JUDGMENT Mr. Mahavir S. Chauhan, J. (Oral):- Inherent powers of this Court are being brought into play, by way of this petition under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code, (for short, Cr.P.C.), by the petitioners to seek quashing of First Information Report (for short, FIR) No.15 dated 04.02.2011 (Annexure P-1) recorded at Police Station, Bhikhiwind, District Tarn Taran, under Sections 420, 506, and 120-B of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (for short, ‘the IPC’) and all the proceedings emanating therefrom on the plea that from the circumstances constituting the FIR, no offence punishable under either of the above-stated Sections is made out. 2. While respondent No.2 has chosen not to file a response, a reply has been filed on behalf of the respondent-State, wherein it has been stated that after receipt of the complaint, an inquiry was conducted and on the basis of inquiry report and legal opinion dated 27.01.2011 of the Deputy District Attorney (Legal), the present FIR was recorded. 3. I have heard learned counsel for the parties. 4. Criminal Conspiracy, which is punishable under Section 12-B, IPC, has been defined by Section 120-A, IPC, as under: “120A. Definition of criminal conspiracy.—When two or more persons agree to do, or cause to be done,— (1) an illegal act, or (2) an act which is not illegal by illegal means, such an agreement is designated a criminal conspiracy: Provided that no agreement except an agreement to commit an offence shall amount to a criminal conspiracy unless some act besides the agreement is done by one or more parties to such agreement in pursuance thereof. Explanation— It is immaterial whether the illegal act is the ultimate object of such agreement, or is merely incidental to that object.” 5. An agreement between two or more persons to do an illegal act or legal act by illegal means is criminal conspiracy. If the agreement is not an agreement to commit an offence, it does not amount to conspiracy unless it is followed by an overt act done by one or more persons in furtherance of the agreement. The offence is complete as soon as there is meeting of minds and unity of purpose between the conspirators to do that illegal act or legal act by illegal means. Conspiracy itself is a substantive offence and is distinct from the offence to commit which the conspiracy is entered into. The offence is complete as soon as there is meeting of minds and unity of purpose between the conspirators to do that illegal act or legal act by illegal means. Conspiracy itself is a substantive offence and is distinct from the offence to commit which the conspiracy is entered into. The common law definition of ‘criminal conspiracy’ was stated first by Lord Denman in Jones’ case (1832 B & AD 345) that an indictment for conspiracy must “charge a conspiracy to do an unlawful act by unlawful means” and was elaborated by Willies, J, while referring the question to the House of Lords in Mulcahy v. Reg (1868) L.R. 3 H.L. 306 and the House of Lords in unanimous decision reiterated in Quinn v. Leathem 1901 AC 495 as under: “A conspiracy consists not merely in the intention of two or more, but in the agreement of two or more to do an unlawful act, or to do a lawful act by unlawful means. So long as such a design rests in intention only it is not indictable. When two agree to carry it into effect, the very plot is an act in itself, and the act of each of the parties, promise against promise, actus contra actum, capable of being enforced, if lawful, punishable of for a criminal object or for the use of criminal means. (emphasis supplied)” 6. Hon’ble Supreme Court of India enumerated the elements of criminal conspiracy in K. Hasim V. State of Tamil Nadu, AIR 2005 SC 128 , thus: “The elements of a criminal conspiracy have been stated to be (a) an object to be accomplished, (b) a plan or scheme embodying means to accomplish the objects, (c) an agreement or understanding between two or more of the accused persons whereby, they become definitely committed to co-operate for the accomplishment of the object by the means embodied in the agreement, or by any effectual means, and (d) in the jurisdiction where the statute required an overt act. The essence of a criminal conspiracy is the unlawful combination and ordinarily the offence is complete when combination is framed. From this, it necessarily follows that unless the statute so requires, no overt act need be done in furtherance of the conspiracy, and that the object of the combination need not be accomplished, in order to constitute an indictable offence. The essence of a criminal conspiracy is the unlawful combination and ordinarily the offence is complete when combination is framed. From this, it necessarily follows that unless the statute so requires, no overt act need be done in furtherance of the conspiracy, and that the object of the combination need not be accomplished, in order to constitute an indictable offence. Encouragement and support which co-conspirators give to one another rendering enterprises possible, which if left to individual effort, would have been impossible, furnish the ground for visiting conspirators and abettors with condign punishment. The conspiracy is held to be continued and renewed as to all its members wherever and whenever any member of the conspiracy acts in furtherance of the common design. For an offence punishable under Section 120-B the prosecution need not necessarily prove that the perpetrators expressly agree to do or cause to be done illegal act; the agreement may be proved by necessary implication. Offence of criminal conspiracy consists not merely in the intention of two or more, but in the agreement of two or more to do an unlawful act by unlawful means. So long as such a design rests in intention only, it is not indictable. When two agree to carry it into effect, the very plot is an act in itself, and an act of the parties, promise against promise, actus contra capable of being enforced, if lawful, punishable if for a criminal object or for use of criminal means.” 7. Criminal Intimidation, punishable under Section 506, IPC, is defined by Section 503, IPC, as under: “503. Criminal Intimidation.—Whoever threatens another with any injury to his person, reputation or property, or to the person or reputation of any one in whom that person is interested, with intent to cause alarm to that person, or to cause that person to do any act which he is not legally bound to do, or to omit to do any act which that person is legally entitled to do, as the means of avoiding the execution of such threat, commits criminal intimidation. Explanation.—A threat to injure the reputation of any deceased person in whom the person threatened is interested, is within this section. Illustration A, for the purpose of inducing B to desist from prosecuting a civil suit, threatens to burn B’s house. A is guilty of criminal intimidation.” 8. Explanation.—A threat to injure the reputation of any deceased person in whom the person threatened is interested, is within this section. Illustration A, for the purpose of inducing B to desist from prosecuting a civil suit, threatens to burn B’s house. A is guilty of criminal intimidation.” 8. To complete, the offence of Section 506, IPC, requires a threat with injury to the person, reputation or property, or to the person or reputation of any one in whom that person is interested and this threat must be with intent to cause alarm to that person. 9. Section 420, IPC, makes “cheating:” punishable. Section 415, IPC, defines cheating as under:- “415. Cheating—Whoever, by deceiving any person, fraudulently or dishonestly induces the person so deceived to deliver any property to any person or to consent that any person shall retain any property, or intentionally induces the person so deceived to do or omit to do anything which he would not do or omit if he were not so deceived, and which act or omission causes or is likely to cause damage or harm to that person in body, mind, reputation or property, is said to “cheat”.” 10. Meaning of the terms “Cheating” has been exponded in G.V. Rao v. L.H.V. Prasad and others, 2000(2) RCR(Crl.) 290 (SC) : 2000(3) SCC 693 , as under: “As mentioned above, Section 415 has two parts. While in the first part, the person must “dishonestly” or “fraudulently” induce the complainant to deliver any property; in the second part, the person should intentionally induce the complainant to do or omit to do a thing. That is to say, in the first part, inducement must be dishonest or fraudulent. In the second part, the inducement should be intentional. As observed by this Court in Jaswantrai Manilal Akhaney v. State of Bombay, AIR 1956 SC 575 a guilty intention is an essential ingredient of the offence of cheating. In order, therefore, to secure conviction of a person for the offence of cheating, “mens rea” on the part of that person, must be established. It was also observed in Mahadeo Prasad v. State of W.B., AIR 1954 SC 724 that in order to constitute the offence of cheating, the intention to deceive should be in existence at the time when the inducement was offered.” 11. It was also observed in Mahadeo Prasad v. State of W.B., AIR 1954 SC 724 that in order to constitute the offence of cheating, the intention to deceive should be in existence at the time when the inducement was offered.” 11. It, thus, appears that for constituting offence of cheating, (I) there should be fraudulent or dishonest inducement by the person alleged to have deceived the complainant; (2) (a) the person so deceived should be induced to deliver any property to any persons, or to consent that any person shall retain any property or (b) the person so deceived should be intentionally induced to do or omit to do anything which he would not do or omit if he were not so deceived; and (3) in cases covered by 2(b) the Act or omission should be one which causes or is likely to cause damage or harm to the person induced in body, reputation or property. Thus, the first element necessary for constituting the offence of cheating is deception of the complainant by the accused. Unless there is deception, the offence of cheating never gets attracted. After deception has been practiced, the persons deceived should get induced to do or omit to do something. 12. Reverting to the case on hand, a perusal of the FIR (Annexure P-1) would show that FIR was recorded on the basis of a complaint made by complainant-Manohar Lal wherein it was alleged by him that his daughter was engaged to Raj Kumar on 17.03.2009 and he had spent a huge amount on the ceremony. It was also stated that the marriage of his daughter and Raj Kumar was fixed for 19.10.2010. Even the invitation cards were got printed and all the arrangements were put in place. After the marriage had been fixed, the petitioners made a demand of Rs. three lacs, one Bullet motorcycle, one air conditioner and gold ornaments worth Rs.one lac, 50 suits and one LCD screen Colour TV for members of the family. This demand was conveyed to him by mediator Sakkar Singh. Thereupon, he, his son Dev Raj and wife Harjinder went to the Mediator and requested him to persuade the petitioners not to raise demand as he was not in a position to fulfill the demand. They even talked to Raj Kumar on telephone but the petitioners did not budge from their demand. Thereupon, he, his son Dev Raj and wife Harjinder went to the Mediator and requested him to persuade the petitioners not to raise demand as he was not in a position to fulfill the demand. They even talked to Raj Kumar on telephone but the petitioners did not budge from their demand. On 11.10.2011 complainant’s brother Sukhdev Sharma approached the petitioners but the petitioners and other members of their family did not accede to their request and stated that the marriage would not be performed if their demand was not met. Ultimately, the petitioners are stated to have refused to go ahead with the marriage and even threatened the complainant party on phone. 13. From the circumstances constituting the FIR, it is not deducible that there was an agreement amongst the petitioners to do an illegal act or legal act by illegal means and that any such agreement was followed by an overt act done by one or all of them in furtherance of the agreement attracting Section 120-B, IPC, or the petitioners threatened with injury to the person, reputation or property of the complainant or to the person or reputation of any one in whom the complainant might be interested, with intent to cause alarm to the complainant attracting Section 506, IPC, or there has been fraudulent or dishonest inducement by the petitioners or that the complainant was induced to deliver any property to any persons, or to consent that any person would retain any property or was intentionally induced to do or omit to do anything which he would not do or omit if he were not so deceived; and the act or omission caused or was likely to cause damage or harm to the complainant in body, reputation or property attracting Section 420, IPC. Rather, from the circumstances of the case it is manifested that the complainant has not been able to digest failure of proposed nuptial tie-up of his daughter with petitioner Raj Kumar and has launched the criminal proceedings only to persecute the petitioner and thereby satiate his annoyance against them. 14. In Emperor v. Khwaja Nazir Ahmed, (1945) 47 Bom. Rather, from the circumstances of the case it is manifested that the complainant has not been able to digest failure of proposed nuptial tie-up of his daughter with petitioner Raj Kumar and has launched the criminal proceedings only to persecute the petitioner and thereby satiate his annoyance against them. 14. In Emperor v. Khwaja Nazir Ahmed, (1945) 47 Bom. L.R. 245, elaborating the scope of S. 561A of the old Code, it was observed by the Privy Council that Section 561A (corresponding to Section 482 of the Code) had not given increased powers to the Court which it did not possess before that section was enacted. It was observed, “The section gives no new powers, it only provides that those which the court already inherently possess shall be preserved and is inserted lest, as their Lordships think, it should be considered that the only powers possessed by the court are those expressly conferred by the Code of Criminal Procedure and that no inherent power had survived the passing of the Code’.” 15. Hon’ble Supreme Court, in a number of cases, has laid down the scope and ambit of the High Court’s power under Section 482, Cr.P.C. This power, though wide has to be exercised sparingly, carefully and with great caution and only when such exercise is justified by the tests specifically laid down in this section itself. Authority of the court exists for the advancement of justice. If any abuse of the process leading to injustice is brought to the notice of the Court, then the Court would be justified in preventing injustice by invoking inherent powers in absence of specific provisions in the Statute. 16. The law has been crystallized more than half a century ago in the case of R.P. Kapur v. State of Punjab, AIR 1960 SC 866 wherein Hon’ble Supreme Court has summarized some categories of cases where inherent power can and should be exercised to quash the proceedings. 16. The law has been crystallized more than half a century ago in the case of R.P. Kapur v. State of Punjab, AIR 1960 SC 866 wherein Hon’ble Supreme Court has summarized some categories of cases where inherent power can and should be exercised to quash the proceedings. Hon’ble Supreme Court summarized the following three broad categories where the High Court would be justified in exercise of its powers under Section 482, Cr.P.C. These are (i) where it manifestly appears that there is a legal bar against the institution or continuance of the proceedings; (ii) where the allegations in the first information report or complaint taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not constitute the offence alleged; (iii) where the allegations constitute an offence but there is no legal evidence adduced or the evidence adduced clearly or manifestly fails to prove the charge. 17. In Smt. Nagawwa v. Veeranna Shivalingappa Konjalgi and Ors., (1976) 3 SCC 736 , it has been held that the process against the accused can be quashed or set aside (1) where the allegations made in the complaint or the statements of the witnesses recorded in support of the same taken at their face value make out absolutely no case against the accused or the complaint does not disclose the essential ingredients of an offence which is alleged against the accused;(2) where the allegations made in the complaint are patently absurd and inherently improbable so that no prudent person can ever reach a conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused;(3) where the discretion exercised by the Magistrate in issuing process is capricious and arbitrary having been based either on no evidence or on materials which are wholly irrelevant or inadmissible; and (4) where the complaint suffers from fundamental legal defects, such as, want of sanction, or absence of a complaint by legally competent authority and the like. 18. Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of Karnataka v. L. Muniswamy and Ors., (1977) 2 SCC 699 , observed that the wholesome power under Section 482, Cr.P.C., entitles the High Court to quash a proceeding when it comes to the conclusion that allowing the proceedings to continue would be an abuse of the process of the court or that the ends of justice require that the proceedings ought to be quashed. The High Court has been invested with inherent powers, both in civil and criminal matters, to achieve a salutary public purpose. A Court proceeding ought not to be permitted to degenerate into a weapon of harassment or persecution. In this case, the Hon’ble Supreme Court observed that ends of justice are higher than the ends of mere law though justice must be administered according to laws made by the Legislature. This case has been followed in a large number of subsequent cases of Hon’ble Supreme Court and other courts. 19. In Janta Dal v. H.S. Chowdhary and Ors., (1992) 4 SCC 305 the Hon’ble Supreme Court observed as under: Section 482 which corresponds to Section 561-A of the old Code and to Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure proceeds on the same principle and deals with the inherent power of the High Court. The rule of inherent powers has its source in the maxim “Quadolex aliquid alicui concedit, concedere videtur id sine quo ipsa, ess uon potest” which means that when the law gives anything to anyone, it gives also all those things without which the thing itself could not exist. 20. This Court is clothed with inherent power to make such orders as may be necessary for the ends of justice. Such power though unrestricted and undefined should not be capriciously or arbitrarily exercised, but should be exercised in appropriate cases, ex debito justitiae to do real and substantial justice for the administration of which alone the courts exist. The powers possessed by the High Court under Section 482 of the Code are very wide and the very plenitude of the power requires great caution in its exercise. Courts must be careful to see that its decision in exercise of this power is based on sound principles. 21. In Dr. Raghubir Sharan v. State of Bihar, (1964) 2 SCR 336 , Hon’ble Supreme Court observed as under “...Every High Court as the highest court exercising criminal jurisdiction in a State has inherent power to make any order for the purpose of securing the ends of justice.... Being an extraordinary power it will, however, not be pressed in aid except for remedying a flagrant abuse by a subordinate court of its powers....” 22. Being an extraordinary power it will, however, not be pressed in aid except for remedying a flagrant abuse by a subordinate court of its powers....” 22. In the above-said case, the Hon’ble Supreme Court also observed that the inherent powers can be exercised under this section by the High Court (1) to give effect to any order passed under the Code; (2) to prevent abuse of the process of the court; (3) otherwise to secure the ends of justice. 23. In Connelly v. Director of Public Prosecutions 1964 AC 1254, Lord Ried expressed his view “there must always be a residual discretion to prevent anything which savours of abuse of process” with which view all the members of the House of Lords agreed but differed as to whether this entitled a Court to stay a lawful prosecution. 24. In State of Haryana and Ors. v. Bhajan Lal and Ors.,(1992) Suppl.1 SCC 335, Hon’ble Supreme Court had an occasion to examine the scope of the inherent power of the High Court in interfering with the investigation of an offence by the police and laid down the following rule: “The sum and substance of the above deliberation results in a conclusion that the investigation of an offence is the field exclusively reserved for the police officers whose powers in that field are unfettered so long as the power to investigate into the cognizable offences is legitimately exercised in strict compliance with the provisions falling under Chapter XII of the Code and the courts are not justified in obliterating the track of investigation when the investigating agencies are well within their legal bounds as aforementioned. Indeed, a noticeable feature of the scheme under Chapter XIV of the Code is that a Magistrate is kept in the picture at all stages of the police investigation but he is not authorised to interfere with the actual investigation or to direct the police how that investigation is to be conducted. Indeed, a noticeable feature of the scheme under Chapter XIV of the Code is that a Magistrate is kept in the picture at all stages of the police investigation but he is not authorised to interfere with the actual investigation or to direct the police how that investigation is to be conducted. But if a police officer transgresses the circumscribed limits and improperly and illegally exercises his investigatory powers in breach of any statutory provision causing serious prejudice to the personal liberty and also property of a citizen, then the court on being approached by the person aggrieved for the redress of any grievance, has to consider the nature and extent of the breach and pass appropriate orders as may be called for without leaving the citizens to the mercy of police echelons since human dignity is a dear value of our Constitution.” 25. In Bhajan Lal’s case (supra), Hon’ble Supreme Court in the backdrop of interpretation of various relevant provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India or the inherent powers under Section 482, Cr.P.C., enumerated the categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of the court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. The apex Court made it clear that it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelized and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list to myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised. These categories are: (1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. (2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code. (2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code. (3) Where the uncontroversial allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused. (4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, on investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code. (5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient grounds for proceeding against the accused. (6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceedings is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party. (7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge. 26. Hon’ble Supreme Court in Zandu Pharmaceutical Works Ltd. and Ors. v. Mohd. Sharaful Haque and Anr., (2005) 1 SCC 122 observed thus: “It would be an abuse of process of the court to allow any action which would result in injustice and prevent promotion of justice. In exercise of the powers, court would be justified to quash any proceeding if it finds that initiation/ continuance of it amounts to abuse of the process of court or quashing of these proceedings would otherwise serve the ends of justice. When no offence is disclosed by the complaint, the court may examine the question of fact. In exercise of the powers, court would be justified to quash any proceeding if it finds that initiation/ continuance of it amounts to abuse of the process of court or quashing of these proceedings would otherwise serve the ends of justice. When no offence is disclosed by the complaint, the court may examine the question of fact. When a complaint is sought to be quashed, it is permissible to look into the materials to assess what the complainant has alleged and whether any offence is made out even if the allegations are accepted in toto.” 27. A three-Judge Bench of Hon’ble Supreme Court in Inder Mohan Goswami v. State of Uttaranchal, [2007(4) Law Herald (SC) 3288] : (2007) 12 SCC 1 has examined scope and ambit of Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the said case observed that inherent powers under Section 482, Cr.P.C., should be exercised for the advancement of justice. If any abuse of the process leading to injustice is brought to the notice of the court, then the court would be fully justified in preventing injustice by invoking inherent powers of the court. 28. In Devendra and Ors. v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Anr., (2009) 7 SCC 495 , Hon’ble Supreme Court observed as under: “There is no dispute with regard to the aforementioned propositions of law. However, it is now well settled that the High Court ordinarily would exercise its jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure if the allegations made in the first information report, even if given face value and taken to be correct in their entirety, do not make out any offence. When the allegations made in the first information report or the evidence collected during investigation do not satisfy the ingredients of an offence, the superior courts would not encourage harassment of a person in a criminal court for nothing.” 29. In State of A.P. v. Gourishetty Mahesh and Ors., [2010(5) Law Herald (SC) 3033] : (2010) 11 SCC 226 , Hon’ble Supreme Court observed that the power under Section 482, Cr.P.C., is wide but has to be exercised with great care and caution. The interference must be on sound principle and the inherent power should not be exercised to stifle the legitimate prosecution. The interference must be on sound principle and the inherent power should not be exercised to stifle the legitimate prosecution. It was further observed that if the allegations set out in the complaint do not constitute the offence of which cognizance has been taken by the Magistrate, it is up to the High Court to quash the same in exercise of its inherent power under Section 482, Cr.P.C. 30. In a recent decision in M. Mohan v. The State, [2011(2) Law Herald (SC) 1174] : 2011 (3) SCALE 78 Hon’ble Supreme Court again had an occasion to consider the case of similar nature and held that if all the facts mentioned in the complaint are accepted as correct in its entirety and even then the complaint does not disclose the essential ingredients of an offence, in such a case the High Court should ensure that such frivolous prosecutions are quashed under its inherent powers under Section 482, Cr.P.C. 31. It has already been noticed in the earlier part of this order that even if the contents of the FIR are taken to be true, no case punishable under Sections 120-B, 420 and 506, IPC, is made out. The respondent-State in the reply submitted by it, though has referred to some inquiry report submitted by Deputy Superintendent of Police and to an opinion of Deputy District Attorney (Legal) to support the contention that in view of the report of inquiry and opinion of Deputy District Attorney (Legal), a prima facie case punishable under Section 420, IPC, was found to be made out and FIR was accordingly recorded but, for reasons best known to the respondent-State neither the report of inquiry nor opinion of Deputy District Attorney has been made part of the record and withholding of these very vital documents from the record raises a presumption in terms of illustration (g) appended to Section 114 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 that the aforesaid documents which could be but have not been produced for inspection of the Court, if produced, would have demolished the case of the State that a prima facie case against petitioners is made out. 32. 32. When the basic ingredients of the offences are missing in the FIR, then permitting the proceedings arising out of such an FIR to continue and to compel the petitioners to face the rigmarole of the criminal trial would be totally unjustified leading to abuse of process of law. Therefore, I accept the petition, quash the FIR (Annexure P-1) with all consequent proceedings arising there from and direct discharge of the petitioners from the proceedings. ---------0.B.S.0------------