JUDGMENT : Abhilasha Kumari, J. Rule in both the petitions. Mr. Lalit M. Patel, learned advocate, waives service of notice of Rule for the respondent-Bank in the petitions. 2. Both these petitions have been preferred by the petitioners under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, challenging both the orders dated 15.05.2014, passed by the learned Auxiliary Chamber Judge, Court No. 13, City Civil Court, Ahmedabad, ('the Trial Court') in Civil Misc. Application No. 815 of 2013 (Special Civil Application No.8359 of 2014) and Civil Misc. Application No.136 of 2014 (Special Civil Application No.8360 of 2014), whereby, the ex-parte decrees have been set aside and leave to defend the Summary Suits has been granted to the petitioners upon condition of depositing 25% of the decretal amount of Rs. 14,13,720/- and Rs. 1,18,88,700/-, respectively. 3. As the issue of law involved in both the petitions is similar, the parties are similar and so are the background facts, the petitions have been heard together and are being decided by a common judgment. 4. For the sake of convenience, the facts of Special Civil Application No.8359 of 2014 are being referred to, as they substantially cover the facts of the second petition. 5. Briefly stated, the relevant facts are that the petitioners are the original defendants and the respondent is the original plaintiff. Respondent-Adarsh Co-operative Bank Limit has preferred Summary Suit No.760 of 2013. The said Suit was decreed ex-parte against the petitioners, who did not file an application for leave to defend within the stipulated period of time. The petitioners then preferred an application under the provisions of Order 37 Rule 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 ("the Code" for short), for setting aside the ex-parte decree. The Trial Court set aside the ex-parte decree and granted conditional leave to defend to the petitioners, upon condition that the petitioners deposit 25% of the decretal amount, as indicated herein above. 5.1. The Trial Court has stayed the impugned order for a certain period of time, which was extended by this Court from time to time and is operative till date. Aggrieved by the imposition of the above mentioned conditions, the petitioners have approached this Court. 6. Mr. 5.1. The Trial Court has stayed the impugned order for a certain period of time, which was extended by this Court from time to time and is operative till date. Aggrieved by the imposition of the above mentioned conditions, the petitioners have approached this Court. 6. Mr. Indravadan Parmar, learned advocate has appeared for the petitioners and has forcefully submitted that: (1) The impugned judgment is ex-facie contrary to the law on the facts and in the circumstances of the case as well as the material on record, more so when the Suit involves real and genuine triable issues. The Suit brought by the respondent-Bank is based solely upon allegations of breach of trust and fraud, for which the respondent has already filed a criminal complaint, alleging connivance of its Manager, Vijay Harmanbhai Patel, whose services have been terminated by the respondent-Bank. The suit, therefore, does not fall within the purview of Order 37 of the Code and cannot be tried as a Summary Suit. (2) Allegations of breach of trust and fraud have been levelled by the respondent Bank upon its Manager Vijay Harmanbhai Patel, who is arrayed as defendant No.4 in the Summary Suit. However, the Trial Court has granted unconditional leave to defend to Mr. Vijay Harmanbhai Patel, whereas an onerous condition of deposit of 25% of the decretal amount has been imposed upon the petitioners. The law has not been applied equally by the Trial Court in the same set of facts. (3) The Suit is not maintainable as a Summary Suit as there was no contract between the petitioners and the respondent Bank, which is evident from the averments of the Suit. Nothing is due or payable to the respondent-Bank from the petitioners, as alleged. (4) The suit involves genuine, triable issues of substantial defence and this aspect has been clearly noticed by the Trial Court in the impugned order. In the entire judgment, there is no mention at all of any adverse or negative opinion regarding the nature of the defence put up by the petitioner. It is not as though the Trial Court has arrived at a conclusion that the defence sought to be put up by the petitioners is either sham or moonshine. In the entire judgment, there is no mention at all of any adverse or negative opinion regarding the nature of the defence put up by the petitioner. It is not as though the Trial Court has arrived at a conclusion that the defence sought to be put up by the petitioners is either sham or moonshine. On the contrary, the Trial Court is satisfied, not only with the special circumstances shown by the petitioners for setting aside the ex-parte decree, but also with the substantial defence that the petitioners have disclosed to defend the Suit. Though the decree in the Suit was passed on 29.06.2003 the respondent Bank filed the Execution Petition only in the year 2013. It is only upon receipt of the notice of the execution proceedings that the petitioners became aware of the ex-parte decree. This aspect has been considered by the Trial Court in the impugned judgment. Under the circumstances, the Trial Court was not justified in granting conditional leave to defend to the petitioners. (5) The sole reason rendered by the Trial Court for granting conditional leave to defend, is that the respondent-Bank is a financial institution dealing with public money. While passing the impugned judgment, the Trial Court has lost sight of the guidelines framed by the Supreme Court in several judgments, regarding the grant of leave to defend in Summary Suits. The case of the petitioners is squarely covered by those guidelines, therefore, no condition could have been imposed by the Trial Court, while granting leave to defend. (6) In support of the above submissions, learned advocate for the petitioners has placed reliance upon the following judgments. (a) Sunil Enterprises and another v. SBI Commercial & International Bank Ltd. reported in (1998) 5 SCC 354 (b) Raj Duggal v. Ramesh Kumar Bansal reported in 1991 Supp (1) SCC 191 (c) John Impex (P) Ltd. v. Surinder Singh and others reported in (2003) 9 SCC 176 7. The respondent-Bank has filed an affidavit-in-reply to the petition. The said affidavit dwells primarily on the aspect that the Trial Court ought not to have set aside the ex-parte decree under Order 37 Rule 4 of the Code, as the petitioners have not shown any special circumstances that would entitle them to the said relief. The aspect of the grant of conditional leave to defend is not the main focus of the said affidavit-in-reply. 8. Mr. The aspect of the grant of conditional leave to defend is not the main focus of the said affidavit-in-reply. 8. Mr. Lalit M. Patel, learned advocate for the respondent Bank has made the following submissions. (1) The respondent-Bank is in the process of filing petitions against the impugned orders as, according to the respondent, special circumstances have not been shown by the petitioners for setting aside the decree under Order 37 Rule 4 of the Code. (2) The summons for judgment were served upon the learned advocate for the petitioners, therefore, they were required to file an application for leave to defend within ten days. However, they did not do so for a year, therefore, the Trial Court passed the ex-parte decree. The question before the Trial Court was whether the decree ought to be set aside or not and whether special circumstances existed to set aside the decree. In the present case, no special circumstances existed in favour of the petitioners, justifying the setting aside of the decree. (3) That the Trial Court has not committed any error by imposing a condition for the deposit of 25% of the decretal amount, within one month of the passing of the said orders. The Trial Court has exercised the discretion vested in it in a proper manner. If the condition is removed, it would amount to grave injustice to the respondent-Bank. The very object and purpose of summary procedure under Order 37 of the Code would be frustrated and it would hamper the recovery of money by the decree holder, which was never the intention of the legislature. (4) The suit was filed in the year 2003, the decree came to be passed in the year 2006 and the petitioners have filed the applications for setting aside the ex-parte decree in the year 2014. The petitioners have not raised any real or genuine triable issues, therefore, the Trial Court has not committed any jurisdictional error while granting conditional leave to defend. (5) That in criminal proceedings, the petitioners had applied for grant of regular bail and had stated before the High Court that they would pay a certain amount due to the bank in instalments. The petitioners cannot resile from the said statement, as it is an acknowledgement of their liability to pay the amount. (6) That the impugned order is just and proper. The petitioners cannot resile from the said statement, as it is an acknowledgement of their liability to pay the amount. (6) That the impugned order is just and proper. As no injustice has been done to the petitioners, this Court may not interfere, in exercise of its supervisory jurisdiction. (7) On the above grounds, the learned advocate for the respondent has prayed that the petition be rejected. (8) In support of his submissions, learned advocate for the respondent has placed reliance upon the following judgments: (a) Shah Shailesh Kumar Vindokumar v. Ashok Kumar Vajeraj reported in GCD-1995-2-432 (b) Santoshi T.V. Centre v. Arvind Mills Limit Electronics Division reported in GCD- 1997-3-427 (c) Eskay Enterprises v. Suresh P. Hinduja, reported in LAWS (BOM)-2005-2-131 (d) Relish Pharmaceuticals Ltd. v. Kamleshbhai Ravjibhai Kevat,reported in LAWS (GJH)-2011-4-157 (e) Rajni Kumar v. Suresh Kumar Malhotra, reported in LAWS(SC)-2003-3-48 (f) TVC Skyshop Ltd. v. Reliance Communication, reported in LAWS(SC)-2013-7-146 9. As narrated herein above, the ex-parte decree has been set aside under Order 37 Rule 4 of the Code as the Court found that the petitioners were able to show special circumstances. It is only that part of the order, whereby the imposition of condition regarding payment of 25% of the decretal amount is concerned, that is challenged by the petitioners in the present petitions. 10. Before determining the question whether the Trial Court ought to have granted unconditional leave to defend or whether the imposition of the condition of depositing 25% of the decretal amount is just and proper on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, it would be fruitful to refer to the relevant provisions of Order 37 of the Code and, subsequently to certain judicial pronouncements in this regard. 11. Order 37 Rule 1 provides for the Courts and classes of suits to which the order is to apply. Sub-rule (2) of Rule 1 is relevant in the context of the present suit and reads as below. "1. 11. Order 37 Rule 1 provides for the Courts and classes of suits to which the order is to apply. Sub-rule (2) of Rule 1 is relevant in the context of the present suit and reads as below. "1. Courts and classes of suits to which the Order is to apply.- (1) *** *** **** "(2) Subject to the provisions of sub-rule (1), the Order applies to the following classes of suits, namely:- (a) suits upon bills of exchange, hundies and promissory notes; (b) suits in which the plaintiff seeks only to recover a debt or liquidated demand in money payable by the defendant, with or without interest, arising,- (i) on a written contract; or (ii) on an enactment, where the sum sought to be recovered is a fixed sum of money or in the nature of a debt other than a penalty; or (iii) on a guarantee, where the claim against the principal is in respect of a debt or liquidated demand only." 12. With reference to the facts that led to the institution of the present summary suits, it is an admitted fact that the suit has not arisen from any bills of exchange, hundis and promissory note or debt. It is also not disputed that there is no written contract between the parties. The case of the respondent-Bank is that its Manager, in connivance with the petitioners, committed a fraud upon the Bank by giving the bank a false assurance that the cheques of the petitioners would be realised. Upon such assurance, a huge amount was taken away by the petitioners. The Manager of the Bank is also impleaded as defendant No.4 in one of the suits filed by the defendant bank. It has also been pointed out by the learned advocate for the petitioners, and not denied by the learned advocate for the respondent-Bank, that the Trial Court has granted unconditional leave to defend to the said Manager who is alleged to have committed the fraud, in collusion with the petitioners. 13. It was contended on behalf of the petitioners, before the Trial Court, that the suit, itself, is not maintainable in a summary form, as there is no written contract between the petitioners and the respondent-Bank. The main ground on which the suit has been instituted is one pertaining to allegations of fraud. 13. It was contended on behalf of the petitioners, before the Trial Court, that the suit, itself, is not maintainable in a summary form, as there is no written contract between the petitioners and the respondent-Bank. The main ground on which the suit has been instituted is one pertaining to allegations of fraud. While dealing with those submissions, the Trial Court has arrived at the following conclusion, in paragraph- 11 of the impugned order. "11. *** *** *** Thus, not only has it stated but it has been orally argued by Shri Gajjar that in view of the fact that there being no written contract between the bank and the applicants and in view of the fact that the Summary Suit was based on the ground of fraud, the question of maintainability of the Summary Suit under Order 37, Rule 1 is a triable issue. The arguments of Shri Gajjar on this count cannot be discarded." (emphasis supplied) 14. Thus, the Trial Court has found that the maintainability of the Summary Suit under Order 37 Rule 1 is a triable issue. 15. We may now refer to the provisions of Sub-rule (5) of Rule 3 of Order 37, which reads as under: "(5) The defendant may, at any time within ten days from the service of such summons for judgment, by affidavit or otherwise disclosing such facts as may be deemed sufficient to entitle him to defend, apply on such summons for leave to defend such suit, and leave to defend may be granted to him unconditionally or upon such terms as may appear to the Court or Judge to be just: Provided that leave to defend shall not be refused unless the Court is satisfied that the facts disclosed by the defendant do not indicate that he has a substantial defence to raise or that the defence intended to be put up by the defendant is frivolous or vexatious: Provided further that, where a part of the amount claimed by the plaintiff is admitted by the defendant to be due from him, leave to defend the suit shall not be granted unless the amount so admitted to be due is deposited by the defendant in Court." 16. The provisions of sub-rule (5) of Rule 3 confers discretion upon the Trial Court to grant unconditional leave to defend or impose a condition, as may appear to be just to the Court. The first proviso to this sub-rule categorically states that leave to defend shall not be refused unless the Court is satisfied that the facts disclosed by the defendants do not indicate that he has a substantial defence to raise or that the defence intended to be put up by the defendants is frivolous or vexatious. While passing the impugned order, the Trial Court has held, in paragraph-15 of the impugned order, as below: "15. *** *** *** The applicants herein have not only shown special circumstances but also satisfied this Court that they have substantial defence to defend the suit." (emphasis supplied) 17. Nowhere, in the impugned order, has the Trial Court stated that the defence put up by the petitioners is flimsy, frivolous, vexatious, sham or mere moonshine. On the contrary, it has found the defence of the petitioners to be substantial in nature. 18. The reason assigned by the Trial Court for imposition of the condition of depositing 25% of the decretal amount, is stated in paragraph-16 of the impugned judgment and reads as below : "16. However, considering the fact that the opponent bank being a financial institution dealing with public money, as well as in the chequered facts and circumstances of the present case, it would be just and proper to allow this application subject to condition of deposit of certain amount in the Court." (emphasis supplied) 19. Having arrived at a conclusion that the petitioners have satisfied the Trial Court that they have a substantial defence to defend the suit and there are triable issues involved, in the view of this Court, the Trial Court would not be justified in imposing such an onerous condition only for the reason that the respondent-Bank is a financial institution dealing with public money and there are chequered facts and circumstances in the present case. 20. True it is that sub-rule (5) of Rule 3 confers discretion upon the Trial Court to grant unconditional leave to defend or impose such conditions as may appear to be just to the Court. However, such discretion is to be exercised on the basis of the facts of the case and sound legal principles. 20. True it is that sub-rule (5) of Rule 3 confers discretion upon the Trial Court to grant unconditional leave to defend or impose such conditions as may appear to be just to the Court. However, such discretion is to be exercised on the basis of the facts of the case and sound legal principles. To gain an insight into this aspect, it would be fruitful to refer to certain relevant judicial pronouncements in this regard. 21. In M/s. Mechelec Engineers & Manufacturers v. M/s. Basic Equipment Corporation reported in (1976) 4 SCC 687 the Supreme Court has, after referring to several judgments on the point, culled out the following guidelines: "8. In Smt. Kiranmoyee Dassi & Anr. v. Dr. J. Chatterjee (1), Das. J., after a comprehensive review of authorities on the subject, stated the principles applicable to cases covered by order 17 C.P.C. in the form of the following propositions (at p. 253): "(a) If the Defendant satisfies the Court that he has a good defence to the claim on its merits the plaintiff is not entitled to leave to sign judgment and the Defendant is entitled to unconditional leave to defend. (b) If the Defendant raises a triable issue indicating that he has a fair or bona fide or reasonable defence although not a positively good defence the plaintiff is not entitled to sign judgment and the Defendant is entitled to unconditional leave to defend. (c) If the Defendant discloses such facts as may be deemed sufficient to entitle him to defend, that is to say, although the affidavit does not positively and immediately make it clear that he has a defence, yet, shows such a state of facts as leads to the inference that at the trial of the action he may be able to establish a defence to the plaintiff's claim the Plaintiff is not entitled to judgment and the Defendant is entitled to leave to defend but in such a case the Court may in its discretion impose conditions as to the time or mode of trial but not as to payment into Court or furnishing security. (d) If the defendant has no defence or the defence set up is illusory or sham or practically moonshine then ordinarily the Plaintiff is entitled to leave to sign judgment and the defendant is not entitled to leave to defend. (d) If the defendant has no defence or the defence set up is illusory or sham or practically moonshine then ordinarily the Plaintiff is entitled to leave to sign judgment and the defendant is not entitled to leave to defend. (e) If the defendant has no defence or the defence is illusory or sham or practically moonshine then although ordinarily the plaintiff is entitled to leave to sign judgment, the Court may protect the Plaintiff by only allowing the defence to proceed if the amount claimed is paid into Court or otherwise secured and give leave to the defendant on such condition, and thereby show mercy to the defendant by enabling him to try to prove a defence". (emphasis supplied) 22. In Sunil Enterprises and another v. SBI Commercial & International Bank Ltd. (Supra) relied upon by the learned advocate for the petitioner, the position of law in this regard has been reiterated as below: "3. In this appeal it is contended that what should be examined at the stage of grant of leave to defend is whether there was a real or a sham defence and whether the facts alleged by the appellants if established would be a good defence and the trial court should not go into the question whether the facts alleged were true or not, as that situation would arise only after leave was granted and at the trial. That a condition as to security could be imposed if the Court was of the opinion that the defence was put forward with a view to prolong this suit. 4. The position in law has been explained by this Court in Santosh Kumar v. Bhai Mool Singh, Milkhiram (India) Private Ltd. v. Chamanlal Bros., and Michalec Eng. & Mfg. v. Bank Equipment Corporation. The propositions laid down in these decisions may be summed up as follows:- (a) If the defendant satisfies the Court that he has a good defence to the claim on merits, the defendant is entitled to unconditional leave to defend. (b) If the defendant raises a triable issue indicating that he has a fair or bona fide or reasonable defence, although not a possibly good defence, the defendant is entitled to unconditional leave to defend. (b) If the defendant raises a triable issue indicating that he has a fair or bona fide or reasonable defence, although not a possibly good defence, the defendant is entitled to unconditional leave to defend. (c) If the defendant discloses such facts as may be deemed sufficient to entitle him to defend, that is, if the affidavit discloses that at the trial he may be able to establish a defence to the plaintiff's claim, the court may impose conditions at the time of granting leave to defend-the conditions being as to time of trial or mode of trial but not as to payment into Court or furnishing security. (d) If the defendant has no defence, or if the defence is sham or illusory or practically moonshine, the defendant is not entitled to leave to defend. (e) If the defendant has no defence or the defence is illusory or sham or practically moonshine, the Court may show mercy to the defendant by enabling him to try to prove a defence but at the same time protect the plaintiff imposing the condition that the amount claimed should be paid into Court or otherwise secured." (emphasis supplied) 23. In Raj Duggal v. Ramesh Kumar Bansal (Supra) also relied upon by the learned advocate for the petitioner, the Apex Court has held as below: "3. Leave is declined where the court is of the opinion that the grant of leave would merely enable the defendant to prolong the litigation by raising untenable and frivolous defences. The test is to see whether the defence raises a real issue and not a sham one, in the sense that if the facts alleged by the defendant are established there would be a good or even a plausible defence on those facts. If the court is satisfied about that leave must be given. If there is a triable issue in the sense that there is a fair dispute to be tried as to the meaning of a document on which the claim is based or uncertainty as to the amount actually due or where the alleged facts are of such a nature as to entitle the defendant to interrogate the plaintiff or to cross-examine his witnesses leave should not be denied. Where also, the defendant shows that even on a fair probability he was a bona fide defence, he ought to have leave. Where also, the defendant shows that even on a fair probability he was a bona fide defence, he ought to have leave. Summary judgments under Order 37 should not be granted where serious conflict as to matter of fact or where any difficulty on issues as to law arises. The court should not reject the defence of the defendant merely because of its inherent implausibility or its inconsistency." (emphasis supplied) 24. In John Impex (P) Ltd. v. Surinder Singh and others (supra) cited on behalf of the petitioner the Supreme Court has held as below: "4. The question is, whether on these facts, the courts below were justified in rejecting the application of the appellant for leave to defend. It is not proper for us to enter into the merits of the contention in view of our findings, which we are hereunder going to give, which make this petition pending before the trial Court. In view of the decision of this Court in the case of Precision Steel Engineering Works Ltd. v. Prem Deva Niranjan Deva Tayal we feel that this matter should not have been rejected at this stage. The submission on behalf of the respondent is that the lease deed clearly confirms the title of the respondent. But this again is a matter to be considered at trial not at this stage i.e. leave to defend application. At this stage neither evidence is to be weighed nor looked into." 25. From the above enunciation of law it is clear that if the defendant satisfies the Court that he has a good and genuine defence, he is entitled to unconditional leave to defend. If the defendant raises a triable issue indicating that he has a fair, bona fide or reasonable defence, even though it may not be a positively good defence, he is entitled to unconditional leave to defend. Where the defendant discloses facts that may be deemed to be sufficient to entitle him to defend, but the defence may not be immediately clear, then the Court may, in its discretion, impose a condition as to the time or mode of trial but not as to payment into Court or furnishing security. If the Trial Court finds that the defence set up by the defendant is illusory, sham, or practically moonshine, then leave to defend is ordinarily refused. If the Trial Court finds that the defence set up by the defendant is illusory, sham, or practically moonshine, then leave to defend is ordinarily refused. However, in such a situation, the Trial Court may impose a condition that the defendant be asked to deposit certain amount in the Court. 26. Applying the above principles of law to the facts of the present case, it transpires that the Trial Court has considered the relevant aspect that there is no contract between the petitioners and the respondent-Bank, therefore, the question of maintainability of the summary suit, itself, would be an important triable issue. The Trial Court has further concluded that the petitioners have satisfied the Court that they have a substantial defence to defend the suit and that there are triable issues involved. It is not as though the Trial Court has found that the facts stated by the petitioners do not disclose triable issues or its defence is flimsy or sham,so as to grant conditional leave to defend. As per the guidelines laid down in M/s. Mechelec Engineers & Manufacturers v. M/s. Basic Equipment Corporation (supra) even though the Court is entitled to impose a condition in its discretion, however, such condition should pertain to the time or mode of trial and not as to payment into Court or furnishing security. The Trial Court has not considered the defence set up by the petitioners to be illusory, sham or practically moonshine, but has concluded that it is a substantial one. Under the circumstances, in the view of this court, the Trial Court ought not to have imposed a condition for deposit of 25% of the decretal amount upon the petitioners. 27. The reason stated by the Trial Court for imposition of the condition,to the effect that the respondent Bank is a financial institution dealing with public money and there are chequered facts in the case, has nothing to do with the legal defence raised by the petitioners or the nature of the triable issues disclosed by them. The Trial Court ought to have considered the genuine triable issues that it found and not whether the plaintiff is a financial institution. The law would operate equally in all situations irrespective of the fact, whether the plaintiff is a financial institution or a ordinary litigant. The Trial Court ought to have considered the genuine triable issues that it found and not whether the plaintiff is a financial institution. The law would operate equally in all situations irrespective of the fact, whether the plaintiff is a financial institution or a ordinary litigant. It is the nature of the defence put up by the defendant that is to be seen and not the nature of business conducted by the plaintiff. 28. Regarding the submission advanced on behalf of the respondent-Bank that in bail proceedings the petitioners have agreed to deposit a certain amount which, constitutes an admission or an undertaking on their part, this court would only say that the said submission is misconceived. Order 37 lays down the entire procedure to be followed in a Summary Suit and is a Code in itself. Statements made in other proceedings will have no bearing in the proceedings of a Summary Suit. 29. The very basis of the Suits are allegations pertaining to fraud and collusion. There is no written contract between the parties, which in itself is a triable issue. It may be noted that the Trial Court has granted unconditional leave to defend to the Manager of the respondent-Bank, who is stated to have been the initiator of the alleged fraud, in the same set of facts. There does appear to be a discrepancy in dealing with the parties in the same set of facts. 30. The judgments cited on behalf of the respondent Bank pertain to order 37 Rule 4 and what constitutes special circumstances so as to justify the setting aside of an ex-parte decree. The Court is informed that separate petitions are being filed by the respondent in this regard,challenging the very orders that it is defending in the present petition. This court,therefore, does not consider it appropriate to discuss this issue in the present judgment. 31. In view of the above discussion and for the reasons stated herein above, this Court considers it proper to modify both the impugned judgments of the Trial Court dated 15.05.2014, passed in Civil Misc. Application No.815 of 2013, challenged in Special Civil Application No.8359 of 2014 and Civil Misc. Application No.136 of 2014, challenged in Special Civil Application No.8360 of 2014, to the extent of quashing and setting aside the conditions regarding payment of 25% of the decretal amount, imposed by the Trial Court in each judgment. Application No.815 of 2013, challenged in Special Civil Application No.8359 of 2014 and Civil Misc. Application No.136 of 2014, challenged in Special Civil Application No.8360 of 2014, to the extent of quashing and setting aside the conditions regarding payment of 25% of the decretal amount, imposed by the Trial Court in each judgment. The rest of the judgments would remain the same. 32. The petitions are partly-allowed to the above extent. Rule is made absolute in both the petitions, accordingly. There shall be no orders as to costs. Mr. Dharmesh V. Shah, learned advocate for the respondent-Bank has made a request that this judgment be kept in abeyance, for some time. Mr. Indravadan Parmar, learned advocate for the petitioners has opposed the said request. For reasons stated in the judgment,the request of the learned advocate for the respondent is declined. Petition partly allowed.