-in-Charge, Nizarat Civil Courts, Angul within ten days hence. With the disposal of the Second Appeal, all the pending misc. cases stand disposed of.