ORDER 1. The petitioner herein has filed the present writ petition aggrieved by the refusal of the respondent Police Department to offer him appointment as Constable despite he being selected in the selection process for the year 2010 by passing the written test and physical fitness test, on the ground that upon verification of his antecedents, it was found by the respondent Superintendent of Police, Jodhpur, that the petitioner was involved in a criminal case under Section 142, 432, 379 r/w Section 149 of the Indian Penal Code and in the trial held by the competent court in Criminal Case No.509/2005 even though all the six accused persons were acquitted upon a compromise between the parties, the petitioner had not disclosed this fact in the Character Verification form even though the petitioner had so disclosed this fact in his initial application for the said job. 2. The writ petition has been filed on 14.12.2011 with the following prayers: - “It is, therefore, humbly and respectfully prayed that this writ petition of the petitioner may kindly be allowed:- A/ By an appropriate writ, order or direction, the respondents may kindly be directed to grant the appointment to the petitioner on the post of constable in pursuance of the advertisement dated 14.10.2010 and amended advertisement dated 10.2.2011, and in pursuance of the combined select list dated 29.6.2011 with all consequential benefits. B/ By an appropriate writ, order or direction, the respondents may kindly be directed to grant the appointment to the petitioner on the post of Constable from 26.8.2011 whereby the similar candidates were given appointment with all service and consequential benefits. C/ By an appropriate writ, order or direction, if any adverse order passed against the petitioner without bringing into his knowledge then it may be treated as the part and partial of the writ petition and same may be quashed and set aside. D/ By an appropriate writ, order or direction, the letter dated 29.4.1995 or any other law excluding the petitioner from the selection process may be quashed and set aside. E/ By an appropriate writ, order or direction any other appropriate writ, order or direction which this Hon'ble Court may deem just and proper in the facts and circumstances of the case may kindly be passed in favour of the petitioner. F/ Writ petition filed by the petitioner may kindly be allowed with costs.” 3. E/ By an appropriate writ, order or direction any other appropriate writ, order or direction which this Hon'ble Court may deem just and proper in the facts and circumstances of the case may kindly be passed in favour of the petitioner. F/ Writ petition filed by the petitioner may kindly be allowed with costs.” 3. Learned counsel for the petitioner, Dr. Nupur Bhati, has submitted that the controversy in the present case is actually covered by the decision of a coordinate bench of this Court in the case of Rai Sahab Vs. State of Rajasthan & Anr. reported in 2013 (3) WLC (Raj.) 485 and the later decisions of the coordinate bench of this Court, in which this Court has held that where the petitioner so selected for the post of Constable in Police Department was acquitted by the competent court, holding the trial against such person, then such person cannot be disqualified for appointment as Constable. She also submitted that in the present case the petitioner had actually made the disclosure of the fact in his initial application and merely because subsequently in the character verification form submitted by him, he mentioned 'No' against the relevant column asking for details of any pending criminal case against him, or whether he was arrested at any point of time in relation to any offence, such stipulation in negative, could not render him disqualified, as otherwise he was duly selected after passing in the written examination as well as physical fitness test. 4. Drawing the attention of the Court towards Rule 13 of the Rajasthan Police Subordinate Services Rules, 1989, (1989 Rules, for short), learned counsel for the petitioner also submitted that even a conviction by a Court of Law need not by itself involve the refusal of a certificate of good character under the said Rule 13 and unless the offence in which the petitioner was involved, displays moral turpitude, such a candidate cannot be refused appointment under Rule 13 of the 1989 Rules. The Rule 13 of the 1989 Rules, is quoted herein below for ready reference: - “13. Character: -The Character of a candidate for direct recruitment must be such as to qualify him for employment in the Service. The Rule 13 of the 1989 Rules, is quoted herein below for ready reference: - “13. Character: -The Character of a candidate for direct recruitment must be such as to qualify him for employment in the Service. He must produce a certificate of good character from the Principal Academic Officer of the University or College or School in which he was last educated and two such certificates, written not more than six months prior to the date of application, from two responsible persons not connected with his School or College or University and not related to him. Notes-(1) A conviction by a Court of Law need not of itself involve the refusal of a certificate of good character. The circumstances of the conviction should be taken into account and if they involve no moral turpitude or association with crimes of violence or with a movement, which has its object to overthrow by violent means a Government as established by law, the mere conviction need not be regarded as a disqualification. (2) Ex-Prisoners, who by their disciplined life, while in prison and by either subsequent good conduct have proved to be completely reformed, should not be discriminated on grounds of the previous conviction, for purposes of employment in the service. Those who are convicted of offences not involving moral turpitude shall be deemed to have been completely reformed on the production of a report to that effect from the Superintendent, After-care Home or if there are no such homes in a particular district, from the Superintendent of Police of that district. Those convicted of offences involving moral turpitude shall be required to produce a certificate from the Superintendent, After-care Home endorsed by the Inspector General of Prisons to the effect that they are suitable for employment as they proved to completely reformed by their disciplined life while in Prison and by their subsequent good conduct in an After-care Home.” 5. Those convicted of offences involving moral turpitude shall be required to produce a certificate from the Superintendent, After-care Home endorsed by the Inspector General of Prisons to the effect that they are suitable for employment as they proved to completely reformed by their disciplined life while in Prison and by their subsequent good conduct in an After-care Home.” 5. Learned counsel for the petitioner also submitted that the Office Memorandum dated 29.04.1995 relied upon by the respondents, is also not applicable in the present case since the alleged offences of the year 2005 was the alleged to be of taking away of the water pipeline measuring about 40 to 50 feet, against a group of 6 persons including the two of the persons of the same name, as the present petitioner was, and after their acquittal by the competent court by the judgment dated 26.02.2008, the other person, namely, Prabhudayal S/o Pratap Ram Vishnoi, who also got selected as a Constable in the same selection process of the year 2010, was offered appointment by the Dy. Commissioner of Police, Jodhpur whereas the present petitioner was so refused the appointment by the Superintendent of Police, Jodhpur, even though both these persons were similarly situated and were co-accused in the same trial of the same alleged offences and were so acquitted. 6. Learned counsel for the petitioner also relied upon the Supreme Court judgment in the case of Commissioner of Police & Ors. Vs. Sandeep Kumar reported in (2011) 4 SCC 644 and other case-laws, the list of which is given herein below and would be discussed hereinafter in support of contentions raised before this Court. 1. Ram Kumar Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors. reported in (2011) 14 SCC 709 . 2. Ghanshyam Vs. State of Rajasthan reported in 2007 (3) DNJ 1525. 3. Commissioner of Police Vs. Dhaval Singh reported in 1999 (1) SCC 246 7. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondents, Mr. Anil Bissa, relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Devendra Kumar Vs. reported in (2011) 14 SCC 709 . 2. Ghanshyam Vs. State of Rajasthan reported in 2007 (3) DNJ 1525. 3. Commissioner of Police Vs. Dhaval Singh reported in 1999 (1) SCC 246 7. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondents, Mr. Anil Bissa, relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Devendra Kumar Vs. State of Uttranchal reported in (2013) 9 SCC 363 , wherein a two Judges Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the concealment of fact of a criminal case by a person so selected for the post of Constable rendered him disqualified for seeking such appointment on the post of Constable and, therefore, the order of the respondent refusing such appointment was held to be legal. It may be pointed out here that in the said decision in the case of Devendra Kumar (supra), the bench of Hon'ble Supreme Court did not notice the earlier decisions in the case of Sandeep Kumar (supra) and Ram Kumar (supra) relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner. 8. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties at length and perused the record and the judgments relied upon by both the sides counsels. 9. This Court is satisfied in the present case that the controversy in hand is squarely covered by the detailed and well reasoned judgment of the coordinate bench of this Court in the case of Rai Sahab (supra), in which the earlier precedents of the Hon'ble Apex Court have also been discussed by the learned Single Judge. It will be useful to quote the relevant part of the said judgment for ready reference. It may also be pointed out that in that case also, a criminal case against the petitioner had been decided upon a compromise between the parties and the accused person, upon such compounding of offence, the petitioner was acquitted on that ground. The learned Single Judge in para 28 of the judgment held that the distinction between the 'honourable acquittal' and 'acquittal by compounding of offence' is wafer thin. The acquittal on the basis of the compromise or compounding of offence has to be treated at par with the honourable acquittal and such an acquitted person cannot be denied appointment as Constable, if otherwise so qualified. The acquittal on the basis of the compromise or compounding of offence has to be treated at par with the honourable acquittal and such an acquitted person cannot be denied appointment as Constable, if otherwise so qualified. Relying upon the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Sandeep Kumar (supra), the learned Single Judge in para 28 to 30 held as under: - “28. In this view of the matter, a distinction between honourable acquittal and acquittal by compounding of offence is wafer thin. Its proximity with the honourable acquittal is much closer than discharge and acquittal by extending benefit of doubt. Even otherwise, a compromise is bilateral act involving the complainant and accused both. There are fair chances wherein the complainant is apprehensive about sufficiency of evidence to bring home guilt against the accused tempting him for compromise. Thus, in totality, construing the acquittal of the petitioner on the touch stone of memorandum dated 29th April 1995, in my considered opinion, it can be treated akin to honourable acquittal. This sort of purposeful and benevolent interpretation of the memorandum in the peculiar facts and circumstances of this case is also desirable. From a bare perusal of the memorandum dated 29th April 1995, it is amply clear that although the author of the memorandum has used the phraseology “acquitted honourably” but no endeavour is made to explain the said term. Moreover, from the recital contained in the memorandum it is crystal clear that acquittal of an individual as a consequence of compounding of offence has not been dealt with and therefore the same cannot be construed as an embargo for consideration of his case for recruitment. Thus, the submission of the learned counsel for the respondents, that the petitioner has not been acquitted honourably in the given circumstances, cannot be accepted and this sort of ambitious contention amounts to overstretching the requirements envisaged in the memorandum. At this stage, it has become imperative for this Court to overrule the argument of the learned counsel for the respondents that acquittal of the petitioner by way of compromise means that the petitioner has admitted his guilt. On the face of it, this argument is preposterous. 29. Commission of the alleged offences by the petitioner in his prime youth is also a mitigating factor tilting equity in his favour. On the face of it, this argument is preposterous. 29. Commission of the alleged offences by the petitioner in his prime youth is also a mitigating factor tilting equity in his favour. Therefore, looking to the merit position of the petitioner in the select list and the ratio decidendi of law laid down by the Apex Court in Commissioner of Police & Ors. vs. Sandeep Kumar (supra) and other judgments of this Court, referred to supra, on which the learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance, denial of reliefs to the petitioner, in my view, may result in travesty of justice. In the present era of rampant unemployment, depriving an individual from valuable right on certain technical pretext is bound to result in inequality jeopardizing his entire future career. A welfare State, as a model employer, cannot be allowed to jettison legitimate aspirations of a selected incumbent by creating a situation where hopes end in despair. Thus, viewed from any angle, the present writ petition deserves acceptance. 30. The net result of the above discussion is that the present writ petition is allowed, the impugned order dated 13th of April 2012 (Annx. 6) is quashed and set aside, and the respondents are directed to consider the candidature of the petitioner for the purpose of appointment as Constable and if he stands in merit, appointment may be accorded to him as Constable in the order of merit from the date appointment is accorded to similarly situated persons. The respondents may undertake the said exercise within a period of two months from the date of the order. 31. In the facts and circumstances of the case, costs are made easy.” 10. Subsequently, the said judgment came to be relied upon by the same learned Single Judge in the case of Bhawani Singh Kumpawat Vs. State of Rajasthan & Ors. (S.B.C.W.P. No.10242/2013, decided on 21.03.2014) and by another coordinate bench of this Court in the case of Rajesh Harijan Vs. State of Rajasthan & Ors. (S.B.C.W.P. No.11492/2011 decided on 28.01.2014). 11. Subsequently, the said judgment came to be relied upon by the same learned Single Judge in the case of Bhawani Singh Kumpawat Vs. State of Rajasthan & Ors. (S.B.C.W.P. No.10242/2013, decided on 21.03.2014) and by another coordinate bench of this Court in the case of Rajesh Harijan Vs. State of Rajasthan & Ors. (S.B.C.W.P. No.11492/2011 decided on 28.01.2014). 11. A bare perusal of the process of character verification provided in Rule 13 of 1989 Rules, would show that even a person convicted or Ex-prisoner has been allowed to prove their good character and unless they were involved in an offence involving moral turpitude, such persons have not been sought to be denied the benefit of their selection in the recruitment process subject to their character verification under Rule 13. This is obviously a reformative measure envisaged in the Rules to avoid any double jeopardy, which is the mandate of the Article 20 of the Constitution of India also, so that a person, who has already suffered the punishment or the charge for the offence not involving moral turpitude, has been acquitted by the competent court after due trial in the matter. The relevant consideration at the point of time at a later stage is only the disclosure of the factum of such criminal offence allegedly committed by the candidate concerned, therefore, the gravity of the offence cannot be a criteria but only the factum of its disclosure or concealment by the candidate. The charge of offence has already been tried by the competent court and has resulted into a particular order of the competent court and if that judgment of the competent court has become final, all concerned have to give due respect to the said judgment of the competent court. The character verification by the appointing authority envisage a fair use of discretion by such authority. 12. In the present case, the petitioner had admittedly disclosed the fact of aforesaid criminal trial against him in the initially filed application form, therefore, he cannot be held guilty of any concealment as such. As far as his stipulation in the negative in the character verification form is concerned, the question given in that verification form, viz. whether the applicant was accused in any criminal case or whether he has suffered any imprisonment in a criminal case vide Item No.8 of the said verification form. As far as his stipulation in the negative in the character verification form is concerned, the question given in that verification form, viz. whether the applicant was accused in any criminal case or whether he has suffered any imprisonment in a criminal case vide Item No.8 of the said verification form. The Item No.9 of the said form puts another question as to whether any criminal case or civil case is pending in any competent court against the applicant. The petitioner answered in negative 'no' ¼ugha½ to both these questions, in the said application form. The mentioning of this word 'No' as against both these questions No.8 and 9, is very well explained by the acquittal of the petitioner at a prior point of time by the competent court vide the judgment dated 26.02.2008. This stipulation when read with the disclosure in the original application form of the petitioner, in which he had stated about the aforesaid criminal case, and his subsequent acquittal, is hardly a supressio-veri or concealment on the part of the petitioner, which should result in the denial of appointment as Constable to him, though otherwise he is fully qualified for the same. 13. This Court also find no adequate reason for differentiating the two persons with the same names, namely, the present petitioner, Prabhudayal Vishnoi S/o Babulal Vishnoi and other one Prabhudayal Vishnoi S/o Pratap Ram Vishnoi, involved in the same case and both having been acquitted by the same Court in the same judgment dated 26.02.2008 (Annex.2), merely because they were selected in different districts, and two different Superintendent of Police, who are the appointing authorities, dealt-with their cases for appointment and one person got the appointment and the other is sought to be refused the same. The respondent-State cannot be permitted to have different yardsticks and parameters for consideration of the cases of two similarly situated persons merely because the appointing authorities are different officers of the same Department. The hostile discrimination on account of this fortuitous circumstances there being of different appointing authorities for the two which is not within the control of the petitioner cannot be countenanced, and the fairness of the decision making process has to be based on objective, fair and common yardsticks and it cannot vary from the person to person. The hostile discrimination on account of this fortuitous circumstances there being of different appointing authorities for the two which is not within the control of the petitioner cannot be countenanced, and the fairness of the decision making process has to be based on objective, fair and common yardsticks and it cannot vary from the person to person. When both these persons are sailing in the same boat, the difference made at the final stage of their appointment cannot be countenanced much-less upheld by this Court. 14. It is true that entry in a sensitive Department like the Police Department, has to be strictly monitored and only such person, who are above the board or with the clean character, deserves to be appointed at the initial entry level in the said Department, namely, at the level of Constable and no person with dubious character or criminal antecedents deserves to be so appointed much-less such person can seek a forcible entry in the police force through the exercise of jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India but while such a caveat properly kept in mind also, this Court cannot permit arbitrary consideration of the cases by the responsible authorities of the Police Department or different treatment meted out to similarly situated persons without any valid or cogent reason. 15. In the present case, unfortunately, it has happened like this and this Court finds little support for the contention raised by the learned counsel for the respondents that denial of appointment to the present petitioner was justified merely because he failed to reiterate the same information in the character verification form, even though he might have disclosed this fact of criminal trial against him in the original application form, particularly, ignoring the fact situation obtaining in the case of other similarly situated person, who along-with said petitioner suffered the same criminal trial for the same offence and both, along-with 4 others, were acquitted upon a compromise between the parties. That is precisely the reason, the learned Single Judge of this Court in the case of Rai Sahab (supra) held that a compromise is a bilateral act involving the complainant and the accused both and the compounding of the offence under Section 320 of Criminal Procedure Code operates as an acquittal, even no acquittal order is recorded treating the settlement of dispute and consequent compounding of the offence as honourable acquittal, the learned Single Judge directed the respondent State to offer appointment to the petitioner as Constable in that case. 16. The judgment relied upon by the learned counsel for the respondents in the case of Devendra Kumar (supra) does not apply to the facts of the present case as the present case is not the case of total concealment of the relevant facts by the petitioner, which itself was held to be a case of 'moral turpitude' by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Devendra Kumar (supra). On the other hand, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Sandeep Kumar (supra) while dismissing the appeal of the Commissioner of Police, has held as under: - “10. We may also here refer to the case of Welsh students mentioned by Lord Denning in his book Due Process of Law. It appears that some students of Wales were very enthusiastic about the Welsh language and they were upset because the radio programmes were being broadcast in the English language and not in Welsh. They came up to London and invaded the High Court. They were found guilty of contempt of court and sentenced to prison for three months by the High Court Judge. They filed an appeal before the Court of Appeals. Allowing the appeal, Lord Denning observed: “I come now to Mr. Watkin Powell's third point. He says that the sentences were excessive. I do not think they were excessive, at the time they were given and in the circumstances then existing. Here was a deliberate interference with the course of justice in a case which was no concern of theirs. It was necessary for the Judge to show-and to show to all students everywhere that this kind of thing cannot be tolerated. Let students demonstrate, if they please, for the causes in which they believe. Let them make their protests as they will. But they must do it by lawful means and not by unlawful. It was necessary for the Judge to show-and to show to all students everywhere that this kind of thing cannot be tolerated. Let students demonstrate, if they please, for the causes in which they believe. Let them make their protests as they will. But they must do it by lawful means and not by unlawful. If they strike at the course of justice in this land-and I speak both for England and Wales-they strike at the roots of society itself, and they bring down that which protects them. It is only by the maintenance of law and order that they are privileged to be students and to study and live in peace. So let them support the law and not strike it down. But now what is to be done? The law has been vindicated by the sentences which the Judge passed on Wednesday of last week. He has shown that law and order must be maintained, and will be maintained. But on this appeal, things are changed. These students here no longer defy the law. They have appealed to this Court and shown respect for it. They have already served a week in prison. I do not think it necessary to keep them inside it any longer. These young people are no ordinary criminals. There is no violence, dishonesty or vice in them. On the contrary, there was much that we should applaud. They wish to do all they can to preserve the Welsh language. Well may they be proud of it. It is the language of the bards-of the poets and the singers-more melodious by far than our rough English tongue. On high authority, it should be equal in Wales with English. They have done wrong-very wrong-in going to the extreme they did. But, that having been shown, I think we can, and should, show mercy on them. We should permit them to go back to their studies, to their parents and continue the good course which they have so wrongly disturbed. (1970) 2 QB 114 : (1970) 2 WLR 792). In our opinion, we should display the same wisdom as displayed by Lord Denning. 11. As already observed above, youth often commits indiscretions, which are often condoned. 12. It is true that in the application form the respondent did not mention that he was involved in a criminal case under Section 325/34 IPC. In our opinion, we should display the same wisdom as displayed by Lord Denning. 11. As already observed above, youth often commits indiscretions, which are often condoned. 12. It is true that in the application form the respondent did not mention that he was involved in a criminal case under Section 325/34 IPC. Probably he did not mention this out of fear that if he did so he would automatically be disqualified. At any event, it was not such a serious offence like murder, dacoity or rape, and hence a more lenient view should be taken in the matter. 13. For the reasons given above, this appeal has no force and it is dismissed. No costs.” 17. In the case of Ram Kumar (supra), the Hon'ble Apex Court held as under: - “15. In Kendriya Vidyalaya Sangathan Vs. Ram Ratan Yadav relied on by the respondents, a criminal case had been registered under Sections 323, 341, 294, 506-B read with Section 34 IPC and was pending against the respondent in that case and the respondent had suppressed this material in the attestation form. The respondent, however, contended that the criminal case was subsequently withdrawn and the offences in which the respondent was alleged to have been involved were also not of serious nature. On these facts, this Court held that the respondent was to serve as a Physical Education Teacher in Kendriya Vidyalaya and he could not be suitable for appointment as the character, conduct and antecedents of a teacher will have some impact on the minds of the students of impressionable age and if the authorities had dismissed him from service for suppressing material information in the attestation form, the decision of the authorities could not be interfered with by the High Court. 16. The facts of the case in Kendriya Vidyalaya Sanghthan v. Ram Ratan Yadav are therefore materially different from the facts of the present case and the decision does not squarely cover the case of the appellant as has been held by the High Court. 17. For the aforesaid reasons, we allow the appeal, set aside the order of learned Single Judge and the impugned order of the Division Bench and allow the writ petition of the appellant and quash the order dated 8.8.2007 of the Senior Superintendent of Police, Ghaziabad. 17. For the aforesaid reasons, we allow the appeal, set aside the order of learned Single Judge and the impugned order of the Division Bench and allow the writ petition of the appellant and quash the order dated 8.8.2007 of the Senior Superintendent of Police, Ghaziabad. The appellant will be taken back in service within a period of two months from today but he will not be entitled to any back wages for the period he has remained out of service. There shall be no order as to costs.” 18. On a totality of the facts and circumstance of the aforesaid case and legal precedent available in this regard, this Court is satisfied that the denial of appointment to the present petitioner as Constable in the selection process of the year 2010 was not justified and the impugned order, therefore, deserved to be quashed and the writ petition filed by the petitioner deserves acceptance. 19. The writ petition is, accordingly, allowed and quashing the impugned order, the respondent is directed to offer appointment to the petitioner as a Constable and take such further steps for his training etc. expeditiously so that no further delay is caused in his regular appointment of the petitioner since more than four years have already passed after his selection on the said post and denial of appointment. No orders as to costs. A copy of this order be sent to the concerned parties forthwith.