JUDGMENT BHASKAR BHATTACHARYA, J. 1. This Special Civil Application has been referred to a Larger Bench by a Division Bench consisting of Jayant Patel & Mohinder Pal, JJ. under the following circumstances :- 1.1 The writ-petitioner had filed this Special Civil Application for quashing and setting aside the Notification under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (for short, “the Act” hereafter), dated 30th January, 2008 and the further Notification under Section 6 of the Act dated 29th April 2008 by which , the land of the petitioner bearing original Survey No.25/2 and 25/3 and 25/4 (now final plot No.50) was acquired. 1.2 When the matter was at the final hearing stage before the referring Bench, the said Bench decided to call for the original file from the State-respondent and it appears from the original file of the State Government that after the proposal was received by the Government, there were various correspondences, but the most important aspect was that the State Government had called for the details about actual use of the land which was already acquired earlier ad-measuring 1, 03,447 Sq.Mtrs. At the time of taking ultimate decision, the highest authority, i.e. the Hon’ble Minister, made notes in the original file, the translated version of which read as under:- “1. The sanction may be granted to publish the notification. 2. Earlier for the same purpose, land was acquired. Whether it was used or not? Considering the purpose is served or not? 28.1.2008.” 1.3 According to the referring Bench, the State Government, before examining the aspect as to whether the land already acquired for the same purpose was in actual use or not and whether the purpose of earlier acquisition was served or not, granted sanction for publication of the notification. Although subjective satisfaction of the State Government is required before taking decision to acquire any particular land, according to the referring Bench, the subjective satisfaction means that the Government on the basis of the materials supplied before it, is satisfied about the requirement of the land for public purpose, which, in this case, prima facie, is not reflected from the records. 1.4 The referring Bench further recorded that the notes in the original file had indicated that from the very beginning, when the proposal was received by the Government, the information about actual use of the land which was already acquired in the past was called for and from the correspondences, it appears that such information were not supplied to the Government and before the said aspect was considered as to whether the land which was acquired earlier for the very purpose was used or not and whether the purpose was served or not, the decision was taken for publication of the notification under section 4, which prima facie was improper, particularly when the Government has taken decision to apply urgency clause under Section 17 of the Act which would mean that the inquiry under Section 5-A of the Act would be dispensed with and the possession of the land would be taken away immediately upon the publication of declaration under section 6 of the Act. 1.5 The referring Bench was of the further prima facie view that there was material available in the original file of the State Government which indicated that the proposal was moved by the Corporation for acquisition of the land as back as 13th October 2004 onwards and the copy of the said correspondence had also been produced with the affidavit-in-reply filed on behalf of the Corporation. The referring Bench further recorded that although initially, no objection certificate was applied by the Corporation for the land in question since it was under Urban Agglomeration and the time was consumed therein, yet, even if it is considered from the date of final decision of the District Collector, the same was 13th December 2006 as per Annexure-VIII produced with the said affidavit-in-reply. The referring Bench further recorded that the Government had ultimately taken final decision on 22nd January 2008 [sic; 28th January 2008] and under the circumstances, when so much time was consumed in processing the proposal for acquisition at various levels after the District Collector was satisfied for acquisition of the land and proposal forwarded to the State Government, the referring Bench was of the prima facie view that dispensation of the inquiry under Section 5-A was not called for and the acquisition, if undertaken in normal course without applying urgency clause under Section 17, would have served the purpose. The referring Bench further noted two decisions of the Supreme Court where the principle for application under section 17 of the Act was laid down. 1.6 Recording the above prima facie finding, the referring Bench was of the opinion that in view of an earlier decision of another coordinate Bench of this Court in SCA No.3639 of 2008 taking a contrary view on the subject-matter of the selfsame notification involving other owners, the matter should be placed before the Chief Justice for constitution of a Larger Bench for hearing of this matter. 1.7 Consequently, the matter is placed before us. 2. In order to appreciate the facts involved in this application, the following dates and events are important, which are quoted below:- Sr. No. Dates Events 1 16.12.1978 Declaration of intention to prepare Town Planning Scheme No.3, Karanj, Surat. 2 07.02.1980 Draft Development Plan is published by Surat Urban Development Authority. 3 29.06.1983 Draft Town Planning Scheme sanctioned by the State as contemplated under section 48(2) of the Town Planning Act. 4 31.01.1986 State Government sanctioned the final development plan of Surat Urban Development Authority. 5 03.03.1986 The said development plan came into force. 6 25.04.1990 The State Government accorded sanction under Section 78 of the BPMC Act and permitted Surat Municipal Corporation to acquire the land. 7 07.09.1990 As stated in the affidavit in reply of the respondent corporation, the Collector, Surat appointed Land Acquisition Officer. 8 21.12.1990 Preliminary Town Planning Scheme was declared. 9 14.06.1993 Preliminary Town Planning Scheme is sanctioned under Section 65(3) of the own Planning Act. 10 17.08.1993 Preliminary Town Planning Scheme came into force. 11 27.01.1994 The petitioner has handed over the portion of land being Original Plot No.17/B/2 to the Corporation and has been given Final Plot No.50. 12 29.04.1994 Owners of Original Plot no.17/B/1 have been given Final plot No.65. 13 24.06.1994 As stated in the affidavit in reply of the respondent corporation, by a letter the State Government informed the Collector that land bearing Survey No.25/2+3+4 is an excess land and for that purpose procedure under section 23 of the Act is required to be followed. 14 08.12.1994 Notification under Section 4 of the Act was published. 15 06.09.1995 Notification under Section 6 of the Act was published. 16 28.02.1996 Final scheme award. 14 08.12.1994 Notification under Section 4 of the Act was published. 15 06.09.1995 Notification under Section 6 of the Act was published. 16 28.02.1996 Final scheme award. 17 06.06.1997 SMC passed a resolution for selling land bearing Plot No.40 admeasuring 13,818 square meters by way of commercial sale to Ranjitnagar Co-Op. Society Ltd. (proposed) for Rs.1200/- per sq.mt. 18 09.09.1997 Final Town Planning Scheme is sanctioned. 19 05.10.2000 The petitioner purchased land bearing Revenue Survey No.25/2, 3, 4 admeasuring 2883 square meters by way of registered sale deed. 20 16.10.2000 The petitioner purchased land bearing Revenue Survey No.25/2, 3, 4 admeasuring 2883 square meters by way of registered sale deed. 21 02.09.2004 (Reservation of the plot is dropped) By modifying the draft development plan, by dropping proceedings to reserve Plot No.50 by stating that the said plot is in residential zone, the said notification is issued by Assistant Town Planner, Urban Development Authority, Surat. 22 13.10.2004 As stated in the affidavit in reply of the respondent corporation, the Commissioner wrote a letter to the Collector for acquiring the land bearing Survey No.25 to 32. 23 19.01.2005 Special Civil Application No.14721 of 2004 preferred by the petitioner is not pressed at that stage as the statement was made by the learned advocate appearing for the respondent Corporation that the petitioners have already submitted necessary plan for sanction and have also applied for development permission and the same will be considered on merits and in accordance with law and the respondent corporation was directed to act accordingly and pass appropriate orders on merits in accordance with law and as early as possible. 24 14.10.2005 As stated in the affidavit in reply of the respondent corporation, Surat Municipal Corporation made a proposal to acquire the land in dispute for issuing Notification under Sections 4 and 6 of the Act for the purpose of Sewage Treatment Plant under urgency clause . 25 07.03.2006 As stated in the affidavit in reply of the respondent corporation, ULC Branch of Collector Office has issued No Objection Certificate under the provisions of the Urban Land Ceiling Act for acquiring the land in dispute for the purpose of sewage treatment plant. 25 07.03.2006 As stated in the affidavit in reply of the respondent corporation, ULC Branch of Collector Office has issued No Objection Certificate under the provisions of the Urban Land Ceiling Act for acquiring the land in dispute for the purpose of sewage treatment plant. 26 23.03.2006 The plans placed for development by the petitioner are rejected on the ground that sanction has been granted by the State-Government for acquisition of the property vide order dated 25.04.1990 and the second ground mentioned is that the possession is not changed as per the Town Planning Scheme. 27 13.12.2006 Special Land Acquisition Officer is appointed, as contemplated under Section 52-A of the Act. 28 18.01.2007 Special Civil Application No.15512 of 2006 is preferred before this Court and the same is allowed on certain conditions by also observing that the clog over the said property cannot be allowed to the party for indefinite period and also by relying upon the decision of the Division Bench of this Court in case of Surat Municipal Corporation Vs. Bhikhabhai Motabhai Patel reported in AIR 1994 GUJARAT 122, certain directions were given in paragraph 8 of the said judgment. Letters Patent Appeal No.1838 of 2007 is preferred by the respondent corporation challenging the order dated 18.01.2007 passed in Special Civil Application No.15512 of 2006. 29 07.07.2007 As stated in the affidavit in reply of the respondent corporation, the certificate is issued by the State Government to acquire the land under the urgency clause. 30 28.01.2008 As is reflected in the order dated27.12.2012 passed in Special Civil Application No.1326 of 2010 (the present petition), the Court after perusing the original file has found that ultimate decision was to be taken by the highest authority, namely the concerned Hon’ble Minister, the decision was as under : (English translation) “1. The sanction may be granted to publish the notification. 2. Earlier for the same purpose, land was acquired. Whether it is used or not? Considering the purpose is served or not? 28.01.2008”. 31 30.01.2008 Notification under Section 4 of the Act is issued. 32 08.02.2008 Section 4 Notification is published in the newspaper. The sanction may be granted to publish the notification. 2. Earlier for the same purpose, land was acquired. Whether it is used or not? Considering the purpose is served or not? 28.01.2008”. 31 30.01.2008 Notification under Section 4 of the Act is issued. 32 08.02.2008 Section 4 Notification is published in the newspaper. 33 Feb – 2008 Special Civil Application No.3639 of 2008 is preferred by one Kanchanben and 13 other petitioners challenging the notification issued under Section 4 of the Act , dated 30.01.2008 and notification of urgency clause Section 17(4) of the Act for land bearing Original Survey No.29/2, 30/2 and 30/3 being Plot No.78 of Town Planning Scheme No.3, Karanj, District Surat. 34 14.11.2008 Special Civil Application No.3639 of 2008 preferred by Kanchanben and 13 others is dismissed by this Court. 35 04.12.2008 Letters Patent Appeal No.1838 of 2007 in Special Civil Application No.15512 of 2006 is dismissed by the Division Bench of this Court by observing that the learned counsel for the appellant corporation has submitted that a notification dated 30.01.2008 has been issued by the Revenue Department of the Government acquiring land in question under Section 17 of the Act for public purpose and on that statement, the Division Bench quashed and set aside the judgment dated 18.01.2007 passed by the learned Single Judge and granted liberty to the respondent No.1 – original petitioner in the said case to seek remedy against acquisition in accordance with law. 36 04.12.2008 The petitioners filed objections before the Land Acquisition Officer at Surat objecting to acquisition of land. 37 29.04.2009 Notification under Section 6 of the Act is issued. 38 23.10.2009 Objections of the petitioner are rejected. 39 11.02.2010 The Division Bench of this Court admitted Special Civil Application No.1326 of 2010(the present petition) and granted adinterim stay in terms of Paragraph 12(E) meaning thereby, the further proceedings in pursuance to the notification under Section 4 of the Act and declaration under section 6 of the Act were stayed. 40 28.12.2010 This Court vacated the ad-interim relief granted on 11.02.2010 mainly on the ground that another petition being Special Civil Application No.3639 of 2008 preferred by Kanchanben and 13 other petitioners has been dismissed wherein the challenge was to the Notification under Section 4 of the Act, though for other parcels of land. 40 28.12.2010 This Court vacated the ad-interim relief granted on 11.02.2010 mainly on the ground that another petition being Special Civil Application No.3639 of 2008 preferred by Kanchanben and 13 other petitioners has been dismissed wherein the challenge was to the Notification under Section 4 of the Act, though for other parcels of land. 41 11.03.2011 In Special Leave to Appeal (Civil) No.4339 of 2011 preferred by the present petitioner challenging the decision dated 28.12.2010 whereby ad-interim relief was not confirmed and was vacated in the present petition being Special Civil Application No.1326 of 2010, after hearing the learned advocate for the respondent corporation who was appearing on caveat, and after consent was given by the learned advocate for the respondent corporation that the Special Leave to Appeal be disposed of at that stage, the Supreme Court directed continuation of the interim order passed on 11.02.2010 disposing of the petition with a request to the High Court to make endeavour to decide the matter as early aspossible but latest within 6 months. First order granting ad-interim relief dated 11.02.2010 was ordered to be continued to operate. 42 07.09.2011 Additional affidavit is filed by the petitioner in the present petition pointing out that accurate facts are not mentioned by the respondent corporation, that vide communication dated 25.02.2000 as far as Plot No.72 is concerned, the said plot consisted of Survey No.27 which was acquired for sewage treatment works of Surat Municipal Corporation, for which award was also published on 09.10.1997, the said plot is released from acquisition vide notification dated 25.02.2000. 43 02.11.2011 In Special Leave to Appeal (Civil) – C.C. No.16896 of 2011 in Special Civil Application No.3639 of 2008 (petition which was preferred by Kanchanben and 13 other petitioners), the petitioner challenged the order dated 14.11.2008 passed by this Court, seeking leave to challenge the same, the Supreme Court permitted the petitioner to withdraw the Special Leave to Appeal with a liberty to file fresh petition as and when any occasion arise for doing so. 44 13.12.2012 The Division Bench of this Court passed an order in the present petition recording the submission made on behalf of the petitioner that in the sketch, which is produced at page no.88 the area of Final Plot No.17/B/1 is shown as already acquired, whereas the very plot is a part of the Town Planning Scheme for original plot and the final plot is given bearing no.65 admeasuring 5049 square meters. If the land was already acquired, no final plot could have been given, it was recorded in the order that the learned advocate for the respondent seeks time to verify the said aspect and it is also recorded that the petitioner be supplied with map and ‘F’ Form of Town Planning Scheme No.3 upon payment of necessary charges on urgent basis, the original file of the State Government is tendered, which is ordered to be retained by the Court. 45 17.12.2012 Additional affidavit is filed by the petitioner in the present petition pointing out that what is stated by the respondent corporation at page no.88 of the compilation is not an accurate picture. Documentary evidence pointing out that it is an inaccurate submission by the respondent corporation is produced. 46 20.12.2012 Further affidavit is filed by the Surat Municipal Corporation. 47 27.12.2012 After extensive bi-parte hearing, and after perusal the original file, the Division Bench-formed a prima facie opinion that the Division Bench may not be in a position to take the same view as was taken by a coordinate Bench in Special Civil Application No.3639 of 2008 due to the fact that the factual aspects pointed out in the present petition and perusal of the said original file etc. were not before the Court and therefore the present petition is referred to the Larger Bench of this Court. 3. Mr. Anshin Desai, the learned advocate, appearing on behalf of the petitioner has advanced fourfold submission in support of the application: 3.1 First, according to Mr. were not before the Court and therefore the present petition is referred to the Larger Bench of this Court. 3. Mr. Anshin Desai, the learned advocate, appearing on behalf of the petitioner has advanced fourfold submission in support of the application: 3.1 First, according to Mr. Desai, it appears from the original record that the Hon’ble Minister, while giving approval of issuing notification under section 4 of the Act by invoking urgency clause as provided in section 17[4] of the Act, did not apply his mind as would appear from the fact that before putting signature on 28th January 2008, two questions were asked: “whether earlier for the same purpose, land was acquired and whether it was used or not or whether the purpose was served or not.” By pointing out the above questions, Mr. Desai contends that it is apparent that there was no application of mind while sanctioning issue of notification when the Hon’ble Minister himself put the above query in the next line. According to Mr. Desai, so long those queries were not answered, there was no justification of granting permission to proceed in terms of section 17[4] of the Act in the matter of issuing notification under section 4. Mr. Desai further contends that it would appear from the original record that those queries were answered subsequently, but in the meantime, already notification under section 4 with urgency clause had already been issued. Mr. Desai contends that on the above ground alone, the notifications under sections 4 and 6 should be quashed. 3.2 Secondly, Mr. Desai contends that invocation of urgency clause in terms of section 17[4] of the Act in the facts of the present case was an abuse of process of law in order to deprive his client of taking benefit of section 5A of the Act. Mr. Desai contends that before invoking the urgency clause, it is the duty of the appropriate government to be specifically satisfied that urgency is such that even to give an opportunity of raising objections, if one or two months are lost, it would frustrate the object of the acquisition. Mr. Desai contends that no material was placed before the appropriate government that this is a case of such a nature and the Hon’ble Minister, while approving the urgency clause did not take into consideration that aspect as would reflect from the approval with query itself. Mr. Desai contends that no material was placed before the appropriate government that this is a case of such a nature and the Hon’ble Minister, while approving the urgency clause did not take into consideration that aspect as would reflect from the approval with query itself. 3.3 Thirdly, Mr. Desai contends that in the earlier Special Civil Application, the selfsame notification was challenged by some other owners in respect of different land where his client was not made party and this Court has upheld the validity of this notification but such fact, according to Mr. Desai, does not come in the way of his client in independently challenging the said notification in respect of his land. Mr. Desai contends that the finding given in the order passed in the earlier Special Civil Application filed by some other owners in respect of other plots of land is not binding upon his client. Mr. Desai further contends that in the earlier proceeding before this Court, the original record was not called for and thus, the earlier Division Bench had no occasion even to see the endorsement of the Hon’ble Minister and if those were brought to the notice of the earlier Division Bench, the conclusion would have been otherwise. 3.4 Lastly Mr. Desai contends that in the facts of the present case, it would appear that in the past, there was an acquisition and the said acquisition was ultimately withdrawn and in the latest town planning scheme, his client’s land has been given a separate holding number. The aforesaid fact, according to Mr. Desai, indicates that there was no justification of acquiring the land by the impugned notification. 3.5 Mr. Desai, therefore, prays for allowing this application by quashing the notifications in question. 3.6 In support of his contentions, Mr. Desai relied upon the following decisions: [1] Union of India & Ors. vs. Mukesh Hans, reported in [2004] 8 SCC 14 [2] Radhyshyam [Dead] through L.Rs. & Ors. vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors, reported in [2011] 5 SCC 553. [3] Darshan Lal Nagpal [Dead] By Lrs. vs. Government of NCT of Delhi and others, reported in [2012] 2 SCC 327. [4] Mahender Pal & Ors. vs. State of Haryana & Ors, reported in [2009] 14 SCC 281. [5] Devsharan & Ors. vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors., reported in [2011] 4 SCC 769. [6] Tukaram Kana Joshi & Ors. vs. Government of NCT of Delhi and others, reported in [2012] 2 SCC 327. [4] Mahender Pal & Ors. vs. State of Haryana & Ors, reported in [2009] 14 SCC 281. [5] Devsharan & Ors. vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors., reported in [2011] 4 SCC 769. [6] Tukaram Kana Joshi & Ors. vs. MIDC & Ors., reported in [2013] 1 SCC 353. [7] Surindersingh Brar & Ors. vs. Union of India & Ors., reported in [2013] 1 SCC 403 [8] Union of India & Ors. vs. Deepak Bhardwaj & Ors., reported in AIR 2004 SC 3289 [9] Patasi Devi vs. State of Haryana & Ors., reported in [2012] 9 SCC 503 [10] Darshanlal Nagpal [Dead] through Legal Representatives vs. Government of N.C.T. Delhi & Ors. Reported in [2012] 2 SCC 327 [11] Mulchand Khanumal Khatri vs. State of Gujarat & Ors, reported in [2012] 5 SCC 365. [12] Laxmanlal [Dead] through LRs & Anr. vs. State of Rajasthan & Anrs., reported in [2013] 3 SCC 764. [13] Women Education Trust & Anr. vs. State of Haryana & Ors., reported in [2-13] 8 SCC 99 [14] Omprakash & Anr. vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors., reported in [1998] 6 SCC 1 [15] National Thermal Power Corporation Limited vs. Mahesh Dutta & Ors., reported in [2009] 8 SCC 339. [16] Anandsinh & Anr. vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors., reported in [2010] 11 SCC 242. [17] Mohanlal Nanubhai Choksi [Dead] through LRs. vs. State of Gujarat & Ors., reported in [2010] 12 SCC 726. [18] M. Naga Venkata Laxmi vs Vishakhapatnam Municipal Corporation & Anr., reported in [2007] 8 SCC 748. [19] Essco Fabs Private Limited vs. State of Haryana & Anr., reported in [2009] 2 SCC 377. [20] Sk. Abdul Hamid and another vs. The Land Acquisition Collector, Balasore and another, reported in AIR 1989 Orissa 255. [21] Pune Municipal Corporation and anothers vs. Harakhchand Misirimal Solanki and others, reported in [2014] 3 SCC 183. [22] Union of India and others vs. Krishan Lal Arneja and others, reported in [2004] SCC 453. 4. Mr. P.K. Jani, the learned Government Pleader, appearing on behalf of the State of Gujarat, has, on the other hand, opposed the aforesaid contentions of Mr. Anshin Desai and has advanced the following submissions in support of his contentions: 4.1 First, Mr. [22] Union of India and others vs. Krishan Lal Arneja and others, reported in [2004] SCC 453. 4. Mr. P.K. Jani, the learned Government Pleader, appearing on behalf of the State of Gujarat, has, on the other hand, opposed the aforesaid contentions of Mr. Anshin Desai and has advanced the following submissions in support of his contentions: 4.1 First, Mr. Jani contends that this application should be dismissed simply on the ground of delay in moving the present application by pointing out that the notification under section 4 of the Act was issued in the year 2008, whereas the present application has been filed in the year 2010. 4.2 Secondly, Mr. Jani submits that in the earlier proceeding challenging the selfsame notification at the instance of some owners of different lands covered under the selfsame notification, the Division Bench of this Court, after taking into consideration the materials on record having specifically upheld the notification, we should not, in this application, take a different view when the selfsame notification has been upheld and the said order was not challenged by the aggrieved party. Mr. Jani points out that the said order was sought to be challenged by the present petitioner, but he withdrew the Special Leave Application before the Supreme Court with liberty to file fresh application. 4.3 Thirdly, Mr. Jani contends that there is no dispute that the purpose for which this notification has been issued is a public purpose as would appear from the fact that municipal authority, after being satisfied with the requirement, asked the State Government to take steps for acquisition. According to Mr. Jani, once it is established that the purpose of acquisition is not mala fide but is a genuine one for the public purpose, this Court should not interfere with such decision for any technical breach of law. Mr. Jani submits that the petitioner, in this application also could not give any convincing reason why the notifications for acquisition should be set aside. Mr. Jani submits that his client is ready to convince this Court even at this stage that the purpose for which the acquisition has been made is public purpose and there is no mala fide intention in it and thus, for giving an opportunity to file objection under section 5A, the notification of 2008 should not be quashed in the year 2014. 4.5 Mr. 4.5 Mr. Jani thus, prays for dismissal of this application. 4.6 Mr. Jani, in support of the above contentions, relied upon the following decisions: [1] Deepak Pahwa and others vs. Lt.Governor of Delhi and others, reported in [1984] 4 SCC 308 [2] State of U.P. vs. Pista Devi reported in [1986] 4 SCC 251 [paras 5 and 6] [3] Chameli Singh v. State of U.P. reported in [1996] 2 SCC 549 [4] Nand Kishore Gupta v. State of U.P. reported in AIR 2010 SC 355 . 5. Mr. Prashant G. Desai, the learned Senior Advocate appearing on behalf of the Surat Municipal Corporation, has supported the contentions of Mr. Jani and has opposed this application. The first submission of Mr. Desai is that the municipal authority, on consideration of the entire materials on record arrived at a conclusion that in view of the increasing population of Surat and for improvement of the sewage treatment system for the purpose of preventing the pollution of Tapi river, such step was essential and as such, the municipal authority recommended the acquisition of the land. Mr. Desai contends that once the municipal authority has arrived at such a decision, such finding is virtually binding upon the State-respondent as would appear from the Division Bench decision of this Court in the case of Kanaiyalal v. State reported in 7 GLR 717. He also relies upon the decision of the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Kikabhai Ukabhai Patel v. State of Gujarat reported in 1990 [2] GLH 163 contending that there is no scope of disputing the finding of the authority as regards the public purpose arrived at by the municipal authority. In support of his contentions, Mr. Prashant Desai relied upon the following decisions: [1] Deepak Pahwa and others vs. Lt. Governor of Delhi and others, reported in [1984] 4 SCC 308 [2] State of U.P. vs. Pista Devi reported in [1986] 4 SCC 251 [paras 5 and 6] [3] Jai Narain vs. Union of India, reported in ( 1996 (1) SCC 9 . 6. In order to appreciate the question involved in this Special Civil Application, it will be profitable to refer to the provisions contained in sections 4, 5A, 6 and 17 of the Act, as it stands after the Gujarat amendment, which are quoted below:- “4. 6. In order to appreciate the question involved in this Special Civil Application, it will be profitable to refer to the provisions contained in sections 4, 5A, 6 and 17 of the Act, as it stands after the Gujarat amendment, which are quoted below:- “4. Publication of preliminary notification and powers of officers thereupon.- [1] Whenever it appears to the appropriate Government that land in any locality is needed or is likely to be needed for any public purpose or for a company, a notification to that effect shall be published in the Official Gazette and in two daily newspapers circulating in that locality of which at least one shall be in the regional language, and the Collector shall cause public notice of the substance of such notification to be given at convenient places in the said locality (the last of the dates of such publication and the giving of such public notice, being hereinafter referred to as the date of the publication of the notification). [2] Thereupon it shall be lawful for any officer, either generally or specially authorised by such Government in this behalf, and for this servants and workmen,- to enter upon and survey and take levels of any land in such locality; to dig or bore in to the sub-soil; to do all other acts necessary to ascertain whether the land is adapted for such purpose; to set out the boundaries of the land proposed to be taken and the intended line of the work (if any) proposed to be made thereon; to mark such levels, boundaries and line by placing marks and cutting trenches; and, where otherwise the survey cannot be completed and the levels taken and the boundaries and line marked, to cut down and clear away any part of any standing crops, fence or jungle: Provided that no person shall enter into any building or upon any enclosed Court or garden attached to a dwelling-house [unless with the consent of the occupier thereof] without previously giving such occupier at least seven days’ notice in writing of his intention to do so. xxx xxx xxx State amendment – Gujarat In its application to the State of Gujarat, in S.4 – (1). In sub-S.(1), the words “or the Commissioner” shall be deleted. (2). In sub-S.(2), the words “or, as the case may be, by the Commissioner” shall be deleted. xxx xxx xxx State amendment – Gujarat In its application to the State of Gujarat, in S.4 – (1). In sub-S.(1), the words “or the Commissioner” shall be deleted. (2). In sub-S.(2), the words “or, as the case may be, by the Commissioner” shall be deleted. Gujarat Act 14 of 1964, S.4 and Sch. [w.e.f. 15.5.1964]. This Act repeals Bombay Act 8 of 1958. (3). In sub-S.(1), after the words “for any public purpose”, insert “ or for a Company”. (4). In sub-S.(2), for the words beginning with word “to mark such levels” and ending with words “trenches, and”, substitute the following, namely:- “to mark such levels, boundaries and line by placing marks and cutting trenches, to measure the land likely to be needed, and.”-Gujarat Act 20 of 1965, S.7 [w.e.f. 15.8.1965]. 5A. Hearing of objections.- [1] Any person interested in any land which has been notified under section 4, sub-section [1], as being needed or likely to be needed for a public purpose or for a company may, within thirty days from the date of the publication of the notification, object to the acquisition of the land or of any land in the locality, as the case may be. [2] Every objection under sub-section [1] shall be made to the Collector in writing, and the Collector shall give the objector an opportunity of being heard in person or by any person authorised by him in this behalf or by pleader and shall, after hearing all such objections and after making such further inquiry, if any, as he thinks necessary, either make a report in respect of the land which has been notified under section 4, sub-section (1), or make different reports in respect of different parcels of such land, to the appropriate Government, containing his recommendations on the objections, together with the record of the proceedings held by him, for the decision of that Government. The decision of the appropriate Government on the objections shall be final. [3] For the purposes of this section, a person shall be deemed to be interested in land who would be entitled to claim an interest in compensation if the land were acquired under this Act. 6. Declaration that land is required for a public purpose. -(1). The decision of the appropriate Government on the objections shall be final. [3] For the purposes of this section, a person shall be deemed to be interested in land who would be entitled to claim an interest in compensation if the land were acquired under this Act. 6. Declaration that land is required for a public purpose. -(1). Subject to the provisions of Part VII of this Act, when the appropriate Government is satisfied after considering the report, if any, made under section 5A, sub-section (2), that any particular land is needed for a public purpose, or for a Company, a declaration shall be made to that effect under the signature of a Secretary to such Government or of some officer duly authorised to certify its orders, and different declarations may be made from time to time in respect of different parcels of any land covered by the same notification under section 4, sub-section (1), irrespective of whether one report or different reports has or have been made (wherever required) under section 5A, sub-section (2). Provided that no declaration in respect of any particular land covered by a notification under section 4, sub-section (1),- (i) published after the commencement of the Land Acquisition (Amendment and Validation) Ordinance, 1967 (1 of 1967) but before the commencement of the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984 , shall be made after the expiry of three years from the date of the publication of the notification; or (ii) published after the commencement of the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984, shall be made after the expiry of one year from the date of the publication of the notification: Provided further that no such declaration shall be made unless the compensation to be awarded for such property is to be paid by a Company, or wholly or partly out of public revenues or some fund controlled or managed by a local authority. Explanation 1. In computing any of the periods referred to in the first proviso, the period during which any action or proceeding to be taken in pursuance of the notification issued under section 4, sub-section (1), is stayed by an order of a Court shall be excluded. Explanation 2. Explanation 1. In computing any of the periods referred to in the first proviso, the period during which any action or proceeding to be taken in pursuance of the notification issued under section 4, sub-section (1), is stayed by an order of a Court shall be excluded. Explanation 2. Where the compensation to be awarded for such property is to be paid out of the funds of a corporation owned or controlled by the State, such compensation shall be deemed to be compensation paid out of public revenues. [2] Every declaration shall be published in the Official Gazette, and in two daily newspapers circulating in the locality in which the land is situate of which at least one shall be in the regional language, and the Collector shall cause public notice of the substance of such declaration to be given at convenient places in the said locality (the last of the date of such publication and the giving of such public notice, being hereinafter referred to as the date of the publication of the declaration), and such declaration shall state the district or other territorial division in which the land is situate, the purpose for which it is needed, its approximate area, and, where a plan shall have been made of the land, the place where such plan may be inspected. [3]. The said declaration shall be conclusive evidence that the land is needed for a public purpose or for a Company, as the case may be; and, after making such declaration the appropriate Government may acquire the land in a manner hereinafter appearing. State amendments .... .... Gujarat In its application to the State of Gujarat, in S.6, (i) In sub-S.(1),- (a) the words “or, as the case may be, the Commissioner” shall be deleted; (b) the words “or, as the case may be, under the signature of the Commissioner” shall be deleted; (ii) In sub-S(3), the words “or as the case may be, the Commissioner” shall be deleted. Gujarat Act 15 of 1964 S.4 and Sch. (w.e.f. 15.5.1964) “17. Special powers in cases of urgency. [1]. In cases of urgency, whenever the appropriate Government so directs, the Collector, though no such award has been made, may, on the expiration of fifteen days from the publication of the notice mentioned in section 9, sub-section (1), take possession of any land needed for a public purpose. (w.e.f. 15.5.1964) “17. Special powers in cases of urgency. [1]. In cases of urgency, whenever the appropriate Government so directs, the Collector, though no such award has been made, may, on the expiration of fifteen days from the publication of the notice mentioned in section 9, sub-section (1), take possession of any land needed for a public purpose. Such land shall thereupon vest absolutely in the Government, free from all encumbrances. [2]. Whenever owing to any sudden change in the channel of any navigable river or other unforeseen emergency, it becomes necessary for any Railway administration to acquire the immediate possession of any land for the maintenance of their traffic or for the purpose of making thereon a river-side or ghat station, or of providing convenient connection with or access to any such station, or the appropriate Government considers it necessary to acquire the immediate possession of any land for the purpose of maintaining any structure or system pertaining to irrigation, water supply, drainage, road communication or electricity, the Collector may, immediately after the publication of the notice mentioned in sub-section (1) and with the previous sanction of the appropriate Government, enter upon and take possession of such land, which shall thereupon vest absolutely in the Government free from all encumbrances: Provided that the Collector shall not take possession of any building or part of a building under this sub-section without giving to the occupier thereof at least forty-eight hours' notice of his intention so to do, or such longer notice as may be reasonably sufficient to enable such occupier to remove his movable property from such building without unnecessary inconvenience. [3] In every case under either of the preceding sub-sections the Collector shall, at the time of taking possession, offer to the persons interested, compensation for the standing crops and trees (if any) on such land and for any other damage sustained by them caused by such sudden dispossession and not excepted in section 24; and, in case such offer is not accepted, the value of such crops and trees and the amount of such other damage shall be allowed for in awarding compensation for the land under the provisions herein contained. [3-A]. [3-A]. Before taking possession of any land under sub-section (1) or sub-section (2), the Collector shall, without prejudice to the provisions of sub-section (3),- (a) tender payment of eighty per centum of the compensation for such land as estimated by him to the persons interested entitled thereto, and (b) pay it to them, unless prevented by some one or more of the contingencies mentioned in section 31, sub-section (2), and where the Collector is so prevented, the provisions of section 31, sub-section (2), (except the second proviso thereto), shall apply as they apply to the payment of compensation under that section. [3-B]. The amount paid or deposited under sub-section (3-A), shall be taken into account for determining the amount of compensation required to be tendered under section 31, and where the amount so paid or deposited exceeds the compensation awarded by the Collector under section 11, the excess may, unless refunded within three months from the date of the Collector's award, be recovered as an arrear of land revenue. (4) In the case of any land to which, in the opinion of the appropriate Government, the provisions of sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) are applicable, the appropriate Government may direct that the provisions of section 5-A shall not apply, and, if it does so direct, a declaration may be made under section 6 in respect of the land at any time after the date of the publication of the notification under section 4 sub-section (1). State amendments ... .... Gujarat (1) In S.17, sub-S.(1), the words, “or the Commissioner” shall be deleted; in sub-S.(2), the words, “or the Commissioner” and “or, as the case may be, of the Commissioner”, and in sub-S. (4) the words “or, as the case may be, of the Commissioner” occuring at two places and the words, “or he” shall be deleted – Gujarat Act 15 of 1964 S.3 and Sch. [w.e.f. 15-5-1964]; (2) In. S.17, the words “waste or arable” shall be deleted Gujarat Act 23 of 1962, S.31 and 20 of 1965, S.17 [w.e.f. 15-8-1965]; 7. The first question, therefore, that arises for consideration is whether the State Government, while issuing notification under section 4 of the Act, had subjective satisfaction that the land in question was needed for any public purpose. 8. S.17, the words “waste or arable” shall be deleted Gujarat Act 23 of 1962, S.31 and 20 of 1965, S.17 [w.e.f. 15-8-1965]; 7. The first question, therefore, that arises for consideration is whether the State Government, while issuing notification under section 4 of the Act, had subjective satisfaction that the land in question was needed for any public purpose. 8. As pointed out earlier, it appears from the original records that first the Municipal authorities opined that the land was necessary for the purpose of Sewage Treatment Plant and, therefore, requested the State Government to take steps for acquisition of land for the said purpose. Consequently, the file, with the notes of the concerned officer was placed before the Honourable Minister whose subjective satisfaction is necessary before publication of the notification under section 4 of the Act. It appears from the official record that the Honourable Minister accorded sanction on 28th January 2008 by giving the following notes in Gujarati, which as translated into English, reads as follows: “1. The sanction may be granted to publish the notification. 2. Earlier for the same purpose, land was acquired. Whether it was used or not? Considering the purpose is served or not? 28.1.2008.” 9. From the above notes of the Honourable Minister, it appears that although the Minister had in his mind some queries as reflected in second paragraph of his notes and put two specific questions in writing, at the very first paragraph, the sanction has been granted without getting answers of those queries. From the above notes, it appears that the Honourable Minister did not take into consideration the fact that sanction granted by him in paragraph 1 cannot be given so long he was not satisfied about the query in his mind as reflected in paragraph 2 of the selfsame note. There is no dispute that answers were given in the month of April – long after publication of the notification under section 4 of the Act. 10. We, thus, find substance in the contention of Mr. There is no dispute that answers were given in the month of April – long after publication of the notification under section 4 of the Act. 10. We, thus, find substance in the contention of Mr. Anshin Desai, the learned advocate appearing on behalf of the petitioner, that before getting answer of the queries, the Honourable Minister granted sanction by totally overlooking the requirement of law that sanction to publish notification under section 4 can be accorded only after subjective satisfaction and so long the questions reflected in paragraph 2 are not answered, the sanction cannot be granted in accordance with law. 11. Although Mr. Jani, the learned Government Pleader appearing on behalf of the State and Mr. Prashant Desai, the learned Senior Advocate appearing on behalf of the Surat Municipal Corporation, tried to convince us that the fact that the municipal authority had required such land for public purpose is sufficient for issue of notification even without the subjective satisfaction of the Minister concerned, we are not impressed by such submission. Satisfaction of the Municipality of its requirement for public purpose should be placed before the State Government, and only the appropriate Government, meaning thereby, the Minister concerned, can take the final decision after taking into consideration the request of the Municipal authority. It appears from the notes that the concerned Minister was conscious that previously the land was acquired and his specific query was whether it was used or not and the purpose was served or not, but before getting any answer from the concerned authority, sanction was granted at the very first instance. Thus, the above ground itself is sufficient for quashing the notifications under Sections 4 and 6 of the Act. 12. The next question is whether it is a fit case where the urgency clause provided in Section 17(4) of the Act could be invoked while issuing notification under section 4 of the Act. 13. It appears from section 5-A of the Act that the said provision was incorporated by way of amendment long back in the year 1923, which gives right to any person interested in the land, which has been notified under section 4 sub-section (1) of the Act, to show that the land is not necessary for the purpose indicated in the notification. Any person interested in the land can be deprived of such valuable right only if the conditions mentioned in Section 17(4) of the Act are satisfied. According to sub-section (4) of Section 17 of the Act, if the appropriate Government is of the opinion that the provisions of subsections (1) or (2) of Section 17 are applicable, then and then only the appropriate Government may direct that the provisions contained in Section 5-A of the Act should not apply and a declaration may be made under section 6 of the Act in respect of the land at any time after the date of publication of notification under section 4 subsection (1). In the case before us, it does not appear from the official record that there is any noting that the appropriate Government had in its mind the provisions contained in Section 17 of the Act. 14. It is rightly pointed by Mr. Anshin Desai, the learned advocate appearing on behalf of the petitioner, that even if for public purpose a notification under section 4 of the Act is issued, the opportunity provided in Section 5-A of the Act must be given to the person interested, and if such opportunity is not given, the invocation of urgency clause will be per se void and in that event, the consequent notification under section 6 of the Act should also be quashed. In this connection, Mr. Jani and Mr. Prashant Desai, the learned senior advocates appearing on behalf of the State and Surat Municipal Corporation respectively tried to convince us that once decision to acquire the land has been taken by the municipal authority, it was binding upon the State Government and in this type of acquisition where land is required for the purpose of Sewage Treatment Plant, urgency is visible on the face of requisition. We, however, find no substance in such contention. It appears that previously also, the land was sought to be acquired but the respondents dropped the idea and no material has been placed before the appropriate Government that it is such a case where it is so urgent that even opportunity of making objection should be taken away. We, however, find no substance in such contention. It appears that previously also, the land was sought to be acquired but the respondents dropped the idea and no material has been placed before the appropriate Government that it is such a case where it is so urgent that even opportunity of making objection should be taken away. We find that there was no justification of even issuing the notification under section 4 of the Act invoking a further clause of urgency by depriving the person interested of giving objection as provided under section 5-A of the Act. 15. We are also not impressed by the contentions of Mr. Jani and Mr. Prashant Desai that even if we find that the question of urgency was not considered, we should call upon the petitioner to disclose his objection under section 5-A of the Act in this proceedings and if he is unable to show such material objection, we should not interfere. The provisions of section 5-A of the Act, in our opinion, is one which cannot be waived as it is based on public policy, and cannot be given a go-bye by giving opportunity to a party interested to give objection post notification. The aforesaid contentions are not tenable in the eye of law. 16. The next question is whether this writ-petition should be dismissed on the ground of delay. It appears that in this application, not only the notification under section 4 but also the subsequent notification under section 6 of the Act has been challenged which was issued on 29th April 2009 – long after 1 year and 3 months after the publication of the notification under section 4 of the Act. The objection filed by the petitioner on 4th December, 2008 before the Land Acquisition Officer was rejected on 23rd October 2009. It appears that this writ-application has been filed in the month of January 2010. Thus, we do not find any substance in the contention that this application should be dismissed on the ground of delay. 17. As regards the question of delay, the rule, which says that the High Court may not enquire into belated and stale claim, is not a rule of law but a rule of practice based on sound and proper exercise of discretion. 17. As regards the question of delay, the rule, which says that the High Court may not enquire into belated and stale claim, is not a rule of law but a rule of practice based on sound and proper exercise of discretion. The principle on which the relief to party on the ground of laches or delay is denied is that the rights which have accrued to others by reason of delay in filing petition should not be allowed to disturb unless there is reasonable explanation for delay. The real test to determine delay in such cases is that the petitioner should come to Court before a parallel right is created and lapse of time is not attributable to any laches or negligence. (See M/s. Dehri Rohtas Light Railway Company Limited v. District Board, Bhojpur and others reported in AIR 1992 SC 802). In this case, the petitioner is still in possession of his land and no third party’s right has been created at the time of filing the Special Civil Application. In any case, by the action of a State within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution, the Constitutional right of the petitioner created under Article 300A of the Constitution has been infringed and at the same time, the action complained of must be held to be arbitrary. Thus, in this case, it cannot be said that the petitioner by his conduct has waived his constitutional right. 18. We now propose to deal with the decisions cited by Mr. Jani and Mr. Prashant Desai, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the State and the Surat Municipal Corporation, in opposing the prayer of the petitioner. 19. In the case of Deepak Pahwa & Others [supra], a point was taken that having regard to the fact that a considerable length of time was spent on inter-departmental discussions before the notifications under section 4(1) was published, there was no justification in invoking the urgency clause under section 17(4) and dispensing with the inquiry under section 5-A. The Supreme Court, however, did not agree with the said contention by pointing out that [paragraph 8] : “......... ..........Very often persons interested in the land proposed to be acquired make various representations to the concerned authorities against the proposed acquisition. ..........Very often persons interested in the land proposed to be acquired make various representations to the concerned authorities against the proposed acquisition. This is bound to result in multiplicity of enquiries, communications and discussions leading invariably to delay in the execution of even urgent projects. Very often the delay makes the problem more and more acute and increases the urgency of the necessity for acquisition. It is, therefore, not possible to agree with the submission that mere pre-notification delay would render the invocation of the urgency provisions void”. 19.1 By relying upon the aforesaid observations of the Supreme Court, Mr. Jani strenuously contended that in the past, there was proposal for acquisition which were dropped and the fact that it look long time in ultimately publishing the notification, is no ground for accepting the contention that in this case, there was no justification of invoking urgency clause. 19.2 It may be mentioned here that in the decision of Deepak Pahwa & Others [supra], the Supreme Court held that the point is whether on the date on which the notification was issued there was urgency or not, as earlier pointed out by the Supreme Court in the case of Jage Ram v. State of Haryana reported in AIR 1971 SC 1033 . It may also be pointed out that in the case of Deepak Pahwa & Others [supra], the Supreme Court made it clear that it wished to say nothing about the post-notification delay. 19.3 In our opinion, in the case before us, if we apply the principle laid down in the case of Deepak Pahwa & Others [supra], we do not find any material on record that on the date of publication of notification, there was any necessity for invoking urgency clause as would appear from the notes of the Honourable Minister itself, and the fact remains that even after publication of notification in the month of January 2008, the Section 6 notification was issued only in the month of April 2009. We, therefore, find that the above decisions only indicates that the reason of any delay prior to the publication of notification under section 4 cannot be taken into consideration for deciding whether, in the facts of a given case, there was justification of invoking section 17(4) of the Act. 20. We, therefore, find that the above decisions only indicates that the reason of any delay prior to the publication of notification under section 4 cannot be taken into consideration for deciding whether, in the facts of a given case, there was justification of invoking section 17(4) of the Act. 20. In the case of State of U.P. v. Smt. Pista Devi and others [supra], the main ground on which the High Court set aside the notification and declaration impugned therein was that the case of urgency put forward by the State Government for dispensing with the compliance of provisions of section 5-A had been belied by the delay of nearly one year that had ensued between the date of the notification under section 4 and the date of declaration made under section 6 of the Act. The High Court observed that “if the government were satisfied with the urgency it would have certainly issued declaration under Section 6 of the Act immediately after the issue of the notification under Section 4 of the Act”. The High Court found that the failure to issue declaration under section 6 of the Act immediately on the part of the State Government was fatal and there was delay of nearly one year between the publication of the notification under section 4(1) containing the direction dispensing with the compliance with Section 5A of the Act and the date of publication of the declaration issued under Section 6 of the Act. In such background, the Supreme Court pointed out that after the publication of the notification under section 4(1), the Collector, after going through it, found that there were some errors in the notification which needed to be corrected by issuing a corrigendum. Accordingly, he wrote a letter to the State Government pointing out the errors and requesting the State Government to publish a corrigendum immediately. Both the corrigendum and the declaration under section 6 of the Act were issued on May 1, 1981. Accordingly, he wrote a letter to the State Government pointing out the errors and requesting the State Government to publish a corrigendum immediately. Both the corrigendum and the declaration under section 6 of the Act were issued on May 1, 1981. The Supreme Court, thus, held that on account of some error on the part of the officials who were entrusted with the duty of processing of the case at the level of Secreteriate, there was a delay of nearly one year between the publication of the notification under section 4(1) and the publication of the declaration under Section 6 of the Act, and thus, the question was whether in the circumstances of that case, it could be said that on account of the mere delay of nearly one year in the publication of the declaration, it could be said that the order made by the State Government dispensing with the compliance with section 5-A of the Act at the time of publication of the notification under section 4(1) of the Act would stand vitiated in the absence of any other material. The Supreme Court further pointed out that in that case, there was no allegation of any kind of mala fides on the part of either the Government or any of the officers, nor did the respondents contend that there was no urgent necessity for providing housing accommodation to a large number of people of Meerut city during the relevant time. The Supreme Court further observed that the letters and the certificates submitted by the Collector and the Secretary of the Meerut Development Authority to the State Government before the issue of the notification under section 4(1) clearly demonstrated that at that time, there was a great urgency felt by them regarding the provision of housing accommodation at Meerut, and the State Government acted upon the said reports, certificates and other material which were before it. 20.1 In the above circumstances, the Supreme Court held that it could not be said that the decision of the State Government in resorting to Section 17(1) of the Act was unwarranted as the provisions of housing accommodation in these days has become a matter of national urgency, which, according to the Supreme Court, could be taken a judicial note. 20.1 In the above circumstances, the Supreme Court held that it could not be said that the decision of the State Government in resorting to Section 17(1) of the Act was unwarranted as the provisions of housing accommodation in these days has become a matter of national urgency, which, according to the Supreme Court, could be taken a judicial note. 20.2 From the above observations of the Supreme Court, it appears that in the facts of that case, the Supreme Court held that the delay of publication of declaration under section 6 of the Act in the above fact did not indicate that there was no urgency at the relevant time of publication of notice under section 4 of the Act. In the fact of the present case, the State, however, could not explain the delay of more than one year in publishing the notification under Section 6 of the Act. 20.3 In the case before us, we have already pointed out that the Honourable Minister himself had inquired regarding the position of the land and what happened as regards the earlier notification, and before getting any answer, the sanction of issuing notice under section 4(1) of the Act with urgency clause was given. Therefore, in the facts of the present case, the said decision cannot have any application. At any rate, the above decision of the Supreme Court does not lay down a proposition of law that delay, however long may be, is not to be taken into account for considering the justification of urgency clause even if the same remains unexplained. 21. In the case of Chameli Singh v. State of U.P. [supra], there was delay in respect of both pre-notification and post-notification on the part of the officials to finalize and publish the notification. 21. In the case of Chameli Singh v. State of U.P. [supra], there was delay in respect of both pre-notification and post-notification on the part of the officials to finalize and publish the notification. The Supreme Court pointed out that those facts were present before the Government when it invoked the urgency clause and dispensed with the inquiry under section 5.A. In the said case, the land was acquired for housing need of Dalits, Tribes and poor, and as such, the Supreme Court held that so long as the unhygienic conditions and deplorable housing needs of Dalits, Tribes and the poor are not solved or fulfilled, the urgency continues to subsist and the Government, on the basis of material, constitutional and international obligations, having formed its opinion of urgency, the Court, not being an appellate forum, would not disturb the findings unless the court conclusively finds the exercise of the power mala fide. 21.1 We have already pointed out that the above decision was taken in the facts of the said case and the said decision cannot be said to be a proposition laying down that the appropriate Government can, without subjective satisfaction, dispense with the necessity of complying with the provisions contained in section 17 of the Act before dispensing with the provision of raising objections under section 5-A of the Act. 22. In the case of Nand Kishore Gupta v. State of U.P [supra], a two-judge-bench of the Supreme Court was considering the case of acquisition of land for the purpose of construction of Yamuna Expressway. In that context it was held that acquisition of land along Yamua Expressway for development of the same for commercial, amusement, industrial, institutional and residential purposes were complementary to creation of Expressway and hence, amounted to acquisition for public purpose. In the above fact, it was further observed that if a person interested wanted to challenge the dispensing with of the inquiry under section 5-A of the Act by invoking section 17(4) of the Act, it could be made only the ground of insufficiency of supporting material or on the ground that the order suffers from malice. In the above fact, it was further observed that if a person interested wanted to challenge the dispensing with of the inquiry under section 5-A of the Act by invoking section 17(4) of the Act, it could be made only the ground of insufficiency of supporting material or on the ground that the order suffers from malice. In that context it was held that the likelihood of encroachment, magnitude of number of persons who had been required to be heard and time to be taken for that purpose and the fact that the project had already been delayed by 8 long years due to various challenges thereto justified dispensing with the inquiry under section 5-A. 22.1 In our view, in the case before us, it appears that the appropriate Government, while giving sanction of issue of notification under section 4 of the Act with urgency clause, was itself not satisfied as would appear from the fact that the Hon’ble Minister inquired on certain factual aspects but without waiting for answers thereto, directed issue of the notification whereas answer to those queries came after issue of such notification. Therefore, the principle laid down in the case of Nand Kishore Gupta & Others [supra] cannot have any application to the facts of the present case and on the other hand, it supports the case of the petitioner that the urgency clause was invoked notwithstanding the existence of insufficiency of supporting material and non-application of mind. 23. So far as the decisions relied upon by Mr. Prashant Desai are concerned, it appears that Mr. Desai also relied upon the case of Deepak Pahwa & Ors [supra] and State of V.P. vs. Pista Devi [supra], which have also been relied upon by Mr. Jani, and we have dealt with those same in the earlier part of this judgment. Therefore, we are not separately dealing with these two cases. 24. In the case of Jai Narain vs. Union of India [supra], a two-judge-Bench of the Supreme Court was considering a case of justification of invocation of urgency clause while issuing a notification under section 4 of the Act in a case where the acquisition of land was for the construction of Sewage Treatment Plant for planned development of Delhi under the direction of the Supreme Court. In that context, it was held that whatever may be the user of the land under the Master Plan and the Zonal Development Plan, the State can always acquire the same for public purposes in accordance with the law of the land. In that case, the Supreme Court observed that the object and purpose of construction the STP was to protect the environment, control pollution and in the process, maintain and develop the agricultural green. The Supreme Court further took judicial notice of the fact that there was utmost urgency to acquire the land in dispute and as such, the emergency provisions of the Act were rightly invoked. 24.1 In the case before us, we find that in the past, the proposal for acquisition of land was sent; subsequently, the proposal was dropped and for the above reason, the Honourable Minister, while granting sanction, made specific query about the past acquisition but before receiving the answer of the queries, on the very same day, sanctioned issue of notification under section 4 of the Act and that too invoking the urgency clause, and the answer to the specific queries were received after three months. Therefore, in our opinion, the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Jai Narain & Others [supra] has no application to the facts of the present case. 25. In the case of Kaniyalal v. State [supra], the contention before the Court was that the State Government had no power to acquire the land of the petitioners under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act for the benefit of the Municipal Corporation since it could not be said that the Municipal Corporation was unable to acquire the land by agreement under section 77 of the BPMC Act, 1949. The argument was that by reason of section 78 of the BPMC Act, the State Government could take proceedings for acquisition of land on behalf of the Municipal Corporation only if the Municipal Corporation was unable under sec. 77 to acquire the land by agreement and since the condition was not fulfilled in the case of the petitioners’ land in that case, the acquisition purported to be made by the State Government was invalid. 77 to acquire the land by agreement and since the condition was not fulfilled in the case of the petitioners’ land in that case, the acquisition purported to be made by the State Government was invalid. The Division Bench, however, rejected the aforesaid contention by holding that the notification impugned in that case did not derive its strength and force from section 78 nor did it seek its justification under that section but it was issued in exercise of the power conferred under section 6 and so far as that section was concerned, there was nothing in it which in any way affected the power of the Commissioner to issue the impugned notification. 25.1 We fail to appreciate how the said decision could be of any help to the respondents in the facts of the present case. It appears that in that case, the Division Bench was considering the quashing of a notification dated 18th August 1961 which raised a question as to the validity of section 3(4) of the Bombay Commissioners of Divisions Act and two notifications issued by the State Government under that section, one dated 5th September 1985 and the other 22nd September 1958. It appears from the Gujarat amendment of the Land Acquisition Act that in the years 1964 and 1965 there have been an amendments in sections 4, 6 and 17 wherein the words “or as the case may be Commissioner” and “under signature of the Commissioner” etc. were deleted. 25.2 Be that as it may, in the facts of the present case, the above question has not been raised by Mr. Anshin Desai regarding lack of power on the part of 6 of the Act in view of Section 78 of the Municipal Act, and, therefore, we find that the said decision is insignificant in the facts of the present case. 26. In the case of Kikabhai Ukabhai Patel [supra], a Division Bench of this Court held that the acquisition proceedings being initiated at the behest of Municipal Corporation which had proposed acquisition of the land for installation of its drainage disposal scheme and the said proposal being accepted by the State Government and notifications under sections 4 and 6 having been issued, such proceedings could be withdrawn only if the proposal was moved by the Municipal Corporation. In the absence of such proposal, the State Government could withdraw the acquisition proceedings in question. In the absence of such proposal, the State Government could withdraw the acquisition proceedings in question. 26.1 In the context of the above case, it was pointed out that if the proposal for alternative site was considered and found to be not feasible, after full deliberations with all concerned, it could not be said that the State authority had followed pick-and-chose policy and arbitrarily selected the petitioners’ land for acquisition or that the said acquisition was contrary to any confirmed policy of the State Government. 26.2 In the case before us, the inquiry under section 5-A has been dispensed with and thus, the petitioner has been deprived of his opportunity to make appropriate submissions against the proposed acquisition in ignorance of Section 17 of the Act. We, thus, find that the above decision could be of no help to Mr. Desai’s client on the question of invoking urgency clause. 27. A four-Judge-Bench of the Supreme Court, in the case of Nandeshwar Prasad v. U.P. Govt. reported in AIR 1964 SC 1217 had the occasion to consider the scope and object of Section 5-A of the Act. In that context, K.N. Wanchoo, J., (as His Lordship then was) speaking for the Bench categorically held [in paragraph 13] that the “right to file objections under section 5-A is a substantial right when a person’s property is being threatened with acquisition and we cannot accept that that right can be taken away as if by a side-wind because sub-sec. (1-A) mentions sub-s(1).” 28. In a very recent decision of a three-judge-Bench of the Supreme Court, in the case of Union of India & Ors. v. Shiv Raj & Ors. in Civil Appeal Nos. 5478 to 5483 of 2014 decided on May 7, 2014, strongly relied upon by Mr. Anshin Desai, it had the occasion to consider this aspect, and the said Court took into consideration the hostile interpretation of section 5-A of the Act which was not there in the original statute. In that context, the Supreme Court made the following observations: “6. Section 5-A of the Act 1894 was not there in the original statute. In J.E.D. Ezra v. Secy. In that context, the Supreme Court made the following observations: “6. Section 5-A of the Act 1894 was not there in the original statute. In J.E.D. Ezra v. Secy. of State for India (1902-1903) 7 CWN 249, the Calcutta High Court expressed its inability to grant relief to the owner of the property whose land was sought to be acquired without giving any opportunity of hearing observing that there was no provision in the Act requiring observance of the principles of natural justice. It was subsequent to the said judgment that the Act was amended incorporating Section 5-A w.e.f. 1.1.1924. The Statement of Objects and Reasons for the said amendment provided that the original Act did not oblige the Government to enquire into and consider any objection of the persons interested nor the Act provided for right of hearing to the person whose interest stands adversely affected. 7. In Nandeshwar Prasad v. U.P. Government, AIR 1964 SC 1217 , this Court dealt with the nature of objections under Section 5-A of the Act 1894 observing as under: “13. The right to file objections under Section 5-A is a substantial right when a person’s property is being threatened with acquisition and we cannot accept that that right can be taken away as if by a side wind…” 8. The rules of natural justice have been ingrained in the scheme of Section 5-A of the Act 1894 with a view to ensure that before any person is deprived of his land by way of compulsory acquisition, he must get an opportunity to oppose the decision of the State Government and/or its agencies/instrumentalities to acquire the particular parcel of land. Section 5-A(2) of the Act 1894, which represents statutory embodiment of the rule of audi alteram partem, gives an opportunity to the objector to make an endeavour to convince the Collector that his land is not required for the public purpose specified in the notification issued under Section 4(1) of the Act 1894 or that there are other valid reasons for not acquiring the same. Thus, section 5-A of the Act 1894 embodies a very just and wholesome principle that a person whose property is being or is intended to be acquired should have a proper and reasonable opportunity of persuading the authorities concerned that acquisition of the property belonging to that person should not be made. Thus, section 5-A of the Act 1894 embodies a very just and wholesome principle that a person whose property is being or is intended to be acquired should have a proper and reasonable opportunity of persuading the authorities concerned that acquisition of the property belonging to that person should not be made. On the consideration of the said objection, the Collector is required to make a report. The State Government is then required to apply mind to the report of the Collector and take final decision on the objections filed by the landowners and other interested persons. Then and then only, a declaration can be made under Section 6(1) of the Act 1894. 9. Therefore, Section 5-A of the Act 1894 confers a valuable right in favour of a person whose lands are sought to be acquired. It is trite that hearing given to a person must be an effective one and not a mere formality. Formation of opinion as regard the public purpose as also suitability thereof must be preceded by application of mind having due regard to the relevant factors and rejection of irrelevant ones. The State in its decision making process must not commit any misdirection in law. It is also not in dispute that Section 5-A of the Act, 1894 confers a valuable important right and having regard to the provisions, contained in Article 300A of the Constitution of India has been held to be akin to a fundamental right. 10. Thus, the limited right given to an owner/person interested under Section 5-A of the Act, 1894 to object to the acquisition proceedings is not an empty formality and is a substantive right, which can be taken away only for good and valid reason and within the limitations prescribed under Section 17(4) of the Act, 1894. 11. The Land Acquisition Collector is duty-bound to objectively consider the arguments advanced by the objector and make recommendations, duly supported by brief reasons, as to why the particular piece of land should or should not be acquired and whether the plea put forward by the objector merits acceptance. In other words, the recommendations made by the Land Acquisition Collector should reflect objective application of mind to the entire record including the objections filed by the interested persons.” (Emphasis supplied). 29. We, therefore, find that the contention of Mr. Jani and Mr. In other words, the recommendations made by the Land Acquisition Collector should reflect objective application of mind to the entire record including the objections filed by the interested persons.” (Emphasis supplied). 29. We, therefore, find that the contention of Mr. Jani and Mr. Prashant Desai that this Court should take into consideration the objections of the petitioner against the proposed acquisition, instead of quashing the notification, is not tenable in the eye of law. 30. A similar view has been taken by another three-judge-bench of the Supreme Court in the case of Union of India & Ors. vs. Mukesh Hans [supra] wherein the Supreme Court made the following observations in paragraphs 35 and 36, which are quoted below: “35. At this stage, it is relevant to notice that the limited right given to an owner/person interested under Section 5-A of the Act to object to the acquisition proceedings is not an empty formality and is a substantive right, which can be taken away for good and valid reason and within the limitations prescribed under Section 17(4) of the Act. The object and importance of 5-A inquiry was noticed by this Court in the case of Munshi Singh vs. Union of India [ (1973) 2 SCC 337 ] where this Court held thus:- "7. Section 5-A embodies a very just and wholesome principle that a person whose property is being or is intended to be acquired should have a proper and reasonable opportunity of persuading the authorities concerned that acquisition of the property belonging to that person should not be made. The legislature has, therefore, made complete provisions for the persons interested to file objections against the proposed acquisition and for the disposal of their objections. It is only in cases of urgency that special powers have been conferred on the appropriate Government to dispense with the provisions of Section 5-A." 36. It is clear from the above observation of this Court that right of representation and hearing contemplated under Section 5-A of the Act is a very valuable right of a person whose property is sought to be acquired and he should have appropriate and reasonable opportunity of persuading the authorities concerned that the acquisition of the property belonging to that person should not be made. Therefore, in our opinion, if the appropriate Government decides to take away this minimal right then its decision to do so must be based on materials on record to support the same and bearing in mind the object of Section 5-A.” (Emphasis supplied). 31. In the case of Radhyshyam (Dead through L.Rs. & Ors. v/s. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors. [supra], the Supreme Court made the following observations in paragraph 77:- “77. From the analysis of the relevant statutory provisions and interpretation thereof by this Court in different cases, the following principles can be culled out: (i) to (iii). xxx xxx xxx (iv) The property of a citizen cannot be acquired by the State and/or its agencies/instrumentalities without complying with the mandate of Sections 4, 5-A and 6 of the Act. A public purpose, however, laudable it may be does not entitle the State to invoke the urgency provisions because the same have the effect of depriving the owner of his right to property without being heard. Only in a case of real urgency, the State can invoke the urgency provisions and dispense with the requirement of hearing the land owner or other interested persons. (v) Section 17(1) read with Section 17(4) confers extraordinary power upon the State to acquire private property without complying with the mandate of Section 5A. These provisions can be invoked only when the purpose of acquisition cannot brook the delay of even a few weeks or months. Therefore, before excluding the application of Section 5-A, the authority concerned must be fully satisfied that time of few weeks or months likely to be taken in conducting inquiry under Section 5-A will, in all probability, frustrate the public purpose for which land is proposed to be acquired. (Emphasis supplied). 32. Even in the subsequent decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Darshan Lal Nagpal v. Govt (NCT) of Delhi [supra], the Supreme Court made the following observations in paragraph 27:- 27. (Emphasis supplied). 32. Even in the subsequent decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Darshan Lal Nagpal v. Govt (NCT) of Delhi [supra], the Supreme Court made the following observations in paragraph 27:- 27. In Radhy Shyam v. State of U.P. (supra), this Court considered challenge to the acquisition of land under Section 4(1) read with Section 17(1) and (4) for planned industrial development of District Gautam Budh Nagar by Greater Noida Industrial Development Authority and extensively referred to the judgment in Narayan Govind Gavate v. State of Maharashtra (1977) 1 SCC 133 and also adverted to other judgments, in which the importance of the rules of natural justice has been highlighted, and culled out the following principles: “(i) to (iii) xxx xxx xxx (iv) The property of a citizen cannot be acquired by the State and/or its agencies/instrumentalities without complying with the mandate of Sections 4, 5-A and 6 of the Act. A public purpose, however laudable it may be does not entitle the State to invoke the urgency provisions because the same have the effect of depriving the owner of his right to property without being heard. Only in a case of real urgency, the State can invoke the urgency provisions and dispense with the requirement of hearing the landowner or other interested persons. (v) Section 17(1) read with Section 17(4) confers extraordinary power upon the State to acquire private property without complying with the mandate of Section 5-A. These provisions can be invoked only when the purpose of acquisition cannot brook the delay of even a few weeks or months. Therefore, before excluding the application of Section 5-A, the authority concerned must be fully satisfied that time of few weeks or months likely to be taken in conducting inquiry under Section 5-A will, in all probability, frustrate the public purpose for which land is proposed to be acquired. 32.1 In the said decision, the Supreme Court further pointed out that the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Jage Ram v. State of Haryana (1971) 1 SCC 671 could not have been relied upon for taking the view that pre-notification delay cannot be considered while deciding the State’s action to invoke urgency provision. 33. 32.1 In the said decision, the Supreme Court further pointed out that the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Jage Ram v. State of Haryana (1971) 1 SCC 671 could not have been relied upon for taking the view that pre-notification delay cannot be considered while deciding the State’s action to invoke urgency provision. 33. In the case of Mahender Pal and others v. State of Haryana and others [supra], the Supreme Court made the following observations in paragraphs 6 and 7 of the judgment, regarding strict compliance of section 17 of the Act. “6. The Act has been enacted for the acquisition of land for public purposes and for Companies. Having regard to the provisions contained in Article 300-A of the Constitution of India as also the provisions of Act, the State in exercise of its power of ‘eminent domain’ may deprive a person of his right to a property only when there exists a public purpose and a reasonable amount by way of compensation is offered for acquisition of his land. The Act fulfills the aforementioned criteria. It, however, lays down the details procedures therefor. It is also of some significance to notice that the Parliament, by reason of the Act, has imposed further restrictions/conditions for acquisition of land for the benefit of the land-owner. 7. Right to file objection and hearing thereof to a notification issued by the appropriate government expressing its intention to acquire a property is a valuable right. Such a valuable right of hearing and particularly in a case of this nature could have been taken away only if conditions precedent for exercise of this emergency power stood satisfied. Sub-section (4) of Section 17 of the Act is an exception to Section 5-A of the Act. An opinion of the government in this behalf is required to be formed if there exists an emergency. Existence of the foundational fact for invoking the aforementioned provision is, therefore, a sine qua non for formation of opinion. Such subjective satisfaction must be based on an objective criteria. Ipse dixit on the part of the State would not serve the purpose. The appellants, in our opinion, had made out a case for examination of their cases in details. The nature of constructions and other features of the land sought to be acquired have been noticed by us hereinbefore. (Emphasis supplied by us.) 34. Ipse dixit on the part of the State would not serve the purpose. The appellants, in our opinion, had made out a case for examination of their cases in details. The nature of constructions and other features of the land sought to be acquired have been noticed by us hereinbefore. (Emphasis supplied by us.) 34. At this stage, it will also be profitable to refer to the following observations of the Supreme Court in paragraph 16 of the judgment in the case of Union of India v. Krishan Lal Ameja reported in (2004) 8 SCC 453 regarding compliance of the provisions of Section 5-A. “16. Section 17 confers extraordinary powers on the authorities under which it can dispense with the normal procedure laid down under Section 5-A of the Act in exceptional case of urgency. Such powers cannot be lightly resorted to except in case of real urgency enabling the Government to take immediate possession of the land proposed to be acquired for public purpose. A public purpose, however, laudable it may be, by itself is not sufficient to take aid of Section 17 to use this extraordinary power as use of such power deprives a land owner of his right in relation to immoveable property to file objections for the proposed acquisition and it also dispenses with the inquiry under Section 5-A of the Act. The Authority must have subjective satisfaction of the need for invoking urgency clause under Section 17 keeping in mind the nature of the public purpose, real urgency that the situation demands and the time factor i.e. whether taking possession of the property can wait for a minimum period within which the objections could be received from the land owners and the inquiry under Section 5-A of the Act could be completed. In other words, if power under Section 17 is not exercised, the very purpose for which the land is being acquired urgently would be frustrated or defeated. Normally urgency to acquire a land for public purpose does not arise suddenly or overnight but sometimes such urgency may arise unexpectedly, exceptionally or extraordinarily depending on situations such as due to earthquake, flood or some specific time-bound project where the delay is likely to render the purpose nugatory or infructuous. Normally urgency to acquire a land for public purpose does not arise suddenly or overnight but sometimes such urgency may arise unexpectedly, exceptionally or extraordinarily depending on situations such as due to earthquake, flood or some specific time-bound project where the delay is likely to render the purpose nugatory or infructuous. A citizen's property can be acquired in accordance with law but in the absence of real and genuine urgency, it may not be appropriate to deprive an aggrieved party of a fair and just opportunity of putting forth its objections for due consideration of the acquiring authority. While applying the urgency clause, the State should indeed act with due care and responsibility. Invoking urgency clause cannot be a substitute or support for the laxity, lethargy or lack of care on the part of the State Administration.” (Emphasis supplied by us.) 35. At this juncture, we also rely upon the observations of the Supreme Court in the case of Dev Sharan and others [supra] wherein the Supreme Court, in paragraphs 35 to 37, made the following observations:- “35. From the various facts disclosed in the said affidavit it appears that the matter was initiated by the Government’s letter dated 4-6-2008 for issuance of Section 4(1) and Section 17 notifications. A meeting for selection of the suitable site for construction was held on 27-6-2008, and the proposal for such acquisition and construction was sent to the Director, Land Acquisition on 2-7-2008. This was in turn forwarded to the State Government by the Director on 22-7-2008. After due consideration of the forwarded proposal and documents, the State Government issued the Section 4 notification, along with Section 17 notification on 21-8-2008. These notifications were published in local newspapers on 24-9-2008. 36. Thereafter, over a period of 9 months, the State Government deposited 10% of compensation payable to the landowners, along with 10% of acquisition expenses and 70% of cost of acquisition was deposited, and the proposal for issuance of Section 6 declaration was sent to the Director, Land Acquisition on 19-6-2009. The Director in turn forwarded all these to the State Government on 17-7-2009, and the State Government finally issued the Section 6 declaration on 10-8-2009. This declaration was published in the local dailies on 17-8-2009. 37. The Director in turn forwarded all these to the State Government on 17-7-2009, and the State Government finally issued the Section 6 declaration on 10-8-2009. This declaration was published in the local dailies on 17-8-2009. 37. Thus the time which elapsed between publication of Section 4(1) and Section 17 notifications, and Section 6 declaration in the local newspapers is 11 months and 23 days, i.e. almost one year. This slow pace at which the government machinery had functioned in processing the acquisition, clearly evinces that there was no urgency for acquiring the land so as to warrant invoking Section 17 (4) of the Act.” (Emphasis supplied). 35.1 The facts of the above case, to some extent, are similar to the one involved in the present case in the matter of publication of notification under section 6 of the Act. 36. Thus, on consideration of the entire materials on record, we find substance in the contention of Mr. Anshin Desai, the learned advocate for the petitioner, that having regard to the notes reflected in the original records, there was no subjective satisfaction on the part of the Honourable Minister, the appropriate authority, before giving permission to issue notification under section 4 of the Act and that too, invoking section 17(4) of the Act. It is, therefore, a fit case where we should set aside the notifications under section 4 as well as 6 of the Act for non-compliance of the provisions contained in Section 5-A of the Act by ignoring the provisions of Section 17(4) of the Act, and the impugned notifications are, accordingly, set aside. 37. The Special Civil Application is allowed accordingly. We, however, make it clear that this order will not stand in the way of the State to proceed afresh after complying with the requirement of Section 5A of the Act. In the facts and circumstances of the case, there will be, however, no order as to costs. FURTHER ORDER : After this judgment was pronounced, Mr. Jani, the learned Government Pleader, and Mr. Pandya, the learned advocate appearing on behalf of the Municipal Corporation, pray for maintaining status quo as regards the nature and character of the property to enable their respective client to move the higher forum against our judgment. The prayer is granted. FURTHER ORDER : After this judgment was pronounced, Mr. Jani, the learned Government Pleader, and Mr. Pandya, the learned advocate appearing on behalf of the Municipal Corporation, pray for maintaining status quo as regards the nature and character of the property to enable their respective client to move the higher forum against our judgment. The prayer is granted. Let there be an order of status quo as regards the nature and character of the property for a period of two months from today. Application allowed.